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Between 1998 and 2000 more than five hundred French castles and museums were robbed 
under the direction of one man, Cornelius M., a Dutch antiques dealer based in Belgium. 
He instructed robberies in all parts of France and organized the smuggling of objects to the 
Netherlands and Belgium. At least forty times a lorry filled with antique clocks, statues, 
furniture and jewels made its way from France to the border region between Belgium and 
the Netherlands. In November 2001, the driver of these transports was arrested with the 
booty of sixteen robberies in his lorry. Two days later, Cornelius M. was arrested and the 
police found more than a thousand stolen objects at his house. The robberies started around 
the time when Cornelius M. left prison in 1998. He went to prison in 1996 after he had 
been sentenced for receiving stolen antiques. In 2002 he was sentenced again to fourteen 
years in prison after he had been extradited to France in 2001. Through Cornelius M., 
the stolen antiques from France were sold to private collectors and other dealers in Belgium, 
the Netherlands and other countries and thus eventually filtered into the legitimate market.1 
Although exceptional for its scale, cases like this one have been occurring for at least four 
decades. In March 2005, another Dutch dealer, Simon V., was sentenced to five years in 
prison for complicity in twenty-eight burglaries and thefts in churches from the North of 
France.2 
 
In 1992, a Viennese court gave a life sentence to Udo Proksch, for six-fold murder as well 
as six-fold murder attempt. He had been the pivotal figure of the Club 45, an elite society 
of high-ranking Socialist politicians, civil servants, business people, arms traffickers and 
others. In 1977, he chartered the freighter M.S. Lucona that allegedly carried parts of a 
uranium processing plant. The heavily insured ship sank in the middle of the Indian 
Ocean, following an unexplained explosion, killing six of its twelve crew members. 
Proksch’ prosecution was actively blocked for more than ten years by several key Socialist 
politicians. Finally, the ‘Lucona Scandal’ was brought to light, leading to the suicide of the 
Secretary of Defense as well as to the chairman of parliament and the Secretary of Home 
Affairs stepping back. The same Secretary of Defense was also instrumental in another 
project set up by Proksch. Together with a several Club 45 members, Proksch planned to 
establish a war museum. The Secretary of Defense approved the gift of everything from 
tanks and jet fighters to rocket launchers. Before an actual building was found, to exhibit 
all these objects, Proksch had given most of it to Polisario in the Western Sahara and sold 
                                                 
1  Judgment of the Montbrison Court, File no. 02/01050, March 6th 2003; C. Naber (2000) 
‘Recidivist uit Retie liet zigeuners zeshonderd kastelen plunderen’ De Morgen, December 
9th. 
2  ‘Un néerlandais condamné à cinq ans de prison pour vols d’objets d’art’ Agence France 
Presse, March 31st 2005; Berkhout, K. & J. Wevers (2005) ‘Hoe Nederlanders Frankrijk 
leegroven’ NRC Handelsblad, October 14th. 
CHAPTER 1 
2 
the remainder in the Middle East. If it would not be for his war museum or sunken 
freighter, Proksch would be known for allegedly being the kingpin of Austrian based techno-
banditry, that is the smuggle of technological knowledge and high-tech materials to the 
Eastern Bloc (Naylor, 2001:44-45; Pretterebner, 1989).3 
 
This study focuses on the interfaces between legal and illegal actors engaging in 
transnational crimes. These interfaces can be quite complex as the cases of Udo 
Proksch and Cornelius M. illustrate. Due to this complexity, such cases and the 
related interfaces cannot be caught easily with clear-cut and mutually excluding 
categories like ‘transnational (organized) crime’ versus ‘legitimate’ businesses and 
government agencies. The boundaries between transnational crime, terrorism, 
corporate crime and state crime fade away as one focuses on such concrete cases. 
As the rest of this study will show, the characteristics of these cases appear to be 
far more representative of transnational crimes in general than usually assumed. 
 The interface between legal and illegal actors, within the context of 
transnational crime, is a research topic that has not been studied systematically. 
That is not to say that this topic has been neglected in studies of transnational 
crime. In studies of transnational crime, the interface between legal and illegal 
actors is usually discussed, although mainly as a side-issue (Farer, 1995; Ryan & 
Rush, 1997). In some case studies, the interface between certain legal and illegal 
actors takes centre stage (Block & Weaver, 2004; Kochan, 2005; Paoli, 1995). 
However, such case studies do not provide a more systematic and comparative 
perspective. 
 For a number of reasons, a study that focuses solely on interfaces can be an 
important and necessary addition to the existing criminological studies. The first 
reason has to do with the mentioned lack of systematic studies of the interfaces 
between legal and illegal actors. The second reason has to do with the 
observation mentioned above. By studying interfaces between legal and illegal 
actors, the rather thin boundaries between transnational crime, corporate crime 
and other types of crime become clear. Only after these boundaries are crossed, 
or even leveled, transnational crimes can be understood from a broader 
perspective. From such a perspective, transnational crimes are always taking place 
against a specific background of economic factors, state policies and legislation, as 
well as other factors. Thirdly, a systematic study of interfaces can help to indicate 
the different types and causes of interfaces that can be found in different types of 
transnational crime. Finally, as the role of legal actors with all kinds of 
transnational crimes is clarified, more effective legislative and policy instruments 
can be designed to counter this role. 
 The first half of this study will be based on the literature on transnational 
crimes. The second half will describe the empirical research of the illicit art and 
                                                 
3  For a summary of Proksch’ endeavors see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Udo_Proksch 
(Visited, October 21st 2005). 
INTRODUCTION 
3 
antiquities trade that was done specifically for this study. The illicit art and 
antiquities trade was chosen for several reasons. On the one hand because it is a 
type of crime that is known for its interfaces between legal and illegal actors and 
on the other hand because empirical studies of this type of crime have been 
scarce, especially from a criminological perspective. 
In the following sections of this chapter, the research questions and definitions 
that will guide this study will be explicated. The data sources of the empirical 
study and the definition of transnational crime used in this study will only be 
pointed at briefly. In chapter 2, the definition of transnational crime will be 
further discussed and the data sources will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
Furthermore, this introduction will outline the topics of the different chapters. 
Finally, some background will be provided with respect to the study of 
transnational crime and the interfaces between legal and illegal actors. 
 
1.1 Research questions 
 
Criminological studies of transnational crimes have focused on a range of research 
topics. Among the most important are those that try to shed light on the way 
transnational crimes are organized. For example, the way people involved are 
organizing themselves, in criminal organizations, networks or incidental 
partnerships. Or the methods of smuggling and the routes used between different 
countries. Usually, studies of transnational crimes deal with one particular type of 
transnational crime or with a particular ethnic group. Sometimes, studies aim 
specifically at a particular ethnic group engaged in a particular transnational crime 
(e.g. Chin, 1999; Soudijn, 2006; Zaitch, 2002). 
 As was pointed out above, this study will solely focus on the interfaces 
between legal and illegal actors in transnational crime. Four main research 
questions will guide this study. Apart from these questions, others will be 
developed along the way. As soon as these additional questions arise, they will be 
integrated in the study. The first main research question is: 
 
• What kind of interfaces can be found between legal and illegal actors in 
transnational crimes? 
 
The aim of this research question is the development of a typology of interfaces 
between legal and illegal actors. Such a typology should cover all main types of 
interfaces between legal and illegal actors. This means that on the one hand, not 
every conceivable type should necessarily be integrated in a typology, while on 
the other hand the typology should not be so general that it is actually 
meaningless. Furthermore, the different types should be independent of particular 
transnational crimes. In such a way, cases involving different types of crime but 
similar types of interfaces can be compared. The analysis of such a typology will 
start with an existing typology that was developed by criminologist Nikos Passas. 
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 The second research question is: 
 
• How can the transformation in legal status of certain transnational activities 
be explained? 
 
Transnational crime is often understood simply as organized crime involving 
more than one country. In that case, it involves an activity that is criminal in all 
countries involved. However, transnational crime can also involve an activity that 
starts as legal but becomes illegal at some stage, or the other way around. The 
second research questions aims at this transformation in legal status. This 
transformation needs to be explained to fully understand the occurrence of 
certain interfaces in these transformations, and the actors involved in these 
interfaces. Furthermore, explanation is wanted because the possibilities of these 
transformations probably cause several types of transnational crime to occur 
significantly less than they actually do. The two cases at the beginning of this 
chapter can illustrate this. The many works of art and antiques that were stolen in 
France under the direction of Cornelius M. were subsequently filtered into the 
legitimate market in the Netherlands, Belgium, and other countries. Udo 
Proksch arranged the opposite trajectory with the state-owned arms that ended 
on the black market. 
 The first two research questions aim at the interfaces between legal and illegal 
actors in general. The third research question aims at one particular type of 
transnational crime: the illicit art and antiquities trade. This type of transnational 
crime will be studied empirically. The empirical study is used to gauge the 
typology and model developed in the first half of the book in which the first two 
research questions are treated. The empirical study, therefore, is not a goal by 
itself, but is meant to establish the usefulness of the models developed in the first 
half of the book. As will be explained more extensively later, this particular type 
of crime was chosen for two reasons. First of all because it is known for its many 
interfaces between legal and illegal actors. Secondly because it has hardly been 
studied empirically by criminologists. The third research question is: 
 
• Does the interface typology provide an analytical tool to describe the 
interface between legal and illegal actors in the illicit art and antiquities 
trade? 
 
To answer this research question, a number of sub-questions need to be 
answered. First of all, what kind of interfaces between legal and illegal actors can 
be found in the illicit art and antiquities trade? Secondly, which interfaces are 
covered by the interface typology and which are not? Thirdly, do the interfaces 
which are not covered by the typology suggest new additional types of interfaces 
that should be added to the typology? 
 The fourth and last research question is: 
INTRODUCTION 
5 
• How can the transformation in legal status in the licit and illicit art and 
antiquities trade be explained? 
 
When the second research question has been answered on the basis of the 
literature on transnational crime, the fourth main question will focus specifically 
on the art and antiquities trade. Can the general explanation be used for this 
particular trade also or are additional explanations required? 
 In addition to the four research questions, the concluding chapter will deal 
with the questions as to what recommendations can be made for future studies as 
well as policy-making. Ideally, the insights gained from criminological studies can 
help to design policies and strategies to counter transnational crimes and the 
interfaces between legal and illegal actors. 
 
1.2 Definitions and data sources 
 
Several concepts need to be defined before they will be further explored in the 
chapters hereafter. First of all, a definition of transnational crime is needed. In this 
study the following definition will be used: 
 
Transnational crime is conduct, which is criminalized in at least one of the jurisdictions 
concerned and jeopardizes the legally protected interests in more than one of the jurisdictions 
concerned or in one jurisdiction while it is similar to acts which jeopardize the legally 
protected interests in most countries 
 
This definition is a slightly adjusted version of a definition used by Nikos Passas 
and will be further discussed in chapter 2. As this definition is not purely legal, it 
can cover the situations pointed at above, in which the same activity is legal in 
one place and illegal in another. Furthermore, this definition also includes types 
of terrorism that involve more than one country. 
 Besides transnational crime, interface is the key word in this study. This term is 
used for the manner in which legal and illegal actors collaborate or collide in 
transnational crimes. The term interface captures the ways in which legal and 
illegal actors are connected. Interface does not have one fixed meaning but can 
have different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. The term 
may be used to point at the boundary between two bodies, or the place at which 
independent and often unrelated systems meet and act on or communicate with 
each other. Furthermore, instead of a boundary, an interface may also be a third 
machine or person through which the other two are connected with each other. 
 The main theme of this book is the interface between legal and illegal actors 
in transnational crime. However, the analyses of these interfaces will always start 
from particular instances of transnational crime, and not from particular actors. 
The definition of transnational crime that is used here does not discriminate 
between legal and illegal actors. This can help to evade a certain bias that can be 
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found in some studies of transnational crimes. These studies restrict transnational 
crime to the illegal (cross-border) activities of criminals, by definition not being 
legal businesses or governments. In case legal businesses or governments are 
involved in these criminal activities, it is assumed to be a matter of incidental 
corruption or unintended complicity. 
 This study is based on a number of data sources. The first part will be 
primarily based on a study of the existing literature on transnational crime. 
Besides the literature, I will use media reports and reports from government 
agencies as well as from international organizations. The second part, dealing 
with the illicit art and antiquities trade, is based on a range of specific data 
sources. First of all, data was gathered from a study of official files from the Dutch 
Inspectorate of Cultural Heritage. Furthermore, data was gathered from several 
foreign official sources: the art unit of the French police and the art unit of the 
Italian military police. Apart from that, interviews were held with officials from 
other foreign government agencies. In addition to these official sources, reports 
from regular as well as specialized media were used to gather data. Furthermore 
interviews were held with art dealers, archaeologists and other actors in the art 
world. Finally, studies of specific parts of the illicit art and antiquities trade are 
used as far as they are available. Chapter 6 will discuss all mentioned data sources 
in more detail. 
 
1.3 Plan of the book 
 
Chapter 2 will start with the first research question. Starting-point is a typology 
of interfaces developed by criminologist Nikos Passas. This typology will be 
analyzed and revised with an adjusted typology as result. Thereafter, chapters 3 
and 4 will focus on the second research question. These chapters will discuss 
certain types of individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions that can function as 
interface by themselves, instead of being one side of an interface between two 
actors. An analytical model to understand this role of individuals, organizations, 
and jurisdictions as interface will be developed in chapter 5. 
 The chapters 6 to 9 will focus on the illicit art and antiquities trade. Chapter 6 
will start with an outline of the data sources that were used. Thereafter, chapter 7 
will introduce the illicit art and antiquities trade, explaining the different parts of 
the trade. Chapter 8 will focus on the illicit art trade and chapter 9 on the illicit 
antiquities trade. This illicit art and antiquities trade will be studied empirically to 
see whether the typology and the analytical model can be used to describe and 
understand a particular transnational crime in practice 
 Following the discussion of the study of the illicit art and antiquities trade, 
chapter 10 will summarize the conclusions from the whole study. Furthermore, it 





1.4  The rise of (the study of) transnational crime in perspective: the 
1990s and beyond 
 
Transnational crime has always existed but the active academic interest in this 
phenomenon is relatively recent. It used to be seen as simply a part of the field of 
‘organized crime’ as far as this involved cross-border activities. The fall of the 
Iron Curtain played a major role in changing the way transnational crime was 
perceived by criminologists as well as law enforcements agencies, intelligence 
agencies and other state actors. In several articles, reports and statements, 
transnational crime was portrayed as a new and global threat. Both the general 
process of globalization, as well as the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, supposedly caused this type of crime to rise and eventually 
threaten both the economies as well as the democratic systems of the developed 
countries. In 1993, Godson and Olson published their study International 
Organized Crime: Emerging Threat to US Security. They argued among other things 
that organized crime undermined democratic institutions in key areas of the 
world and eroded US alliances and coalitions (1993:i). A year later, US Senator 
John Kerry summarized his views in an easy one-liner “Organized crime is the 
new communism: the new monolithic threat”.4 Kerry was not a newcomer to 
this topic as he wrote a US Senate report on the BCCI scandal that showed, 
among other things, how this bank was involved in, and connected with, several 
transnational crimes like illicit arms deals, money laundering and financing 
terrorism (Kerry Report, 1992). In the same year of Kerry’s remarks on 
organized crime, journalist Claire Sterling published her book Thieves’ World in 
which she outlined a global conspiracy between criminals from Italy, Colombia, 
Russia and other places.5 Sterling’s book was regularly referred to by 
criminologists and others in later publications on transnational crime. 
Furthermore, in February 1996, when President Clinton placed his updated 
National Security Strategy before congress, for the first time, he recognized 
“Fighting International Organized Crime” as a national security issue facing the 
United States (Lupsha, 1996:21). Around the same time, two academic journals 
were established that focused particularly on (transnational) organized crime. In 
1995, Transnational Organized Crime was founded and some time later the journal 
Trends in Organized Crime. The latter journal explicitly presented its central theme 
as one that threatened the integrity of local institutions and national governments 
(Block, 1999:220-221). 
                                                 
4  L.A. Horvitz (1994) ‘FBI Enters Global Battle on Organized Crime’ Washington Times, 19 
July, p. A9. 
5  Sterling had written about terrorism and crime for decades when she published this book. 
When she died a year afterwards, a tribute was held in the US Senate (June 22nd 1995). See 




 In response to these doom-scenarios, Western governments felt the need to 
adjust their law enforcement techniques to fight this new threat. In the US, these 
concerns were raised during a conference with the striking title Global Organized 
Crime: The New Empire of Evil (Raine & Cilluffo, 1994). Inspired by their 
American counterparts, European law enforcement agencies increased their use 
of special investigative methods, for example with undercover operations and the 
use of criminal informants. Soon these new methods led to major scandals as it 
turned out that these methods were not completely compatible with the existing 
systems of law (Van de Bunt et al., 2001; Van Calster & Vander Beken, 2004:9). 
 In Belgium and the Netherlands, these scandals led to the establishment of 
parliamentary enquiry commissions to investigate these police methods. The 
Dutch parliamentary inquiry commission asked four criminologists to study and 
describe the mentioned police methods as well as the current status of organized 
crime in the Netherlands. The result was an extensive report that dealt for a 
significant part with different types of transnational crime that (for a minor or 
major part) took place in the Netherlands (Fijnaut et al., 1996).6 In the period 
following this report, a range of criminological studies looked at different topics 
in the field of (transnational) organized crime. A number of these studies used 
official sources that were relatively easy to access. The Belgian enquiry 
commission was a smaller version of the Dutch commission. Its influence on later 
studies was also less because the openness of official agencies for criminologists 
was far less than in the Netherlands. 
 Following the increased interest in transnational crime in the US and Europe, 
the United Nations adopted the Convention Against Transnational Crime in the 
year 2000. It came into force on September the 29th 2003 and 106 states are 
currently party to the convention.7 After the adoption of this convention, 
transnational crime still frequently figured in government reports in Europe and 
the US, as well as in other publications, until the terrorist attacks of 2001 caused 
a significant change of attention and priorities. One of the latest multilateral 
initiatives occurred in October 2003 when the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption was adopted. This is one of the bases of legislation against 
corruption and similar behavior. Since then only 34 countries became party to 
this convention. None of the major industrialized countries, except for France, 
have become party and the Convention that has entered into force on December 
14, 2005.8 
                                                 
6  A full text version of the report is available online at:  
 http://www.burojansen.nl/traa/index.htm (Visited October 24th 2005).  
 It contains over 5500 pages. For an English summary see: Fijnaut et al. (1998). 
7  See: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_signatures.html (Visited October 24th 
2005). 
8  See: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_signatures_corruption.html  
 (Visited October 24th 2005). 
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 Since 9/11, terrorism has clearly become the primary security concern in the 
US, and to a lesser extent in Europe. It is understood as a specific type of 
transnational crime in this study, as far as it involves more than one country. 
However, in public discourse and policies, terrorism is understood as a particular 
phenomenon, independent and something different as ‘ordinary’ crimes as well as 
‘ordinary’ warfare. In its consequences for public policies, new legislation and law 
enforcement methods, terrorism has clearly exceeded transnational crime. The 
first major legislative initiative was the US Patriot Act in 2001. Since then, far-
reaching new legislation has been enacted in the US as well as elsewhere. 
According to many observers, these new laws have seriously compromised the 
constitutional rights of citizens in the US (Kroes & Janssens, 2004). The same can 
be said of many legislative initiatives in European countries. Part of these 
initiatives concern law enforcements methods have been invented or legalized in 
the ‘war against terrorism’. Several parallels can be found with the previous 
handling of transnational crime, as well as specific ‘wars’ that predated the current 
war on terrorism, for example the ‘war on drugs’ during the last decades and the 
‘war on terrorism’ under President Reagan during the 1980s. One of these 
parallels concerns the derailed law enforcement methods. Furthermore, the 
invasion of Iraq was for a part made acceptable to the (American) public on the 
basis of the systematic insinuation that the former regime was connected with the 
September 11th attacks, although officially, the war was justified by the claims of 
‘weapons of mass destruction’ that later turned out to be unfounded. Finally, in 
all wars, very similar rhetoric could be found whether the actual threat concerned 
terrorism, drugs or transnational crime.9 
 Although (transnational) terrorism is considered as a type of transnational 
crime in this study, the analyses in this book will be based primarily on the 
literature and study of types of transnational crime that are usually described as 
(transnational) organized crime, (transnational) corporate crime or (transnational) 
state crime. Nevertheless, several examples of terrorism in Europe and elsewhere 
will be used for the analyses of the interface typology and its extensions. 
 
1.5 General assumptions about transnational crime 
 
A number of assumptions about transnational crime can be found in many of the 
mentioned publications. The most important assumptions are: (1) transnational 
crime is primarily a new phenomenon that arose in the 1990s, (2) for a large part 
connected with large-scale criminal organizations that often have a specific ethnic 
background, (3) and regularly work together with criminal organizations in other 
countries, while transnational crime is (4) primarily caused by the process of 
                                                 
9  Especially, the wars on terrorism under President Reagan and Bush show a range of 
similarities in language. See e.g. Richard Jackson (2005). 
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globalization during the last three decades and (5) infiltrates legitimate businesses 
and governments. 
 Some of these assumptions were already mentioned before. Hereafter, these 
assumptions will be used for reflection, although very briefly, on the 
phenomenon of transnational crime. On closer look, these assumptions do not 
always seem to be rational, although actual changes have taken place with respect 
to transnational crime. The assumptions seem to confirm Letzia Paoli’s 
observation that the perception of (transnational) organized crime is polluted by a 
moral panic, and “issues shaped by moral panic are not likely to be handled in a 
rational, matter-of-fact way” (2002:52). To be sure, the assumptions should not 
be seen as elements of a standard perspective on transnational crime. However, 
each of the assumptions can be found to some extent in many studies of 
transnational crime. For that reason it is useful to explicate these assumptions 
before one starts to study a particular research topic within the field of 
transnational crime. 
 
1.5.1 Transnational crime as a new phenomenon 
 
The first assumption that seems to underlie many discussions of transnational 
crime is the assumption that one is dealing with a relatively new phenomenon. In 
the old days, organized crime took care primarily of the local and national 
markets in illegal goods like drugs, gambling and prostitution. Nowadays, 
organized crime has gone global and illegal goods are traded globally, like legal 
merchandise, on a massive scale. This assumption fails to recognize the fact that 
transnational crime has existed as long as there have been different nations. 
Furthermore, this does not only involve crimes that no longer occur, like the 
slave trade from Africa to the US. It also involves some crimes that are often seen 
as relatively new, like human trafficking or cigarette smuggling. An interesting 
study on human trafficking, from this perspective, is Edward Bristow’s narrative 
of the international traffic of Jewish women for prostitution in Prostitution and 
Prejudice: The Jewish Fight against White Slavery 1870-1939 (1982). He describes 
the massive trade in Jewish women from regions in Poland, Russia and the 
Austrian-Hungarian Empire, to destinations in Africa, Asia, the US, Brazil and 
Argentina from the 1870s to the 1930s. A careful look at the literature on 
transnational crime shows that this type of crime is anything but new, although 
its transnational character may have increased together with legitimate activities 
across borders. Furthermore, studies of transnational crime in the past are 
available for every reader willing to look for them.10 An interesting parallel can 
be drawn here with the new interest in terrorism. The type of terrorism that 
                                                 
10  For the illicit drugs trade see e.g. Block (1979, 1989) and McCoy (1971); for the illicit 
trade in art and antiquities see e.g. Chamberlin (1983), Meyer (1973) and Middlemas 
(1975); for the illicit arms trade see e.g. Brogan & Zarca (1983) and Naylor (1987, 2001); 
for illegal migration or smuggling of humans see e.g. Lucassen (1998) and Soudijn (2006). 
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defines the contemporary concept of terrorism for most observed, has many 
variations in both past and present.11 Furthermore, several European countries 
have for decades experienced serious form of terrorism. 
 Although transnational crime in general thus seems to be far less ‘new’ than 
sometimes assumed, it should not be forgotten that significant changes have taken 
place with regard to certain aspects of transnational crime. The global role of 
criminals from the former Soviet Union, as well as the countries in Eastern 
Europe is a real and largely new phenomenon (Kochan, 2005).12 They have 
become active in for example human trafficking, drug trafficking and protection 
rackets. In Europe, the role of these criminals has been described by the annual 
reports of the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)13 as well as academic publications 
(Galeotti, 2002; Nožina, 2004). In the US, the focus has been primarily on 
Russian criminals active in the US and elsewhere (Finckenauer & Voronin, 2001; 
Williams, 1997). 
 
1.5.2 Large-scale (ethnically defined) criminal organizations as typical 
manifestation of transnational crime 
 
The second assumption holds that transnational crime is for a large part 
connected with large-scale criminal organizations with a definite ethnic 
background. This ethnic background can for example be Russian, Italian, 
Colombian or Turkish.14 According to Peter Lupsha “most transnational 
organized crime groups have a single ethnic character or national identity root, 
with cells inserted into nation-states, where aspects of their criminal enterprises 
take place” (1996:22). This observation can be found in many discussions and 
with that, according to Paoli and Fijnaut, the debate on organized crime has 
come full circle. Until the 1960s, the ‘alien conspiracy model’ was the primary 
model to understand organized crime. 
 
“The ‘illegal enterprise model was developed in the 1970s to criticize this 
‘alien conspiracy’ model but, 30 years after, some of its later followers – by 
the very use of economic tools – have ended up subscribing to one of the 
                                                 
11  Furthermore, an interesting body of literature exists on this type of crime and the role that 
some states have played to support it. See for example: Morstein (1989), Naylor (1987, 
2001), Adams (1986), James (2003), De Kock (1998). 
12  This is not to say that criminals from these countries did not play a role before 1989. 
Bovenkerk pointed at the criminals send abroad by the Yugoslav secret service before 1989 
(Bovenkerk, 2003). Furthermore, government agencies and companies from East-Germany 
and some other countries have been involved in particular transnational crimes. These will 
be further discussed in chapters four, five and eight.  
13  The reports can be found at the BKA website: www.bka.de. 
14  For an analysis of the relationships between ethnicity and transnational crime see e.g. 
Bovenkerk (1998); Bovenkerk, Siegel & Zaitch (2003). 
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basic tenets of such a theory: namely, the rise of large scale bureaucratic 
organizations…” (Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004:30). 
 
With regard to the rise of such large scale bureaucratic organizations, kind of 
multinational criminal organizations, Paoli points at two important paradoxes. 
First of all, 
 
“the provision of illegal commodities mainly takes place in a ‘disorganized’ 
way and, due to the constraints of products illegality, no immanent tendency 
towards the development of large-scale criminal enterprises within illegal 
markets exist.” Secondly, “some lasting large-scale criminal organizations do 
exist, however, such as the Italian Cosa Nostra and N’drangheta (…) 
Although these groups are usually presented as the archetype of organized 
crime, they are neither exclusively involved in illegal market activities, nor is 
their development and internal configuration the result of illegal market 
dynamics” (Paoli, 2002:52). 
 
1.5.3  Collaboration between transnational criminal organizations as a way to 
divide the criminal underworld 
 
In addition to the previous assumption, some authors argue that these criminal 
multinationals are collaborating and divide the world of illicit activities between 
themselves. Thomas Naylor summarizes the assumption held by these authors 
with his observation that “If the 1950s and 1960s were an era when the principal 
enemy facing the West was supposedly monolithic international communism or 
the infamous Com-intern, in the 1980s and 1990s the real threat has become a 
sort of Crime-intern” (1995a:38). Criminological studies of the last decade have 
not produced any substantial evidence to validate this assumption. As far as large-
scale organizations do exist, and as far as they may collaborate, they are just a part 
of a wide range of actors involved in transnational crimes. Far more important 
than these organizations are all kinds of networks and loose collaborations of 
criminals, organizing transnational crimes like drug trafficking and cigarette 
smuggling. 
 
1.5.4  Globalization as the primary cause of transnational crime 
 
The fourth assumption holds that the general process of globalization of the last 
decades provides the major explanation for the rise of transnational crime. Due to 
market liberalizations and the declining importance of borders between countries, 
transnational crime has increased dramatically. This assumption to some extent 
simplifies the causes and developments of transnational crimes. It was already 
pointed out that transnational crimes have always occurred. They do not, 
however, only occur because people, goods and services can cross borders. They 
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only cross borders when there is a reason for it. This may be that certain goods 
are available in some countries and not in others (despite demand for them), or 
that price differences make smuggling lucrative. If such a reason exists, the 
increased transport opportunities and trade flows can make the traffic easier. 
 However, some aspects of globalization can in fact decrease the causes for 
transnational crime. Market liberalization, for example, led to deregulation of 
capital flows in many countries. This led to the automatic decrease in capital 
flight, as many activities that were once labeled as capital flight are now legal 
financial transactions across international borders. On the other hand, many 
transnational crimes are caused or at least stimulated by countries that maintain 
different legislation with respect to certain commodities. The present scale of 
cigarette smuggling, for example, could not be imagined when similar countries 
would not maintain such large differences in taxation. Furthermore, trade barriers 
and subsidies, set up by the European Union, cause all kinds of fraud and 
smuggling activities. Harmonization of legislation between countries, as part of a 
process of globalization, could undo at least part of the negative externalities (like 
transnational crime) of the process of globalization. 
 
1.5.5 Transnational crime as cause of criminal infiltration of legitimate 
businesses and governments 
 
The last assumption about transnational crime is that this type of crime infiltrates 
legitimate organizations as well as governments. This is one of the reasons why 
democratic governments and legitimate corporations are threatened. Despite this 
perceived threat, not much proof has been produced during the last decade large-
scale infiltration by transnational criminals indeed occurs. In fact, this should not 
cause too much of a surprise. Many transnational crimes can be executed without 
any substantial infiltration or corruption (see e.g. Huisman et al., 2004; Van de 
Bunt & Kleemans, 2004; Zaitch, 2001). Evading law enforcement is often easier 
than trying to corrupt them. Furthermore, many services provided by legitimate 
companies and government agencies can be used by criminals without this being 
noticed by the companies and agencies. For most transnational crimes, one can 
probably draw the same conclusion as Alan Block drew about the trade in illegal 
drugs: “the relationship between nation-state security and narcotics-driven 
corruption is primarily a Third-World problem” (Block, 1999:222). 
 To argue that the infiltration as meant above is not a very common 
phenomenon is not to argue that legal and illegal actors can and will not be 
connected to all kinds of transnational crimes. However, many of the interfaces 
between legal and illegal actors are clouded by the scope of transnational crimes 
that is discussed in many studies and government reports. They usually focus on 
criminals engaged in drug trafficking, human smuggling and other well-known 
crimes. Other crimes, around which at least as many interfaces can be expected, 
are often neglected or excluded through definitions that exclude transnational 
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crimes committed by legal actors or in which these actors play important roles. 
For those reasons, the crimes committed by large corporations (like cigarette 
producers or banks) or state agencies (like intelligence agencies) are not included 
in the discussions about infiltration or other interfaces between legal and illegal 
actors. Nevertheless, a number of studies can be found that focus on these crimes 
and provide insights in these interfaces (e.g. Block & Weaver, 2004; McCoy, 
1972; Naylor, 1987, 2001; Paoli, 1995; Passas & Goodwin, 2004; Von Bülow, 
2003). In the following chapters the focus will be as much on these other types of 
transnational crime as on the more common types like drug trafficking and 
human smuggling or trafficking. Chapter 2 will start with a discussion of a 




INTERFACES BETWEEN LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTORS:  




In this chapter interfaces between legal and illegal actors will be viewed from 
several angles that will also be used in the following chapters. As was pointed out 
in the introduction, the interfaces between legal and illegal actors in transnational 
crime have not been systematically and empirically studied. However, a typology 
of interfaces was developed in several papers by criminologist Nikos Passas. He 
initially outlined a typology of interfaces in a paper for the National Research 
Council (NRC, Passas, 1998). In 2002 he published a new version of this 
typology, a chapter in a book entitled: Upperworld and Underworld in Cross-Border 
Crime (Passas, 2002). This book was edited by Petrus van Duyne, Klaus von 
Lampe, and Nikos Passas (Van Duyne et al., 2002). In 2003, Passas published the 
latest version of his paper in the Security Journal. This latest version will be used 
for our analysis in this chapter. 
 The typology serves several different purposes. First of all, it provides an 
analytical tool to describe interfaces between actors independent of the type of 
crime or the actors involved. This enables a comparison of interfaces in cases that 
may involve totally different crimes and perpetrators. Furthermore, it helps to 
organize data and serves heuristic purposes. In this study, the focus will be on the 
typology as an analytical tool to describe types of interfaces between legal and 
illegal actors. It needs to be stressed that the analysis here will thus be more 
limited and at the same time more in-depth than envisaged by Passas. More 
limited because it only uses the typology as a descriptive analytical tool and more 
in-depth because it attempts to define the typology more precise for this specific 
purpose. 
 Following a discussion of Passas’ typology of interfaces, a revised typology and 
an extension of the typology will be outlined. From the perspective of the 
typology, there are always two actors that collide or collaborate. The type of 
collaboration or collision is labeled with one of the interface types. On the one 
hand one will have a legal actor and on the other hand an illegal actor. This is 
also the perspective on interfaces that can be implicitly or explicitly found in 
most studies on transnational crime. However, this does not say anything about 
the criminal nature of the activities that these actors are involved in. Usually, 
both legal and illegal actors are involved in criminal activities. However, in some 
cases, the interface between two actors is not primarily a certain interface as 
relationship, but an interface as a concrete intermediary person, organization or 
jurisdiction. This extension of the typology thus involves three different levels. 
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First of all, the role of certain individuals in transnational crime will be looked at. 
Thereafter, the role of legitimate organizations as interfaces between legal and 
illegal will be discussed. Finally, the role of jurisdictions as interfaces will be 
discussed. These different extensions share one core characteristic. They act as a 
lock through which activities are either legalized or instead become illegal. 
Therefore, they will be discussed as variations of a new analytical model to 
understand a part of the legal–illegal interface. In chapters 3 and 4, each variation 
will be analyzed in depth with a number of case studies. In chapter 5, a new 
analytical model will be developed that simplifies the role of these actors as 
interface. 
 
2.2 Passas’ typology of interfaces 
 
2.2.1 A definition of transnational crime 
 
Before the typology of interfaces will be discussed, the definition of transnational 
crime used by Passas should be presented. In the original paper for the NRC, the 
following working definition of (transnational) crime was presented: 
 
“misconduct that entails avoidable and unnecessary harm to society, which is 
serious enough to warrant state intervention and similar to other kinds of acts 
criminalized in the countries concerned or by international law (…) What 
makes crime transnational is that offenders or victims find themselves in – or 
operate through – different jurisdictions” (Passas, 1998:3). 
 
This definition was neither entirely legal nor sociological. Thereby it evaded the 
drawbacks of a solely legal definition although at the same time it seemed to 
incorporate a moral or political element. The phrases ‘avoidable and unnecessary 
harm’ and ‘serious enough to warrant state intervention’ can be tricky when used 
in an empirical study. In Passas’ most recent work on interfaces, the term cross-
border crime is used instead of transnational crime with another definition: 
 
“cross border crime is conduct, which jeopardizes the legally protected 
interests in more than one national jurisdiction and which is criminalized in at 
least one of the states concerned” (Passas, 2003:20) 
 
With this definition, most values that might creep into a definition are probably 
evaded. However, in some instances such a definition, if taken literally, would 
leave out some examples of conduct which are usually seen as cross-border or 
transnational crime. Passas did not mean his definition to be taken literally but 
the aim here is to design a definition that is inclusive even if taken literally. In 
many instances of what is usually interpreted as transnational crime, one of the 
countries involved has been chosen for the very reason that certain conduct does 
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not jeopardize the legally protected interests and is not criminalized in one of the 
jurisdictions involved. In that case, legally protected interests are taken literally. 
In that case, some of the examples of transnational crime would not necessarily fit 
the above definition. Tax evasion, capital flight and the use of child labor do not 
by definition jeopardize the legally protected interests in more than one 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, many transactions in the illicit art and antiquities trade 
provide additional examples. Many works of art that are not allowed to leave 
their source country end up in places like Switzerland or Hong Kong because 
their presence there does not intervene with any legally protected interests in 
those jurisdictions. The same goes for many examples for what is commonly 
regarded as money laundering. When the destination or source country of certain 
capital flows is for example Panama or the Bahamas, one will easily evade the 
above definition if there are only two countries involved. For many other 
transnational crimes, the same problem can be illustrated. If one takes the UN list 
of transnational crimes as a starting point, one can mention (at least): computer 
crime, theft of intellectual property, illicit traffic in arms, terrorist activities, and 
environmental crime. The disadvantages of the definition might be cured by a 
variation of an element from the old definition “similar to other kinds of acts 
criminalized in the countries concerned.” The variation on this element might be 
“or in one jurisdiction concerned while it is similar to acts which jeopardize the 
legally protected interests in the majority of countries.” This would lead to a less 
readable but not much longer definition: 
 
Transnational crime is conduct, which is criminalized in at least one of the jurisdictions 
concerned and jeopardizes the legally protected interests in more than one of the 
jurisdictions concerned or in one jurisdiction while it is similar to acts which jeopardize 
the legally protected interests in the majority of countries 
 
While including some transnational activities that preferably would fall within 
this research, this definition would bring back some of the subjectivity of the first 
definition. Although illicit activities under international law can be more or less 
defined, how can the other activities objectively be described? Somehow, one 
needs to define activities that on the one hand can be easily organized legally, 
using a number of loopholes in the international economic and legal system, 
while on the other hand some consensus exists that they are in fact illegal. At this 
point, no definition seems to be at hand which evades all the problems, while 
incorporating everything we should like to define as illegal and transnational. 
This might also explain the fact that there still is no official juridical meaning of 
the term transnational crime, as pointed out by Gerhard Mueller in his discussion 
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on the definitions and concepts of transnational crime (Mueller 2000).15 In the 
following chapters, the above definition will be used as working definition. 
 
2.2.2 Legal and illegal actors 
 
A crucial characteristic of all the mentioned definitions is that it does not separate 
between crimes committed by legal businesses or state actors, and crimes 
committed by other actors. The reason for this inclusive definition lies in the fact 
that many activities preferably defined as transnational crime are in practice 
organized by, or with, legal actors. Therefore, every definition which draws a 
clear-cut line between organized crime and for example corporate crime will be 
hard to justify on an empirical basis. 
 However, the use of an inclusive definition of transnational crime can also 
complicate the discussion on interfaces. When a more limited definition is used, 
transnational crime is simply cross-border crime committed by organized 
criminals. In case legal actors would get involved with these criminals, a legal–
illegal interface would exist by definition. It is then assumed that these legal 
actors are less import than the ‘real’ criminals. However, in case one incorporates 
the crimes committed by legal actors, two problems arise. First of all, these crimes 
are often not committed in collaboration with illegal actors but with other legal 
actors. Secondly, one has to decide whether the legal actors as organizational 
entities, engaged in transnational crime, should be called legal at all. Especially 
when these actors are convicted of acting as a criminal organization (like e.g. in 
the Netherlands) or are convicted under certain RICO provisions (in the US), 
there are grounds to call them ‘illegal’ or to be more specific ‘criminal’.16 As can 
be illustrated by two simplified arguments, the mentioned problems cannot easily 
be solved. With respect to (originally) legal actors committing transnational 
crimes, one can argue that these actors should be viewed as legal, despite their 
illegal activities and possible conviction as criminal organization. This has the 
advantage that one does not ignore the fact that often part of the activities of the 
company or state institution was legal.17 However, when this legal actor 
committed crimes in collaboration with other legal actors, there is no legal–illegal 
interface. This would leave out a large number of examples of transnational 
crimes like cigarette smuggling, trafficking of toxic waste and the illicit arms 
trade. 
                                                 
15  To be sure, such a legal definition is not a necessity for a criminological study. However, if 
an accepted legal definition would be available, it would make comparative studies easier 
and the use of data from law enforcement agencies more useful.  
16  For a discussion of the role of corporations as criminal actors see e.g. Punch (2004); Van de 
Bunt & Huisman (2004). 
17  Often this ‘part’ will mean the major part of the activities of that state institution or 
company. However, in some cases this part can be a rather minor part, for example in case 
of some intelligence agencies or financial institutions. 
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 On the other hand, one could call ‘legal’ actors illegal when they are engaged 
in transnational crime. Especially when these actors are convicted, this seems to 
be a sensible solution. However, this would create more or less the same 
problem. In case a so-called illegal actor committed his crimes together with 
other criminals, there is strictly speaking no legal–illegal interface. When for 
example a cigarette producer cooperates with smugglers, this would fall outside a 
study of interfaces because they would be both seen as ‘illegal’. The same goes for 
crimes committed by legal actors. As they would be also defined as ‘illegal’ the 
moment they engage in crimes, there would be no interface anymore. One could 
also demand a conviction as ‘criminal organization’ before calling a legal actor 
‘illegal’. However, this would make the range of cases one can study depend on 
the successes and priorities of the criminal justice system. It is not hard to imagine 
that, for example, intelligence agencies will never be convicted as ‘criminal 
organizations’, despite their involvement in illegal arms deals or drug trafficking. 
 For the moment, the conclusion seems to be that a strict definition of actors 
engaged in transnational crime does not bring much clarity. However, in an 
attempt to create some order into this elusive topic, some basic assumptions 
should be outlined. As far as transnational crime is concerned, the definition of 
this phenomenon is based on certain activities which fall within the given 
categories. Within this domain of crime, actors are defined by their ‘official’ 
status to begin with. That means, legitimate state agencies, private companies and 
private non-profit organizations are defined as legal actors, and others defined as 
illegal or criminal actors. Specific exceptions to this rule will be discussed later. 
 Despite this inclusive definition of transnational crime and the flexible use of 
the concept of interfaces, there are some clear limitations. Many cases that have 
transnational characteristics do not fall into the category of transnational crime. 
Often the actor, for example a multinational corporation, operates in numerous 
jurisdictions. However, this does not make all the crimes the corporation engages 
in by definition transnational crimes. Furthermore, when companies or state-
actors commit transnational crimes by themselves, without any connection to 
other legal or illegal actors, the interface can be lacking. However, in most cases 
there will at least be an indirect relationship with other actors. Besides these two 
technical limitations, one important additional limitation exists. As far as can be 
judged from studies on transnational crime, reports in the media, and popular 
accounts, important differences seem to exist between different countries or 
regions, with respect to transnational crime and the involvement of legal actors. 
Despite an inclusive definition of transnational crime, the number of legal actors 
that are found to be directly or indirectly involved is probably more limited in 
the Netherlands if compared with for example Italy, Russia or Turkey. This was 
illustrated by the Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on Police Methods in 
1996 (Fijnaut et al., 1996, 1998), as well as more recent studies (Kleemans et al., 
2002; Zaitch, 2001). However, this should not lead to ignorance with respect to 
the exceptions to this rule. 
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2.2.3 Enterprise crime, political crime and hybrid crime 
 
Passas distinguishes between three kinds of transnational crime: enterprise crime, 
political crime and a combination of the two, hybrid crime. This distinction is 
based on different motivations for transnational criminals. According to Passas, 
this distinction is important for both theoretical and policy reasons. Firstly, no 
complete account of the root causes of such crimes can be offered without an 
account of motives. Secondly, different types of policy interventions would be 
required for long-term effective solutions. It can be hypothesized that each of 
these three types fosters different kind of associations between legal and illegal 
actors (Passas, 2003:22). The three different types will be briefly described using 
excerpts from Passas article. Thereafter, the potential use of these types in this 
study will be discussed. 
 Enterprise crime refers to criminal acts carried out within an entrepreneurial 
structure, motivated primarily by financial gain. This is by far the most common 
type. Illegal actors of this type take advantage of the demand for certain goods 
and services. At the other end of the legal–illegal continuum, the criminal 
activities of legitimate actors may reflect the organizational skills or level of their 
corporations. Since these actors are legal, their offences are quite often of a 
predatory nature. In this light, there is little surprise when legitimate and illegal 
entrepreneurs act together (Passas, 2003:22). 
 Political crime refers to transnational crime that is motivated by political or 
religious goals. The main goal ranges from overthrowing the government to 
political independence or land rights. When it comes to political transnational 
crime, we should expect connections with political and government agents and 
agencies. Typical examples can be found in cases of states accused of supporting 
terrorism (Passas, 2003:23). 
 Hybrid crime amounts to a combination of enterprise and political crime. It 
may be that financial and political motives are of almost equal importance (Passas, 
2003:23). 
 It can be rather illuminating to point at the different goals of transnational 
offenders, like Passas does with the above three types. It stresses the wide scope of 
transnational crime, beyond the constraints of transnational illegal markets. 
Furthermore, for heuristic purposes, this distinction can be useful to understand 
these distinct types of crime as well as to raise new research questions. However, 
in this study the aim of the typology analysis is more limited, as was pointed out 
before. Furthermore, the definition of transnational crime used here already 
incorporates these different types and the rest of this study will draw sufficiently 
on all three different types. Besides that, the different goals do not necessarily lead 
to different interfaces. They will lead to interfaces between different actors but 
that does not mean that different types of interfaces are found between these 
actors. For these reasons, the distinction between different types of transnational 
crime will not be used in this study. 
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2.2.4 Antithetical interfaces 
 
Among the legal and illegal actors engaged in transnational crimes, several types 
of interfaces can be found. Passas divides these in two broad categories: 
antithetical and symbiotic interfaces. The different types are presented in figure 1. 
The distinction between antithetical and symbiotic can be compared with the 
distinction between parasitical and symbiotic interfaces described by Bruinsma 
and Bovenkerk, and the developmental model described by Lupsha, from the 
predatory stage, through the parasitical stage to the symbiotic stage (Bruinsma & 
Bovenkerk, 1996; Lupsha 1996). However, in contrast to Lupsha, Passas does not 
describe a developmental process from antithetical to symbiotic but rather two 
different types of relationships between legal and illegal enterprises. 
 Figure 1 shows the antithetical interfaces on the left. There are four different 
antithetical interfaces: the antagonistic, injurious, predatory, and parasitical interface. 
The arrow on the left shows the direction of the relationships between the legal 
and illegal actors. The antithetical interfaces aim at situations where the illegal 
actor is harming the legal actor in some particular way. On the right are eight 
different symbiotic interfaces: outsourcing, (systemic-) synergy, legal actors committing 
organized crimes, legal interactions, funding, collaboration, reciprocity, co-optation. The 
arrow in the middle of the symbiotic interfaces points in two directions because 
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In the paragraphs below, the different types of interfaces will be discussed one by 
one. First, Passas’ description of the interface will be given. Thereafter, the 
interface will be discussed. The discussion will focus on the analytical validity of 




“Antagonistic relationships obtain when there is competition between legal 
and illegal actors. Actors may be vying for market share acting independently, 
as in the case of state-run lotteries, casinos, and illegal gambling operations. 
Similarly independent is the antagonistic relationship between crooked 
financial institutions on the internet or offshore offering illegal services to 
clients who would otherwise do business with conventional banks (e.g. the 
European Union Bank in the Caribbean). In the political, ideological or 
religious spheres, the competition may be for legitimacy. Actors may seek to 
gain popular support and following in the same geographic area by legal and 
criminal means. Illustrations of such antagonisms can be found in political 
conflicts, such as those in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, former Soviet 
Republics, Angola, Peru, parts of Northern India or Sri Lanka” (Passas, 
2003:24). 
 
The antagonistic interface as developed by Passas is analytically useful to clarify 
the relationship between legal and illegal actors in many situations of 
transnational crime. There are many situations where local political groups are 
linked to cross-border criminals. Recent conflicts, like the war in former 
Yugoslavia, have shown intricate links between governments and organized 
crime (e.g. Kelly et al., 2005; Thamm, 1999). According to some authors these 
links should not be seen as atypical examples, but rather as a common version of 
modern wars (Crefeld, 1998; Rufin, 1999). Many illicit trades also involve 
antagonistic relationships. The smuggling of arms, antiquities, and untaxed 
cigarettes leads to competition between legal and illegal actors. 
 However, some of the examples mentioned above do not fit the definition of 
this interface. The reason is the absence of a transnational character. Gambling, 
for example, is not by definition a transnational activity. The same goes for 
political conflicts, although there will often be connections with actors abroad. If 
so, these need to be made explicit; otherwise the examples seem to involve 
merely national crimes. Especially during the Cold War, both the US and the 
Soviet Union supported all kinds of foreign political organizations that were 
either legitimate political actors or ‘terrorists’ or ‘insurgencies’ according to the 
authorities in the countries concerned. 
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Predatory and parasitical interface 
 
“The relationship is predatory when the aim or effect is to destroy or bleed to 
death an organization, for example to control and fraudulently bankrupt a 
business. The relationship is parasitical when the aim is to preserve the 
viability of the target, such that illegal benefits can be extorted on a more or 
less regular basis. For example triad members selling protection to Asian 
business owners; or surplus line insurance companies selling a mixture of 
sound and bogus policies to foreign institutions keen to enter the US market” 
(Passas, 2003:25). 
 
These two interfaces described by Passas have some overlap with each other and 
potentially with other interfaces. The aim of preserving the viability of the target 
does not rule out that the effect may be that the target is destroyed or bleed to 
death. Furthermore, the aim may be to destroy the target while the effect may be 
that the target survives. For these reasons, I suggest a more limited definition of 
the predatory interface. The predatory interface involves relationships in which 
the aim is to destroy or bleed to death an organization. 
 Empirically, it is harder to find examples of this interface than of the 
antagonistic interface. Passas does not mention empirical examples of the 
predatory interface and this may suggest the rare occurrence of this interface. 
Attempts to destroy or bleed to death organizations are not by definition 
transnational if they occur. In some cases there may be some link to activities or 
policies abroad of legal actors. In the 1980s, a range of incidents of arson at stores 
owned by SHV (a Dutch company) by a left-wing terrorist organization 
(RARA) in the Netherlands forced the company to stop doing business in South 
Africa. However, it can be questioned whether this should be designated as an 
example of a predatory interface or rather as injurious or parasitical. The aim is 
not primarily to destroy the legitimate actor involved but rather to blackmail this 
actor to force the actor to change its policies. 
 The parasitical interface can be used to interpret cases of extortion. On a local 
level, many examples of criminal organizations, like the mafia in the US or Italy, 
can be pointed at that extort legitimate enterprises (see e.g. Jacobs, 2001). 
However, in this study it should be evident that such cases have some 
transnational connections. Triad members selling protection to Asian business 
owners does not by definition involve transnational crimes.18 Even if there is 
indeed a transnational element, this crime will often involve actors from the same 
ethnic background. Within that context the denotation ‘transnational’ loses some 
of its meaning. The report of the parliamentary inquiry commission in the 
Netherlands described how different Chinese groups on the one hand violently 
                                                 
18  The debate on the precise nature and importance of the Triads will be left aside here. See 
further: Bresler (1981) and He (2003).  
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fought each other, while on the other hand were involved (among many other 
things) in extortion of Chinese restaurant owners and other Chinese businesses 
(Fijnaut et al., 1996). A similar situation of rather ‘national’ transnational crime 
can be found with some instances of terrorism. During the 1980s a number of 
terrorist attacks was performed in the Netherlands by the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) and ETA. In 1979, the British ambassador in The 
Hague was shot outside his official residence. In 1988, the PIRA performed two 
attacks on British subjects. In the city of Roermond, a vehicle with three British 
military was shot at and left one of them dead. In Nieuw Bergen, a car bomb 
killed two members of the British army. Finally, in 1990, two Australian tourists, 
driving a car with British number plates, were shot in Roermond (Muller, 
1994:382-383). During 1989 and 1990, the ETA performed a range of attacks on 
Spanish objects and subjects. In October 1989, the car of the Spanish consul in 
The Hague was destroyed by a bomb. During the same month, bombs exploded 
at two Spanish institutions in The Hague. In December 1989, three grenades 
were fired at the residence of the Spanish ambassador in The Hague. Finally, in 
June and July of 1990, two office buildings in Amsterdam, that housed Spanish 




“Injurious relationships occur when actors undermine, attack or harm each 
other. This is typified by groups, which may sabotage a foreign corporation 
they consider as exploitative or corrupt. Another example is when offenders 
commit robbery in order to finance a guerrilla. The above injurious and 
antagonistic interface may overlap in practice: a combination of antagonistic 
and injurious relationship is when activists employ violent means against the 
state, its symbols or citizens” (Passas, 2003:25). 
 
The injurious interface to some extent includes all other antithetical interfaces. 
All antithetical interfaces involve situations where actors harm or attack each 
other. Therefore, for analytical purposes, either the injurious interface should be 
defined more narrowly or the other interfaces should be eliminated. As there are 
wide differences between the relationships that can be understood as antithetical 
interfaces, it seems most productive to define the injurious interface more 
narrowly, while leaving the other interfaces intact. For that reason I define 
injurious interfaces as: interfaces that involve actors that harm, attack or 
undermine each other, in other ways than covered by the predatory, parasitical or 
antagonistic interface. 
 With respect to the examples mentioned in the quote above, the transnational 
nature of the crimes needs some explication. Groups that sabotage a foreign 
corporation are in principle involved in mere (local) vandalism. The fact that a 
corporation operates in more than one country does not mean that any illegal 
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acts against, or by, this corporation involves transnational crimes. The offenders 
who commit robbery to finance a guerrilla are not engaged in transnational crime 
as long as robbery and guerrilla take place in the same country. 
 




“Outsourcing refers to a division of labour between legal and illegal actors, 
where one party offers specialized services to the other. This mainly covers 
cases where the ‘dirty work’ is done by ‘criminals’, while the main benefit is 
reaped by a legal actor. It can be a one-off or a continuous relationship 
between a client and a provider. The dirty work may be delegated to actors 
outside an organization or agency for reasons of convenience, efficiency or 
plausible deniability. The blame is thus externalised, if the misdeed or the 
offenders are ever discovered (e.g. Iran-Contra and other intelligence-related 
activities, such as the use of death squad by the Turkish government against 
Kurd nationalists (Bovenkerk & Yesilgoz, 1998); use of agents or subsidiaries 
to bribe foreign officials in order to avoid scrutiny under the law). In the 
above cases, legal actors are the clients. The reverse, however, is also possible. 
Legal actors may provide financial or other support to criminal groups. It is 
possible that only one of the parties is aware of the quasi-contractual 
relationship. The Abu Nidal organization, for example, has used a network of 
legitimate companies whose proceeds financed terrorist activities without the 
knowledge of the managers and workers of these companies” (Passas, 
2003:25). 
 
This interface involves a relationship between legal and illegal actors that can be 
found very frequently in studies of transnational crime. It is analytically clear. 
Besides the examples mentioned above, numerous other examples can be found 
in the field of intelligence organizations and the international arms trade as well as 
the transnational trade in, and disposal of, toxic waste. One can also imagine 
examples of legal actors providing specialized services to criminals. The 
trafficking of human beings from China to the US depends largely on the services 
of state officials, delivering passports and exit permits (Zhang & Gaylord, 1996; 
Ghosh, 1998). The last example mentioned by Passas does not seem to fit the 
definition of this interface. In case of legitimate companies used to raise funds in a 
legitimate way although for a terrorist organization this can hardly be seen as 
‘dirty work’ that is outsourced. This example can probably better be interpreted 






“In case of collaboration, the links become stronger and more direct as legal 
and illegal enterprises or actors work together for the commission of the same 
offence. For instance, police officers may work with drug traffickers or an art 
gallery owner may fence stolen cultural property. Under this category, we can 
also examine various types of professionals – such as lawyers, politicians, 
accountants, bankers or casino managers – who knowingly offer their services 
to criminal operators.” (Passas, 2003:26) 
 
Collaboration, like outsourcing, is a type of interface that can be found very 
often in studies on transnational crime. Analytically this interface is clear as well. 
Nevertheless, the last examples mentioned above, about professionals offering 
their services, do not by definition fit the definition of collaboration. These 
professionals basically offer specialized services to criminals and would rather be 
examples of outsourcing than collaboration. If these professionals are really 
working together with their clients, this can be defined as collaboration. The 
only exception could be the politicians. One could imagine that politicians might 
sometimes sincerely share the goal of the criminals and are more than providers 
of a particular service. For example when terrorist groups have legal counterparts 
in politics they can help each other. Whether one chooses to refer to these 
examples only as collaboration or also as outsourcing depends on the 
inclusiveness of the definition of outsourcing. When outsourcing is supposed to 
consist of situations where criminals do the ‘dirty work’ for legal actors, the 
mentioned examples of collaboration are clearly different from outsourcing. 
However, one could question the difference between the two. What 
distinguishes the criminal who specializes in the disposal of toxic waste for legal 
actors, from the lawyer who specializes in the disposal of black money in tax 
havens for criminals? Often, he will do the same thing for legal companies. 
Surely in that case, this would also be called ‘dirty work’. Furthermore, as the 
definition of transnational crime does not discriminate between legal and illegal 




“In this category, there may be some arm-twisting or voluntary interactions. 
So, while it involves mutual benefits, there are uneven power relations 
between the parties. For example, a deal may be struck for a company to 
operate unimpeded in a country or at all, if a government agency is allowed 
to monitor its computers and collect information on its clients. For example, 
BCCI has been accused of being a bedfellow of intelligence services in several 
countries. Some BCCI managers have argued that this was the only way 
INTERFACES BETWEEN LEGAL AND ILLEGAL ACTORS: FROM BRICKS TO THE BAHAMAS 
27 
BCCI could hope to survive and do business internationally…” (Passas, 
2003:26) 
 
Co-optation can be a useful concept to distinguish some relationships from 
collaboration or outsourcing. Many examples can be mentioned of transnational 
corporations engaged in some kind of transnational crime, like for example 
money laundering, cigarette smuggling, and smuggling toxic waste. Soudijn 
described a case of a high-placed customs official at Paris airport who enabled the 
smuggling of at least 30 illegal Chinese immigrants by a smuggling organization. 
 
“This official had officially been appointed to prevent illegal immigration to 
the United States and Canada. By virtue of his position, he consulted 
regularly with Embassy personnel and the US customs authorities. He even 
had the right to deny migrants permission to continue their journey if he had 
any doubts” (Soudijn, 2006:69). 
 
For each illegal immigrant that was smuggled he was paid a fee of $ 2,000. Due 
to the uneven power relations, this case can be understood with the co-optation 
interface, instead of cases of corruption where the power relations between 
parties are more even. Those latter cases are better understood with the 
reciprocity or outsourcing interface. However, the examples provided by Passas 
do not always speak for themselves. In case transnational corporations engage in 
illegal activities abroad this does not by definition involve transnational crimes, 




“This is the case when there are consciously mutual benefits between the 
legal and illegal actors (e.g. legal brothel manager working with smugglers or 
aliens). This type included possibly the most common interface, whereby 
legitimate or conventional actors are the clients for goods and services offered 
by criminals (e.g. drugs, gambling, weapons, prostitutes, etc). Other examples 
of reciprocity include dictators or government officials, who receive rich 
commissions and kickbacks in exchange for favours to transnational 
corporations. The latter are then allowed to exploit the land, people or entire 
country for financial benefits (..). Similar offers of safe haven and protection 
are made to illegal entrepreneurs and criminal organizations too (examples 
may be found in Bolivia, Aruba, Italy or Russia)” (Passas, 2003:26). 
 
The reciprocity interface has one major analytical problem, similar to the 
injurious interface discussed above. The definition of the reciprocity interface 
covers almost all other symbiotic interfaces because these interfaces involve 
situations of mutual benefits that both actors are aware of. The only exception is 
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the synergy interface that will be discussed hereafter. To distinguish between 
reciprocity and the other interfaces, the definition should be more restricted. I 
therefore suggest the following definition: reciprocity than aims at interfaces 
involving situations of conscious mutual benefits, not covered by any of the other 
symbiotic interfaces. 
 The empirical examples mentioned by Passas illustrate the overlap between 
the different interfaces. A brothel manager working with smugglers of aliens, for 
example, can also be interpreted as outsourcing. The smuggler of aliens is 
providing the specialized service of illegally delivering women for the brothel. 
Dictators or government officials, who are well rewarded with commissions and 
kickbacks in exchange for favors to transnational corporations, can best be seen as 
examples of co-optation relationships. Moreover, although committed by 
transnational actors, these examples do not involve transnational crimes by 
definition. When commissions lead to an unlimited permit to harm the 
environment, this may cause environmental crimes in several countries. 
However, paying commissions only to be able to operate in a country, without 
any further benefits, does not by definition constitute a transnational crime. It 
may do so when actors come from particular countries with legislation against 
paying such commissions, but most countries do not have such legislation.19 Of 
course, the permission to operate in a country may lead to opportunities which 
are not available at home, but which are standard practice in the host country. In 
that case, one could argue whether opportunities like child labor lead to the 
conclusion that the transnational corporation (TNC) does anything illegal? 
However, this might be a somewhat contrived argument. As Michalowski and 
Kramer argue: 
 
“The differences in the laws of the home and host nations, and the ability of 
the TNC’s to influence the legal climate in host countries, renders the laws 
derived at the level of nation-states an unsatisfactory basis for determining the 
scope of criminological research on TNC’s” (Michalowski & Kramer, 
1987:34) 
 
The observation of Michalowski and Kramer will be further discussed in chapter 
4 where the role of jurisdictions and other geographically defined entities is 
analyzed. That chapter will show how activities which would normally be 
defined as transnational crime in a particular country; both according to the 
definition used here as well as to the laws of the country concerned, are de facto 
legalized by the policies of the government of this country. 
                                                 
19  On October 31st 2003, the United Nations Convention against Corruption was adopted. 
This is one of the bases of legislation against corruption and similar behavior. Since then 
only 34 countries became party to this convention. None of the major industrialized 
countries, except for France, have become party. 




“We can speak of synergy when legal and illegal actors benefit each other 
while they go about their business independently promoting their interests 
and objectives. The practical effects of synergy are similar to those of 
outsourcing. In this case, however, there is no conspiracy or client-provider 
relationship. The synergy is the consequence of structural factors. There may 
be no knowledge, intent or reasonable suspicion of such a link (in some cases, 
suspicions may be ‘cured’ by efforts to avoid any knowledge). Legitimate 
actors merely reap benefits from others’ criminal activities. For example, 
financial institutions in the West may receive from overseas substantial funds 
that are the proceeds of crime. In such cases, the laundering has taken place 
elsewhere, and intermediary transactions have hidden the traces of 
illegality.(…) The smuggling of cigarettes across borders in order to avoid 
taxes and customs dues ultimately helps tobacco companies sell cheaper 
products to their clients and thereby increase their market share, which in the 
end creates an elaborate underground economy. (…). The reverse is also 
possible. That is, criminal actors can benefit from the activities and practices 
of legal actors. For instance, secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens do not serve 
only the criminals. If that were the case, there would be little resistance to 
calls for action against such jurisdictions (or indeed, the very existence of such 
jurisdictions)” (Passas, 2003:26-27) 
 
This situation extends the range of interfaces to a large number of legal actors. 
Casino’s, lease companies, banks, insurance companies, and cigarette producers 
are among the actors that are connected with numerous illegal actors through the 
synergy interface. 
 The synergy interface is analytically clear. However, in practice, as with most 
other interfaces, it can be hard to draw a line between synergy and some other 
interfaces. In particular outsourcing and collaboration are sometimes hard to 
separate from synergy. The international smuggling of cigarettes shows the 
different variations. Cigarette producers know that in general a certain amount of 
their products is smuggled around the world and that they benefit from this 
smuggle. In case of some specific countries, where taxes are extraordinary high 
(absolute or relatively), smuggling becomes impossible to ignore for producers. 
Synergy starts at this point and moves in the direction of collaboration as relations 
between smugglers and producers become tighter. An example of a case between 
synergy and collaboration is the export of cigarettes from British producers to 
Andorra. Between 1993 and 1997 exports skyrocketed from 13 million to 1,520 
million packets. Even taking into account sales to tourists in this tax haven, 
there’s no way that the 60,000 inhabitants of Andorra could get through those 
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quantities.20 It is without much doubt that those cigarettes are re-exported to 
Britain and the producers are aware of this and are consciously involved in 
supplying large smuggling networks. Actual cooperation was proven in a lawsuit 
against the Canadian branch of Reynolds Tobacco. They admitted to be 




“Funding relationships are also possible, with legitimate organizations 
providing, knowingly or not, essential financial support for the operation of 
criminal groups. A recent example is provided after the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the USA by agencies around the world, which are looking for 
charities and other legal entities (e.g. farming businesses) that may have fuelled 
the Al-Qaeda network” (Passas, 2003:27) 
 
It seems that funding should be split in two to avoid overlap with outsourcing, or 
outsourcing should be defined more narrowly. In case legitimate organizations 
unknowingly provide financial support for criminal groups, the same situation 
appears as in the example of the Abu Nidal organization. According to Passas, 
this was an example of outsourcing. However, the relationship can also be 
described as parasitical. In my view, it seems not fully consistent to label 
extortion of money from a legal organization in case of terrorist groups as 
outsourcing, when in any other situation this simply means parasitical behavior. 
In case the legitimate organization knowingly and willingly provides financial 
support, one can argue about the precise interface. In case they both share the 
same goal, it can be called collaboration. When their goals differ, it might also be 
called collaboration but one can prefer funding to emphasize the separation of 
tasks and possible goals. As a theoretical example, one can even imagine an 
individual or corporation that funds terrorism to make money with it. In that 
case they purchase large amounts of stock options, while knowing that a planned 
terrorist attack will strongly disturb stock markets as well as other markets. 
 Numerous charities that directly or indirectly support terrorist organizations 
can also be understood with the funding interface. Some charities have for 
example supported the IRA or Provisional IRA (Hachey et al., 1996; Tupman, 
1998a, 1998b). 
 
                                                 
20  See further: Rowell, A. & C. Bates (2000) Tobacco smuggling in the UK, Action on 
smoking and health http://www.ash.org.uk/html/smuggling/html/uksmuggling.html# 
_Toc495558652  (Visited July 23rd 2005). 
21  J. Gatehouse (1998) ‘RJR Reynolds pays $15M in fines after subsidiary helped smugglers’ 
National Post, December 23rd; US Department of Justice (Press Release) ‘R.J. Reynolds 
affiliate pleads guilty, pays $15 million in criminal fines and forfeitures as part of cigarette 
smuggling operations’ December 22nd 1998 see: http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/ 
December/605usa.htm (Visited, October 24th 2005). 




“No criminal actor commits only and always crime. Diversification is 
required not only for money laundering purposes, but also for the reduction 
of risk and maximization of benefits. Some may do so in order to leave the 
life of crime eventually, others seek protective shields, while still others strive 
for respectability. So they all have legal aspects or faces (e.g. Cali drug 
traffickers). Inevitably, then, they interact with conventional actors” (Passas, 
2003:27). 
 
The examples of legal interactions illustrate the diverse nature of activities and 
relationships of criminal actors. It underlines the necessity to look at such 
criminal actors as parts of a wider social environment of which legal actors are 
integral parts. However, it is not fully clear how this interface can analytically add 
something to the others. Basically, there is an interface but no transnational crime 
in case of legal interactions. The example of money laundering is an exception 
here because it is not legal. Therefore it should fall under the type of 
outsourcing, collaboration or synergy. In case illegal actors invest in legitimate 
organizations this is either illegal (and thus involving one of the other interfaces) 
or it is legal because the funds have been successfully laundered before (and thus 
there is no legal–illegal interface anymore). For the reasons mentioned here, this 
interface will be left out of the revised typology that will be drafted at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
Legal actors committing organized crimes 
 
“In this instance, there is no interface between legal and illegal actors. Rather, 
legal actors engage in well-organized and sophisticated crimes on their own; 
legal actors behave in a typical illegal-actor fashion” (Passas, 2003:27) 
 
Legal actors that commit organized crimes are crucial to a good understanding of 
the interfaces between legal and illegal. Many of such actors will be discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4, and in chapters 7 to 9. However, analytically this interface 
seems to be inconsistent or at least unnecessary within the general typology of 
interfaces and the definition of transnational crime which is used. This definition 
does not discriminate between legal and illegal actors. Therefore, the crimes by 
legal actors do not need any specific attention. Furthermore, as Passas mentions, 
there is no interface between legal and illegal here. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusion section 2.2: the interface typology 
 
The typology discussed above, provides an analytical tool to interpret a wide 
range of relationships between legal and illegal actors. Most of them cannot be 
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defined meticulously and a thin line separates some interfaces from others. 
However, each interface aims at a particular kind of relationship between legal 
and illegal and concrete examples were mentioned in the text. Some of the 
interfaces appeared to be not fully consistent with the typology, in particular legal 
interactions and legal actors committing organized crime. The funding interface partly 
overlaps with the parasitical interface, as far as the legitimate organization does 
not know or is opposed to the tapping of funds from its resources. Furthermore, 
as far as the legitimate organization voluntarily funds the criminal organization, 
there seems to be a situation of collaboration. However, one can prefer to use the 
funding interface for situations where the legitimate actor voluntarily funds the 
criminal actor but does this for the pursuit of another goal. The revised typology 















antithetical relationships symbiotic relationships
figure 2: the interface typology
 
 
The remaining four antithetical and six symbiotic interfaces provide a framework 
to define and understand examples of interfacing relationships in the literature on 
transnational crime or in empirical studies. Nevertheless, many objects of study 
cannot be related to only one interface. Often, one can discern several different 
interfaces in one case. This is especially true for large cases like the BCCI affair 
and the Banco Ambrosiano case that will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
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2.3 Three extensions of the interface typology: individuals, 
organizations, and jurisdictions as interface 
 
Many legitimate organizations maintain different interfacing relationships with 
numerous illegal actors (or did so in the past). Examples that can be mentioned 
here are intelligence agencies like the CIA or financial institutions like the BCCI 
(Block & Weaver, 2004; Passas, 1996). In addition to these actors there are single 
individuals that act as intermediaries between legal and illegal actors. Many can 
be found in the illicit art trade, but also in the arms trade or in the toxic waste 
trade (Gerstenblith, 2004; Phytian, 2000; Szasz, 1986). Finally, at a macro level, 
one can understand whole countries as interfacing structures between legal and 
illegal or hinges between the legal and illegal side of transnational deals in arms, 
art, cigarettes or waste (Blum et al., 1998; Bülow, 2003). 
 From this perspective, the typology of interfaces consists of a number of 
bricks with which the overall legal–illegal interface is build. Hereafter, an attempt 
will be made to show how some bricks can be organized on a number of 
different levels. On each level the same process can be found. This process 
involves a transformation of legal into illegal activities or a transformation of 
illegal into legal activities. All three variations consist of an important addition to 
the typology of interfaces. They will be briefly outlined here while a detailed 
discussion will follow in chapters 3 (on individuals and organizations) and 4 (on 
jurisdictions). Chapter 5 will use the analyses from chapters 3 and 4 to develop an 
analytical model of these individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions as interface. 
Thereafter, one particular field of transnational crime, the illicit art and antiquities 
trade, will be studied to see whether the typology and its extension help us to 












In Figure 3, the role of individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions is shown. 
Normally, interfaces are considered to be located between legal actors on the one 
hand and illegal actors on the other hand. The typology discussed above provides 
labels to distinguish the different interfaces between these legal and illegal actors. 
However, often individuals, organizations or jurisdictions can be seen as located 
between the legal domain on the one hand and the illegal domain on the other 
hand. Through these entities, activities either become legal or instead illegal. The 
organization can for example be a bank through which criminal funds are 
laundered, or a state that officially acts as end-user for arms that are ultimately 
destined for an outlawed destination. Depending on one’s point of view, one 
could label the arrows next to A (connecting the legitimate organization with 
the legal actor) or B (connecting the legitimate organization with the illegal 
actor) as examples of interfaces from the typology. Besides that, one could also 
label both sets of arrows as interface. However, this seems to be inconsistent as 
ideally there can only be one line separating legal from illegal. As will be argued 
in the next chapter, neither perspective does really catch the reality of many 
cases, like for example BCCI. The arrows at both sides of the circle are actually 
part of an activity that runs from legal to illegal or the other way around. The 
large arrows next to C illustrate this fact. 
 
2.3.1 Solo in transnational crime 
 
One of the major issues in the study of transnational crime concerns the 
organization of crime. A range of ideas can be found from Donald Cressey’s idea 
of large hierarchically organized criminal groups to Peter Reuter’s idea of 
disorganized flexible illegal markets (Cressey, 1969; Reuter, 1983). During the 
1990s, the idea of transnational crime as a sort of multinational (criminal) 
organization became popular. Whereas in the 1960s, organized crime was 
understood as a sort of criminal IBM; during the 1990s organized crime was by 
some others pictured as a criminal version of the flexible and powerful 
multinational corporation (Sterling, 1994; Williams, 1994). 
 Besides this strong current, other ideas about structures in organized or 
transnational crime can be found in the literature. One of the competing 
perspectives is based on network theories. The number of articles and studies on 
networks in transnational and organized crime has significantly increased in 
recent years. In the Netherlands, a number of authors have used network theories 
to enrich studies on organized and transnational crime, primarily based on police 
files (Kleemans et al., 1998, 2002; Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004). 
 Despite the differences between the mentioned approaches, they have at least 
one crucial element in common. All different approaches tend to focus on actors 
instead of activities. They differ with respect to the assumed structure of these 
actors. The actual objects of study are partly defined by the expectation to find 
structures like criminal organizations, criminal networks, or mafia like groups. 
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Furthermore, one tends to focus primarily on ‘real’ criminals. Criminal elements 
within state institutions, legal companies or other non-criminal entities are seen 
as exceptional phenomena outside the scope of organized crime, or as facilitators 
helping out their criminal clients without being part of the actual organization of 
crime. Through definitions of organized, white-collar, and corporate crime, 
boundaries tend to be drawn between activities that can hardly be separated in 
practice without bringing arbitrary elements into these definitions. The given 
tendency can be opposed by looking primarily at activities instead of actors. In 
the words of Dwight C. Smith: 
 
“The observer who looks first at events and then at the persons associated 
with them is more likely to adopt a scientific, value-free and causal analytical 
style. The observer who defines a universe by the people it contains is more 
prone to bias and nontestable assumptions – in short, to conclusions that are 
based more on ideology than on logic” (Smith, 1991) 
 
When the focus is shifted to activities, the whole subject of interfaces tends to 
shift from the sideline to the centre, because many illegal markets have only 
vague boundaries with the legal upper world. However, this is not to say that all 
different actors are no longer relevant to discuss. On the contrary, without actors 
it is impossible to discuss the illegal activities and especially the way in which 
they sometimes get laundered or instead become illegal. What is meant here is 
that it should be activities that define the field of study and thereafter one should 
look at the actors involved to describe and analyze these activities. As soon as one 
shifts the focus from actors to activities, the role of a number of independently 
operating individuals can be given a proper place within the whole of 
transnational crime. In a number of transnational crimes, these individuals play a 
crucial role which is clearly different from the typical criminal organizations. 
Pointing at these individuals is not meant to be an argument opposing any theory 
of structures of transnational crime. To the contrary, any argument to support 
one particular type of structure as typical for transnational crime, or a specific 
transnational crime, would again mean a focus on actors. 
 The remarks about actors may seem to contradict with the previous discussion 
in which legal and illegal actors were used. However, two things need to be 
separated clearly here and in the following chapters. The definition of 
transnational crime does not discriminate between ‘legitimate’ and ‘criminal’ 
actors but simply focuses on criminal activities in different jurisdictions. This 
definition guides the types of activities that will be used in this study to elaborate 
on interfaces. However, the individuals, organizations, and other entities 
involved in these activities are still labeled as legal or illegal. The reason for this 
artificial distinction is the fact that only by using this distinction, one can show 
most clearly how legal and illegal are intertwined in practice. 
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 The interest in the role of individuals has been lacking in most studies for a 
number of reasons. First of all, organized crime research and more recently 
transnational crime research, has often been primarily dealing with large 
structures that were mentioned before. This can be partly explained by the types 
of transnational crime that have been of primary importance to the criminal 
justice system and most criminologists. In recent years many research projects 
have focused on smuggling of humans and related topics (Soudijn, 2006; Staring, 
2001; Van Dijk, 2002).22 At the same time, drug trafficking and dealing has been 
a major topic for criminologists for years (Korf, 1993; Bovenkerk, 1998; Klerks, 
2000, Zaitch, 2001). Most other types of transnational crime enjoy much less 
interest: the illegal arms trade, the trade in ‘blood’ diamonds, the trade in toxic 
waste, the illegal art and antiquities trade, and until recently the smuggling of 
cigarettes. 
 All this seems to distract the attention from the main topic here, the role of 
independently operating individuals in transnational crime. However, this topic is 
directly related to the above in two ways. First of all, the role of the mentioned 
individuals is especially present in the description of types of transnational crime 
that fall outside the focus of most criminological studies of transnational crime. 
Secondly, these types of crime are known for their connections with legal actors, 
governments as well as corporations (Block & Weaver, 2005; Kochan, 2005; 
Naylor, 1993, 2001; Peleman, 2002; Pretterebner, 1989). Therefore, from a 
perspective of interfaces, these crimes are particularly relevant. 
 The individuals have different roles with different transnational crimes. One 
role is to act as black market brokers for legal actors, or between legal actors. 
These legal actors use the broker because for some reason they cannot organize 
the illegal activities themselves. Examples can be found in the arms trade, where 
arms are exchanged between states, terrorist groups, opposition movements or 
other actors (Morstein, 1989; Naylor, 1995b). The broker finds ways to arrange 
this exchange, evading embargoes, export regulations, international treaties, and 
other inconvenient provisions which are officially binding the legal actors, and 
benefiting the innovative illegal actors. In chapter 3, this example and others will 
be discussed in more detail, using a number of examples from the illegal trade in 
art, arms and toxic waste. 
 
2.3.2 Legitimate organizations as interface 
 
In the situation described above, the broker acts as an interface between the legal 
actor and the black market in for example arms, art or diamonds. For some 
reason, legal and illegal actors are unable to do business without getting 
                                                 
22  Judging from recent criminological studies, as well as media coverage of smuggling of 
humans, trafficking, and related topics, it seems as if migration is nowadays primarily of 
interest as a criminal phenomenon. For a more philosophical approach see for example 
Hedetoft & Hjort (2002); Schlesinger (2004).  
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themselves into legal difficulties, or at least into embarrassing situations. Partly the 
opposite situation can be found with a number of legitimate actors. These actors 
do business with illegal actors as supple as with legal ones. However, their status 
is perfectly legal, as is usually their appearance. The transactions with both sides 
of the law are not unrelated, but are part of a process whereby illegal goods are 
transformed into legal merchandise. Whereas the dealer in ‘hot’ items is able to 
get rid of them at the backdoor, the items are perfectly legal when they go 
through the frontdoor to the customers. Analogous to the laundering of money, 
these goods are in a way laundered so that they can enter the legal trade again, 
and be sold for regular prices which are usually substantially higher than at the 
black market. The legitimate actor can be described as an interfacing organization 
between the legal and illegal domain. 
 These legitimate organizations provide an open gate for illegal actors to get 
their goods into the legal market, laundering them in the process. The trade in 
so-called ‘blood’ diamonds can serve as an example here (NIZA, 2001; Tailby, 
2002). Besides different markets in which goods are laundered, one can point at 
the primary laundering business, money laundering. This activity is usually seen 
as an organized crime itself, and is of crucial importance to many transnational 
criminals (Beare, 2003; Blickman, 1997; Naylor, 1996; Passas, 1995). While there 
are many ways for criminals to launder the proceeds of their crime themselves, 
the banking sector is probably responsible for the biggest share of the business. In 
some cases, the activities of these banks have become public and led to major 
scandals. Examples are the Nugan Hand Bank, Banco Ambrosiano, the BCCI 
and the European Union Bank (Blum et al., 1998; Henry, 2003; Kwitny, 1987; 
Paoli, 1995; Passas, 2001). Recently, new examples were added to this list in 
relation with money laundering practices by Russian criminals and US banks 
(Kochan, 2005; Block & Weaver, 2004). 
 Finally, there is the specific role of intelligence agencies. Though these 
agencies do not directly fit in the category of organizations mentioned before, 
their role is in a way comparable. Intelligence agencies often provide an 
intermediary structure or interface between all kinds of criminals and state 
officials (Auchlin & Gaberly, 1990; Block & Weaver, 2004; Bülow, 2003; 
McCoy, 1972; Naylor, 2001; Roth, 2000). 
  
2.3.3 Jurisdictions as interfaces 
 
In the previous paragraph, some holes in the fuzzy boundaries between ‘upper 
world’ and ‘underworld’ were discussed. Interfacing organizations show the 
permeable boundary between legal and illegal. They make clear that, in addition 
to incidental interfaces between legal and illegal actors, there are in fact 
organizations that provide more or less institutionalized interfaces. However, 
despite the often impressive scale of illegitimate activities around these 
organizations, one can move beyond this level with regard to interfaces. Beyond 
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individual organizations, there are numerous jurisdictions that can be seen as 
macro-level interfaces. As there are ‘holes’ in economic branches like the art 
trade or the banking industry, there are also whole jurisdictions that serve as 
‘holes’ in the global system. For the illegal trade in arms, a range of countries 
are relevant which can provide satisfactory end-user certificates or other services 
for ‘hot’ deals. An example is Singapore, which “would long ago have sunk into 
the sea, had it actually kept all the weapons its officials had signed for” according 
to a standing joke in the arms trade (Naylor, 1995b). Naylor discusses the 
activities of a Swedish arms producer that used both Swiss bank secrecy as well as 
the services of Singapore as official end-user of its arms, to keep the business 
running against all national and foreign regulations. In connection with Belgium 
he writes: 
 
“(Belgium) earned a triple notoriety – the products of its own industry were 
available essentially on a come-on, come-all basis; it played host to a large 
assortment of traffickers in other countries’ weapons; and it was the world 
centre for the organization of the mercenary forces that were doing so much 
to drive up the demand for the equipment being offered.” (Naylor, 1995b) 
 
Besides suitable territories for all kinds of products, there is a market for 
convenient banking services. This market provides an effective hole in the 
regular banking structures around the world. All kinds of exotic places like the 
Cayman Islands, the Bahamas or closer to home, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, 
have an enormous potential to provide both legal actors as well as transnational 
criminals with essential services (Block & Weaver, 2004; Kwitny, 1987; Naylor, 
1987). According to Jack A. Blum: 
 
“the Cayman Islands are the world’s fifth-largest banking centre. The Islands 
are home to 520 banks and more corporations than people. The Netherlands 
Antilles are the fourth largest source of foreign investment in the United 
States. The British Virgin Islands are home to nearly 180,000 corporations” 
(Blum, 1999). 
 
The role of these territories is an issue which runs through accounts of all kinds 
of different transnational crimes. Not only to launder the proceeds, but to assist in 
the operation of these crimes. Despite the ease with which funds are laundered 
through these jurisdictions, it should not be forgotten that in absolute numbers, 
most laundering probably still takes place in the US and the UK as well as other 
highly regulated economies. 
 The typology of interfaces at the beginning of this chapter can be applied to 
these territories or states in the same way as to the interfacing organizations 
described earlier. Between actors in these countries and actors in the rest of the 
world, all kinds of symbiotic or antithetical interfaces can be distinguished: 
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outsourcing, collaboration, and reciprocity. On a more abstract level, the synergy 
interface is omnipresent. The legal trade in arms, art, cigarettes, and diamonds is 
benefiting from the activities of illegal counterparts that are facilitated by actors in 
the discussed territories, even if they are not involved in them. It increases the 
market for all these commodities, while they (the legal actors) do not bear the 




This chapter started with a discussion of the typology of interfaces developed by 
Passas. He defined a typology with four antithetical and eight symbiotic interfaces 
between legal and illegal actors. Each type from the typology was described and 
discussed. As a result, I decided to leave two symbiotic interfaces out of the 
typology. The definitions of the other interfaces were clarified although the 
boundaries between the different types cannot be drawn meticulously in practice. 
However, each type aims at a distinct type of relationship between legal and 
illegal. All types together provide an analytical tool with which the legal–illegal 
interface can be described in all kinds of situations, for all kinds of different 
crimes. Therefore, the typology provides at least an analytical tool to describe 
different relationships between legal and illegal actors. 
 However, beyond the particular interfaces between a single legal and illegal 
actor, I have argued that one can look at interfaces at a number of other levels. 
First of all, there are categories of individuals who act as intermediaries or brokers 
between legal and illegal actors. Secondly, there are legitimate organizations that 
connect the legal and illegal part of transnational transactions. Meanwhile, these 
individuals or organizations launder the merchandise which is the subject of the 
transaction. The legitimate organizations can be seen as an interfacing 
organization between the ‘upper world’ and ‘underworld’. With this, they can be 
understood as holes in the boundaries between the legitimate and illegitimate part 
of a line of business. Thirdly, there are territories, or even whole states, that also 
provide loopholes in the international system. These territories can be seen as 
macro-level interfaces between different legal and illegal actors. 
 In the following chapters, the different extensions of the typology will be 
discussed in more detail. In chapter 3, individuals and legal organizations are 
discussed as interface between legal and illegal actors. Chapter 4 will focus on 
jurisdictions as interfaces. Thereafter, the findings from these chapters will be 
used to develop an analytical model, the so-called lock model, with which to 
understand the role of ‘institutionalized’ interfaces. In chapters 6 to 9, the 
empirical study of the illicit art and antiquities trade will be described and used to 
test the findings from the previous chapters. Finally, chapter 10 will summarize 
the conclusions from the whole study and formulate recommendations for future 
criminological studies as well as public policies. 
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 The new typology and the lock model should be seen as an instrument useful 
for ordering, classification, and description of observations and data in the field of 
transnational crime. As such, it is not meant to be, presently, a theory producing 
hypotheses on how the world of transnational crime functions, but as a 
classification instrument, helping to understand and describe what is happening 
there. Testing a classification typology boils down to investigating whether it is 
indeed useful for the function it has to serve: understanding and describing the 
structure and functionality of interfaces in a field not well researched up to now. 
The degree to which the typology succeeds in producing a comprehensible 






INDIVIDUALS AND LEGITIMATE ORGANIZATIONS AS INTERFACE 
 
 
In the previous chapter a new the typology of interfaces was developed based on 
the analyses of the interface typology of Passas with which chapter two started. 
Many concrete examples of a number of different interfaces between legal and 
illegal were given. On both sides of the line between legal and illegal, the actors 
involved are usually ‘organizations’ in one way or another. To be sure, 
organizations are not meant in a traditional sense here. They also include loose 
networks of criminals. These criminal organizations or networks usually consist 
of groups of people who are engaged in some transnational crime together, that 
does not consist of only a one-off collaboration. 
 In addition to the fact that actors are usually seen as organizations, the 
interfaces are thought to be between legal and illegal actors. They are thus 
interpreted as a relationship, for example, the interface between arms producers 
and rebel groups in some far away country. Or the interface that exists between 
an international bank and a drug dealing criminal organization. In these cases, the 
interface is something which links the two actors. One could also see it as 
something in between, something which does not constitute a part of either the 
legal or illegal actor. 
 Against this idea of an interface between actors, another idea was suggested in 
the previous chapter. This idea consists of actors as interface, in addition to 
interfaces between actors. An actor as interface can be imagined on at least three 
levels: individuals as interface, legal organizations as interface and jurisdictions as 
interface. In this chapter the focus will be on individuals and legal organizations 
as interface. However, it should be stressed that the different levels can hardly be 
separated. Individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions are mutually facilitating 
deals that would otherwise be impossible. The first part of this chapter will focus 
on individuals and the second part on legal organizations. 
 
3.1  Individuals as interface 
 
When can individuals be understood as interfaces? Usually, individuals will be 
part of either the legal or the illegal part of an interfacing relationship. However, 
they can also be part of both worlds in certain specific configurations. They 
combine regular connections with legal and illegal actors. As far as their dealings 
with legal actors are concerned, they act as legal actors themselves. This can 
either be under the cloak of a legal enterprise or when they act as private persons 
without known criminal background. As far as the dealings with criminal actors 
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are concerned, they act as criminal actors themselves. This can be for example as 
buyer of ‘blood’ diamonds or smuggled cigarettes. 
 The fact that individuals can take another form in another setting is nothing 
new of course. Historian Mark Haller (1990) pointed at the different roles played 
by a range of individuals that were linked with each other in both legal as well as 
illegal enterprises. These individuals combined legal businesses in one sector with 
an illegal business in another sector. However, the roles of individuals that are 
analyzed in this chapter are different in at least one respect. In each case, the 
individual plays the different roles in the same type of business. For example, he 
buys stolen or outlawed goods in one country and sells them legally in another 
country. As a result of the somewhat schizophrenic character of the discussed 
individuals, the interface between legal and illegal cannot be solely positioned 
between this individual and his legal or illegal counterpart. The interface actually 
coincides with the individual. It is through the individual that goods are 
laundered from the black market to the legal trade, or fluently migrated from a 








figure 4: different views of the same individual acting as interface between legal
and illegal
A) individual relationships between criminal acting as a businessman
(legal part) or on the black market (illegal part)




It has to be stressed that the idea of individuals as an interface is not an alternative 
for the types of interfaces described in the previous chapter. An individual can be 
seen as an interface under very specific circumstances, in addition to being 
involved in a number of interfacing relationships. Usually, one can discern two 
levels of interfaces. First of all, a number of concrete relationships between the 
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individual and legal and illegal actors around him. These relationships can be 
described with the typology of the previous chapter. Secondly, the individual as 
interface through which an illegal input is laundered into legal goods or services. 
The different abstraction levels are represented in the figure above. 
 
In situation A and B the individual is represented by the circle. The first circle 
contains the ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ part of the individual and the relationships 
between these parts and other actors in the legal and illegal domain. All 
relationships can be designated by one of the interfaces from the interface 
typology. At the same time, these relationships together show how the 
individuals act as interface by themselves. An example from the (conflict) 
diamond trade can illustrate both situation A and B. 
 A diamond merchant has a legitimate business in Belgium where he sells 
diamonds in his store. He buys a part of his merchandise legally at diamonds 
auctions in Israel and India. Another part of his merchandise is bought directly in 
Africa in a source or transit country, or from a particular source, that is boycotted 
by the United Nations. This part of the trade consists of what is usually described 
as conflict diamonds. As private person he regularly travels to this country to buy 
diamonds there in contravention of this international boycott. Thereafter, he will 
take the diamonds back to Belgium or use an African smuggler to do this for 
him. Sometimes, they will have to bribe officials at the airport before they can 
board their flight back to Belgium without any further red tape. At other times 
they obtain so-called Kimberley Process certificates, also with sufficient bribes. In 
many cases they may just take the diamonds with them, hidden in cloth or in a 
double bottom suitcase. In Belgium he mixes his new merchandise with the 
merchandise from legitimate channels like the diamond auctions. Thereafter, the 
diamonds are sold to regular customers or to other dealers who may or may not 
know the illegitimate source of the diamonds. 
 In terms of the interface typology, a number of concrete interfaces can be 
distinguished here. The arrows in situation A visualize these interfaces. The 
dealer and the African supplier of diamonds share a symbiotic relationship. 
Depending on the exact division of labor between them, this relationship can be 
designated as either reciprocity, collaboration or outsourcing. The dealer, or the 
smuggler that he hires, also share a symbiotic relationship with the official at the 
airport. Depending on the even or uneven power between them, this can either 
be co-optation (with the official as the most powerful) or reciprocity (in case of 
more or less even power). The same goes for the relationship between the dealer 
and the provider of the Kimberley Process certificates. As soon as the diamonds 
are in Belgium, they are sold to individual customers or other dealers. The 
relationship between the dealer and an individual customer, or between the 
dealer and another dealer, can be designated as reciprocity. Finally, synergy exists 
between the dealer, together with all other dealers involved in the import and 
sale of conflict diamonds, and the overall market. This market benefits and 
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ultimately depends upon the input of conflict diamonds, as well as diamonds 
from legitimate sources. 
 A critical reader can argue that several of the above interfaces are in fact no 
legal–illegal interfaces at all. The relationship between the dealer and his suppliers 
in Africa is an interface between two illegal actors. At the same time, the 
relationship between the dealer and his customers and the diamond market in 
general is the relationship between a legitimate businessman and other legal actors 
or entities. As soon as one understands the inconsistencies in the above described 
example, one can start to come to grips with the analytical conception of an 
individual as interface instead of an individual as one end of a relationship called 
interface. When the relationships in the illegal domain and the relationships in the 
legal domain are connected and run through the same individual, this individual 
can be seen as the interface. Besides being the interface between the legal and 
illegal domain on an abstract level, all kinds of concrete interfaces can be 
designated. Some of them are between legal and illegal actors, but not all of them 
are. 
 In situation B there is no further specification of the individual as interface 
between the legal and illegal domain. To be sure, situation A and B are really the 
same. The difference is one of perspective, not an empirical fact. In situation A, 
all the different relationships are visualized by the arrows on both sides of the 
individual and the individual is portrayed as a combination of an illegal and legal 
part. In situation B, the individual is portrayed as one actor on the imaginary line 
between legal and illegal. Through this individual, transnational criminal activities 
are laundered. 
 In practice, most diamonds will thus make it to the official market in 
numerous devious ways. As soon as they are sold on one of the large diamond 
auctions or by dealers in Antwerp or elsewhere, they have been effectively 
laundered. This may be done with the knowledge or even active involvement of 
these actors, but it may also be done before.23 In the next sections, a number of 
examples of ‘interfacing’ individuals will be discussed. Thereafter, two models of 
these individuals will be developed. 
 
3.1.1 Case studies of individuals as interface 
 
A number of concrete examples can elucidate the notion of individuals as 
interface between legal and illegal actors engaged in transnational crime. The 
examples will first be described and secondly discussed in terms of interfaces. The 
first person to discuss is Monzer Al Kassar. Since the 1970s this Syrian has been a 
major arms dealer, and connected to a number of terrorist groups as well as the 
illegal drug trade (Brunwasser, 2002; Morstein, 1989; Naylor, 2001; Wood & 
                                                 
23  A range of reports by Global Witness provides in-depth coverage of all areas where conflict 
diamonds are mined and the illicit trade connected with these areas (Global Witness, 1998; 
2003; 2004a; 2004b). 
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Peleman, 1999). Secondly, Victor Bout, a Russian businessmen and former KGB 
agent, will be looked at. Since the end of the Cold War he has played a 
significant role in the illegal arms trade in Africa and Asia (Kochan, 2005; Verlöy, 
2002; Wood & Peleman, 1999). The third individual is Fouad Abbas, a major 
wholesaler in drugs for the Benelux and other regions, as well as a diamond 
dealer in Belgium (De Stoop, 1998). 
 
Monzer Al Kassar 
 
The first person here is the Syrian national Monzer Al Kassar, described by the 
US Drug Enforcement Administration as one of the most important figures in 
the international drug trade (Wood & Peleman, 1999). The US Senate 
investigation on BCCI Affairs referred to Al Kassar as a ‘Syrian drug trafficker, 
terrorist and arms trafficker’ (Wood & Peleman, 1999). This sums up most of his 
activities from the 1970s onward into the 1990s, although in the US he is mainly 
known for his role in Iran Contra affair. However, his range of activities in many 
fields in a number of countries during more than two decades is covered by 
numerous academic and non-academic authors (Brunwasser, 2002; Morstein, 
1989, Naylor, 2001; Roth, 2000). It is almost impossible to sum up his major 
actions with a brief summary. However, a few should be mentioned both 
because they are relevant by themselves, as well as because they point out crucial 
characteristics of many individuals like the ones discussed here. Al Kassar should 
not be seen as a unique person but merely as an example. Other arms dealers can 
be mentioned that have a lot in common with Al Kassar, like for example the 
Armenian/Lebanese Sarkis Soghanalian and the Saudi Adnan Khasnoggi. 
 Al Kassar started his career with stealing cars and using them to smuggle 
drugs. He was convicted for drug dealing in Paris in 1979 and ran into trouble 
for more of the same crime several times (Morstein, 1989:60). However, he was 
involved with drug traffickers in several other ways both before and after that 
date. He was sought by Interpol for swapping weapons supplied by the Italian 
mafia for drugs in 1977 (Morstein, 1989; Wood & Peleman, 1999). The deal 
involved terrorist groups who supplied drugs to an Italian mafia organization. 
They marketed the drugs in Italy and connected Al Kassar with Italian arms 
producers who were willing to send weapons to terrorists. Al Kassar organized 
the whole scheme and got a part of the money involved although he sympathized 
with the terrorists. Besides his connection with Middle Eastern drug producers, 
he allegedly was the investor behind at least one major Dutch wholesaler in 
drugs, according to the detailed account of events by Morstein (1989:172-174). 
When this wholesaler was arrested in June 1986 in Morocco he allegedly sent a 
message to Al Kassar that he should get him out of prison or else end up there 
himself (Morstein, 1989:189). However, a personal attempt by Al Kassar to set 
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him free failed.24 In the same month Al Kassar’s connection with terrorist 
organizations in the Middle East was legally proven when he was convicted in his 
absence by a Paris court. Because of his active involvement in a Palestinian 
terrorist organization he was sentenced to eight years in prison. Despite this 
sentence, Al Kassar later brokered a deal with the French government when a 
number of French hostages had to be freed in Lebanon. Al Kassar arranged the 
release of the hostages in exchange for French arms for Iran (Morstein, 
1989:244). Besides the French, the CIA allegedly contacted Al Kassar for the 
same purpose. If Al Kassar would assist in freeing the hostages in Lebanon, the 
Americans would allow Al Kassar to continue his drug transports from the 
Middle East to the United States via Frankfurt in West-Germany (American 
Radio Works, 2005; Lee & Solomon, 1990).25 
 Despite his sympathies for the mentioned organizations and his involvement 
in the drug trade, his core business was arms. Al Kassar was under investigation in 
Switzerland for violating the arms embargo on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
He brokered a deal in which officially arms from the Polish state arms producer 
Cenrex were exported to the defense ministry of Yemen (Brunwasser, 2002; 
Naylor, 2001:346). In 1992 the arms, 27 containers, were shipped by a Honduras 
registered ship and docked at Ceuta (a Spanish territory in Morocco) for supplies. 
From Ceuta the ship headed not for Yemen, but instead for Reijka, Croatia, 
where it unloaded. In the same year, Al Kassar undermined the UN arms 
embargo against Somalia. From the same sources in Poland he planned a 
shipment to this war-torn country. This time, the end-user certificate was signed 
by Latvian authorities who were given a share of the arms shipment before it 
departed for Somalia (UN, 2003:19-20). 
Furthermore, Al Kassar was involved in the Iran Contra affair and in the sale of 
weapons to Libya in 1983. To be sure, he did not only sell arms to organizations 
or states he sympathized with or did not care about. An example of this is the fact 
that he sold arms to both Iraq and Iran during the 1980s. He purchased his arms 
in several European countries like Spain, Portugal, Austria and Poland (Morstein, 
1989). 
 To be effective in his work, Al Kassar managed to create a legal cover for 
many of his activities. In Austria he grounded a legitimate trading company 
                                                 
24  Eighteen months later he was paroled at the birthday of the Moroccan king. Several years 
ago, he was sentenced to another year in prison in the Netherlands because of his smuggle 
of about thousand kilos of hashish from Spain to the Netherlands (Eerenbeemt, 2003). At 
the time of writing (2005) he is awaiting his sentence in the US for his role in wholesale 
trafficking of XTC. See: Eerenbeemt, M. van den & K. van Keken (2005) ‘Charmante 
leugenaar is justitie niet altijd te slim af’ De Volkskrant, October 11th. 
25  These events again were allegedly connected with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 
above Lockerbie in Scotland. Aboard this flight was a regular courier for Al-Kassar’s drug 
running operation, as well as several CIA officials who were on their way to the US to tell 
their superiors about Al-Kassar’s role (American RadioWorks, 2005; Lee & Solomon, 
1990). 
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together with his brother. Furthermore, he allegedly obtained a significant share 
in a commercial bank in Spain during the 1980s. Furthermore, he grounded his 
own airline, Jet Air. Besides using the airline himself, a number of Austrian 
politicians were regular customers. Through Udo Proksch, who will be discussed 
in chapter 4, he was introduced to many Austrian politicians in the so-called 
Club 45 in Vienna. This elite network will be discussed in the chapter on states 
because of its relevance for the subject of the legal–illegal interfaces. Besides the 
legitimate businesses, Al Kassar organized some sort of legal immunity for 
himself. At different times he had at his disposal a diplomatic passport of Yemen 
and Argentina, a fake passport of Morocco and a special Syrian pass (Morstein, 
1989; Naylor, 2001). In addition to this, he enjoyed active protection of the 
Syrian government and local authorities in Spain. Furthermore, he was rather 
well-connected in Argentina for some time during the time of the presidency of 
Menem, which left him with an Argentine passport (Romero, 2002:298). When 
Al Kassar tried to obtain the Austrian nationality, one of the major Austrian arms 
producers send a letter of recommendation to the authorities although the 
attempt finally failed. Finally, Al Kassar was said to be well connected behind the 
Iron Curtain, in particular in the German Democratic Republic and with its 
deputy minister of foreign trade, Schalck-Golodkowski26 and in Poland 
(Morstein, 1989). During the Swiss investigation into the alleged sanctions-
busting in Yugoslavia, Al Kassar explained in 1993 that he was a diplomatic 
representative from Yemen in Poland which seemed to confirm his Polish 
connection (Brunwasser, 2002). 
 From a perspective of interfaces, the case of Monzer Al Kassar is too diverse 
to describe in full. Al Kassar had different types of relationships with a range of 
intelligence agencies, arms producers, terrorist groups, heroin producers, military 
officials, and politicians. Although he allegedly smuggled heroin during the 1970s 
and 1980s, his core business was the arms trade. In this trade, his role as interface 
was clear in a number of cases. Each time he organized schemes in which arms 
from legitimate companies, or from the stocks of East Bloc states, were shipped 
to outlawed destinations or organizations. The arms were thus in fact funneled 
from the legitimate source onto the black market and further to the outlawed 
destination or organization. Because of Al Kassar’s role, the different parties 
                                                 
26  Not much is known about this relationship. The only account of events is provided by 
Morstein who wrote his book before 1989. This organization of this enterprising East-
German minister was also engaged in smuggling a range of commodities like toxic waste, 
oil and stolen and confiscated art (Von Bülow, 2003). During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Stasi-controlled Kommerzielle Koordinierung (KoKo), or Commercial Coordination, led 
by Schalck-Golodkowski, raided the homes of an undetermined number of wealthy GDR 
citizens, taking jewelry, works of art, stamp collections, and other valuables. Schalck-
Golodkowski was to funnel more than DM50 million into the beleaguered East-German 
economy each year. Almost all of the property, the value of which historians have been 
unable to determine, was first ‘sold’ to KoKo’s holding firm Art-and-Antiquities-GmbH 
before flowing into West-Germany (Bischof, 2003; Blutke, 1990). This will be further 
discussed in chapter 8. 
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involved did not have to deal with each other directly. Furthermore, with end-
user certificates from countries that were in fact not end-users of the arms, Al 
Kassar provided legitimate destinations for the legitimate sources of the arms 
involved. This case study thus shows the opposite mechanism as the one 
mentioned above, involving the trade in conflict diamonds. Whereas the conflict 
diamonds were laundered and funneled in the legal market, the arms were taken 




The second person to discuss is Victor Bout. He is native of Tajikistan, who uses 
several aliases and graduated in 1991 from Moscow’s Military Institute of Foreign 
Languages which left him reportedly fluent in six languages (Kochan, 2005; 
Niekerk & Verlöy, 2002; Verlöy, 2002). Although Bout is discussed in this 
chapter, he is the middle of a range of legitimate companies, and employees. His 
empire is a maze of individuals and companies, which employs some 300 people 
and owns and operates some 40 to 60 aircraft, including the largest fleet of 
Antonov cargo planes in the world, according to an investigation by the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) (Niekerk & Verloy, 
2002). However, he is discussed here because it is only Bout himself who is the 
constant factor in all activities, and who is the sole architect of all schemes. 
Nevertheless, one could also choose to discuss him within the context of the 
legitimate organizations that are the topic of the next chapter. Like Al Kassar, he 
should not be seen as a unique person in this business although he is presently 
probably one of the most active and successful. 
 Bout made use of the large stock of arms in the former Soviet Union. After 
the demise of Communism, these stocks, as well as those in East European 
countries like Bulgaria became available for arms dealers like Bout (Naylor, 1998; 
Wood & Pelemans, 1999).27 Such dealers funneled these arms to the black 
market where they were sold to guerilla movements, boycotted governments and 
other outlawed destinations. 
 Not all of Bout’s activities were illegal. On the one hand, he was allegedly 
involved in the (legal) trade in all kinds of commodities as well as transport 
services. On the other hand he was engaged in arms deals that might have been 
very risky but nonetheless legal. In 1993, for example, Bout funded the Transavia 
Export Cargo Company, which flew Belgian peacekeepers to Somalia as part of 
operation Restore Hope, the US-led famine relief effort. In 1999, he flew 
platoons of Pakistani UN peacekeepers to East Timor. Around the beginning of 
the 1990s, he regularly organized arms shipments from Eastern Europe to 
Afghanistan. Bout had struck up a friendship with Ahmed Shah Massoud, the 
                                                 
27  For a discussion of the important role of Bulgaria in providing arms for conflict areas in 
Africa see: Howe (2004). 
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renowned commander of what later became the Northern Alliance (the 
resistance movement against the Taliban) and who was assassinated by Al Qaeda 
on September 9, 2001. Supplying the Taliban or any of the other groups was not 
actually illegal under international law during the 1990s. The UN only put an 
embargo on arming the Taliban on December 19, 2000 (Kochan, 2005:40).28 
 Bout became a major player in the illicit arms trade in 1995 when he started 
working from Ostende, Belgium, where he stayed until 1997 (Wood & Peleman, 
1999). In March 1995, Bout and a business partner founded the Trans Aviation 
Network Group (TAN). TAN was based in Ostende as well as in Sharjah in the 
United Arab Emirates. Since 1995 Bout has been involved in a long list of arms 
trafficking operations to numerous embargoed African countries like Angola, 
Sierra Leone, and Liberia. As soon as he came to the attention of law 
enforcement agencies, he did not let the arms be flown directly from Eastern 
Europe to Africa. They would first fly from Eastern Europe to Sharjah. There the 
arms would be combined with legitimate merchandise and directed to major 
African airports. As soon as the planes arrived at these airports, the arms 
disappeared. They had been dropped off secretly along the way in rebel 
controlled territories. In 1996, Bout registered an airline, Air Cess, in Charles 
Taylor’s Liberia. A year later, he had to leave Belgium after pressure from human 
rights groups. Thereafter, the United Arab Emirates became the primary base of 
operation. According to the United Nations, almost all of Bout’s companies 
operate out of the United Arab Emirates. Companies registered in Swaziland, the 
Central African Republic, Liberia, and Equatorial Guinea used Sharjah airport as 
an ‘airport of convenience’. In May 1997, Bout extracted President Mobutu 
from Zaire when rebels seized control of the country. In August of the same year 
Bout rearranged the documentation of part of his fleet, creating Air Cess 
Swaziland (Pty), registered in Swaziland. Some of the planes that had been 
registered in Liberia were registered on the Swaziland aviation register, with the 
tails repainted accordingly. In reality Air Cess Swaziland operated from 
Pietersburg, South Africa, until Bout was pressured out of the country by both 
the authorities as well as local motorcycle gangs (Kochan, 2005:40-46). South 
Africa was not the only country that Bout had to leave. In Central Africa, a 
corrupt director of civil aviation had registered dozens of planes from 
Centrafrican, an airline that had only a license to operate three small aircraft. The 
airline was owned by three companies from Gibraltar and these companies were 
owned by Bout and a business partner. In January 2000, the president of the 
Central African Republic discovered this fraud and closed down Centrafrican and 
de-registered its planes. Bout was sentenced to two years in absentia although a 
special court nullified this sentence three months later (Kochan, 2005:49-50). 
                                                 
28  Bout has also been accused of arming the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These allegations, 
however, have never been proven. 
CHAPTER 3 
50 
 One of the primary destinations of arms shipments brokered by Bout during 
1997 and 1998, were the UNITA rebels in Angola. Bout, 
 
“supplied UNITA with $14 million worth of arms through a company he 
established in Gibraltar, called KAS Engineering. The arms included 100 anti-
aircraft missiles, over 6,000 anti-tank rockets, 20,000 mortar bombs, as well as 
cannons, assault rifles, and a mind-boggling amount of ammunition, enough 
to keep a huge army going for several years, which is exactly what it did. Al 
this weaponry came from Bulgaria” (Kochan, 2005:45). 
 
Bout used end-user certificates from Togo that later turned out to be forgeries. 
They were, however, based on a genuine end-user certificate given to UNITA 
by the Togolese authorities in 1997. 
 Bout not only catered for outlawed rebels but also worked for several 
governments. Among them was the Rwandan government. Bout’s aircraft were 
used to transport coltan and cassiterite, two locally-mined minerals illegally 
plundered in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the Rwandan authorities 
(Kochan, 2005:48).29 
 In early 2001, Bout relocated from Sharjah to neighboring Ajman, where he 
set up office in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Building (Niekerk & 
Verloy, 2002). 
 From the information available on Bout’s activities, some interesting parallels 
can be drawn with Al Kassar. Niekerk and Verlöy, in their article on Bout, write 
that: 
 
“Although intelligence documents reveal that Bout is ‘under investigation in a 
number of western countries’ and that ‘Interpol has opened a file on him’, 
Bout continuous to operate freely, shuttling between the United Arab 
Emirates, Russia, Central Asia and Africa’s war zones” (2002:3). 
 
Al Kassar’s biography written by Morstein, showed exactly the same situation for 
Al Kassar during the 1980s. In that last case, it could be largely explained why 
nobody interfered with Al Kassar’s entrepreneurial activities. A mixture of 
political friendships, blackmail and corruption ensured his continuous freedom, 
although he was officially sentenced to prison terms several times. It still has to be 
explained whether Bout’s successes until about 2004 has been primarily a 
                                                 
29  Coltan is a key element in cell phones, computer chips, nuclear reactors, and PlayStations. 
The market for the mineral has greatly increased in recent years, exacerbating conflict in 
Congo. It illustrates that diamonds and oil are not the only commodities fuelling civil wars. 
Cassiterite is a tin oxide mineral that is also used as a gemstone and collector specimens 
when quality crystals can be found. See also: H. Vesperini (2001) ‘Congo coltan’s rush’ 
BBC News, August 1st, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1468772.stm (Visited October 
24th 2005). 
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symptom of a bankrupt system of controls on the transnational trade in arms, or 
the result of political protection like in Al Kassar’s case. 
 Since the war in Iraq started, reports have been surfacing connecting Bout 
with the war efforts. According to several sources, the US and UK have been 
using his extensive mercenary services in Iraq (Godoy, 2004; Remy, 2004).30 
Furthermore, according to journalist Jean-Philippe Remy: 
 
“By virtue of his participation in the Liberian drama and his violation of the 
embargo that prohibited arms exports there, Viktor Bout was up till now 
subject to two types of United Nations sanctions, prohibiting him from 
foreign travel and planning a freeze of his foreign assets. Now Viktor Bout’s 
situation is about to change. Although the United States, involved in the 
Liberian dossier, had committed to make sure those responsible for the 
atrocities committed during the country’s civil war were punished and 
promised a reward for whoever should deliver Charles Taylor to international 
justice, it ‘is working to erase the name of the arms merchant from the list of 
people subject to sanctions,’ a diplomatic source asserts.” (Remy, 2004). 
 
When two US Cabinet members, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the 
Deputy Secretary of State, were questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on these and other allegations they indicated to be unaware of Bout’s 
role in Iraq and would further look into the matter.31 Nevertheless, since May 
2004 reports about Bout’s involvement in Iraq keep appearing in the US and 
other media (Daly, 2004; Isikoff, 2004).32 According to a report in the Los 
Angeles Times: “Planes operated by Irbis and Air Bas flew at least 142 times into 
Baghdad International Airport after the Iraq invasion, Air Force fuel records 
show. The planes shuttled in supplies and personnel for the U.S. military, Federal 
Express and the American contractor KBR”.33 Finally, in April 2005, the US 
imposed financial sanctions on companies aligned to Victor Bout.34 It remains to 
be seen whether this means that none of Bout’s companies will operate in Iraq or 
Afghanistan anymore. 
 
From a perspective of interfaces Bout’s activities are even harder to describe that 
those of Al Kassar. In a relatively short period of about twelve years, Bout 
                                                 
30  The sources are allegedly French and other unspecified diplomats.  
31  Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 18, 2004; Subject: Iraq: The 
way ahead. Chaired by Senator Richard Lugar. See: http://feingold.senate.gov/ 
statements/04/05/2004622A35.html (visited July 27th 2005). 
32  Braun, S., J. Pasternak & T.C. Miller (2004) ‘Blacklisted Russian tied to Iraq deals – the 
alleged arms broker is behind four cargo firms used by US contractors, officials say’ Los 
Angeles Times, December 14th. 
33  Ibid..  
34  Braun, S. ‘The US freezes the assets of 30 firms and four people linked to Russian Victor 
Bout’ The Los Angeles Times, April 27th. 
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operated in dozens of countries. He was involved in practically all armed conflicts 
in Africa during the 1990s and thereafter. To some extent he was a typical post-
Cold War figure. His business was supplied by the superfluous Soviet stocks of 
arms, and benefited from the freedom of operation during this period. During 
the Cold War, many arms deals were in some way controlled or sanctioned by 
the two superpowers, but thereafter it seemed to some extent a free for all, that 
is, for characters like Bout (Brogan & Zarca, 1983; Naylor, 1998; Wood & 
Pelemans, 1999). 
 All kinds of interfacing relationships with heads of state, rebel groups, arms 
providers and others enabled Bout to build up his global enterprise. Most of the 
time, political actors outsourced their arms purchases to Bout. Sometimes Bout’s 
transport companies shipped arms and returned diamonds or other commodities 
from conflict zones. This resulted in still other interfaces, such as reciprocity 
between Bout and the purchases of these conflict diamonds and synergy between 
the activities of Bout and the overall legitimate diamond market. Furthermore, a 
co-optation interface can be found between Bout and local authorities in many 
countries. The unlawful registration of dozens of planes in the Central African 
Republic was just one example. 
 Besides the individual interfaces, Bout served as an interface by himself. 
Through Bout and his different partners, arms were funneled onto the black 
market while conflict diamonds were ultimately added to the legitimate market. 
Although many other examples can be discussed besides Bout, he is at least 




The last person to discuss here had strong links with both Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The Pakistani drugs and diamond dealer Fouad Abbas had his base 
of operation in Antwerp, Belgium, from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s 
(Brouwer, 1996; Roox, 2001; Stoop, 1998). Abbas moved to Belgium when his 
enterprises in Dubai went into serious trouble after the war between Iraq and 
Iran broke out. In Antwerp he grounded TTS Diamonds and rapidly established 
a network of businesses. At the height of his power, he had diamond companies 
in Antwerp, Geneva, London, Tel Aviv, and Bombay. Furthermore, he 
exploited a diamond mine in Guinea and had other enterprises and real estate in 
the UK, Canada, the US, Singapore and Pakistan (Roox, 2001). 
 Besides his diamond business, he became a major player in the drug 
trafficking business in Europe. He made use of his connections to a number of 
large Pakistan producers of hashish, under whom Ayub Alfridi. Abbas was said to 
have closed a deal with two major importers of hashish in the Netherlands. 
Between 1987 and 1994 Abbas brokered deals amounting to 400 tons of hashish. 
The profits from this trade formed part of the explanation of Abbas’ successes in 
the diamond business, which was at the same time used to launder the money. 
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Through a bank in Antwerp, Abbas was able to transfer huge amounts of money 
all over the world. According to Schaap (1999:70), Abbas was able to funnel 
more than 48 million Dutch guilders into his accounts at this bank during the 
period from March 1989 to February 1992. The cashier at the bank became an 
instant millionaire, until the bank went bankrupt and he went into prison for 
months, together with the bank’s president. 
 Abbas’ activities in Belgium went fine as long as he could rely on his contact 
with high placed officials, among which the head of the Antwerp drug squad. 
However, at some point Abbas these officials ran into trouble themselves and 
Abbas soon afterwards. To save himself from Belgium law enforcement, he 
closed a deal with the Dutch authorities to testify against Johan V., in addition to 
a payment of 2 million guilders to the Dutch tax authorities. However, this only 
saved him for some time. After having moved to England, he was extradited by 
the UK to Belgium on money laundering charges. 
 
From a perspective of interfaces, Abbas differs in one important respect from Al 
Kassar and Bout. Abbas did combine the purely illegal drug trade, with the in 
principle legal diamond trade. However, because these trades were strongly 
connected in Abbas’ case, his dealings are discussed as a case study here. He did 
not ‘launder’ his drug business or ‘blacken’ his diamond business, but used the 
legal trade to launder the proceeds from his illegal trade. To operate with relative 
impunity he exploited his high-level political and criminal contacts. 
 
3.1.2 Common characteristics 
 
The individuals described here seem to be unique in a number of ways. 
However, there are some general characteristics that many of them share. These 
characteristics can explain why they are able to connect legal and illegal in such a 
successful way. 
 The first characteristic that all the discussed individuals have in common is 
their base of operations in at least two different countries. Al Kassar, for example, 
operated from Austria, Spain and Syria. Besides simply staying in these countries, 
they have a well-developed network of relations which helps them to do business 
from these countries. Furthermore, most of the individuals discussed or 
mentioned here possess at least one foreign passport besides the passport of their 
state of origin. Bout is known to possess a range of passports and the same is true 
for Al Kassar, which seriously impeded any effort to arrest the latter (if any 
country was willing to do so). Of course, possession of several passports can 
hardly be said to be unique among transnational criminals. However, these 
passports are often false and therefore of limited use. The passports that were 
mentioned here are real and (at least in the case of Al Kassar) diplomatic passes, 
which cannot be compared to regular passes. 
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 A second characteristic which some of the individuals share is the ability to 
arrange all kinds of political protection, or compel a passive stance by means of 
direct or indirect blackmail. Part of this is simply corruption, but it in the case of 
Al Kassar, Bout and, to a lesser degree, Abbas; it developed way beyond ordinary 
bribes or kickbacks. Being unassailable for law enforcement is clearly something 
different from mere corruption as far as European countries are concerned. The 
primary example here is Al Kassar who, for example, closed a deal with the 
French government. While being sentenced to eight years in Paris, he negotiated 
without any problem with the French authorities and several opportunities to 
arrest Al Kassar were ignored. In general, Al Kassar was rather well-connected in 
Austrian politics and through his business interests in Spain. In the Middle East, 
Al Kassar was directly connected to the Syrian government, and his relation with 
the Yemen authorities was good enough to be provided with a diplomatic 
passport 
 A third characteristic is the knowledge and use of the financial system and the 
mobilization of numerous legitimate companies. As with the other characteristics, 
this is not claimed to be unique for transnational criminals. However, the scale 
and sophistication of this factor differs for most criminals. Whereas criminals 
often have to rely on the knowledge of others to use the opportunities of banks, 
foreign registered companies, and tax havens, the persons discussed here were to 
some degree experts on these matters themselves. However, the relative risk 
involved in financial operations is illustrated by the fact that both Abbas and Al 
Kassar ran into legal trouble not because of their core business (arms and drugs) 
but because of their trail in the financial system. It indicates the strategic 
importance of adequate knowledge and use of the financial system, to operate 
effectively as a criminal or to be able to track them down as law enforcement 
agency. 
 The last important characteristic is related to the types of crime. In most cases, 
the type of crime or one of the types involved consists of crimes where goods are 
laundered in some way or another. This can be facilitated by inconsistencies 
between legislation in the countries involved in transnational crime. The best 
examples here are the arms trade and the trade in conflict diamonds. 
 
3.1.3 Brokers in transnational crime 
 
One can distinguish two types of brokers in transnational crime. First of all, 
brokers that close deals between actors in different countries that cannot deal 
with each other directly. It may be that national law, international law, UN 
resolutions or other provisions stand in the way of a scheme. In that case a way 
has to be found to proceed with the deal without any of the actors getting into 
legal or political difficulties. By nature, a broker does not personally buy illegal 
goods or services, but functions as an intermediary for buyer and seller. As with 
other types of brokers in the legal economy, he gets a cut from the deal as 
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commission. This might be a substantial part of the total sum of money or goods 
involved. 
 Whereas the first type of brokers starts from the assumption that the broker is 
really on his own, the second type incorporates the realities of cases that do 
involve a range of people or organizations. Often, brokers employ many people 
at specific stages of their activities. Furthermore, part of the business of such a 
broker may be legitimate. As was mentioned before, Victor Bout can be 
understood to be such a broker. His empire is a maze of individuals and 
companies, which employs some 300 people and owns and operates some 40 to 
60 aircraft. On first sight, entities like this one look more like a huge criminal 
organization than a small brokering firm. However, there is a number of reasons 
for setting this type of criminal entity apart from well-known models like the 
transnational criminal networks, or criminal organizations. First of all, despite the 
potentially large number of people involved, their ties with the broker and his 
activities are very loose. For every new project, the broker decides which people 
to hire, and what kind of routes, means of transportation etc. to use. This implies 
an important difference with for example criminal networks. Although they are 
also known for their relative flexibility, they usually aim at a rather specific 
transnational smuggle, along one or more specific routes (see e.g. Auchlin & 
Gaberly, 1990; Bernasco & Bruinsma, 2004; Chin, 1999). Secondly, whereas 
criminal networks and organizations often have a transnational base because of 
the different people in different countries involved, the broker is really footloose 
himself. His base in several countries is at the same time part of the explanation 
of his capabilities to close complicated deals and connect legal and illegal entities 
in a smooth way. Thirdly, the broker can to some degree be compared to the 
strong leader of a criminal organization. Both have considerable power and lay 
down the course of action of the organization. However, whereas the leader of a 
criminal organization can often be replaced without the disintegration of the 
organization, this does not hold for the broker. He is a necessity for two reasons. 
First of all, there are usually hardly any people who are around him all the time 
who could try to step in his place. Secondly, and most importantly, the broker 
commands the ability to close difficult deals in which he has to operate both as a 
criminal and as a business man and has to have a huge network of relevant people 
with governments, large companies, as well as with other criminals. 
 
3.1.4 Transnational (criminal) dealers 
 
Besides the two types of brokers, one can distinguish so-called transnational 
(criminal) dealers. They share some characteristics with the brokers, like for 
example their base of operation in more than one country. Furthermore, through 
their activities they connect illegal with legal markets and launder their 
merchandise in the process. As opposed to most brokers, they have steady 
patterns of activities. They restrict themselves to the trade between two or three 
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particular countries, and usually do not divert to other fields of crime. From this 
perspective, some parallels can be drawn with transnational criminal networks. 
However, besides differences in structure, an important characteristic of the 
dealers is the fact that they are able to launder their merchandise, whereas 
criminal networks usually operate in purely illegal markets, like drug trafficking. 
 Examples of this type of dealer can be found in the trade in conflict diamonds, 
toxic waste or the illicit art and antiquities trade, where major inconsistencies in 
legislation between source and market countries create an arena where these 
dealers can operate in both the legal and illegal domain. The trade in conflict 
diamonds is particularly interesting because it is also indirectly or directly linked 
with other types of crime, like the illicit arms trade, money laundering and tax 
evasion. A number of publications shed some light on this relatively unknown 
field of crime (Fijnaut, 2002; Kochan, 2004; NIZA, 2001; Peleman, 2002; 
Tailby, 2002). 
 The dealers operate alone or primarily alone. The dealers are transforming the 
legal status of their merchandise while they smuggle it from source to destination 
country, or organize this smuggling operation. This means that they act as 
interfaces by themselves, despite numerous individual relationships with other 
legal or illegal actors. 
 
3.1.5 Conclusion section 3.1: Individuals as interfaces 
 
In the above sections, the role of a specific category of individuals in transnational 
crime was discussed. These individuals are able, in different ways, to function as 
interfaces themselves, instead of being solely engaged in interfacing relationships 
with other actors. To be sure, one can discern all kinds of interfacing 
relationships between these individuals and others, if one looks at the level of the 
typology developed in chapter 2. However, as was argued here, on a more 
abstract level, the interface is located ‘within’ the individual. As soon as one 
comes to grips with this concept, the legal–illegal interface in transnational crimes 
like arms trafficking, and the illicit trade in art and antiquities, can be more fully 
understood. These are crimes where the illegal character is not primarily 
dependent on the goods involved but on the status of the actors involved and the 
jurisdictions in which one deals. Out of all the examples –discussed and 
otherwise – one can develop two types: the transnational broker and dealer. The 
first type can be divided again in two sub-types. 
 
3.2 Legitimate organizations as interface 
 
In the following sections the focus will be on a particular kind of legal 
organization. These organizations can be a part of the private sector or the 
administrative machinery of states. They play a role which can be compared to 
some extent to the role of the individuals discussed in the sections above. To 
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explain this role, the next section will start with a discussion of a number of case 
studies. The choice of cases is partly based on the availability of sufficient and 
reliable sources to back up the crucial elements which are relevant for the topic at 
hand.35 However, many other cases could have been chosen. The aim of the case 
studies is to analyze the same mechanism that was analyzed above. This 
mechanism transforms legal activities into illegal activities and the other way 
around. Finally, the conclusion will try to clarify the interconnectedness of 
individuals, organizations as well as jurisdictions as interfaces. 
 
3.2.1 Case studies of legitimate organizations as interfaces 
 
In this section, a number of organizations will be discussed that can be 
understood with the analytical model in which legitimate organizations are the 
embodiment of the legal–illegal interface. Half of the cases consist of financial 
institutions, reflecting the importance of financial infrastructure for transnational 
crime as well as the transnational crimes committed by financial institutions 
themselves. The cases are derived from rather different periods and places. They 
can illustrate a point which has been discussed before. The suggestion that 
transnational crime is for a large part a recent phenomenon – connected to the 
fall of Communism and the recent trend of globalization – is hard to maintain 
against the background of historical data. The same goes for the legal–illegal 
interface and the specific case studies discussed here. As Alan Block puts it 
“…much of the social scientific literature dealing with organized crime suffers 
from a particular kind of ahistoricism that critically weakens arguments about the 
nature of organized crime” (Block, 1994: ix). 
 
International Overseas Service 
 
In the late 1950s, Bernie Cornfeld established Investor Overseas Services (IOS). His 
idea was to help people in countries with non-convertible currencies to move 
their money offshore. To enable this goal he set up a number of mutual funds 
and banks. These funds and banks were structured to take full advantage of lax 
security laws, tax breaks for offshore corporations, and a mix of jurisdictions to 
stymie potential litigants and investigators (Blum, 1999). To potential customers, 
IOS offered a mix of two products. First of all, it offered investments in mutual 
funds that invested in the US stock market, an opportunity that was beyond the 
reach of potential customers in most parts of the world. Secondly, it offered the 
chance to move funds into a Swiss bank, which could be practical for several 
                                                 
35  This does not mean that there are absolute guarantees for the accuracy of the mentioned 
cases. The reader is provided with references to all the sources and has to judge for 
him/herself. Especially in this sub-field of criminology one cannot restrict oneself to 
sources which can always be verified personally if one would wish to do so. At least, this is 
the opinion of the author as was discussed in the introductory chapter. 
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reasons like evading taxes, preventing confiscation and protecting against 
inflation. In practice, things were often combined. IOS would smuggle the funds 
of a customer out of the country and move them into a Swiss bank account. 
Thereafter, an investment in one of the IOS mutual funds would be made with 
the money from the Swiss bank account (Raw et al., 1971). The mutual funds 
were established in unregulated tax havens, mostly Panama and the Bahamas, and 
managed in Switzerland. Because the transfer of funds out of the customer’s 
country was usually illegal, IOS knew that most of its customers would in general 
not take action against the company in their home countries. 
 From the moment IOS started an ever-growing army of mutual funds 
salesmen literally went all over the globe. Cornfeld went looking for crooked 
money on the assumption that the dirtier the funds invested in his stocks, the less 
likely they were to be withdrawn in a hurry (Naylor, 2001:101). The most 
important markets were in South America and Europe. Ever more customers 
were tempted to trust their savings to the IOS salesmen. Meanwhile IOS 
invested the pool of hundreds of millions of dollars in a rather different way than 
it told its customers. A huge part of the money went to the salesman and all his 
superiors. This pyramid of people was growing all the time, as salesmen were 
allowed to attract salesmen themselves. Another part went into investments in 
companies which were partly owned by IOS members. Often these investments 
ended up total failures. To some extent, the whole organization was operating a 
huge Ponzi scheme which could only continue as long as ever more new 
customers filled the gaps left by bad investments and the huge overhead. During 
the late 1960s, country after country in South America kicked the IOS salesmen 
out of the country or arrested them (Raw, 1971).36 These countries saw their 
economies threatened by massive capital flight helped by the army of salesmen 
from Cornfeld’s organization. This turned out to be the beginning of the end. 
Thereafter, IOS started to run into trouble in other markets also. Finally, IOS 
was sold to the company to Robert Vesco, a New Jersey businessman. Vesco was 
able to drain a substantial part of all the funds that were still left in IOS, according 
to the most popular estimates about $260-300 million, by turning the mutual 
funds into closed-end funds and subsequently plundering them through a series 
of shell companies and accounts scattered around the world (Blum, 1999; 
Herzog, 1987; Hutchison, 1974).37 
 The relationships which IOS developed with a number of actors can be 
understood from a perspective of legal–illegal interfaces. Between IOS and the 
customers for which it either laundered or ‘criminalized’ funds, an outsourcing or 
                                                 
36  Brazil was one of those countries. In 1966, Brazilians sent more money abroad than all the 
new foreign investment and foreign aid brought in (Henry, 2003). In that year the police, 
assisted by others, raided the offices of IOS in seven cities, arresting thirteen salesmen and 
seizing files on ten thousand clients (Hutchinson, 1974:70). 
37  For a discussion on the actual amount that was stolen by Vesco, Herzog’s book on Vesco 
provides the best overview.  
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reciprocity interface can be pointed at. Outsourcing occurs when a division of 
labor between legal and illegal actors exists in which one actor offers specialized 
services to the other. Reciprocity aims at the interface where mutual benefits 
exist for legal and illegal actors. In the case of IOS, one could say that the 
reciprocity interface does exist because mutual benefits are exchanged. However, 
it is the legitimate organization that primarily offers the services instead of some 
‘regular’ criminal. Depending on concrete individual cases, one can label the 
relationship between IOS and its customers and partners as either outsourcing or 
reciprocity. 
 Through time, this relationship of reciprocity or outsourcing evolved into 
one which was merely predatory. In this case, it seems that the members of IOS’s 
leadership fraudulently bankrupted their own company. However, the predatory 
interface aims at someone from outside the company who manages to bankrupt 
it, whereas in this case the company bankrupts itself and, thereby, its customers. 
A major part of the invested funds from customers was either grabbed by IOS or 
stolen by Robert Vesco, who bought the residual of the once successful 
corporation (Hutchinson, 1974; Herzog, 1987).38 At the same time, synergy 
existed between several actors. In this case, the large-scale smugglers of funds and 
the banks and banking system in Switzerland and some other jurisdictions 
benefited each other, as well as the US stock market which was injected with 
extra funds that would otherwise stay in the home countries of IOS customers. 
 The above conclusions about the interfaces around IOS point at an important 
characteristic which is shown by this study in many empirical examples. When 
two actors are connected within the framework of transnational criminal 
activities, there will be a certain type of interface most appropriate to describe the 
relationship. Often this relationship will be called, for example, outsourcing or 
reciprocity. However, at least two other types of interface may often accompany 
the ‘basic’ interface type connecting the two actors. First of all, relationships may 
have a different meaning when looked at over time. The relationship that started 
out as a kind of outsourcing may in the end turn out to be more of a predatory 
or parasitical interface. That is, whereas the relationship was supposedly 
symbiotic, it turns out to have been (or have become), antithetical. Secondly, the 
‘basic’ interface between two actors will often imply other interfaces with third 
parties or entities. These third parties or entities will be connected with the two 
actors through a relationship that can be labeled as synergy or antagonistic. 
 IOS can serve as an introduction to the other case studies as it shows most of 
the elements that will resurface with every new case. Hereafter, a number of 
banks will be discussed that served as an embodiment of the legal–illegal 
interface. It should be stressed that these banks are only examples that have been 
chosen here for practical reasons. Many other cases could be mentioned, several 
                                                 
38  The various authors that have written about IOS differ (substantially) in their estimate of 
the health of IOS at the time Vesco moved in and bought the IOS. 
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On August 6, 1982, the Italian Treasury Minister Beniamino Andreatta 
announced the compulsory administrative liquidation of the Banco Ambrosiano. 
The largest bank collapse since World War II was a fact. A month earlier, on 
June 18, the lifeless body of Roberto Calvi, the former president of the Banco 
Ambrosiano, had been found dangling beneath Blackfriars Bridge in London 
(Paoli, 1995).39 
 The Banco Ambrosiano was originally founded in 1896 as a Catholic bank to 
provide an alternative to the large (non-Catholic) Italian banks. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, Roberto Calvi tried to transform the sober Italian commercial bank 
into a top-level international merchant bank. He purchased a network of 
corporations and banks in Luxemburg, Switzerland, Nicaragua, and the Bahamas. 
With this, the bank had a stable base in Europe and Latin America. In Nicaragua 
it opened a branch in Managua to facilitate exchange control evasion, political 
pay-offs and arms trafficking in Italy and abroad. It for example helped 
Nicaraguan president Somoza to buy weapons and his supporters to create 
offshore retirement accounts. Furthermore, Banco Ambrosiano closely 
collaborated with the Instituto per le Opere di Religione (IOR), or the Vatican 
bank. As there were no customs checks between Italy and the Vatican, Italian 
money could easily circumvent the tight Italian exchange controls by going 
through the IOR. As far as there were any barriers, Calvi was able to neutralize 
these through corrupt political contacts. With this network that combined fiscal 
advantages, bank secrecy rules and freedom from regulation, the Banco 
Ambrosiano had a magnificent instrument for illegal capital movements (Naylor, 
1987:81-82; 2001:200; Trepp, 1996). As a result, Banco Ambrosiano developed 
into a meeting point for Cosa Nostra members, Colombian drug traffickers, 
white-collar criminals, secret Masonic lodges, and the IOR. 
 Clear proof of the fact that Banco Ambrosiano was not merely corrupted 
from the outside but rather itself a centre of corrupt relationships, was provided 
in the initiatives of its president towards the Italian establishment. As president of 
the Ambrosiano, Roberto Calvi consistently financed political parties: PSI, PSDI 
                                                 
39  The Calvi’s death has been subject to many speculations. In October 2002, a forensic 
report confirmed that he was murdered and in March 2004, four suspects were on trial for 
the murder. ‘Mafia squad probe Calvi bag theft’ BBC News, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk 
(June 29, 2004); Hooper, J. & P. Willan (2004) ‘Four go on trial for murder of God’s 
banker’ The Guardian, March 17, www.guardian.co.uk/italy/story (Visited August 8th, 
2004); Hours before Calvi was found, his secretary, Graziellla Corrocher, fell – or was 
pushed – out of the window of the Ambrosiano building’s fourth floor.  
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(and even the PCI)40; party newspapers and individual politicians; private and 
state enterprises; Latin American dictators, as well as revolutionary guerrillas; 
bank accountants, managers, auditors and whoever else he thought could be 
helpful in fostering or hiding the bank’s illegal activities (Procura della 
Repubblica di Milano, 1988 cited in Paoli, 1995:354). 
 From a perspective of legal–illegal interfaces, Ambrosiano provided a number 
of examples on different levels. Between the bank and its numerous customers, 
all kinds of relationships can be distinguished. Some of them consisted of large 
scale money laundering operations which can be understood as a situation of 
outsourcing or reciprocity between the criminal with his unaccounted-for income 
and the bank. Not only did the Ambrosiano ‘wash’ the profits of Sicilian Mafia 
families, but it was also involved in money laundering operations world-wide: in 
1984 the Operation ‘Greenback’ task force revealed that since September 1981 
about US $34 millions had been clandestinely exported from the United States, 
placed in foreign financial centers and then reunited in a Banco Ambrosiano 
Overseas Limited of Nassau account on behalf of the Columbian drug trafficker 
Gabriel Abuchaibe. The sums then traveled back to the US, allegedly as 
investments of Panamanian companies (Paoli, 1995). Operation Greenback gave 
a clear idea of how serious the involvement of the Banco Ambrosiano was in 
international money-laundering; the amounts involved were in fact huge. Besides 
the outsourcing interface, one can point at a funding interface between Banco 
Ambrosiano and the ultra-secret, ultra-rightist Masonic lodge Propaganda-Due, 
or P2 as it is usually called. Banco Ambrosiano financed part of the activities of 
P2. This Masonic lodge interfaced with European right-wing political and 
paramilitary organizations in such ‘Masonic’ activities as international arms 
trafficking (Naylor, 1987:84). Before 1974, the lodge tried to undermine the 
liberal democratic institutions in Italy and parts of South America and to replace 
them with corporatist political systems inspired by Mussolini and Juan Peron. To 
attain these goals, the members of P2 encouraged capital flight to put downward 
pressure on the lira; during the resultant financial chaos, the funds illegally moved 
out of Italy would be brought back again to buy strategic parts of the Italian 
economy. Furthermore, terrorist outrages from both extreme ‘right’ and extreme 
‘left’ were fomented (Naylor, 1987:85). After 1974, P2 infiltrated all facets of 
Italian public life: the state, the judiciary, the secret services, and the military. 
However, it did not completely abandon terrorist tactics. Research by Charles 
Raw and later Gian Trepp has shed new light on the links between Ambrosiano, 
the P2, and its leader Licio Gelli (Raw, 1992; Trepp, 1996). According to Raw, 
Calvi had to pay a heavy price for the services of Gelli and others. The total sum 
of payments from Ambrosiano to Gelli between 1976 and 1981 are estimated at 
250 million dollars. To organize these funds, Gelli and Calvi robbed the Italian 
                                                 
40  Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI) and Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) 
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state with the help of corrupt politicians and leading civil servants. The primary 
victims were the state oil company ENI and the Banca Nazionale del Lavorno or 
BNL bank. 
 In terms of interfaces, several other relationships can be discerned here. 
Through P2, Banco Ambrosiano was also funding terrorist organizations. Terrorist 
acts subsequently stimulated a further growth of capital flight. Therefore, a 
relationship of synergy existed between the terrorist activities and the capital flight 
services of the Banco Ambrosiano and with the banking systems of Switzerland, 
Luxemburg, and other convenient destinations of Italian funds. At the same time, 
the influx of mafia funds into the Banco Ambrosiano indirectly helped to foster 
the goals of the P2. Between ordinary customers of the Banco Ambrosiano, who 
wanted to hide their financial resources from the Italian tax authorities and save 
them from the weak lira, a relationship of reciprocity existed. However, with the 
benefit of hindsight, the same relationship could be understood as either parasitical 
or predatory. Banco Ambrosiano was in practice looting not only the state oil 
company’s funds, but also the funds from ordinary customers. As was mentioned 
with IOS, what differs about this parasitical interface is the fact that a legitimate 
organization again plays the role of criminal instead of the role of victim. As was 
the case with IOS, and with Nugan Hand and BCCI (as will be discussed later) 
the operations of Banco Ambrosiano also had some things in common with the 
Ponzi scheme mentioned before. Due to this similarity, one can also define the 
situation around Ambrosiano as predatory or parasitical. In the long run, the 
relationships between Ambrosiano and some of its customers and shareholders led 
to huge losses for the latter thanks to the fraudulent schemes of Ambrosiano. 
Finally, one could easily add other interfaces to the list, depending on the 
combination of actors involved. 
 Besides these individual interfaces, which are pointed out above, one can 
argue that a more abstract legal–illegal interface can be found in the Banco 
Ambrosiano itself. It functioned as an intermediary between organized crime 
figures, terrorists, banks, businesses and ordinary citizens. The bank was a cross-
road of legal and illegal actors involved in both legal and illegal activities. 
Criminal funds were laundered through the bank and funds from legitimate 
sources illegally fled Italy’s territory. Therefore, in the same way as the 
individuals discussed in the previous chapter, the bank functioned as an interface 
itself on a more abstract level. 
 
Nugan Hand Bank 
 
Some years before Banco Ambrosiano collapsed, another bank imploded after a 
similar bloody incident; this time in Australia. In January of 1980, two patrolling 
policemen found Frank Nugan, co-founder and president of the Nugan Hand 
Bank, sitting in his car along the road. On closer inspection, he was covered in 
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blood and killed by a rifle which was still in his hands, suggesting he had killed 
himself (Kwitny, 1987:19-20). 
 Despite the distance between the Banco Ambrosiano and Nugan Hand Bank, 
a number of parallels can be drawn between the two cases. First of all, they had 
similar structures partly founded in several bank secrecy jurisdictions. Secondly, 
both utilized high-level connections in political and intelligence circles; and 
finally, both organizations acted as interfaces in themselves. 
 Starting in the late 1960s, the Australian Frank Nugan and the American 
Michael Hand started to do business through what was to become a range of 
companies (some of them banks) in Australia, South-East Asia, and elsewhere. At 
the beginning of the 1970s, they founded the Nugan Hand Bank. The 
background of the different managers of Nugan Hand banks revealed close links 
with the CIA and the American army. The offices in Washington, Taiwan, 
Hawaii, Manila, and Saudi Arabia were run by high-profile former CIA or US 
Army members (Chambliss, 1988). Other offices were set up in Bangkok, 
Chiang Mai, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Cayman Islands (Kwitny, 1987). 
 The bank offered a number of services to its clients. First, it moved or 
laundered the profits of a range of drug traffickers. Jonathan Kwitny provided a 
list of drug clients in his book on Nugan Hand. In one of the best-known cases, 
Nugan Hand allegedly financed one shipment of drugs as well (Kwitny, 
1987:229-230). Besides drug clients, Nugan Hand helped ordinary customers 
move their savings out of the reach of the Australian tax authorities. At the same 
time it moved criminal illicit funds earned in Asia to Australia. In both directions, 
Nugan Hand was able to circumvent the tight exchange controls in place at the 
time. Finally, it helped expatriates working in Saudi Arabia to illegally move their 
income out of the country on a massive scale. The bank was able to collect all 
the funds in the first place because of the high-profile former CIA and US Army 
characters leading the Nugan Hand branches. 
 Besides banking services, Michael Hand was allegedly involved in arms sales 
to South Africa in 1975, or attempts to sell arms (Kwitny, 1987). During that 
period, the CIA tried to prop up the UNITA forces in Angola after the 
Portuguese lost control and the civil war escalated (Davis, 1978; Wright, 1997). 
At the same time, the white Rhodesian government was trying to suppress the 
two ‘terrorist’ movements trying to topple the minority rule in their country 
(Flower, 1987; Stockwell, 1978; Wright, 1997). Finally, as the Nugan Hand staff 
might suggest, the bank allegedly had strong links with the CIA and moved funds 
of the agency to several troubled regions. The CIA connection was especially 
sensitive in Australia where they had funded a campaign that slandered the left 
wing prime-minister who left office some time later (Chambliss, 1989; Kwitny, 
1987). 
 The relationships between the Nugan Hand Bank and its customers can be 
divided into several interfaces. Most relationships can be caught under the 
heading of either outsourcing or reciprocity, like the relationship between the bank 
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and the customers trying to evade tax authorities, exchange controls, and the 
peering eye of the justice department. Collaboration between the CIA and Nugan 
Hand seemed to be present all the time although it was hard to prove this 
through official Australian investigations and the work of specialized research 
journalists in the field of organized crime, like Jonathan Kwitny. A situation of 
synergy existed between the illegal activities of Nugan Hand’s customers and the 
offshore banking system. On the other hand, an antagonistic interface existed, by 
definition, between the activities of Nugan Hand (and similar organizations) and 
the legal economies of the countries from which it facilitated massive capital 
flight operations. Finally, in a way there was also a parasitical or predatory interface 
between the bank and the customers that lost their savings with the collapse of 
Nugan Hand. As was pointed out with respect to the IOS, these interfaces will 
often appear over time. As the whole Ponzi-like scheme collapses it turns out 
that the assumed symbiotic relationship between customer and bank has been or 
has turned into an antithetical interface – that is, something resembling a 
predatory interface. 
 Part of the reason for the huge losses of the bank was the fact that Nugan 
Hand did not do much banking in the way that most banks do. It did not 
seriously invest or loan the deposits of its customers and therefore made heavy 
losses on the payment of interest to customers. 
 Similar to the Banco Ambrosiano, the Nugan Hand Bank can be seen as an 
interface in itself. It enabled cross-border tax evasion, money laundering, and 
capital flight for a range of customers. Through the Nugan Hand Bank, illicit 
funds were laundered and licit funds were illegally moved across the border. In 
that way, aside from all mentioned interfaces between particular actors, Nugan 
Hand functioned as interface by itself. 
 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
 
The collection of cases in this chapter started with Bernie Cornfeld and his 
International Overseas Services (IOS). At the time when Charles Raw, Bruce 
Page, and Godfrey Hodgson published their book on Cornfeld and IOS, another 
financial institution was founded that would lead to a crash twenty years later 
(Raw, Page & Hodgson, 1971). In 1972, Agha Hasan Abedi founded the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) with nominal headquarters in 
Luxembourg. Capital came from the Bank of America and several rich Arabs, and 
especially from the emirate of Abu Dhabi. Abedi dreamed of creating a genuinely 
international bank to serve business in the developing world that the big 
American, European and Japanese institutions neglected (Naylor, 2001). To 
attain these goals, a rather complicated corporate structure was developed, 
making use of the many advantages that bank secrecy laws and tax havens had to 
offer. After 1972, BCCI expanded rapidly, initially helped by the oil boom that 
was just starting. The bank spread around the world and at its peak operated in 
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73 countries and employed over 14,000 people of 83 nationalities, although top 
managers were chiefly of Pakistani origin (Passas, 1993a, 1995). 
 Besides the purely legal activities of BCCI, it engaged in many activities that 
were either illegal in themselves or facilitated the illegal operations of others. An 
impressive list of such activities is given by Naylor (2001:69-71). Among other 
things, BCCI 
 
“aided capital flight, engaged in bribery. Laundered drug money, assisted 
quota busting, abetted maritime fraud, facilitated techno-banditry and 
financed arms trafficking. It helped military dictators and commodity traders 
loot Nigeria’s oil wealth. It bribed Peruvian central bank officials to get them 
to deposit the country’s foreign exchange reserves in BCCI. It handled narco-
payoffs in Panama. It ran tax evasion schemes for Asians in Britain and 
exchange control scams for people in India and Pakistan” (Naylor, 2001:71). 
 
Many things about BCCI are still unknown but even the things that are known 
cannot be briefly summarized in terms of individual interfaces. However, the 
types of interfaces mentioned in the figure below will not need much 
explanation. Synergy, co-optation, reciprocity, and predatory or parasitical behavior can 
be found within many activities of BCCI. However, some important conclusions 
should be drawn from this case and the ones before. It is tempting to look at 
these cases as unique and dramatic incidents which were largely solved by the 
disappearance of these organizations. As the phrasing above suggests, the 
examples cannot be seen as mere incidents. As Passas argued about BCCI, they 
can to some extent be seen as a Mirror of Global Evils instead of the ‘source of 
global evil’ (Passas, 1993a). These global evils show a remarkable durability and 
return as central themes in accounts of all these scandals as well as attempts to 
come to grips with the interrelatedness of transnational crime, economic and 
physical warfare, corporate crime and state crime (Auchlin. & Gaberly, 1990; 
Block, 1991; Bovenkerk & Yesilgöz, 1998; Bülow, 2003; Henry, 2003; Kwitny, 
1987; McCoy, 1972; Naylor, 1987, 1996, 2001; Passas, 1993b, 1995; 
Pretterebner, 1989; Roth, 2000; Trepp, 1996). If anyone would be tempted to 
ascribe the interrelatedness to the inconsistencies caused by the Cold War or the 
pre-neoliberal era, it suffices to point at the startling number of incidents and 
scandals that continue into the present. Recently, an informative account of this 
was written by former banker James Henry in The Blood Bankers: Tales from the 
Global Underground Economy (2003).41 Furthermore, Kochan (2005) as well as 
                                                 
41  Since then a new scandal broke in Lebanon where the Al-Madina Bank collapsed. This 
bank was allegedly involved in the laundering of billions of dollars for the Russian mafia, 
Saudi associations as well as the former Saddam Hussein’s regime and Syria intelligence 
agency (Gambell & Abdelnour, 2004). Despite numerous newspaper reports on Al-
Madina, there is not yet enough credible information available to discuss this bank here as 
a case study. See also: ‘Lebanese bank chief sues Syria official’ News Arab World, Aljazeera 
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Block and Weaver (2004) have studied some recent scandals at large established 
US banks during the 1990s.42 Besides the criminal nature of the activities of these 
banks, they were also related to typical transnational ‘organized criminals’ from 
Russia, Mexico, and elsewhere. 
 One of the mentioned evils is the network of secrecy jurisdictions and tax 
havens around the world. This will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. Here it suffices to point out the importance for the subject at hand. In 
almost every case study discussed, these havens and secrecy laws were crucial in 
facilitating the transnational criminal activities. Another evil is political unrest or 
outright (civil) war causing all kinds of evils by itself. Unrest leads to capital flight 
and war stimulates both the arms trade as well as illegal markets with which to 
finance it. The installment of sanctions often makes this situation even worse and 
more profitable for the actors involved. An account of this is provided by Naylor 
in his  Economic Warfare: sanctions, embargo busting and their human cost (2001). The 
fact that the decisions of public officials in both developing and developed 
countries are more than incidentally for sale to the highest bidder plays a major 
role in both banking scandals and arms deals. Finally, the tremendous pool of hot 
money from drug trafficking, capital flight and other sources that seeks both 
discretion and profitability is another evil. 
 
The Dutch ‘Coffee shop’ 
 
Most of the organizations discussed here have developed relationships with drug 
traffickers in some way or another. This might be by providing money 
laundering services, as in the case of Nugan Hand Bank and Banco Ambrosiano, 
or through direct involvement in drug trafficking operations. However, a specific 
Dutch phenomenon can be added here; the so-called ‘coffee shop’. This is not 
just one specific organization, like the ones discussed above, but a type of 
organization that has thousands of examples in the Netherlands. To understand 
the relevance of the coffee shop here, the Dutch context needs to be clarified. 
For years, the Netherlands have maintained a rather unique legal regime for so-
called ‘soft-drugs’. Soft-drugs are drugs like cannabis and hashish, as opposed to 
hard-drugs like cocaine and heroin. Soft-drugs are not only different from hard-
drugs because of their less serious impact on users, they are also different legally. 
MacCoun and Reuter clarify the situation in their comparative study of drug 
policies and practice (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001:238-264). Dutch law, in 
compliance with international treaty obligations, states unequivocally that 
cannabis is illegal. However, since 1976 the Dutch have maintained a formal 
written policy of non-enforcement for violations of possession or sale of up to 30 
grams of cannabis. In 1995, this threshold was lowered to 5 grams in response to 
                                                 
Net, May 19th 2005, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6F3DA399-F395-4F23-
B1DE-6F526BFCE05F.htm (Visited November 3rd 2005) 
42  These scandals were also investigated by the US Senate in 1999 and 2001.  
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domestic and international pressures. Retailers are allowed to maintain a trade 
stock of 500 grams. However, enforcement against wholesalers and traffickers 
who surpass the limit is still in place.43 
 Retailing soft-drugs is for a major part done through the so-called coffee shops. 
However, as a result of the policy described above, the wholesalers who are 
supplying the coffee shops are left what they are everywhere: criminals who, if 
caught, will be prosecuted. At the borders, shipments of drugs are regularly 
intercepted by customs, while local production of drugs (in excess of allowed 
amounts for personal use) is actively countered. Therefore, in practice these 
coffee shops function as the interface between the legal and illegal flow of this 
type of drugs. 
 The retailers (coffee shops) can be connected with the traffickers in several 
ways. Depending on the nature of the relationship between the two, the interface 
can take the form of collaboration, reciprocity or outsourcing. When the coffee 
shop can be seen primarily as one of the customers of the wholesalers, one could 
either call this outsourcing or reciprocity. When the wholesaler and coffee shop are 
strongly connected, collaboration seems to be a more appropriate label. In its most 
extreme form, wholesaler and retailer are in fact parts of the same organization. 
In that case, the coffee shop is just the legal part of a criminal organization that 
covers the whole trajectory from import to retail sale. At least one example of 
such a combination can be named. In the 1980s, Steve Brown, a Dutch 
(American born) former student of law headed the so-called Happy Family in 
Amsterdam. The Happy Family consisted of a foundation subsidized with public 
funds and running a chain of relief centers for teenage drop-outs. The relief 
centers in practice functioned as coffee shops where the use and sale of cannabis 
was presented as part of the treatment of the problematic youngsters (Van Hout, 
1995).44 For years, a large organization could grow that combined both the 
wholesale and the retail level in the cannabis trade. With that, it combined both 
its legal and illegal side. At the beginning of the 1990s, Brown’s empire crumbled 
and disappeared due to his destructive passion for cocaine, gambling, and 
women. In 1993, he acted as crown witness in the trial against Martin Hoogland, 
the convicted murderer of Klaas Bruinsma, usually seen as the most important 
drug dealer ever in the Netherlands. 
                                                 
43  For an extensive explanation of the Dutch policy see: ‘Drugs policy around the world – 
The Netherlands’ Drug Policy Alliance http://www.drugpolicy.org/global/drugpolicyby/ 
westerneurop/thenetherlan (Visited November 3rd 2005). 
44  In addition to Van Hout’s book, Brown wrote a book about his life himself.: Steve Brown 
(2001) Steve Brown, Drugsbaron in spijkerbroek (Elmar, Rijswijk). The Parliamentary 
Inquiry Committee on Organized Crime in the Netherlands also contains some brief 
remarks on the Happy Family (Fijnaut & Bovenkerk, 1996). In December 1999 an attempt 
to kill Brown failed. According to the Dutch authorities, another murder attempt was 
planned in the Summer of 2005 but did not happen. Since then he lives abroad. See: 
Middelburg, B. & P. Vugts (2005) Hasjbaas doelwit Angels’ Het Parool, October 29th  
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 The relationship between the coffee shop and its individual customers can be 
labeled as reciprocity. A situation of synergy exists between the transnational 
trafficking of cannabis and several legal actors. By legalizing the retail part of the 
cannabis trade, the Dutch government has created a source of revenue out of this 
transnational illegal trade. The coffee shops are accountable for taxes, as are all 
legal enterprises. Finally, one could even argue that the tourist sector is benefiting 
from foreigners from neighboring countries that are attracted by the free 
availability of cannabis. This is especially so in cities located in border regions 
with Germany and Belgium, like for example Maastricht, Arnhem, and 
Enschede. 
 Besides the relationships with a range of potential actors, the coffee shops 
themselves function as interface between the illicit drug trade and the legal retail 
of so-called soft-drugs. At the end of this chapter, the coffee shop will be further 
discussed and used as an example for a particular type of organization that 




The coffee shop as interface partly finds its inverse form in a totally different 
organization. Through the coffee shop, a limited number of transnational drug 
traffickers provide drugs for large numbers of individual customers who can 
legally buy their drugs. In the case described hereafter, numerous individuals 
support a legal organization that supports several terrorist organizations. 
 In 1970, Irish Northern Aid (NORAID) was established in the United States. 
It was initially set up to support IRA prisoners. From its foundation until the 
Good Friday Accords in 1998, Noraid has supported both the IRA and the 
Provisional IRA with funds (Hachey et al., 1996; Tupman, 1998a, 1998b).45 It is 
often alleged that Noraid also directly supported the (P)IRA with arms, but proof 
of this allegation, and discussion of this topic, is hard to find in criminological 
studies. In public, Noraid claims to support only humanitarian causes and it 
collects funds from ordinary US citizens. However, according to Hachey: 
 
“Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, courts in the United States and 
Canada tried a number of Noraid officials for arms offences. Some received 
suspended sentences others were jailed (…) Noraid was also condemned by 
the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which, together with 
other federal agencies, helped to secure the indictments of people who were 
transporting guns into Northern Ireland” (Hachey et al., 1996:252).  
 
                                                 
45  It is not fully clear what the role of Noraid has been since 1998 and the discussion here is 
therefore restricted to the period before 1998. 
INDIVIDUALS AND LEGITIMATE ORGANIZATIONS AS INTERFACE  
69 
Considering the history of arms offences, the above mentioned citizens actually 
supported the terrorist organizations through Noraid, a legal organization.46 Since 
1986, Noraid has allegedly moved in the direction of a more moderate approach. 
According to Stack and Hebron “Traditionalists within the Noraid, and Sinn 
Fein movement in Ireland, did not approve of these developments which led to a 
split that prompted Michael Flannery, the founder of the Noraid, to resign from 
that organization” (Stack & Hebron, 1999:64). In 1989, a new organization was 
founded, the Friends of Irish Freedom, “composed of Noraid dissidents who 
supported a military approach to Northern Ireland. The Friends stuck to fund-
raising and, it appears, some gun running to Northern Ireland” (Stack & Hebron, 
1999:64-65). Despite the rift within Noraid, the allegations against this 
organization keep appearing, whether they are founded or not. According to 
Anne Applebaum “As recently as 1999, long after the IRA had declared its cease-
fire, members of an IRA group connected to an American organization, the Irish 
Northern Aid Committee (Noraid), were arrested for gun-running in Florida”.47 
 Noraid and similar organizations can thus be understood an interface between 
individual citizens in the US, or elsewhere, and the terrorist (P)IRA in Northern 
Ireland. The relationships between the citizens and NORAID and the (P)IRA 
can be labeled as funding. The relationship between Noraid and the (P)IRA can 
also be described as outsourcing to some extent. 
 Both the (P)IRA and Noraid are part of a broader Republican Movement, 
together with for example Sinn Fein, the women’s movement, social clubs, 
Gaelic Sports associations, the Catholic ex-Servicemen’s Association, prisoner’s 
support organizations and various businesses (Tupman, 1998b). Furthermore, 
within Ireland and probably abroad, organized crime and parts of the Republican 
Movement are often intertwined. The purpose of discussing Noraid lies in its 
role as interface between the general public of supporters and the terrorist 
elements in the Republican Movement, notably the IRA and PIRA. 
 The Noraid case of not only particularly interesting from a perspective of 
interfaces, but also in relation with public policies to fight terrorism. Since 2001, 
the US government has put pressure on other governments to devise strict 
policies against terrorism, and the funding thereof. However, some authors have 
pointed at the lack of US interest in organizations like Noraid, especially before 
9/11. According to Lutz “Unlike some other groups supporting dissidents or 
terrorists in other regions or countries, the US has failed to crack down on 
organizations with links to the IRA” although this is possible under US law 
(Lutz, 2004:179). Applebaum pointed at numerous ways in which the IRA and 
its cause received all kinds of (moral or material) support from Irish groups, 
                                                 
46  The official activities of NORAID are described on its website, http://www.inac.org/ 
ina/contact.html (Visited August 7th 2005).  




individuals and even Members of Congress in the US.48 In his discussion of the 
US clampdown on terrorist financing, Kochan cites the head of the UK Office of 
fraud and money laundering who made a likewise argument: 
 
“It (the US prior to 9/11) did little or nothing about the Northern Irish Aid 
Committee (NORAID), long suspected by the UK security services and 
police of providing funding for weapons and bombs to the PIRA – a claim 
that NORAID has denied. When the UK unsuccessfully tried to extradite 
PIRA prison escapees and suspected bombers from the USA they were 
deemed to be ‘freedom fighters’ and not terrorists…” (cited in Kochan, 
2005:242). 
   
The CIA and other intelligence agencies 
 
While discussing the coffee shop phenomenon, the Happy Family was briefly 
mentioned. They were able to develop an organization that controlled both a 
wholesale and a retail trade in drugs in the Netherlands. Part of the development 
costs were unintendedly provided by the local government in the form of 
subventions for youth centers. This meant that public funds were actually used to 
finance transnational crime for the benefit of a small group of crooks. 
 The opposite version is told by the often-quoted study of Alfred McCoy, The 
Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (1971). In this study, he outlined the role of the 
CIA in the opium trade in South-East Asia. According to McCoy, the CIA 
developed close links with the opium growers and their marketers. The CIA 
provided the opium-growing feudal lords in the mountains of Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, and Thailand with transportation for their opium via Air America, 
the CIA airline in Vietnam (Chambliss, 1989). Air America regularly transported 
bundles of opium from airstrips in Laos, Cambodia, and Burma to Saigon and 
Hong Kong (Chambliss, 1977:56). The proceeds of these criminal activities were 
used to fund several covert operations. 
 In the 1980s, the proceeds of illicit arms sales to Iran were used to finance 
support for the Contras in Nicaragua which ultimately led to the Iran-Contra 
scandal (Block, 2000; Williams, 1994). The involvement of the US in Nicaragua 
was so serious that this country later successfully sued the US for launching 
attacks and causing substantial damage. Tens of thousands of people died as a 
direct or indirect result of the US support for the Contras. In November 1986, 
the International Court in the Hague found the US liable for several clear 
violations of international law – notably for launching an unprovoked war not 
justified by any ‘right of self-defense’. The Court suggested that the resulting 
property damage was on the order of $17 billion. But the Reagan administration 
                                                 
48  Ibid. 
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declined to appear in court and refused to recognize the judgment (Henry, 
2003:196).49 
 At the same time, the Contras and the CIA caused another scandal. It turned 
out that not only were Contra members heavily involved in the drug trafficking, 
but the CIA played a crucial facilitating role here. From the very start of the US 
involvement in the war in Nicaragua, the CIA knew that the Contras were 
planning to traffic in cocaine in the US (Henry, 2003).50 It did nothing to stop 
the trafficking and, when other government agencies began to probe, the CIA 
impeded their investigations. When Contra money-raisers were arrested, the 
agency came to their aid and retrieved their drug money from the police 
(Cockburn & St. Clair, 1998). 
 In the first two cases, criminal activities were used to raise funds for state-
policies which could not be endorsed overtly and legally. In many cases, the same 
outlawed goals will be directly funded with public money. This happened in 
numerous operations all over the world. It would require a study in itself to 
describe all the cases, but one was already mentioned above. In Angola, the CIA 
worked side by side with the South African secret service and army to back up 
UNITA with arms and funds (De Kock, 1998; Wright, 1997). The support was 
outlawed soon after the civil war started in 1975 but lasted almost continuously 
until after the South Africans left and the Cold War ended (Matloff, 1997; 
Tvedten, 1992; Wright, 1997). The support for UNITA consisted of activities 
which would be called transnational crime or terrorism if they were committed 
by private persons. It consisted of illicit arms deals, money laundering and, 
depending on the political point of view of the observer, funding of terrorism or 
freedom fighters. Even after the end of the Cold War, the US kept funding 
UNITA. In the fiscal year 1992, $30 million in covert funding was funneled to 
UNITA through the CIA (Wright, 1997). From the perspective of the US 
administration this funding was completely logical as it in fact countered what 
they perceived as a terrorist threat. In a speech on South Africa by President 
Reagan, he recalled that: 
 
                                                 
49  With respect to the US intervention in Nicaragua and other places, Noam Chomsky 
argued that the US policies can be described as terrorism by a definition used by the US 
Department of Defense: “calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to 
coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, 
religious, or ideological.” According to Jenkins, in his study of images of terrorism, the 
reference to ‘international terrorism’ by the US is merely a kind of leftwing urban legend 
(Jenkins, 2003:21). Nevertheless, whether the covert and overt interventions of the US in 
places like Nicaragua, Angola, or Iraq, should be defined as pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorist or other evil actors, or as terrorist acts themselves, they have resulted in far more 
casualties that the terrorism directed against the US in the last two decades (see e.g. Henry, 
2003; Naylor, 2001; Wright, 1997).  
50  As the CIA’s inspector general later admitted in 1998, the agency made sure to get a 
statement from the US Department of Justice in 1982, waiving the CIA’s duty to report 
drug trafficking by any Contra contractors (Henry, 2003:196). 
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“…there is the calculated terror by elements of the African National 
Congress: the mining of roads, the bombings of public places, designed to 
bring about further repression, the imposition of martial law, eventually 
creating the conditions for racial war (…) the South African government is 
under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any 
organization that proclaims a goal of creating a Communist State, and uses 
terrorist tactics to achieve it” (quoted in Crocker, 1992:323). 
 
In the case of Nicaragua, the CIA made itself complicit in the drug trafficking 
activities of the Contras. Although it did not directly launder the drug trade or its 
revenues, it did actively oppose law enforcement efforts against this trade. For 
this reason, this example of CIA involvement in transnational crime cannot be 
used as an example of the CIA as an ‘interface organization’. Nevertheless, it is 
relevant to note the co-optation interface that existed during a considerable 
period between the drug traffickers and the CIA. 
 Besides these large-scale cases, one will often read about individual cases 
against drug traffickers or money launderers in South America or the Caribbean 
which are blocked by the CIA. Often, one of the persons involved turns out to 
be a CIA agent or the agency fears that a trial will harm its interests in another 
way. Judging from most of the American and Dutch literature on transnational 
crime, it seems that the CIA is, or was until recently, the only example of an 
intelligence agency that often finds itself involved in transnational criminal 
activities. However, other examples from agencies in Europe and elsewhere can 
be added to the list. In fact, the only exceptional characteristic of the CIA seems 
to be that it ends up in the main stream literature at all. Auchlin and Gaberly 
analyze some cases of large-scale cigarette smuggling in Europe during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Some of the main characters were allegedly agents of the 
Bundesnachrichtendienst, the German intelligence agency (Auchlin & Gaberly, 
1990).51 Bovenkerk looked at the role of Tito’s secret service in Yugoslavia. He 
described how this agency facilitated the development of a Serbo-Croatian 
speaking underworld in Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s (Bovenkerk, 
2003). Numerous examples can be drawn from the history of East Bloc secret 
services engaged in both smuggling activities and so-called techno-banditry or 
the illicit gathering of Western technology (Bülow, 2003; Naylor, 2001; 
Pretterebner, 1989). Besides these specific examples, many can be found in the 
                                                 
51  Besides the involvement of the intelligence agency, this case is interesting because it sheds 
light on the long history of large-scale cigarette smuggling in Europe. Most accounts of this 
type of crime solely focus on the recent history of cigarette smuggling by some large 
cigarette producers and their criminal allies in the US, Canada, and elsewhere. Rather 
remarkable is the discussion about many traffickers moving to Switzerland, avoiding the 
heat in the US. The study by Auchlin and Gaberly shows that Switzerland has been a 
centre of this trade for at least thirty-five years.  
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range of publications by Tom Naylor and others (Morstein, 1989; Naylor, 1987, 
1993, 2001; Roth, 2000). 
 In the next section, an analytical model will be developed in which 
organizations act as interface between legal and illegal actors. It is inspired on the 
examples discussed in this chapter. 
 
3.2.2 Legitimate organizations as interfaces 
 
The previous sections focused on legitimate organizations as interfaces. These 
organizations can, under specific circumstances, have a comparable role as 
individuals. Some examples were discussed in the previous sections. These 
examples can be drawn from a wide range of legal and illegal economic branches. 
The legitimate organization as interface role is not connected with specific crimes 
or branches but with the way the organization is able to take an intermediary 
position with respect to one or more transnational crimes. The organization is 
able to have normal relationships with both legal and illegal actors and engage in 
both legal and illegal activities. What is meant by ‘normal’ is that these 
relationships are in a way on the same level. Therefore, when such a legitimate 
organization is collaborating with drug traffickers it does not mean that the drug 
traffickers are corrupting the legitimate organization. That is, the relationship 
should not be seen as primarily one-way. The drug traffickers and the 
organization do business as they would do if there were no difference in ‘legality’ 
between the two.52 Often, illegal goods will be laundered, or instead become 
illegal, though the organization.  
 In both the legal and illegal domain, the organization is dealing with third 
parties on the same level. The relationships with these third parties can be 
described with the interface types from the general typology. Most of the 
discussed organizations had a diverse range of interfaces in both the legal and 
illegal domains. On a more abstract level, they are an interface themselves. 
 The legitimate organization as interface has two variations. First of all, the 
legitimate organization that can be seen as an extension of a criminal organization 
or network of organizations or individuals. It is called the ‘coffee shop model’, 
inspired by one of the case studies discussed above. The legal organization can be 
seen here as the beginning or end of a transnational criminal network. The 
second model concerns the legitimate organization that is fully independent but 
has multiple links with both legal and illegal actors. It is called the ‘Ambrosiano 
model’, inspired by the other example discussed in the previous sections. Both 
models will be analyzed in the next sections. It has to be stressed that they are 
                                                 
52  This does not mean that the illegal character of some transactions or products is not 
relevant in causing the relationship. Consider the difference between a bank that is offered 
a certain amount of money from a legitimate source and one from an illegitimate source. 
Often, the bank will be able to earn an interesting provision for moving and/or laundering 
the funds with an illegitimate source whereas the legitimate funds will be far less lucrative. 
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meant as analytical models and not exact illustrations of everyday life. 
Furthermore, they are only inspired by the case studies, not exact copies. 
 
3.2.3 The coffee shop model 
 
The first model consists of legal organizations that can be seen as the end or 
beginning of a transnational criminal network through which something gets 
laundered or becomes illegal. Three of the examples discussed in the first section 
can be understood with this model. A coffee shop can be seen as the end of the 
trajectory through which cannabis moves from a producer in a source country to 
the end user in the Netherlands.53 The products are bought from one or a couple 
of wholesalers and sold to a coffee shop that sells it again to numerous individual 
consumers. The figure below can be used as a model for the situation described. 
It shows the basic mechanism, although other variations are possible. The legal 
organization may be funded from one source (for example a national 











 The opposite situation was illustrated by the Noraid example. In this case, 
numerous legitimate sources are aimed at one organization that funnels the 
money (or part of it) to the terrorist organizations abroad. The increased focus on 
terrorism since 9/11 has stressed the importance of charities like Noraid that 
fund, or allegedly fund, all kinds of terrorist organizations. 
                                                 
53  This does not hold for cannabis grown in the Netherlands itself, although the process of 
laundering is the same. For the Dutch production and trade, see e.g. Bovenkerk (2001). 
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3.2.4 The Ambrosiano model 
 
This model involves organizations that do not depend on a specific type of 
transnational crime or a specific branch. The legal organization was set up at 
some stage to engage in regular (legal) activities and can extract enough revenues 
from these activities to stay in business or attract enough legitimate goals to be 
maintained as part of the administrative machinery. 
 The organization has multiple relationships with all kinds of actors, many of 
whom may not be involved in transnational crimes. In the figure below, all the 
different relationships are shown. 
illegal domain
legal domain









The arrows next to the A connect legitimate customers with the organization. 
Together they are engaged in legitimate transactions without any connection to 
illegal activities. The opposite situation is illustrated by the arrows besides D. 
Illegal actors are engaged in transactions with the organization without any 
connection to legal activities or laundering. A legal–illegal interface can be 
distinguished, but the organization itself does not function as an interface 
between legal and illegal. 
 Situations B and C are the ones that are relevant from the perspective of 
organizations as interfaces. Actors in the legal and illegal domain are connected 
with each other through the legitimate organization that launders the goods or 
services involved, or on the contrary ‘makes them illegal’. Diamonds may be 
laundered through one of the twenty-one official auctions worldwide (or 
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‘cleaned up’ by wholesalers ahead of this auction). The difference with the type 
of individual dealers that may fall in the other category discussed before is the fact 
that these auctions do not depend on the trade in conflict diamonds. On the 
contrary, most of the diamonds will be from legitimate sources and the auction 
can lack any active knowledge of the inflow of conflict diamonds. Many other 
examples of laundering can be found with any of the banks that were discussed 
above. Furthermore, as opposed to laundering activities, funds actually become 
illegal in many instances. Governments that pay for illegal covert operations 
through these banks or terrorists who receive funds from legitimate sources use 
criminalized funds. As a result of the actual laundering or blackening that occurs 
through the legitimate organization, these organizations can be seen as the 
embodiment of the legal–illegal interface. 
 
3.2.5 Conclusion section 3.2: legal organizations as interface 
 
In the previous sections, a number of case studies were used to analyze the role of 
legitimate organizations as interfaces. While discussing these case studies, an 
important conclusion about the use of the interface typology emerged. The 
relationship between two actors can be, or be defined, completely different, 
depending on the point in time or the level of abstraction. Through time, 
relationships which are initially interpreted as, for example, outsourcing can be 
interpreted as predatory or parasitical in a later stage. This means that symbiotic 
interfaces may later (or at the same time depending on one’s perspective) be 
defined as antithetical. Sometimes this means that the true nature of an interface 
can only be established at a later point in time and often this means that 
symbiotic interfaces over time turn into antithetical. 
 Furthermore, besides the interface between the two actors, a separate interface 
can be distinguished with numerous third parties or entities. Usually this will 
involve either synergy or antagonistic interfaces. 
 The role of legitimate organizations as interface has several variations. The 
two main types were called the coffee shop model and the Ambrosiano model. The 
coffee shop model aims to understand organizations that are part of a network or 
organization through which transnational criminal activities take place. The 
legitimate organization is either the beginning or the end of this network or 
organization. Without the illicit activities, the organization would not or could 
not exist. This is a clearly different from the Ambrosiano model. This model aims 
at organizations that were established for regular business or government 
purposes. Somewhere in their existence, these organizations developed into 
organizations involved in many illegal activities. However, they maintain both 
their legal status as well as multiple relationships with legal actors engaged in legal 
activities. 
 Finally, the overall picture should not be forgotten. Both the legal 
organizations as well as the individuals discussed in this chapter often rely on the 
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opportunities offered by the global network of tax havens and the blessings of 
bank secrecy laws. In the next chapter, these phenomena will be discussed in 
detail. It will be argued that the legal–illegal interface will often be comprised of 
an intricate web in which individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions or 












In this chapter, the focus will be on jurisdictions and other geographically-
defined entities. In many instances, they play the same role of interface through 
which the legal status of transnational activities is transformed. 
 In the following sections, the role of jurisdictions as interface will be 
discussed. Besides the jurisdiction as interface, two variations will be discussed in 
this chapter because they (like jurisdictions) can be characterized by a specific 
geographical scope. On the one hand certain state policies and on the other hand 
networks of corruption that function as de facto interfaces. These variations are to 
some extent combinations of the individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions as 
interface. 
 The variations mentioned above will be discussed in a number of case studies 
that partly fit in the analytical model of a jurisdiction as interface. The choice of 
cases is based on the availability of sufficient and reliable sources to back up the 
crucial elements which are relevant for the topic at hand.54 While discussing 
individual cases, the basic interfaces from the typology will no longer be 
identified. Chapter 3 explained how the interfaces from the typology can be 
distinguished in individual case studies while at the same time individual or legal 
organizations can act as interface by itself. 
 
4.2 Jurisdictions and other geographical entities as interfaces I 
 
In the previous chapter, a number of individuals and organizations were discussed 
that function as interfaces. This meant that through those organizations, activities 
were transformed as far as their legal status was concerned. This process does not 
involve some magic trick. It merely involves the use of a number of 
opportunities which are available for transnational criminals involved in some 
illicit activity. One of those opportunities is the difference in legislation between 
states. This may involve jurisdictions where legislation is lacking on topics like 
money laundering, capital flight, arms trafficking or smuggling of art and 
                                                 
54  This does not mean that there are absolute guarantees for the accurateness of the 
mentioned cases. The reader is provided with references to all the sources on which the 
account here is based and has to judge for him/herself. Especially in this sub-field of 
criminology one cannot restrict oneself to sources which can always be verified personally 
if one would wish to do so. At least, this is the opinion of the author as was discussed in 
the introductory chapter. 
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antiquities. It can also involve jurisdictions with legislation that actively creates 
opportunities which might be used by criminals (besides being used for perfectly 
legitimate purposes). The best known jurisdictions are the so-called tax havens 
and secrecy jurisdictions which can be found all over the world.55 However, 
despite their importance, they are just part of a much larger number of states 
which can be seen as havens in particular areas of the licit and illicit economy. 
Many countries which are usually seen as highly regulated and serious in 
enforcing laws against transnational crime have failed to regulate particular areas 
and thereby enable criminals to use their territory as an interface. 
 When jurisdictions function as interfaces, this means that the role as interface 
is in fact institutionalized for particular types of offences. Therefore, it does not 
depend on concrete cases where corrupt individuals or organizations enable 
relationships between legal and illegal. For the simple reason that specific 
legislation is lacking (or on the contrary, exists), some usually illicit activities can 
turn from illegal into legal. Besides these institutionalized interfaces, one can 
discern de facto interfaces. These interfaces are the result of networks of 
corruption between all kinds of actors like politicians, criminals, intelligence 
agents, and businessmen. Through these networks, transnational crimes are de 
facto legalized in at least the home jurisdiction or another geographically defined 
area. Between the jurisdiction as interface and the corrupt networks as interface, 
one can discern another type. This involves jurisdictions that function as de facto 
interfaces because the laws prohibiting certain transnational activities are 
systematically nullified, without an actual corrupt system which can be held 
responsible. There usually is no conspiracy to hush up or authorize illicit 
activities, but the consequences are actually the same. 
 The analyses of jurisdictions as interface has some characteristics in common 
with the concept of “criminogenic asymmetries” that was developed by Nikos 
Passas. This concept refers to “structural discrepancies, mismatches and 
inequalities in the realms of the economy, law, politics, and culture” (Passas, 
1999b:3). According to Passas, these asymmetries can cause crime in three ways: 
by fuelling the demand for illegal goods and services; by generating incentives for 
people and organizations to engage in illegal practices, and by reducing the ability 
of authorities to control crime (1999b:3). The role of jurisdictions as interface can 
be understood as a result of asymmetries in the realm of the law and politics. 
                                                 
55  The best known tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions include: Aruba and the Netherlands 
Antilles, the Bahamas, the Bermuda Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Islands, 
Cyprus, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Isle of Man, Mauritius, 
Panama, Switzerland, and the British Virgin Islands. Long lists of countries are provided by 
the G7 Financial Action Task Force, the Financial Stability Forum, and the OECD, see 
Sofus (2003). It should be noted with these lists that, as far as for example money 
laundering is concerned, ‘regular’ developed countries in Europe, North America, or 
South-East Asia, are at least as important as the small jurisdictions that are often associated 
with money laundering and other financial crimes. See for example US Senate (1999, 
2001).  
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However, the discussion of criminogenic asymmetries focuses primarily on the 
asymmetries as causes of transnational crimes whereas this chapter focuses on 
these asymmetries themselves and the way in which these asymmetries enable the 
change in legal status of certain activities. This is both an important theoretical as 
well as a practical difference. Many asymmetries can be pointed out that are a 
major cause of transnational crimes, without actually involving any interfaces as 
meant in this chapter. Examples can be found in the field of drug trafficking, the 
smuggling of small arms, and smuggling of humans. 
 Together with criminogenic asymmetries, Passas discusses the so-called 
“crime without law-breaking”, referring to the article by Kramer and 
Michalowski (1987) mentioned in chapter 2. “Transactions criminalized in 
various parts of the world can be concluded in countries that allow or welcome 
them. Transactions can be structured so that no country’s laws are broken 
although the final outcome is clearly unethical or ‘criminal’.” (Passas, 1999b:9). 
These transactions share some elements with the transactions discussed in this 
chapter, as well as with those in chapter 4. However, in our analyses transactions 
do break the laws of at least one of the countries involved. Nevertheless, they are 
laundered through individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions as interface. 
Therefore, they will in the end be ‘legal’ and no longer break any laws. 
 In the following paragraphs, the three variations of jurisdictions and other 
geographical entities will be discussed in a number of empirical examples. First of 
all, tax havens and related jurisdictions will be discussed, which play an important 
role in both purely financial crimes as well as other crimes. Secondly, the arms 
trade will be looked at, to illustrate the de facto interface without some 
conspiracy-like situation. Finally, an Austrian and an Italian case are used to 
illustrate both variations mentioned above, as well as the role of individuals and 
organizations as interfaces. 
 
4.3 Tax havens, bank secrecy jurisdictions and offshore financial centers 
 
The first category of jurisdictions consists of jurisdictions that share the most 
important elements of tax havens, bank secrecy jurisdictions, and offshore 
financial centers. In practice, these terms are often used interchangeably, but they 
are by no means synonymous for the same phenomenon. Before the use of these 
jurisdictions as interfaces is discussed, they will be briefly described without 
discussing them in depth. In practice, each jurisdiction will have another mix of 
elements of the different types, like for example an instant-corporation business, 
guaranteed anonymity of shareholders, etc.56 
 There are numerous definitions of tax havens and these definitions define 
different sets of jurisdictions as tax havens. At least three factors are usually 
associated with tax havens. The first factor is low, or no taxes on at least one 
                                                 
56  For an extensive outline of the different havens see Doggart (2002); Blum et al. (1998). 
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important category of income.57 A second factor is political stability.58 The third 
factor is expertise. There must be a framework of proven business expertise. 
Besides these factors there are additional factors, depending on the needs of a 
particular tax fugitive. Double-taxation agreements (or their absence), availability 
of labor, and cost of living are a just few examples. For criminal purposes, there 
are some related factors that are of great importance. Three of them will be 
briefly discussed here: bank secrecy, offshore banking, and the availability of 
flexible and anonymous legal entities. 
 To some extent, bank secrecy is available in almost all developed countries 
(Blum et al., 1998). That means that laws exist that guarantee the basic 
confidentiality of bank data to others. The US, for example, has the Bank 
Secrecy Act, although this has little in common with the type of bank secrecy 
that is discussed here. Bank secrecy jurisdictions involve more than common 
secrecy provisions. In these jurisdictions, bank secrecy laws are more extensive 
and often use criminal law provisions to enforce them. Furthermore, secrecy is 
also guaranteed towards government agencies, both foreign and domestic. This 
means for example, that these jurisdictions will not help foreign governments 
who are after their citizens, who have moved their capital to that particular 
jurisdiction and who evade taxes this way. 
 Banks or other financial institutions operating offshore are institutions that, 
while legally domiciled in one jurisdiction, conduct business solely with non-
residents. These institutions are exempt from a wide range of regulations 
normally imposed on ‘onshore’ institutions: their transactions are often tax-
exempt, they are not encumbered by reserve requirements, they are free of 
interest-rate restrictions and often, though not always, exempt from regulatory 
scrutiny with respect to liquidity or capital adequacy (Blum et al., 1998:37). 
 Finally, the so-called instant corporation business is an important ingredient 
for many jurisdictions. As the term indicates, these companies can be established 
instantly. Furthermore, the costs are usually rather limited, in comparison with 
most developed countries.59 In addition, the shareholders of these companies can 
often remain anonymous. For criminal purposes, the instant corporations offer an 
                                                 
57  This clearly differs from the notion that the tax burden in general is low or negligible in 
tax havens. This is clearly a simplification, often made by politicians for their own 
purposes. The average tax burden of the 24 tax havens examined by The Economist was 
26% of GDP in 1999 (Doggart, 2002:10-11). American OECD member countries 
(Canada, Mexico, US) had an average of 27,5% whereas Pacific OECD (Australia, Japan, 
New Zealand, South Korea) had an average of 28,8%. The real outlier here is the EU, 
with an average of 41,3% in 1999.  
58  The importance of political stability can be illustrated with many examples. Lebanon 
suffered from the internal and external conflicts with neighbors and likewise confidence in 
Panama as financial centre suffered from its political problems.  
59  Many examples of this business can be found on the internet. Companies in a dozen 
jurisdictions offer everything that can be imagined as far as corporations are concerned. As 
extra service, some countries offer residence permits for investors for relatively low (for 
Western standards) amounts of money invested. 
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additional opportunity. One can purchase an instant-bank in one of several 
jurisdictions offering such facilities. With this, one partly conceals a money trail 
by making sure the money flows through this bank and subsequently winds up in 
the bank, with no record of these transactions left behind (Blum et al., 1998:19). 
 As was said above, the mentioned factors or ingredients are mixed differently 
in every jurisdiction. Some might have it all, and some only one of them. For 
criminal purposes, several ingredients can be combined, depending on the 
activity one is involved in. Many of the illicit activities by the organizations and 
individuals discussed in the previous chapter were indeed enabled by these 
ingredients. 
 Before the BCCI and Nugan Hand made the best of the opportunities of the 
available tax havens, Bernie Cornfeld already showed the potential of these 
jurisdictions to engage in activities which would be otherwise illegal or 
impossible (Blum, 1999; Herzog, 1987; Raw, 1971). Despite the unique scale at 
which Cornfeld operated, his use of tax havens was also nothing new at the time, 
that is, during the 1960s. In response to asset freezes and heavy taxes during 
World War I, the machinery evolved to move money covertly and hide wealth. 
In the 1920s and 1930s this development continued rapidly. During the post-war 
decades, Liechtenstein introduced its instant corporation business, and it drafted 
legislation that imposed heavy penalties for revealing information about 
companies. Switzerland passed its bank secrecy laws. its bankers began using 
professional couriers to ferry clients’ cash and valuables past neighboring 
countries’ customs officials and developed techniques such as anonymous mail 
drops (Naylor, 2001:18). One of the well-known criminals that used the 
opportunities offered by jurisdictions like Switzerland was Meyer Lansky. He 
 
“exploited Swiss liberality with an innovative scheme he called ‘loan-back’. 
Couriers carried cash from the US to Switzerland to escape the US tax net. 
(…) The money returned to Lansky’s accounts in the United States, without 
the US authorities realising that it was taxable” (Kochan, 2005:xix). 
 
Whereas the examples discussed in the previous chapter thus have precedents 
from earlier eras, the present shows that new scandals emerged afterwards. The 
BCCI and Banco Ambrosiano scandals both led to stricter rules in the global 
financial system, outlined by the supervisors of central banks convening in Basle, 
Switzerland (Doggart, 2002:77). However, new scandals emerged after the 
increased regulation was enacted. BCCI followed Ambrosiano and the European 
Union Bank of Antigua followed BCCI when it collapsed in July 1997. The 
European Union Bank was a perfect example of the way in which the offshore 
banking jurisdictions and bank secrecy havens facilitate criminal activity (Blum et 
al., 1998). 
 For the time being, there is no reason to assume that the combined 
opportunities offered by the jurisdictions mentioned will be substantially limited 
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or altered in the near future. That does not mean that nothing will change. On 
the contrary, a constant change can be observed, stimulated by different forces. 
Many jurisdictions change their systems to comply with the demands made by 
the international community. 
 The UN conventions on transnational organized crime, the financing of 
terrorism and corruption are also significantly altering this situation. Nevertheless, 
it remains to be seen how much this will affect daily business. By combining 
several jurisdictions, one usually does not have to depend on one jurisdiction to 
get all the services one needs. On the other hand, many jurisdictions compete 
with each other to be the most attractive place for investors, tax refugees,  
criminals, or other clients valuing privacy for several reasons. This implies a 
development in the opposite direction as the case of Switzerland showed. 
 
4.4  Jurisdictions and other geographically defined entities as  
  interface II 
 
The description above showed the important characteristics of tax havens and 
related jurisdictions and mentioned some well-known cases that were discussed 
in the previous chapter: the BCCI, Banco Ambrosiano, Nugan Hand Bank and 
the European Union Bank affairs. Although these cases all involve banks that are 
now, with the benefit of hindsight, seen as rogue banks, it has to be stressed that 
many well-known (still active) global banks are also using the same structures. 
Recently, James Henry, a former banker turned research journalist, wrote an 
extensive account of the activities of these banks during the last decades (Henry, 
2003). A number of case studies from the last fifteen years are provided by 
Kochan (2005) and Block and Weaver (2004). The banking activities involve, 
among other things, the financing of huge infrastructural projects in developing 
countries. These projects are accompanied by substantial kickbacks to politicians 
involved, often paid through offshore bank accounts, and sometimes these 
projects do not result in any actual building at all with a billion dollar debt as 
only lasting evidence. Other examples are the laundering of funds for Russian 
criminals that appeared in the US after the demise of the Soviet Union, and the 
stashing of billions of dollars from a range of corrupt dictators and other 
politicians around the world. 
 The cases in chapter 3 illustrated how specific jurisdictions can play a role 
with different types of transnational crime. At the same time, it showed how 
organizations, jurisdictions, and specific individuals were combined to enable 
transnational crimes which sometimes involved the transformation of 
transnational crimes into legal activities or the other way around. 
 The process can be illustrated with the proceeds of a wholesale importer of 
cocaine. This importer receives huge amounts of cash as income unaccounted 
for. To turn this cash into funds that are rightfully his, he starts by smuggling the 
cash to a bank secrecy jurisdiction in the Caribbean. There he opens a bank 
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account held by a corporation which he founded in another jurisdiction where 
shareholders are granted absolute anonymity and an instant-corporation 
manufacturing business exists. From the first bank account, the funds may be 
moved through an additional number of accounts. Finally, it will either be lent to 
the importer, through a so-called loan-back structure, or it will be returned to 
him through false invoicing. In the latter case, cross-border trade is imitated in 
which the importer makes substantial profits which he can account for in his own 
country. Depending on the amounts of money involved and the attention that a 
particular individual enjoys from law enforcement agencies, the number of layers 
in a laundering structure can be extended or restricted. If necessary, extra 
instruments which can be used include international business corporations 
(IBC’s), trusts or a Liechtenstein anstalt.60 It is even possible to add a personal 
offshore instant-bank that will be eliminated if a law enforcement agency 
attempts to work itself through all the layers. 
 Instead of laundering, funds or goods can also be made illegal. The best 
known examples can be found with structures to evade taxes. The principles used 
may be very similar, although the effect is the opposite of money laundering 
operations. Whereas money laundering involves the creation of a seemingly 
legitimate source for unaccounted income, tax evasion involves minimizing the 
income accounted for generated from legitimate sources. 
 Besides tax evasion, and sometimes together with it, capital flight functions in 
the same way. This used to be one of the most important transnational crimes in 
monetary terms. However, its scale and scope has lowered during the last twenty 
years due to deregulation of cross-border financial transactions in numerous 
countries. From a perspective of interfaces, this provides an interesting case study. 
Many activities and actors that were seen as transnational crime and criminals 
twenty years ago are now transformed into legitimate businesses and business-
men. 
 Cigarette-smuggling often involves the same use of tax havens and often 
consists primarily of tax evasion (Beare, 2002; Hudgins, 1998; Saba et al., 1995). 
Cigarettes are legal goods which are smuggled for the simple reason that there are 
significant differences in taxes levied by different states. Any combination of states 
can trigger smuggling and this will not necessarily be done through a ‘cigarette-
haven’. However, tax havens and bank secrecy jurisdictions might offer such a 
haven because they do not consider cigarette smuggling a crime and do not 
cooperate with other states who are seeking to fight the large-scale smuggling. 
To be more precise, these states do not consider tax evasion in other jurisdictions 
a crime that should be fought within their own jurisdiction and for that reason, 
cigarette smuggling (being a kind of tax evasion) is not considered a crime. 
Therefore, these jurisdictions can be used as intermediary locations in the 
                                                 
60  Such an anstalt is a particular type of entity similar to a trust. However, whereas one 
officially loses control when a trust is used to park funds, an anstalt can run a corporation 
which turns over its profit to the founder of the anstalt. 
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smuggling of cigarettes from producing country to destination country. 
Furthermore, independent distribution networks sometimes have their base in 
these jurisdictions. 
 Switzerland provides the best case study to illustrate a cigarette haven. Since at 
least World War II, it has been a centre of cigarette smuggling in several 
directions (Auchlin & Gaberly, 1990; Koch, 1992; Trepp, 1996). Inhabitants of 
the border region between Italy and Switzerland used to generate additional 
income through small-scale smuggling operations. Later on, the mafia took over 
and organized large-scale smuggling networks (Trepp, 1996).61 To Spain and 
other European destinations, a large-scale smuggling operation worked smoothly 
for years. The cigarettes came primarily from Swiss wholesalers. Although the 
basis for the smuggling was the mentioned advantage of Switzerland as a haven, 
there were other factors which perfected the whole operation. A network of 
corrupt customs officials assisted the smugglers for years (Auchlin & Gaberly, 
1990). This network of corruption will be further discussed in section 5.5. It 
remains to be seen whether the recent attempts by governments in the EU and 
America to limit the smuggling problem will be successful. As long as there 
remain havens that can be used in supplying important destination countries, they 
will be used to evade the high taxes on cigarettes in those countries. 
 
4.5 De facto interfaces I: the arms trade 
 
The arms trade is probably the trade to most ideally illustrate the principles 
described in this chapter and the previous chapter. Hereafter, two case studies 
will be discussed in which the concept of de facto interfaces will be explained. 
First to be discussed are the so-called arms supermarkets, described by Naylor. A 
second example is a government that nullifies the legislation it should comply 
with, and through that unintentionally legalizes otherwise illegal arms sales. 
 Most arms, or parts with which arms are produced, come from legitimate 
private or state companies in a limited number of countries. The US, Russia, 
France, the UK, Germany, Ukraine, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy are the 
most important suppliers, as far as conventional arms are concerned.62 The licit or 
illicit character of arms usually depends on its destination, not on its contents. 
 Many examples of arms deals date back to the days of the Cold War. The post 
Cold War period has seen some changes in the arms trade but has surely not 
made it any less serious in its scope or consequences (Crefeld, 1998; Kochan, 
2005; Phytian, 2000; Wood & Pelemans, 1999). Naylor points at two control 
mechanisms of the arms trade that disappeared at the end of the Cold War. 
 
                                                 
61  Bonner, R. (1997) Racketeer Cases Shed Light on Cigarette Smuggling in Italy New York 
Times, September 2nd. 
62  For data on arms suppliers and other related issues, see: SIPRI (2004) SIPRI Yearbook – 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
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“On the supply-side of the arms market, there was the ability of the major 
powers to influence, even sometimes control, the movement of weapons, 
ammunition and spare parts around the world. On the demand-side, the 
ability of non-state actors to get even those weapons that escaped such 
political control was limited by their capacity to obtain means of payment” 
(Naylor, 1998:212). 
 
4.5.1 Arms supermarkets as de facto interfaces  
 
The disappearance of these two control mechanisms has exacerbated the problem 
of so-called arms supermarkets. According to Naylor, some zones of conflict have 
turned into regional arms supermarkets, due to the large amounts of second-hand 
weapons (Naylor, 1998:218).63 He draws an interesting parallel with offshore 
banking centers. 
 
“A conflict zone is for weapons what an offshore banking centre with strict 
secrecy laws is for money (…) Indeed so effective is the process that is has 
been known for intelligence agencies to deliberately ship more weapons than 
required for their purposes to a particular conflict area, just in order to be free 
to then divert them to some other, politically unauthorized or publicly 
unacceptable place. This appears to be how the CIA continued to equip both 
UNITA in Angola and the Contra rebels in Nicaragua during periods when 
such aid was banned by the US Congress” (Naylor, 1998:219). 
 
The first supermarket to appear was in Bangkok, following the Vietnam war and 
other conflicts in the region. Next came Beirut, Singapore, the Horn of Africa, 
and Afghanistan. 
 These arms supermarkets can function as interface between licit and illicit 
arms transfers. As was mentioned above, one can publicly ship arms to a conflict 
zone and then divert the surplus to places that are not politically authorized. 
Every era has one or more major conflict zones that provide such supermarkets. 
The areas mentioned above cover the period from the 1960s through the 1990s. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and some of its former republics 
provided one immense arms bazaar, selling everything from tanks to fighter jets 
and smaller items like Kalashnikov riffles to everybody (Berryman, 2000; 
Kochan, 2005; Naylor, 1998). 
 In addition to these arms supermarkets, there are countries which are not 
conflict zones themselves but play the same role. Often arms are shipped to 
countries with the implicit or explicit aim to support other countries or rebel 
groups to which one cannot directly send arms because of official boycotts. At 
some point during the twenty-five year involvement of the US in Angola, the 
                                                 
63  See also Kelly et al. (2004:73-75) which focuses on so-called weapons ‘supermarkets’. 
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US simply replenished Mobutu’s arms depots, knowing that Zairian arms would 
subsequently be moved to the armed forces of UNITA (Wright, 1997). 
 
4.5.2 Dutch arms export policies as de facto interfaces 
 
The second example to discuss here cannot be compared in any way to the arms 
supermarkets mentioned above. It deals with the arms export policies of the 
Netherlands during the 1990s. This country is not chosen because it is a unique 
case that stands out in relation to other arms exporting countries. Although it can 
be seen as a de facto interface, as will be explained below, this could probably be 
argued for several other European countries. However, the Netherlands are 
relatively exceptional as far as available information on the arms trade is 
concerned. As compared to other states, the Netherlands are relatively transparent 
as far as their export policies are concerned. A number of publications by the 
Dutch pressure group Campaign against Arms Trade provide a rich source of 
information on a large number of arms deals (Broek & Slijper, 2003; Campaign 
against Arms Trade, 1998). Dutch criminologists, on the other hand, show little 
interest in the arms trade.64 
 According to data gathered by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), the Netherlands are the seventh largest conventional arms 
exporter in the world.65 However, this does not mean that a huge arms industry 
exists. Arms exports are just part of the overall picture because most large or rich 
countries prefer to produce their own arms. 
 The Netherlands are not a haven in a legalistic sense. That is, they do not 
have particularly favorable legislation for arms exporters and brokers. As a 
member of the European Union, the Netherlands use the (non-binding) European 
Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports for their arms export policy.66 This code 
sums up eight criteria that have to be met before arms exports can be allowed. 
Among them are the compliance with international obligations, respect of human 
                                                 
64  Frank Bovenkerk, a Dutch criminologist, remarked in 1996: “About the, in my opinion 
extremely threatening, trade in illegal arms, far too little is known and what we write 
about it in our reports probably rests on an enormous underestimation of the problem” 
(Bovenkerk, 1996:96). Not a lot seems to have changed since 1996, as far as the 
Netherlands is concerned. In 2001, the Dutch criminological journal Tijdschrift voor 
Criminologie, dedicated a special issue to arms trade. It contained some interesting articles 
on the illicit trade in firearms and the relations with legal dealers. However, none of the 
articles dealt with the international illicit trade in arms with terrorists and foreign states. It 
seemed that for mainstream criminologists the arms trade consists of incidental sales of small 
arms and thefts from legitimate dealers. To be sure, the attention of politicians and the 
criminal justice system is at least as little as that from criminologists. 
65  SIPRI (2002) The suppliers of major conventional weapons, SIPRI Yearbook. The data 
concern the period from 1997 to 2001.  
66  ‘European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports,’ agreed by European Union (EU) 
Foreign Ministers on 25 May; formally adopted at the EU Council of Ministers, 8-9 June 
1998, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd27/27eu.htm (visited November 5th 2005) 
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rights in the destination country, preservation of regional peace and stability, and 
the prevention of re-export to undesirable end-users. Besides the EU Code, 
national legislation is applicable and requires exporters to obtain export permits 
for certain categories of military goods. Based on the European code and national 
legislation, a rather strict export policy would be expected. A couple of arms 
exports which received some publicity or were discussed by Broek and Slijper, 
can illustrate the export policy in daily practice. 
 In August 1998, Belgian customs intercepted forty army trucks and ninety-
one containers with ‘car parts’ destined for Eritrea and sent by a Dutch company. 
The car parts turned out to be eighty engines for Russian T-54 and T-55 tanks. 
At the time Eritrea and Ethiopia were fighting a war against each other and both 
used this type of tank. Together with the trucks and engines, other essential 
military equipment was sent. The Belgian authorities had no doubt that the 
shipment was not allowed to leave the country under the current arms export 
regulations. The Dutch assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs, however, argued 
that no infringement of Dutch legislation has been found. It took seven months 
before he concluded that the shipments indeed consisted of arms (Broek & 
Slijper, 2003:160-161). The lack of interest by the Dutch authorities is especially 
remarkable because during the same period, the same Dutch firm was suspected 
of involvement in shipments to Iran, via the United Kingdom and Singapore. 
This ultimately led to a conviction and a fine by a Dutch court in 2001 (Broek & 
Slijper, 2003:162). 
 Whereas the shipment to Eritrea lacked an export permit, a range of 
shipments to another shaky area sheds some light on the Dutch export policy. 
Between 1990 and 1997, export permits were granted for a large number of 
shipments of goods for military use to Algeria, a country in the middle of a 
period of significant political unrest and violence. Part of these shipments were 
made public in the yearly government reports on arms exports, and another part 
was only made public after demands by the Campaign against the Arms Trade. In 
1997, a national newspaper wrote about a shipment to Algeria and some 
politicians voiced their objections. Since then, no export permits have been 
granted for shipments of military use goods to Algeria (Broek & Slijper, 2003:52-
54, 231). 
 When the government itself wants to export arms, in principle the same rules 
apply as for private companies. Therefore, this applies to the example of 
superfluous materials sold by the Ministry of Defense. During the previous 
decade, the Ministry sold army vehicles to Botswana, Nigeria, Angola, Bosnia, 
and Macedonia. At least for some of these destinations, one can wonder whether 
the EU criteria would allow this. The vehicles that went to Bosnia were sent 
there just after the Dayton Peace Accords were concluded. This led to questions 
in parliament (among other things) because of the remaining tensions in the 
region. The Foreign Ministry responded by arguing that it was unlikely that the 
vehicles would be used militarily, and even if they were, this would fit with the 
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aims of the Dayton Peace Accords which included establishing a regional military 
balance of power (Broek & Slijper, 2003:133). 
 Besides high-tech goods and parts of goods, many shipments consist of 
chemicals with military or dual uses. Raw materials for poison gasses could be 
exported in substantial quantities to countries with a dubious reputation as transit 
points or smuggling paradises, because of failing customs services. Byelorussia, 
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Jordan, and Ukraine are among the claimed destinations 
(Broek & Slijper, 2003:97). Some other exports (for example to Iraq and Iran) 
did lead to penal sanctions. However, in most cases, the verdicts were mild and 
concerned the fact that companies or individuals failed to obtain export permits 
instead of the fact that they exported to particular countries. 
 Other examples could be added to the summary above. Without generalizing 
too much, some conclusions can be drawn so far. The official legislation and 
intentions of the Dutch authorities indicate a very cautious approach to potential 
arms exports. At the same time, the export permits that are granted each year 
seem to show a somewhat different picture.67 As long as exporters ask for permits 
according to all the bureaucratic formalities one will usually get a permit, despite 
the end destination or nature of the goods involved. 
 The above implies that one will often observe the following situation. 
Theoretically, one has an individual or company engaged in an illicit 
transnational arms deal. The illicit nature is either based on the outlawed 
destination, the outlawed goods, or both. In practice, there is a government that 
gives official permission for the export before anything leaves its territory. 
Therefore, in practice there is no transnational crime committed at all. The 
potential crime is subject to a sort of pre-emptive laundering by the authorities. 
This does not fit neatly with the mechanisms described in chapter 3 and in this 
chapter. This mechanism always involves an activity which is either laundered or 
made illegal, the activity meant here is legal at any stage, due to the pre-emptive 
laundering outlined above. 
  
4.6 De facto interfaces II: corrupt networks 
 
The last variation also involves a so-called de facto interface. However, this de facto 
interface is not the result of a more or less open and official policy by a particular 
government to (unintentionally) nullify its own legislation or formal intentions. 
Instead, this de facto interface emerges from a corrupt network of high-level 
figures from both government and private companies and persons. Depending on 
the particular network one looks at, they might involve high-level figures from 
                                                 
67  Although this paragraph mainly focuses exports during the 1990’s, previous studies suggest 
that this has not been significantly different in the past. An extensive review of the Dutch 
export policy from the 1960s to the 1980s is provided by Colijn and Rusman (1989) in 
their dissertation, Het Nederlandse wapenexportbeleid 1963-1988 (The Dutch policy on arms 
exports 1963-1988). 
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intelligence agencies, customs, police, political parties, and media companies as 
well as top-politicians, arms dealers, and managers of large private companies. 
Through such networks, transnational crimes become immune to prosecution to 
the extent that they are de facto legalized or at least immunized from prosecution. 
 The corrupt network as interface should not be seen as another analytical 
model, besides individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions as interface. It is more 
a mixture of the models that were discussed before. The corrupt network is 
discussed in this chapter because of its more or less geographical similarity to 
jurisdictions as interface. 
 To illustrate this geographically concentrated network of individuals and 
organizations that function as an interface, two concrete case studies will be 
discussed. First of all, the so-called Club 45 in Austria and secondly the P2 
Freemasons Lodge in Italy. These cases have been chosen because of the available 
sources of information on them. Although not all aspects of these cases (which 
ultimately led to major scandals) have been clarified with absolute certainty, 
enough is known to use them for the purposes of this chapter. Furthermore, the 
difficulties of studying cases like the ones mentioned above should be stressed. 
The ingredients of these cases, while making them interesting from an interface 
perspective, also ensure their secrecy and attempts to cover up as much as 
possible. 
 
4.6.1 Club 45 in Vienna 
 
Club 45 was primarily an association of politicians from the Austrian SPÖ, the 
Socialist party. It was founded shortly after a curious take-over took place in 
Vienna’s most prestigious shopping street. Naylor summarized the events around 
the takeover: 
 
“In 1972, the widow of the last proprietor of Vienna’s Konditorei Demel, 
former pastry makers to the Hapsburg court, decided to sell the firm. One 
person decidedly not an acceptable buyer was Udo Proksch, a hard-drinking, 
gun-toting, womanizing former pig farmer. However, with the joint 
assistance of a Swiss shell company and a pliable countess he was bedding, 
Proksch disguised his identity long enough to secure control of the imperial 
institution and the status it conveyed” (Naylor, 2001:44). 
 
In the same year, Club 45 was founded with Demel as its meeting point.68 The 
core of Club 45 was made up of Udo Proksch himself and a number of high-
                                                 
68  Different accounts exist of the Club 45 formation. Whereas Naylor speaks of a secret 
society created by Proksch, some former members insist that some young Socialists 
founded the Club, while Proksch played a minor role in the beginning. Many intimate 
friends of Proksch are interviewed in Helmut Schödel’s (1998) Ein Staat braucht einen 
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ranking members of the Socialist party, among them subsequent prime-ministers 
and cabinet members. Besides this core, members also included a long list of 
managers from Austrian banks, insurance companies and state-industries, as well 
as the head of the Viennese police, the secret service, and some arms dealers 
(Pretterebner, 1989:84-87; Von Bülow, 2003:88). The Club was founded during 
the beginning of a long period of Socialist hegemony in Austrian politics. 
Between 1970 and 1983 they constantly ruled Austria as a one party 
administration. Only after 1983 did a coalition government form with the right-
wing FPÖ (Seiffert, 1998). 
 One of the visitors of the Club 45 was Monzer Al Kassar, who was discussed 
in chapter 3. He is best-known for his role as arms broker but was also involved 
in drug trafficking and connected to terrorist groups in the Middle East 
(Brunwasser, 2002; Morstein, 1989; Roth, 2000). Partly because of his excellent 
contacts in Vienna, Al Kassar was able to organize a number of large arms deals, 
at least one of which led to a national scandal and the resignation of several 
politicians. One of the deals involved a huge shipment of ammunition for the 
PLO, which was intercepted in Greece in 1984 (Morstein, 1989:145). The 
ammunition came from a subsidiary firm of the state company VOEST. When Al 
Kassar made a failed attempt to obtain Austrian citizenship, this subsidiary firm 
allegedly wrote a letter of recommendation. Another deal by Al Kassar and his 
Austrian friends led to the mentioned scandal and involved an enormous 
shipment to Iran. As arms sales to Iran were outlawed during the war with Iraq, 
Al Kassar organized a range of end-user certificates. Most of the arms were 
supposed to go to Libya, where he was well-connected through his friend Abu 
Abbas, a well-known terrorist.69 Abu Abbas was one of the Hijackers of the 
Achille Lauro cruise ship. The hijacking was allegedly financed by Al Kassar 
although his involvement could never be proven by Spain’s National Court that 
tried to get a conviction. While awaiting trial, Al Kassar was freed on the record 
bail of $7,7 million (Bohn, 2004). 
A part of the above mentioned shipment of arms to Iran was intercepted 
in a Yugoslavian port and it turned out that the arms were accompanied by 
instructions for use written in an Iranian dialect. Soon, the deal got a lot of media 
attention and had to be cancelled while only half of the shipments had made it to 
Iran. Nevertheless, about ten percent of the total costs had already made it to the 
accounts of numerous shell companies in Panama and Liechtenstein (Morstein, 
1989:146). 
 Al Kassar was not the only Syrian in Club 45. Nabil Kuzbari also visited the 
Viennese Demel-cafe regularly and shared Al Kassar’s core business – brokering 
                                                 
Mörder – Udo Proksch und die ‘Lucona’-Obsession (~A state needs a killer – Udo 
Proksch and the ‘Lucona’ obsession).  
69  For some time he headed the Palestinian Liberation Organization and was part of the 
executive committee of the PLO. He died in March 2004 in US custody, after being 
captured in Bagdad eleven months earlier by US special forces.  
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profitable arms deals. He also owned an airline, Transair, which was often used 
by top politicians like the Minister of the Interior who used Transair to fly to 
Syria and other destinations (Morstein, 1989:138). Kuzbari also brokered deals 
between Austrian firms and Iran. According to Von Bülow, he even held an 
Austrian diplomatic passport which made his work even easier (Von Bülow, 
2003:88). 
 Before Al Kassar and Kuzbari closed their biggest deals, Udo Proksch himself 
was already deeply involved in military matters. Always fascinated by arms and 
wars, he found a rather original way to fund his own arms deals. Together with 
some friends inside Club 45 he founded an association aimed at establishing an 
army museum. Members of the association included the head of the state 
television channel ORF and the Austrian Minister of Defense. The latter official 
organized a constant flow of military goods to the association. Everything from 
tanks, fighter jets, jeeps, and rocket launchers were provided to the association 
for free. Proksch did not wait for the moment they would find a suitable building 
for a museum. Most of the arms went to the Polisario guerrilla movement in the 
Western Sahara, to Egypt, and to other destinations in the Middle East. Years 
later, when asked where all the arms had gone, Proksch would claim they had all 
been stolen (Pretterebner, 1989:190-95). 
 Besides his interest in arms, Proksch had been on rather good terms with 
numerous East Bloc institutions, among them the East-German intelligence 
agency. Furthermore, he actively sought Western technology in Silicon Valley 
and elsewhere, allegedly to export it to Eastern Europe. However, he was never 
arrested because of active political protection and the fact that American efforts to 
follow the trail of his activities could not pass the secrecy of a Swiss shell 
company. At some point, members of parliament started to press the Ministers of 
Justice and Foreign Affairs for answers on questions about Proksch’s activities. 
The questions were triggered by a book by some American and British 
journalists. In this book Techno-Bandits: How the Soviets are stealing America’s high-
tech future (1984), a whole chapter was devoted to Vienna. In the end the 
questions led nowhere. One Minister announced an investigation, which did not 
reach any concrete results. Another Minister could not respond because he first 
needed a German translation. The third Minister acknowledged that the US 
government had warned Austria that its country was used for the smuggling of 
technology. However, he claimed that Udo Proksch was never mentioned. He 
had apparently missed a NATO black list on which several companies that were 
owned by Proksch or by the Demel-café were mentioned (Pretterebner, 
1989:104). 
 Because of the political protection and the use of everything that corporate 
secrecy had to offer, Proksch continued his diverse activities for years. In the end, 
however, there was one crime which could not be denied forever: the planned 
explosion of the Lucona, a freighter with twelve persons on board, six of which 
died in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. Proksch had incorporated in Switzerland 
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a company called Zapata AG and used it to secure an abandoned coal mine. 
Machinery was removed, repainted and marked Zapata AG. Various parts were 
sent back and forth between Switzerland, Austria, and Italy to cloud their origins, 
aided by collaborators in Austrian Customs who altered the description of the 
official documents (Naylor, 2001:46). Subsequently, Proksch obtained technical 
information about a uranium ore processing plant and copied this on Zapata’s 
letters. Next, he set up a Hong Kong company whose officers signed a ‘contract’ 
with Zapata to purchase uranium ore processing machinery (Naylor, 2001:46).70 
To make it look legitimate, some letters and money were sent back and forth 
between Switzerland and Hong Kong. Finally, he chartered the M.S. Lucona, a 
freighter who had to bring the processing plant to Hong Kong. In 1977, the 
Lucona left the Italian port of Chiaggio, waved goodbye to by a group of high-
profile Austrian politicians, organized by Proksch to witness the departure. In the 
middle of the Pacific Ocean, a huge explosion ended the journey of the Lucona. 
Six crew members died due to the explosion and six survived. Convinced that 
they might also be killed, the Dutch and Philippine survivors chose to remain 
silent. In the following decade, several attempts were made to bring Proksch and 
his accomplices to justice. However, each time anyone dared to start 
investigations or even prosecutions, they were immediately stopped by their 
superiors. Meanwhile, some collateral damage was added to those already dead. 
The engineer of the Lucona fell off a highway bridge just before he was due to 
give evidence and one of the collaborating customs officers died of a heart attack 
after having admitted his complicity. The Minister of Defense who had covered 
Proksch for years was killed after relations with Proksch had cooled down.71 In 
the end, Proksch fled to the Philippines where he went through plastic surgery to 
change his looks. Despite his changed face and a false passport, he was arrested 
when he returned to Vienna (Schödel, 1998). After a trial, he was condemned to 
life imprisonment and died in June 2001. 
 Looking back at this summary of the history of the Club 45, it becomes clear 
how this network of corrupt relationships functioned as a sort of interface. 
Through this network, illegal arms transfers, transnational shipping insurance 
fraud, and other activities were laundered or immunized from prosecution. 
When the political protection by the Austrian Socialist Party diminished, Udo 
Proksch was getting more and more difficulties to maintain his colorful and 
criminal activities and was finally arrested and imprisoned. 
 
                                                 
70  The Zapata AG should not be confused with other companies with the same name and at 
least as well-known owners. George H.W. Bush participated in a company with the name 
Zapata. Furthermore Operation Zapata was the code name for the failed Bay of Pigs 
invasion in 1961 (Aguilar, 1981). 
71  His murder was presented as suicide but according to a detailed account of events by 
Pretterebner, it seems most likely to have been murder, although the murderer was never 
found (Pretterebner, 1989:624ff).  
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4.6.2 Propaganda Due (P2) in Italy and South America 
 
Through a complicated network of shell companies in several tax havens and 
connections to a number of banks with similar structures, Banco Ambrosiano was 
able to function as an interface by itself in a chain of activities linking Colombian 
drug traffickers, Italian mafia groups, South American dictators, terrorist groups, 
political parties and the freemasons lodge Propaganda Due (P2) (Paoli, 1995; 
Raw, 1992; Trepp, 1996; Willan, 2001). 
 The discussion of Banco Ambrosiano in the previous chapter focused 
primarily on the illicit activities of the bank and the actors the bank was able to 
influence. Among these actors were several Italian political parties and politicians 
in South America. However, Ambrosiano itself was instrumental in a larger 
power structure that had the P2 and its leader Licio Gelli as its centre. A 
symptom of the leverage Gelli had over Calvi, the director of Banco 
Ambrosiano, was the flow of funds from Ambrosiano to Gelli. According to 
Charles Raw, Ambrosiano paid about 250 million dollars to Gelli between 1976 
and 1981. To organize these funds, Gelli and Calvi robbed the Italian state with 
the help of corrupt politicians and leading civil servants. The primary victims 
were the state oil company ENI and the Banca Nazionale del Lavorno or BNL 
bank (Raw, 1992). 
 P2 had been led by Licio Gelli since the 1960s. He actively recruited 
powerful members of the Italian establishment. Judges, police commanders, 
captains of industry, intelligence agents and leading members of the military were 
incorporated in the secret lodge (Trepp, 1996:293; Willan, 2001). Until 1974, P2 
aggressively tried to bring the Italian system to the brink of collapse, so that 
ultimately P2 members would be able to establish a new order, inspired by 
Mussolini’s corporatism. Terrorist activities by right wing groups were allegedly 
supported, like the attack in 1974 on the ‘Italicus Express’ in which twelve 
people died and the attack in 1980 on the train station of Bologna that killed 
eighty-five people. For these crimes, over a dozen P2 members were convicted. 
Licio Gelli was given a long sentence to a house of correction. However, his 
lawyers appealed and in the end Gelli did not have to go to jail. In 1974, P2 
changed its strategy and started to infiltrate the Italian government to achieve 
changes from within the political system (Trepp, 1997:295-96). Gelli was rather 
successful in his recruitment of new powerful members to P2 until a list of P2 
members became public and caused a huge scandal that preceded the subsequent 
collapse of the Banco Ambrosiano. Gelli went to jail briefly but was able to 
escape. 
 Like Club 45, P2 was a meeting point of many members of both the political, 
economic, and criminal elite. Although the basic principle was much the same, 
P2 was far more complicated, threatening, and far-reaching that it’s Austrian 
counterpart. The close links between all actors involved enabled or laundered 
many national as well as transnational crimes. To be sure, national and 
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transnational and corporate, terrorist and ‘mafia’ crimes cannot be separated in 
any meaningful sense here. Terrorist attacks, for example, were meant to 
destabilize the Italian society. The fruits of these activities were to be reaped by 
exploiting massive capital flight after dramatic attacks. National terrorism and 
transnational corporate crimes went hand in hand. The same goes for the 
activities of both the Italian mafia and foreign drug traffickers. While Banco 
Ambrosiano as an organization functioned as an interface, P2 comprised a 
structure in which the bank was subordinate to the aims and power of the 
Freemasons Lodge. This structure can be understood as a wide, complicated and 




In this chapter jurisdictions or other geographically defined entities as interface 
were discussed. It was argued that jurisdictions and other entities can also 
function as interface to change activities from licit to illicit or the other way 
around, besides the individuals and organizations that were discussed in chapter 3. 
Successively, the jurisdiction as interface, as well as two variations of this 
interface, were outlined and illustrated with case studies derived from the 
literature on transnational crime. The first variation involves government policies 
that bring about a de facto interface because they nullify the legislation which 
makes certain transnational activities illegal. The second variation involves a de 
facto interface as a result of a network of corruption. 
 Jurisdictions may function as interfaces when they lack legislation in areas 
where most other jurisdictions have enacted legislation that outlaws certain cross-
border activities. Ideally, the jurisdiction without legislation does not cooperate 
with other jurisdictions seeking the perpetrators or persons acting against the 
specific laws. Depending on the type of crime, this may involve small 
jurisdictions with strict bank secrecy laws and corporate structures which provide 
the maximum privacy for their shareholders, or on the contrary large countries 
like the US, or the UK. Several activities, defined as illegal outside these 
jurisdictions, can under specific circumstances be legalized through these 
jurisdictions. Money laundering is such an activity, as well as tax evasion and 
capital flight. In fact, the range of crimes that may have jurisdictions through 
which they are protected or laundered is wide. 
 Besides the interface as a result of legislation in a particular jurisdiction, there 
are de facto interfaces as a result of government policies. In an ideal world, the 
combined set of laws tells everyone what is illegal and who will be prosecuted as 
such. However, governments and courts have wide margins within which to 
interpret and enforce these laws. When these margins are used to effectively 
nullify the laws prohibiting certain transnational crimes, there will often be no 
difference with the situation described above. Despite the actual legislation, the 
jurisdiction (or a part of it) has turned into a haven for this particular crime and 
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can be understood as a de facto interface in certain situations. The Dutch arms 
export policy was used as an example here. In practice, this policy has to some 
extent nullified the legislation and intentions of the government. In the case of 
arms exports from the Netherlands, this implies that these transnational 
transactions are de facto ‘pre-emptively’ legalized and therefore do not fall into the 
category of transnational crime at all. 
 The last interface in this chapter was also a de facto interface. However, it is 
not the result of a general policy to interpret laws in a way as to nullify them. It is 
the result of a corrupt network of persons that causes a situation that at some 
place, during some period, transnational crimes are covered in way as to de facto 
legalize them. In practice, such a situation will almost always involve other 
interfaces as well. Persons involved will make use of every possible foreign haven, 
as well as loopholes in legislation. However, when this does not suffice to make 
certain transnational crimes possible and legalize them, the mentioned network 
will take care of this. Two possible illustrations of this type of interface were 
discussed above: the Austrian Club 45 and the Italian P2. 
 In the next chapter, an analytical model will be developed that incorporates 
the role of individuals, legitimate organizations, and jurisdictions as interface. 
Thereafter, chapters 6 to 9 will discuss the illicit art and antiquities trade. This 
trade will be used to analyze the usefulness of the three institutionalized 
interfaces, as well as its variations, that were discussed in this chapter and the 
previous one. It remains to be seen whether the typology, extended with the 
three institutionalized interfaces, suffices to describe and understand the 
relationships between legal and illegal in this field, which will be studied both 










In the previous chapters a number of case studies were discussed in which certain 
individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions that have one crucial characteristic in 
common. They can all, under specific circumstances, act as interface by 
themselves. This means that such an individual, organization or jurisdiction is not 
only engaged in relationships with legal or illegal actors (that are called interfaces 
within the interface typology) but can be seen as embodiment of the legal–illegal 
interface themselves. That is, through these individuals, organizations or 
jurisdictions, the legal status of certain goods, services, or funds is transformed. 
This means that they are either laundered or on the contrary become illegal. 
 In this chapter, an analytical model will be developed that simplifies and helps 
to understand this process. This model integrates all variations that were discussed 
in the previous chapter into one simple model, the so-called lock model. 
 In the next section, this model will be explained. Thereafter, it will be 
explained how individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions perform a so-called 
lock function. Hereafter, we will no longer speak about the role as interface but 
instead about the lock function of individuals, organizations or jurisdictions. 
 
5.2 The lock model 
 
The introduction above started with the observation that the individuals, 
organizations, and jurisdictions discussed in previous chapters can all have a so-
called lock function. Several specific factors can enable this lock function, 
depending on the type of actor one focuses on. These factors will be summarized 
for each different type of interface in the sections below. 
 One general factor in all case studies was the ability to deal with criminals as 
well as legitimate companies and government agencies ‘on the same level’. All 
actors discussed in the case studies were able to have ‘normal’ relationships with 
both legal and illegal actors, engaging in both legal and illegal activities. 
Therefore, when for example one of the legitimate organizations discussed 
collaborated with drug traffickers it did not mean that the drug traffickers were 
corrupting the legitimate organization. That is, the relationship should not be 
seen as primarily one-way. The drug traffickers and the organization did business 
as they would do if there were no difference in ‘legality’ between the two. 
 When certain actors function as lock, the ability to deal with third parties on 
different levels is used in at least one type of transnational crime. In that case, the 
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actor can be seen as located in the middle of a transnational criminal activity. On 
one side, the activity involves illicit transactions with goods or services, while on 
the other side it involves legal transactions involving the same goods or services. 
On both sides, the interfacing actor or entity is engaged in relationships with 
criminal or legitimate third parties. These relationships can be labeled with the 
different types from the typology. This process can best be compared with the 
mechanism of a lock in shipping. In the figure below, this mechanism is 
illustrated. 





















On the left, a ship passes the lock-gate and enters the lock-chamber from the 
lower side. This lower side is a metaphor for the illegal part of a transnational 
activity. After the ship has entered the lock, the lock closes again. After that, the 
ship is locked upward as water is entering the lock from the higher level. This 
upward move is a metaphor for the transformation of the legal status of a 
particular activity from illegal to legal, or, as is it commonly called the laundering 
of this particular activity. Finally, the ship leaves the lock as soon as the level 
inside the lock has become the same as outside the lock at the higher level. 
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 On the right side of the figure, the opposite process is shown. The ship now 
comes from the higher level and is moved to the lower level. The status of the 
particular activity is now transformed from legal to illegal. 
 The lock in the figure above can vary as to the degree of complexity. In its 
most simple form, the lock consists of a particular individual, organization, or 
jurisdiction. However, the lock may also be assembled of a complex web of 
individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions. The case studies in chapters 3 and 4 
consisted of cases that were primarily built around one particular interface, that is, 
an individual, organization or jurisdiction as interface. However, most cases also 
used one or both of the other interfaces. In the next sections, the different 
variations of the lock model will be outlined based on the findings from chapters 
3 and 4. These variations will outline step by step how the legal status of 
transnational activities is transformed in the same way as the level at which a ship 
sails is altered by a lock. 
 
5.3 The lock function of individuals 
 
Individuals can function as a lock in two different ways. First of all, they can act 
as (transnational) broker between actors in different countries that cannot, or do 
not want to, deal with each other directly. The broker is arranging a deal in 
which legal goods or services are delivered to outlawed customers, or illegal 
goods or services are delivered to legitimate customers. The model is portrayed 
in the figure on the next page with an illicit arms deal as example. 
 The arms come from a legitimate source, for example a defense ministry or 
intelligence agency. They are destined for an outlawed end-user. This can for 
example be a guerrilla movement affected by national legislation in the source 
country, or a UN boycott forbidding the sale of arms to them. The deal may be 
motivated by practical concerns (sale of redundant material) or by the intention 
to support this movement despite the laws forbidding such support. The broker 
organizes both the logistical process to get the arms from country X to country 
Y, as well as the process to get the arms to the outlawed destination without any 
visible illegalities for the legitimate source. In this theoretical case, that will at 
least involve obtaining an end-user certificate for the arms from a third country 
that can legally buy them. Through this end-user certificate, the source country is 
formally selling to a legitimate buyer. Furthermore, the broker should make sure 
the arms cannot be intercepted along the way to the destination country. Finally, 
he will often have to make sure that the source of the arms cannot be exposed as 
soon as they have arrived at their destination. This can be done for example by 
changing their appearance, adding a false provenance for them, or even swapping 
them for arms originating from the enemy. The result of this set-up is that the 
source country is engaged in a legitimate deal with another country. At the same 
time, the receivers of the arms obtain them from the broker in an unofficial and 
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illegal way. Therefore, it is through the broker that the arms move from legal to 
illegal without direct contact between the two parties. 
 
figure 8: the lock function of individuals 1
country X:
arms from
legitimate source... country Y:
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Among the factors characterizing most individuals, a base of operation in at least 
two countries is the most important. This base is not restrained to a mere place to 
stay or a local branch of their legitimate company abroad. It also involves a 
network of relevant individuals that can be used to broker deals. This 
‘multinational’ base is usually combined with the ownership of passports, and 
sometimes diplomatic passports, of several countries. To be sure, the ownership 
of more than one passport is hardly a rare occurrence among transnational 
criminals. However, these passports are sometimes false or stolen. The kind of 
individuals discussed in previous chapters usually owned several authentic 
passports and sometimes (authentic) diplomatic passports. 
 Furthermore, political protection and contacts with the top of the political 
apparatus and administrative machinery are shared by many of these individuals. 
Again, there is a qualitative difference with other transnational criminals. These 
criminals may obtain certain favors by corrupting individual law enforcement 
officials or others. However, the individuals discussed before could arrange 
protection that went as far as to secure effective immunity from prosecution. 
 Finally, the knowledge and use of the global financial system and the 
combination of numerous legitimate companies in different jurisdictions, is a 
crucial factor. As with the other factors, this is not claimed to be unique for 
transnational criminals. However, the scale and sophistication of this factor is 
different from most criminals. Whereas criminals often have to rely on the 
knowledge of others to use the opportunities of banks, foreign registered 
companies, and tax havens, the persons discussed here were to some degree 
experts on these matters themselves. 
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Besides transnational brokers, another category of individuals was discussed in 
chapter 3. This category consists of transnational dealers that do not broker deals 
between actors but buy from actors in country X and thereafter sell to customers 
in country Y. The figure below portrays the transnational dealers functioning as 
lock between a source and a market country. 
 The trade in conflict diamonds is used as an example. The dealer buys from 
an outlawed source in the diamond’s country of origin. Thereafter, he ships the 
diamonds to the market country where he sells them on the legal market. If 
necessary, the dealer obscures the illegal source of the diamonds. This can for 
example be done with false papers or shipment through third countries. The 
result of the whole procedure is the effective laundering of conflict diamonds 
into regular diamonds on the legal market. 
 






... bought by dealer and
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5.4 The lock function of legitimate organizations 
 
In the second part of chapter 3 the role of legitimate organizations as interface 
was discussed. Similar to the individuals discussed above, organizations can 
combine relationships with both legal as well as illegal actors. The factors that 
were discussed above, are to a large extent also relevant for these organizations. 
 Legitimate organizations can function as a lock in two ways. First of all the 
organization that can be seen as an extension of a criminal organization or a 
network of organizations or individuals. Here it is called the coffee shop model, 
inspired by one of the case studies in chapter 3. The legal organization can be 
seen here as one link in the transnational criminal network. Through this link, 
the legal status of goods, services, or funds is transformed. In the figure below, 
this type is portrayed. 
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 The funding of terrorism by certain charities is used as an example here. Such 
a charity on the one hand engages in numerous, perfectly legal, relationships with 
supporters. These supporters primarily donate funds to the charity. The charity 
secretly funnels part of these donations to terrorist organizations abroad. The 
latter transaction is unofficial and illegal. The result is that through the charity, 
legally donated funds are used to finance terrorist organizations. The status of 
these donations thus changes from legitimate funding to illegal funding of 
terrorism. 
 







... and funnels part
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The second variation involves an organization that is fully independent but has 
multiple links with both legal and illegal actors. Here it is called the Ambrosiano 
model, named after one of the case studies in chapter 3. This organization is not a 
link in one particular transnational crime, but is connected to various 
transnational crimes, as well as legitimate activities. 
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figure 11: the lock function of organizations 2
country X:
flight capital & proceeds
of transnational crimes...
country Y:
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The laundering of both flight capital and the proceeds of criminal activities is 
used as an example here. The funds originate from country X but are laundered 
abroad through one or more subsidiaries of the bank involved and finally invested 
in country Y. Besides the illegal activities, the bank is involved in numerous 
perfectly legal transactions with customers in several countries. At the same time, 
the bank is involved in illegal transactions that do not involve any transformation 
of the legal status of the funds involved. It should be noted that this is only a 
theoretical example of an analytical model. In practice, endless variations will be 
found of the mechanism mentioned. 
 
5.5 The lock function of jurisdictions 
 
The last variation of the lock model involves jurisdictions that function as a lock. 
Jurisdictions can function as a lock in case they lack legislation in branches where 
most other jurisdictions have enacted legislation that outlaws certain cross-border 
activities. Ideally, the jurisdiction without legislation does not cooperate with 
other jurisdictions seeking the perpetrators or persons acting against the specific 
laws. Depending on the type of crime, this may involve small jurisdictions with 
strict bank secrecy laws and corporate structures which provide the maximum 
privacy for their shareholders, or on the contrary jurisdictions in Europe or 
North America. Several activities defined as illegal outside these jurisdictions can 
under specific circumstances be legalized through these jurisdictions. Money 
laundering is such an activity, as well as tax evasion and capital flight. In fact, the 
range of crimes that may have jurisdictions through which they are protected or 
laundered is wide. 
 One major difference exists between jurisdictions as a lock as opposed to 
individuals and organizations as a lock. In case of jurisdictions, the role as lock is 
not the result of some sort of set-up or conspiracy. It is a direct result of the 
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absence or existence of certain legislation within the jurisdiction.72 However, 
individuals and organizations will often deliberately make use of these 
jurisdictions while they organize all kinds of transnational crimes. 
figure 12: the lock function of jurisdictions 1
countries X and Y:
cigarettes produced in
country X sold to
wholesaler in country Y




(where taxes are evaded)
(illegal)
(legal)







In the figure above, the lock function of jurisdictions shown as a simple model. 
The smuggling of cigarettes is portrayed as an example. First the cigarettes are 
shipped from a cigarette company in country X to a wholesaler in country Y. 
This transaction is fully legal and as a result the cigarettes are within a jurisdiction 
where they are only moderately or not taxed at all. Thereafter, the wholesaler 
knowingly provides smuggling organizations with large quantities of cigarettes 
that are moved to country Z in which cigarettes are officially subject to high 
duties. As these duties are evaded, the smugglers and the legitimate wholesaler are 
working together in this transnational variation of tax evasion through cigarette 
smuggling. 
                                                 
72  One can argue that legislation is a result of human decisions, potentially taken to attract the 
kind of illegal activities that are discussed here. However, this possibility falls outside the 
topics that need to be clarified in this study. Within this context it matters that certain 
jurisdictions simply offer certain opportunities, independent of the causes or reasons for 
these opportunities. 
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figure 13: the lock function of jurisdictions 2
country X:
toxic waste is smuggled
out of the country,
violating the laws for
disposal of this material...
country Y:
... and the toxic waste is
dumped in a legal way
(illegal)
(legal)
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The opposite situation from the first figure is shown in the second figure. The 
example used is here is the disposal of toxic waste. In country X toxic waste 
needs to be disposed of. According to the current legislation in country X, this 
waste needs to be processed by specific companies in country X. The waste is not 
allowed to be exported out of country X. Stimulated by the significant costs of 
this type of disposal, the producer of the toxic waste organizes the smuggling of 
this waste to country Y where the material involved is not subject to specific 
legislation. As soon as the producer has succeeded in this illicit export to country 
Y, he has laundered the toxic waste. Thereafter, he finds a company that is 
willing to dump or process the waste for a small sum of money. As specific 
legislation concerning the material involved is lacking in country Y, the producer 
is free to close a deal with anyone willing to take on the toxic waste. 
 Besides the jurisdiction as (automatic) lock for certain activities, two variations 
were discussed in chapter 4. First of all, there are so-called de facto interfaces as a 
result of government policies. In an ideal world, the combined set of laws tells 
everyone what is illegal and who will be prosecuted as such. However, 
governments and courts have wide margins within which to interpret these laws. 
This applies to laws governing transnational crimes, just as it does to other types 
of crimes. When these margins are used to effectively nullify the laws prohibiting 
certain transnational crimes, there is no longer a difference with the situation 
described above. Despite the actual legislation, the jurisdiction (or a part of it) has 
turned into a haven for this particular crime and can be understood as a de facto 
lock. 
 The second variation on the jurisdiction as a lock is also a de facto lock. 
However, it is not the result of a general policy to interpret laws in a way as to 
effectively nullify them. It is the result of a corrupt network of persons which 
causes a situation that within a specific geographical area, during some period, 
transnational crimes are covered in way as to de facto legalize them, or at least 
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make them immune from prosecution. In practice, such a situation will almost 
always involve individuals or organizations as locks as well. Persons involved will 
make use of every possible foreign haven, as well as loopholes in the legislation. 
However, when this does not suffice to make certain transnational crimes 
possible and launder them, the mentioned network will take care of this. The 
variation should not be interpreted as yet another model but more as a mixture of 
the different models that is discussed with the jurisdictions because it is related to 




In this chapter an analytical model was developed of individuals, organizations, 
and jurisdictions that can function as a lock between legal and illegal. This so-
called lock model is inspired on the insights that were a result of the case studies 
in chapters 3 and 4. The model simplifies the processes by which the legal status 
of certain transnational activities is transformed. This can either involve a process 
of laundering or on the contrary a process by which goods, services, or funds 
become illegal. 
 The model is called after a shipping lock because of the mechanism by which 
the individual, organization, or jurisdiction combines equal relationships with 
both sides despite of the different levels (that is the difference in legality). The 
lock model can both be restricted to individuals, organizations, or jurisdictions; 
or it can incorporate combinations of these interfaces in a general model. All 
different possibilities were discussed in the sections above. If the lock model is 
used to analyze a concrete case study, one can also use the interface typology to 
label all the different stages in the lock ‘mechanism’. Labeling these stages in a 
case study with the typology makes it possible to compare them with other case 
studies involving other types of transnational crimes. 
 The following chapters will discuss the illicit art and antiquities trade. The 
chapters are based on both an empirical research project, executed specifically for 
the present study, as well as on a review of the available literature. The interface 
typology and the lock model will be confronted with the empirical data in order 
to establish whether these analytical tools can help to describe and understand the 
interfaces between legal and illegal in the art and antiquities trade as observed in 
practice. Furthermore, it will be investigated whether the change in legal status 
can thus be understood. It should be pointed out that the empirical study of the 
illicit art and antiquities trade is thus not a goal in itself, but is used here first and 
foremost to gauge the usefulness of the models developed in the first part of this 
book. In chapter 6, data sources of the empirical study will be discussed. 
Thereafter, chapter 7 will provide an overview of the illicit art and antiquities 
trade on the basis of the available literature. Then, chapter 8 will discuss the illicit 
trade in art, and chapter 9 the illicit trade in antiquities, both on the basis of the 
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empirical study. The conclusions of the whole book will follow in chapter 10, 






THE TRANSNATIONAL ILLICIT ART AND ANTIQUITIES TRADE: 
RESEARCH OUTLINE AND DATA SOURCES 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
The previous chapters dealt with the interface typology and the lock model. The 
analyses were based on the literature on transnational crime, media reports, and 
other written sources. This chapter and the following three chapters will focus on 
one particular type of transnational crime: the transnational illicit art and 
antiquities trade. The research outline and data sources will be discussed in this 
chapter. Chapter 7 will provide a general overview of the transnational illicit art 
and antiquities trade. Chapter 8 will focus on the illicit art trade, using data that 
was gathered in the empirical study discussed in this chapter. Finally, chapter 9 
will focus on the illicit antiquities, also using data from the empirical study. 
 There are two major reasons why the transnational illicit art and antiquities 
trade provides an interesting and useful object of study within the context of a 
study of interfaces. The first reason is the assumption that this trade has many 
interfaces because in general stolen or smuggled art needs to be sold on the legal 
market to be profitable.73 This implies some form of laundering along the way 
from the moment of theft and/or illegal export to the sale to a customer. The 
second reason to study the illicit art and antiquities trade is the fact that it has 
hardly been studied by criminologists.74 Nevertheless, there are a number of 
interesting studies by archaeologists and other academics but they usually do not 
primarily focus on subjects that are relevant for criminological study (e.g. Brodie 
& Renfrew, 2001; Tubb, 1995). Furthermore, several lawyers have dealt 
extensively with the legal instruments with regard to the illicit trade like the 
Unidroit treaty and the UNESCO Convention (Prott, 1997; Rascher, 2000). For 
these reasons, a study of the illicit art and antiquities trade can be both an 
important addition to other empirical studies of transnational crime, as well as a 
fruitful area to look at the significance of the typology and the lock model. 
                                                 
73  This has been illustrated in some accounts of the art trade. See for example Atwood 
(2004), Middlemas (1975), Watson (1998) as well as several popular books written by 
Thomas Hoving, former director of the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art (Hoving, 
1994, 1996).  
74  In the Netherlands, for example, no academic studies have been done into the illicit art 
and antiquities trade. One of the few academic studies done in the last years has been a 
PhD by Laurence Massy, a Belgian criminologist and art historian (Massy, 2000). The best 
known academic work is John Conklin’s Art Crime (1994). This book, however, is 
primarily a broad overview of the range of art crimes without real new data or insights. 
Finally, several Australian criminologists, have focused on art crime. See e.g. Aarons 
(2001), Polk & Alder (2002); Aarons, Chappell & Polk (1998). 
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 The following sections will first discuss the different data sources that were 
used in this study. Thereafter, the opportunities and limitations of these sources 
will be discussed as far as this study is concerned. It must be stressed that an 
eclectic approach was followed to gather data for this study. Due to the fact that 
law enforcement efforts in the field of the illicit art and antiquities trade are 
generally minimal in the Netherlands, together with the absence of other 
abundant sources of data, makes it necessary to simply make the best of every 
source available for researchers. 
 Finally, in an annex to this chapter, the differences between the licit and illicit 
trade from a legal perspective will be further discussed, as well as the activities of 
several police forces in the field of stolen and smuggled art. The legal perspective 
is treated here because in the countries discussed there are variations in the 
regulations of the legal status of works of art, and the import and export of them. 
Because of the inclusive definition used in this study, these differences do not 
have to explained all the time. However, these legal complexities have a great 
impact on the interface between legal and illegal actors and understanding these 
complexities is indispensable to grasp the meaning of the next two chapters. For 
that reason they will be outlined sufficiently in the annex to this chapter. 
 
6.2  Data sources 
 
In the following sub-sections, all sources used in this study will be briefly 
described. The main sources were official data, interviews with experts and 
analysis of media reports, non-academic literature, and specialized media. Besides 
these sources, academic literature has been used of course. However, this is not 
seen as a ‘source’ that has been opened specifically for this study. Having 
discussed all sources, a separate section will focus on the usefulness as well as 
limitations of these sources. 
 
6.2.1 Official sources 
 
First, the use of official files is considered. In most countries, art-related crimes 
are not a priority for the police. In the appendix, a brief overview of the activities 
of police agencies in the Netherlands, France, Germany, the UK, and the US is 
presented. Because of the low priority of art crimes, it is usually difficult to work 
with police agencies to gather data. In the Netherlands, an art unit at the national 
police is no longer active and collaboration with the police in this field is 
therefore more or less impossible. However, I spoke with several informed police 
officers from the National Police Service (KLPD) about the illicit art trade, 
among them the former head of the art unit. 
 Even when it was possible to use police files or other official documents, I 
had to take notice of the potential problems with official data. Several of these 
problems surely applied to the data that will be discussed hereafter. The data are 
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probably selective75 and often only permitted to be mentioned anonymous. 
However, other problems do not, or to a lesser extent, apply to this study as 
compared to others. Using official files did not seriously inhibit using other 
sources. Most of these other sources were available as will be explained hereafter. 
Furthermore, one very important practical point motivated me to pursue all 
official sources that could be approached. For this study I could not profit from 
many reliable and relevant studies based on official sources and by collecting data 
from these sources myself would therefore add a unique set of findings for my 
own and future research. For these reasons, I decided that I would use all the 
material that could reasonably be obtained from official sources. The different 
official sources will be described below. 
 
The Inspectorate of Cultural Heritage in the Netherlands 
 
Most of the data collection has been done at the Dutch Inspectorate of Cultural 
Heritage in the Hague. The inspectorate is part of the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science, and is responsible for examining state collections in 
independent museums.76 The inspectorate is also responsible for conferring 
export permits for works of art that leave the EU from the Netherlands. In 
addition, in case other EU countries claim items under the EU regulations, the 
inspectorate is the responsible agency to deal with such a claim. Furthermore, the 
inspectorate is responsible for the protection of a list of items of Dutch cultural 
heritage which are protected under the Law for the Protection of Cultural 
Heritage (WBC).77 With regard to suspected illegal import or export of cultural 
objects, the inspectorate works together with Dutch customs. When customs 
runs into items that might fall under any of the regulations, they contact the 
inspectorate in the Hague. One of the inspectors will then come to study the 
items or send an expert to do so. When it is established that the items are in fact 
relevant cultural objects, and the source country can be traced, the inspectorate 
will discuss with the public prosecutor (OM) or police whether the case can and 
should be further investigated. Usually this involves the question whether the 
objects are in fact stolen. Depending on the answer to this question the case will 
be either taken over by the police/OM or will go back to customs to let the 
objects go or deal with the fiscal aspects of the case. Because of this task assigned 
to the inspectorate, I started to work at the inspectorate to look at all their files 
on suspected illegal import or export. Since then, I have studied all files of 
                                                 
75  Without any comparable reliable set of data, one cannot tell whether data are selective or 
not. One can only assume that they are selective because of practical factors like e.g. 
changing policies by customs and the limited part of cross-border flows that can be 
monitored by customs. 
76  See: http://www.minocw.nl/cu_insp/ (Visited November 5th 2005)  
77  This law, as well as other legislation, can be found at: www.overheid.nl (Visited 
November 5th 2005) 
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suspected illegal import and export between 1995 and 2004. This included 105 
cases of import, 17 cases of transit and 8 cases of export of works of art. In the 
next chapter, these cases will also be discussed from the perspective of interfaces. 
Despite the fact that these cases provide a rich source of information, some 
limitations should be mentioned here. As customs officials cannot investigate ‘art 
crimes’ systematically, due to the limited legal provisions (see appendix), they will 
only run into illegal imports or exports by chance. Furthermore, numerous 
factors influence the cases that will make it to the inspectorate. For example, the 
ever-changing priorities of the customs bureaucracies and the individual officers 
on duty can have an effect on detection and investigation.78 Finally, at the 
inspectorate I have discussed particular issues and cases with the other members 
of staff who are all well acquainted with the art scene.79 
 
The art squad of the National Police in France  
 
Through the Dutch Inspectorate of Cultural Heritage it was possible to visit the 
French national police art squad (OCBC).80 In May of 2003, I joined the head of 
the inspectorate at a visit to the OCBC in Paris. I was able to engage in 
discussions with several officers who turned out to be very well-informed and 
willing to share their experiences in this field. We discussed a number of topics 
that are particularly relevant to this study. One of them is the traffic of stolen art 
from France to Belgium and the Netherlands and the way some art dealers are 
involved in this traffic. In 2002, a Belgian-based Dutch art dealer was convicted 
for his leading role in numerous art robberies in French castles. I knew of this 
case and a number of unrelated cases during the 1970s. In December 2003, I 
stayed at the OCBC for two weeks. This enabled me to look in depth at this 
case, which is considered the largest since the start of the OCBC in the 1970s. 
Furthermore, I was able to discuss other cases, as well as specific topics of the 
illicit art trade, with several officers at the OCBC. In the next chapter the 
collected data will be discussed from a perspective of interfaces. 
                                                 
78  A shocking example of customs policies are the so-called 100% checks of passengers at 
Schiphol airport on flights from notorious drug trafficking regions. Thanks to the 
enormous investment of resources in these checks, other flights and goods are often 
scarcely checked. As every regular visitor of Schiphol airport can observe, it sometimes 
happens that certain arrival gates are hardly checked. This means that anybody with illicit 
art or for example small arms can enter the Netherlands without a reasonable chance of 
being inspected.  
79  Several persons have worked at auction houses, taught at faculties of art history, and were 
editors for art journals. Furthermore, the lawyer of one of the most important museums in 
the Netherlands worked at the inspectorate for one day a week.  
80  The central office for the fight against the illicit trade in cultural objects (OCBC) in Paris. 
See annex two. 
TRANSNATIONAL ILLICIT ART & ANTIQUITIES TRADE: RESEARCH OUTLINE AND DATA SOURCES  
115 
New Scotland Yard and the Ministry of Culture in the United Kingdom 
 
In September 2003, I visited the art squad of New Scotland Yard in London.81 I 
discussed my research and the most important questions and topics with two 
inspectors at New Scotland Yard. Although I was not able to look at specific 
cases, I could interview them on a number of relevant topics within the illicit art 
and antiquities trade. They informed me on the basis of their experience in the 
London metropolitan area. New Scotland Yard’s art squad deals with art crimes 
in the London metropolitan area. Besides Scotland Yard, I spoke with the head 
of the agency that grants export permits for works of art. This agency is part of 
the Ministry of Culture of the UK. 
 
The art and antiquities unit of the Carabinieri in Italy 
 
In January 2005, I made a three-day visit to the head office of the art and 
antiquities unit of the Italian Carabinieri in Rome. I was joined by an expert in 
Italian art and antiquities who is both allied to the University of Amsterdam and 
to the Dutch Inspectorate of Cultural Heritage. Through extensive discussions 
with five members of the head office, we were able to gather information about 
antiquities looting and trafficking from Italy as well as the process of laundering 
through several third countries. Furthermore, thanks to their database (Leonardo) 
they were able to provide statistics on thefts and recoveries. Their database is the 
largest of its kind worldwide, and probably the most advanced. 
 
6.2.2 Interviews with experts 
 
Whereas observing or contacting criminals directly seems rather difficult, it is 
possible to get information from all kinds of people that have come into contact 
with the illicit trade through their work, academic field of interest, or for other 
reasons. This was done by talking to a number of people working in museums, 
art galleries, customs, police, private security firms, an investigative journalist, and 
others. Sometimes this led to new information or ways to cross-validate 
information from other sources. However, it also showed some less illuminating 
features of this technique of data collection. Rather often, people primarily 
recycle notions taken over from others and actually without any empirical base. 
Examples of such notions can be found with the explanations given for large art 
thefts, the link between drug trafficking and art thefts, and the presence of 
smuggled and stolen items in the legitimate art trade. Despite the fact that 
numerous ‘experts’ share these notions, they often lack any credible proof. Some 
of these notions have been discussed before (Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2003; Tijhuis & 
Soudijn, 2004; Tijhuis & Van der Wal, 2005). 
                                                 
81  See: http://www.met.police.uk/artandantiques/index.htm (Visited November 5th 2005). 
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 Besides the importance of the experiences with interviews for this study, it 
motivated me to be extra cautious with articles or books primarily based on 
conversations or interviews with experts. Especially when experts lack a record of 
substantial empirical research it will often be better to stay with open sources and 
empirical studies by others. The different types of people that were interviewed 
are briefly described below. 
 
Archaeologists and museum curators 
 
As far as the trade in antiquities is concerned, many staff members of 
ethnographical museums have experiences with both the source of the trade 
(theft and smuggling of antiquities from source countries) and the trade itself in 
source and market countries. Some of them work in a museum part of the year 
and do field work abroad for the rest of it. Several had experienced looting of 
archaeological sites at which they worked. I interviewed staff members from 
museums in the Netherlands, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. 
 At a number of universities and institutes, I interviewed archaeologists, art 
historians and related academics. They were working at the University of Leiden 
and the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands), the Illicit Antiquities Research 
Centre at the University of Cambridge (the United Kingdom), Bryn Mawr College 
(United States) and Chulalongkorn University (Thailand) as well as the National 
Museums of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. In total, I spoke with sixteen persons 




Art dealers are potentially one of the best sources of information. However, this 
depends upon their willingness to discuss their dealings with outsiders. Several 
conversations with dealers gave some idea of their way of working although it 
usually did not result in any ‘hard’ data. Furthermore, I was restrained in the 
possibilities to interview art dealers because of the work at the Inspectorate of 
Cultural Heritage. The reason for this was the chance to engage the same people 
that also figured in official files. However, I was able to speak with eight dealers 
from the Netherlands, France, and Thailand. 
 Questions relating to the provenance of items are often evaded or answered in 
vague terms. In each concrete case, one can only guess about the reasons for this 
and not automatically assume that anything illegal is involved. No dealer has to 
answer any questions and legitimate reasons for secrecy can be thought of – for 
example, the anonymity of their clients. However, as long as some dealers prefer 
to abstain from the degree of transparency that is required or custom in many 
other economic sectors, they are by themselves cause for suspicion when they are 
involved in parts of the trade known for their incidental or regular connection 
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with looting and smuggling.82 This holds true, for example, for the trade in items 





Several other persons do not fit into the categories above. Among them was one 
of the investigative journalists working on the illicit antiquities trade. 
Furthermore, I had a number of conversations with the director of NedArt, a 
foundation promoting the interests of the Dutch cultural heritage as well as the 
different parts of the art sector. They were all rather well informed and provided 
me with significant information on specific topics. 
 
6.2.3 Media reports, non-academic literature and specialized media 
 
The last method of data collection involves media reports and other open 
sources. At first this method seemed to have rather limited opportunities because 
of the lack of media coverage for most of the art thefts and illicit trade. However, 
it turned out that there was in fact a substantial pool of information to be found 
in numerous specialist media. Nevertheless, with regard to the pros and cons of 
different research methods, some notes should be added here. First of all, many 
media reports keep a number of myths alive that have no (or a rather small) 
empirical base.83 They need to be cut out before the remaining credible 
information can be used. Furthermore, as with natural persons, different media 
tend to repeat each other’s ‘news’. This does not necessarily mean that anything 
is wrong or misleading with regard to this information, but it simply means that 
large quantities of information need to be scanned to get anything new or 
relevant. Finally, to some extent the media have the same problem of selection as 
the official sources. However, some specialist media discussed below are less 




Since 1977 the International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR) has published the 
Stolen Art Alert as part of the IFAR Journal.84 In this periodical, IFAR publishes 
                                                 
82  This custom of secrecy clearly is not observed by all dealers. Interesting differences can be 
found at major events like The European Fine Art Fair (TEFAF) in Maastricht. Some dealers 
have labels with all relevant information with all or most of their items, whereas others, 
involved in the same kind of items, do not provide any information at all and also prefer 
not do so in conversations with potential customers.  
83  Examples were mentioned above and concern the close link between the drug trade and 
the trade in stolen art, the theft of works of art ordered by collectors and the growing 
involvement of ‘organized crime’ in the illicit art and antiquities trade. 
84  See: http://www.ifar.org/what_main.htm (Visited November 5th 2005). 
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reports of thefts and recoveries, as well as articles on particular thefts. Most of the 
reports are on thefts or recoveries from European countries or the US. I was able 
to use the reports from 1982 to 2004. This provided me with data on a number 
of important thefts that led to the smuggling of art to other countries and 
subsequently to sales of these stolen items. I analyzed the recoveries of one group 
of items in particular to get a clearer picture of the perpetrators and the possible 
links with legal actors. The group consisted of paintings that were stolen in 
Europe from museums or large private collections (Tijhuis & Van der Wal, 
2005). This group was chosen because it has the highest recovery rate and it is 
usually used in arguments on the perpetrators of art crime. 
 
Illicit Antiquities Research Centre 
 
Besides the information from the IFAR, much information is published by the 
Illicit Antiquities Research Centre at Cambridge University. The Illicit Antiquities 
Research Centre (IARC) was established in May 1996, and commenced 
operations in October 1997 under the auspices of the McDonald Institute for 
Archaeological Research in Cambridge, England. its purpose is to monitor and 
report upon the detrimental effects of the international trade in illicit antiquities 
(i.e. antiquities which have been stolen or clandestinely excavated and illegally 
exported). It publishes an online newsletter and has published a number of books 
on the illicit art and antiquities trade (Brodie & Watson, 2000; Brodie & 
Renfrew, 2001).85 The IARC is the only academic institution that is solely 





In addition to the information from IFAR and IARC, I screened all major Dutch 
newspapers since 1993 on recoveries in art theft cases.86 In addition to the 
newspapers from that period, I went through the archive of the Netherlands 
Institute for Art History in the Hague.87 This institute keeps files on millions of art 
objects and is known worldwide for its expertise and archives. Besides the files on 
particular objects, they have an archive with newspaper reports on art thefts and 
related topics. Part of this archive deals with reports of thefts and recoveries going 
back to the early 1950s. This provided a useful addition to the more recent 
reports that were more easily available. Besides the Dutch newspapers, I checked 
                                                 
85  Their website provides much information in digital form: see:  
 http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/IARC/home.htm (Visited November 5th 2005). 
86  The newspaper articles are online available for members of pica, an online library service. 
See www.pica.nl (Visited November 5th 2005). 
87  See: http://www.rkd.nl (Visited November 5th 2005). 
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foreign newspapers as far as they were available online and written in English, 
German, or French. 
 
The Museum Security Network reports 
 
A solely web based source of information are the reports provided by the 
Museum Security Network. This organization publishes reports that often 
involve reports on art theft and the illicit trade from all around the world. I 
scanned all reports available in the archive of the Museum Security Network 




Finally, an additional source of information were a number of books by research 
journalists or other non-academic authors. They were especially useful for 
information about the illicit trade before the 1990s (Koldehoff & Koldehoff, 
2004; Kretschmann, 1991; Leitch, 1969; McLeave, 1981; Middlemas, 1975; 
Roux & Paringaux, 1999). 
 
6.3  Opportunities and limitation of the sources 
 
The empirical study should answer the question whether the interface typology 
provides us with a useful tool to describe the relationships between actors in the 
illicit art and antiquities trade. Furthermore, it should show whether the lock 
model can explain the way in which illicit art and antiquities are laundered or 
licit art and antiquities are added to the black market. To answer these questions, 
the empirical study should be sufficiently wide in scope and reliable as far as the 
data is concerned that it produces. Both the scope and the reliability depend to a 
large extent on the sources that are used. The section above, in which all data 
sources were outlined, mentioned some pros and cons of the different sources. 
They will be further discussed below to appraise the empirical study as a whole. 
The different categories of sources will be looked at together with other studies 
that were primarily based on particular sources. 
 
Studies based on official sources 
 
First of all, there are studies that are solely or primarily based on official sources. 
They usually offer an abundance of information on one or more cases. A number 
of such studies on organized crime were for example done in the Netherlands 
since the middle of the 1990s (Huisman et al., 2004; Kleemans et al., 2002; Van 
Duyne, 2003). However, much of the information will usually not be available 
                                                 
88  See www.museum-security.org (Visited November 5th 2005). 
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to the reader and made anonymous as far as it is available. Furthermore, there is a 
number of other drawbacks. The information cannot be checked by other 
researchers and cannot be placed within a wider context where it can be 
connected with results from other studies. This problem was also apparent in the 
empirical study of the illicit art and antiquities trade. Furthermore, working with 
police or other official institutions will often reduce the use of other methods like 
interviewing the main characters in a particular case. This only applied to part of 
this study. As the study was not limited to the Netherlands, data from official files 
could be combined with data from other sources in other countries. Finally, an 
important drawback is the selective nature of official files. Usually, critics of the 
use of official files point to the fact that these files look at specific aspects of 
crimes that are investigated by police, customs, or other agencies. This was not a 
relevant problem in this study. However, the illicit art and antiquities trade shows 
another type of selectivity that actually is a problem. This is the selectivity of the 
types of transnational crime that are investigated by police and other law 
enforcement agencies in general (not only in the Netherlands). Whereas drug 
trafficking, terrorism, smuggling and trafficking of humans are priorities in most 
countries, the illicit trade in art, antiquities, ‘blood diamonds’, and (wholesale) 
arms trafficking are usually given less priority. Therefore, it is more difficult to 
study these crimes on the basis of official files. From a perspective of interfaces, 
these types are exactly the ones that seem to be most interesting.89 Many of the 
cases discussed in the previous chapters belonged to this group of transnational 
crimes. 
 
Studies based on the social environment of criminals 
 
Contrary to studies based on police files, there are criminologists who try to look 
at the criminal activities and actors from the inside. This can for example be done 
by structured interviews or by casual conversations as part of an attempt to 
partially integrate into the social life of the criminals. An interesting example of 
the latter was Zaitch’s study of a particular category of Colombian drug traffickers 
(2001) and Ko-Lin Chin’s study of Chinese people smuggled into the US (2002). 
A classic example of this type of study was performed by McCoy and focused on 
the heroin trade in South-East Asia during the Vietnam war (McCoy, 1972). 
With such an approach, one does not rely on others to choose research subjects 
and one is not accountable to official institutions with regard to publications of 
findings. However, there are also some important drawbacks. Checking 
information from studies done in this way can be as hard or impossible as in the 
case of studies based on police files. The reader has to rely for a large part on the 
integrity of the researcher and his capacity to separate fact from fancy. At the 
                                                 
89  In the last two chapters, this topic will be further discussed. The relationship between law 
enforcement priorities and crimes known for their interfaces is rather complicated. 
However, for an adequate understanding of interfaces, it is essential to focus on this topic. 
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same time, the researcher will have to rely on his contacts without being able to 
cross-validate much of the information. Furthermore, the safety of the researcher 
can demand restrictions in the way he studies his research subjects or the way he 
publishes his findings. 
 In the empirical study of the illicit art and antiquities trade, there are several 
types of insiders that could be approached: dealers, thieves, and smugglers. In 
theory, it would be possible to focus on art thieves and other actors. 
Nevertheless, at least one important practical fact will hinder an attempt to 
engage in this type of research. Partly because of the lack of interest of the Dutch 
and other police forces, hardly any art thieves are caught. Therefore, it is 
impossible to come very far, for example by interviewing imprisoned thieves or 
other criminals. This does not mean, of course, that one cannot approach them 
in another way. However, in the case of the illicit art and antiquities trade, this 
would be very difficult. Buyers of and dealers in stolen or smuggled art are not 
easily recognizable or traced by observation and conversations with bystanders. 
Furthermore ‘illicit art’ is not easily separated from licit art as will be discussed in 
the appendix. As far as the dealers are concerned, the study of official files in the 
Netherlands limited the opportunities to interview them. However, some dealers 
were interviewed in other countries. This did not provide substantial extra data. 
An important difference between the illicit art and antiquities trade, as opposed 
to for example the drug trade, is the fact that dealers are businessmen whose 
reputation is one of their most important assets. This reputation can be hurt by 
the fact that people associate the art trade with theft, smuggling, or other crimes. 
For this reason they generally are not eager to shed light on the way in which 
they work or the way they know their colleagues work. 
 
Studies based on media reports and studies by investigative journalists 
 
Some of the drawbacks of both methods can partly be averted by another kind of 
study. For some types of crime, and in some countries, media reports can be a 
primary source of data for a researcher. Depending on the exhaustiveness and 
reliability of certain media, this can sometimes be an alternative to the previous 
two approaches. One does not have to rely on questionable characters for 
information and neither on official institutions that may have better information 
but will not allow full coverage of it. However, at the same time this implies that 
one has to rely on another subject beyond one’s own control: the media that are 
used in the study. Media reports may be one-sided or false. They may even be 
the victim of purposeful disinformation campaigns. Nevertheless, due to the large 
number of newspapers, magazines, and other media one can choose, cross-
validating is sometimes possible. Furthermore, one can use media reports in 
addition to other sources. An example of a study based for a part on media 
reports is The Turkish Mafia by Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz (1998). 
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 In addition to the use of media reports, books by investigative journalists and 
others like former police officers, can offer information that is otherwise 
unavailable. In fact, investigative journalists will regularly provide books on 
specific topics of interest that are far more informative than those written by 
criminologists. When these books are read with the same critical attitude as 
media reports are read, they can provide a crucial tool for the academic study of 
transnational crime. Most of the analysis in the previous three chapters would not 
have been possible without these kinds of books (see e.g. Henry, 2003; Morstein, 
1989; Pretterebner, 1989; Trepp, 1996; Von Bülow, 2003). 
 As was pointed out in the previous section, this study made use of media 
reports as well as some specialized media. As far as the regular media are 
concerned, they illustrated several problems. First of all the fact that many media 
tend to copy each other’s news, whether it consist of factually correct 
information or unfounded assumptions, myths or false simplifications. However, 
in case of crimes that are ‘under-investigated’ by law enforcement agencies and 
‘under-researched’ by academics, media reports can at least have the function to 
point at the existence of specific crimes, criminals etc. Thereafter, other sources 
can be used to fill in the information or suggestion brought by a media report. 
Furthermore, most of the information used for this study, came from specialized 
media that have proven to provide mostly accurate information. Finally, as was 
mentioned before, books by non-academic authors fill an important gap in the 




The above sections showed which data sources are used in this study. For both 
practical as well as methodological reasons, a mix of sources is used. The practical 
reason is the fact that no single source can be used to obtain both reliable and 
sufficient data about the research object. The methodological reason is the fact 
that each source has serious drawbacks which can be lessened by combining them 
with other sources. This is not to say that this study is based on an ideal set of 
data. Considering the restrictions of a study like the one at hand, the most 
promising and available sources were used while it is a fact that many others were 
unavailable or have not been because used of these restrictions. 
 On the basis of this study there are several research questions that cannot be 
answered. The precise quantity of certain crimes or criminals cannot be 
established, not even a realistic estimate. Furthermore, possibilities of the 
existence of certain interfaces between actors or other relevant occurrences 
cannot be dismissed on the basis of this study. However, it can be concluded that 
certain interfaces are unlikely to occur very often while other interfaces are 
regularly observed. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the lock model can or 
cannot explain the laundering of illicit art and antiquities in cases that were 
studied. In general it can be concluded that the main questions set out for this 
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study can be answered with the data sources described before. The main 
questions are whether the relationships in the illicit art and antiquities trade can 
be described with the interface typology, and whether the process of laundering 
of art and antiquities can be explained by the lock model. 
 
Annex 1: Defining the illicit art and antiquities trade 
 
Some cross-border activities are looked upon as illegal almost everywhere. For 
that reason, we can for example speak of drug trafficking without additional 
qualifications. In case of art and antiquities, the qualification ‘illicit’ is added 
because art and antiquities by themselves are not illegal. They are only illegal 
when they are stolen, smuggled, or forged. 
 The transnational trade in stolen or illegally exported art and antiquities is the 
subject of a number of international and bilateral treaties, as well as national laws. 
These laws define to a large extent the difference between the licit and illicit art 
and antiquities trade and the status of an owner as a (il)legitimate possessor. In 
one way or another, these laws all try to contain the illicit trade and accomplish 
restitution of art to the original owners, or states of origin. It is very important to 
stress the difference between stolen art and illegally exported art. Both are illegal, 
but important differences exist between the way these are and can be treated by 
the responsible authorities and by interested parties in debates about the illegal 
trade. Most important are the following provisions: 
 
• UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of an Armed Conflict (1954, 1999)90 
• UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
(1970)91 
• Bilateral Treaties between the US and ten countries in South America and 
elsewhere, inspired by the 1970 UNESCO treaty92 
                                                 
90  For full text and ratifications see:  
 http://www.unesco.org/general/eng/legal/convent.shtml.  
91  For full text and ratifications see:  
 http://www.unesco.org/general/eng/legal/convent.shtml. 
92  The treaties are guided by art 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention: Article 9  
 Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of 
archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States 
Parties to this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a concerted international 
effort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and 
imports and international commerce in the specific materials concerned. Pending agreement each State 
concerned shall take provisional measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the 
cultural heritage of the requesting State.  
 For further information see: http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop. 
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• Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
(1995)93 
• EU Council Directive 93/7 EEC On the Return of Cultural Objects 
Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State (1993)94 
• EU Council Regulation (EEC) 3911/92 On the Export of Cultural 
Goods 
• EU Council Regulation 1210/2003 Concerning specific restrictions on 
the economic and financial relations with Iraq 
• National laws like e.g. the Dutch ‘Wet tot Behoud van Cultuurbezit’ 
(Law for the Protection of Cultural Heritage) 
• (Not legally binding) ICOM (International Council of Museums) ‘Red 
List’95 
• (Not legally binding) ICOM ‘Ethical Code’ 
 
The 1954 UNESCO Convention refers to art and antiquities that are looted 
during occupations of states or parts of states in times of armed conflicts. It was 
supposed to be used for situations like the looting of antiquities in Afghanistan 
and Iraq recently, although its success has been marginal. One important problem 
is the fact that a number of important countries like the UK and the US have not 
ratified the Convention. To be sure, the protection of cultural heritage by the 
armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan should not be dependent on particular 
international legal regimes. However, as could be followed in the media coverage 
of these wars, the protection of the unique cultural heritage in these countries did 
not seem to have a top priority.96 
 The 1970 UNESCO Convention deals with the illicit art and antiquities 
trade in general. A large number of countries ratified the convention including 
some European Union countries. In recent years, France (1997),97 Finland 
(1999), the United Kingdom (2002), Denmark (2003), and Sweden (2003) 
ratified the convention. However, the convention lacks clear results and its role 
has primarily been symbolic. Part of this can be explained by the fact that the 
convention only aims at states and concrete actions are therefore dependent on 
diplomatic and other state channels which are not known for their impressive 
speed and efficiency. 
 The 1995 Unidroit Convention tried to solve this problem by concentrating 
on uniform standards of private law. Under this convention, owners of stolen or 
                                                 
93  For full text and ratifications see: http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-
cult.htm. 
94  For full text of all EU legislation see: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/ 
searchlif.html. 
95  For ICOM see: www.icom.org. 
96  A range of articles on this topic can be read online at: http://www.savingantiquities.org 
(Visited August 9th 2005). 
97  However, France still needs to implement the convention into its national law. 
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illegally exported cultural objects can directly address courts in both their own 
state and the state where the object is located. In a way, this convention provides 
far better tools to bring back stolen items. However, there are also some major 
disadvantages. One of them is the small number of ratifications, although this 
number is increasing. Besides some source countries, a number of European 
countries are party to Unidroit: Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, and Spain. Lacking are the big market countries France, Japan, the UK, 
and the US. Besides the limited number of ratifications, there is another 
important technical disadvantage. The Convention allows the claimant of stolen 
art a certain degree of ‘forum shopping’. Not only the courts in the state where 
an object is located, but also the courts in the state of residence of the claimant 
have jurisdiction over these claims. This leads to a situation where source 
countries like China and Italy, both known for their huge losses of cultural 
heritage as well as for their sometimes radical policies, can deal with claims in 
their own courts and subsequently ask for execution of the verdicts in the state 
where an object is located. 
 All the conventions share a number of problems that hinder their 
effectiveness. First of all, many cultural objects are not registered and therefore 
hard to trace and claim in case of theft. This is especially problematic with illicit 
excavations where registration is impossible by definition. Some countries try to 
evade this problem with national laws that declare everything which comes from 
their soil as their property.98 However, this is not as simple as it seems. As 
civilizations and cultures of the past did not run along present state-boundaries, it 
can be extremely difficult to prove beyond doubt that something comes for 
example from Thailand (instead of Cambodia), Italy (instead of Greece) or 
Greece (instead of Turkey). Secondly, there is the problem of corruption. In 
many source countries, customs officials or other relevant officials are willing to 
turn a blind eye, if they are paid the right price. In many cases, they are even 
involved in the illicit trade themselves, as for example in China.99 Thirdly, as 
long as art, like money, can easily be ‘laundered’ in places like Switzerland, South 
Africa, or Hong Kong, every treaty or law will be of limited effect. 
 The EU Directive and Regulation have created a more or less uniform system 
of export permits for objects that leave the EU, and a system of rules for 
restitution of objects between EU countries. Export permits are demanded for 
fourteen different categories of items and are granted by the country from which 
an object leaves the EU. Penalties on the violation of this system of export 
permits can be quite harsh. For exporting without a permit, one can be fined 
twice the value of the object in addition to seizure of the object itself.  
 Besides the system of export permits, there are rules for restitution of objects 
between EU countries. EU countries are held to assist each other in the 
                                                 
98  A well-known example is Italy. 




restitution of items which have been stolen or illegally exported. Illegal export 
refers to a violation of the national law for the export of cultural items. This is 
something different from the illegal export of cultural items out of the EU, to be 
sure. Since the adoption of the EU Directive and Regulation in 1992/93, there 
have been a number of cases where EU countries have demanded items from 
other EU countries. This topic will be further discussed below. 
 EU Council Regulation 1210/2003 Concerning specific restrictions on the 
economic and financial relations with Iraq, aims at the protection of Iraq’s 
cultural heritage. The import of art and antiquities from Iraq has been forbidden 
from August 1990 onwards. This regulation enables authorities in European 
countries to fight the illicit trade in Iraq art and antiquities, without having to 
rely on the UNESCO or Unidroit conventions. 
 The Red List of the International Council of Museums lists categories of 
items which are regarded as particularly vulnerable. Dealing in these items is seen 
as ‘not done’, irrespective of the legal or illegal character of these dealings in a 
particular jurisdiction. Examples of items which have been on a Red List for 
some time are Nok statues. 
 The ICOM also has an Ethical Code for its members, a large group of 
museums all over the world. This ethical code demands from its member’s 
compliance with the rules set by the UNESCO Convention. Both the Ethical 
Code and the Red List are not legally binding for the members of ICOM. 
 
Finally, I would like to make some specific remarks on the Dutch situation. The 
Netherlands is not party to any of the treaties against the illegal trade in cultural 
objects. This means in principle that any legally protected object that is smuggled 
out of or into the Netherlands cannot be claimed by the Netherlands (in the case 
of Dutch items) or the foreign country (in the case of items from that country). 
The exception to this rule is provided by the EU Directive and Regulation. In 
case works of art are within the EU, they are protected and can be brought back 
to the Netherlands. Furthermore, through the EU law, the WBC extends its 
reach over the territory of the EU. At the time of writing (November 2005), the 
Dutch government has announced plans to ratify the UNESCO 1970 
Convention and the implement this convention, as well as the already ratified 
UNESCO 1954 Convention, into Dutch national law.100 However, it remains to 
be seen whether and when these plans will materialize. 
 A different situation exists for stolen items that enter the Netherlands. When 
customs find an item which they suspect has been stolen, they can hold it to 
investigate the case. However, before it can be identified as stolen it first has to 
be traced back to its source country, or it needs to be registered as stolen at 
Interpol. Usually, this is quite complicated if not impossible. One of the main 
problems is the fact that many antiquities are looted from unexcavated sites. 
                                                 
100 For a commentary on the proposed legislation see Ott, Tijhuis & Van der Wal (2005). 
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Therefore, they cannot be identified by definition by the source country. This 
makes it almost impossible to prove theft. Due to the rather minimal legal 
provisions, customs officers are not allowed to search systematically for works of 
art that enter the Netherlands. Only objects which are found by chance may be 
seized and investigated. This is an important fact to consider when one looks at 
the numbers of items which are seized by customs and subsequently end up in 
the files of the inspectorate (see paragraph on official agencies). 
 
Annex II: Specialized police agencies dealing with art crimes 
 
The attention to crimes related to art differs quite substantially between 
individual source and market countries. Even within countries, important 
differences are found. For the empirical study of the illicit trade and the interfaces 
between legal and illegal actors, it is important to understand these differences. 
Different approaches by police, customs and other authorities influence both the 
illicit trade as well as the interfaces with legal actors. These different approaches 
are linked with, or guided by, different legal provisions against the illicit trade. As 
was described above, there are several international regulations that are important 
here in addition to national laws. 
 In the Netherlands, the legal provisions that art criminals have to take into 
account are rather limited. They will be further discussed in the paragraph on the 
seizures of cultural objects by Dutch customs. The focus here will be on the 
government agencies which have a role in this area. As far as stolen art is 
concerned, the police is the natural institution to look at. In the Netherlands, 
there used to be an art unit at the National Police and National Intelligence 
Service in Zoetermeer (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten/Centrale Recherche 
Inlichtingen).101 Since January 1st 2002, this art unit has been abolished. 
Ironically, the period from 2001 until now has seen a series of serious art thefts 
from museums.102 Furthermore, the local police departments do not have art 
units or police officers specialized in this field. Even the city of Amsterdam, with 
an unprecedented share in Holland’s cultural heritage, lacks an art unit within its 
police department. With regard to the illegal import or export of antiquities, 
Dutch customs and the Inspectorate of Cultural Heritage in the Hague are the 
responsible authorities. They were discussed in the paragraph on the inspectorate. 
 In many other European countries, the situation with regard to art related 
crimes can probably be compared with the Netherlands. In Belgium, a 
                                                 
101  For the KLPD see: http://www.politie.nl/KLPD/ (Visited November 5th 2005). 
102  There were thefts in the Van Gogh Museum (Amsterdam), the Rijksmuseum 
(Amsterdam), the Nieuwe Kerk (Amsterdam), the Frans Hals Museum (Haarlem), the 
Museon (The Hague), and a number of museums in the country side. None of them have 
been solved up till now. During the 1980s and 1990s there have been more high-profile 




specialized art squad exists with the federal police in Brussels. They claim to be 
very active in several fields of art crime, like thefts, forgeries, and money 
laundering in the art trade.103 However, it seems that Belgium does hardly 
anything about the traffic of antiquities, especially from Africa. Furthermore,  the  
interest in the trade in stolen items from France or art crimes outside Brussels is 
limited. 
 In Germany, the attention of the police for art crimes seems to depend 
heavily on the state within the federal republic. Some states seem to be quite 
active, while others do not pay any perceptible level of attention to this topic. 
The National Police Service, Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)104 in Wiesbaden, seems 
to be comparable to its Dutch counterpart as far as art is concerned, although in 
general the BKA is known to be quite competent. On the BKA website, the 
listing of stolen art works runs from 1997 through 2001. Since 2001 no new 
information has been added! 
 In the US, another federal state, the situation is partially comparable with 
Germany. Some cities (like New York and Los Angeles) have special art units or 
detectives within their police departments while others do not seem to place any 
special emphasis on this topic. However, since the art trade is concentrated 
primarily in New York and just a few other cities, it is hardly surprising that 
there is not widespread attention to art theft and trafficking issues. In addition to 
the local police departments, the FBI has an art unit.105 When it comes to illegal 
imports and exports, the US is relatively active. Bilateral treaties were signed with 
a group of ten countries, most of which are located in South America. With this, 
the US differs from many countries which are party to multilateral treaties. 
However, the bilateral treaties have seen concrete results whereas measures like 
the UNESCO treaty have not many known successes since its adoption over 
thirty years ago. 
 In France, an active and central bureau for art crimes exists in Paris, the 
central office for the fight against the illicit trade in cultural objects: the Office 
central de lutte contre le trafic des biens culturels (OCBC).106 Staffed with about 35 
persons, this is probably one of the most effective art squads in Europe at the 
moment in terms of arrests and returns of stolen objects, although it is not the 
largest organization. In Italy, an art unit of more than 150 persons exists as part of 
the Carabinieri, or military police. They claim to be most effective in tracing 
stolen art, both in absolute as well as relative numbers. 
 
                                                 
103  See: http://www.fedpol.be/police/fedpol/pol/3/pol3_kua1.htm (Visited November 5th 
2005). 
104  See: http://www.bka.de/ (Visited November 5th 2005). 
105  See: http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/arttheft/aboutus.htm (Visited November 5th 2005). 










The previous chapter dealt with the data sources for the empirical study of the 
transnational illicit art and antiquities trade. The data will be used in the next two 
chapters to study the interfaces that can be found in this type of transnational 
crime. Before that, a more general overview of the illicit art and antiquities trade 
will be provided in this chapter. The aim of this overview is threefold. First of all, 
it outlines the range of activities considered to be part of the illicit trade as well as 
its estimated scale. These activities are the subject of a small body of academic 
literature, some books by journalists, and numerous reports in the (specialized) 
media.107 It tries to answer the question: what do we actually mean by ‘the’ illicit 
art and antiquities trade? Secondly, it points at the problems of discerning licit 
from illicit trade. Due to several factors, it can often be rather hard to label 
particular cases as licit or illicit. In those cases, illicit activities will become licit, or 
the other way around, because of the jurisdictions at hand, the characteristics of 
the objects involved, or the simple passing of time. Thirdly, this chapter studies 
the links between the illicit trade in cultural goods and other types of crime, like 
for example money laundering and drug trafficking. 
 One important topic will not be specifically discussed in this chapter: the 
different actors involved in the illicit trade. This topic will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 
7.2 The illicit trade 
 
According to Conklin (1994:2) art crimes are criminally punishable acts that 
involve works of art. This definition seems to be rather broad at first sight. 
However, if the range of activities is limited to those that are transnational, this 
definition provides a reasonable starting point. Hereafter, a number of crimes will 
be described: art theft, forgery, and the looting and smuggling of antiquities. 
Each crime has many variations of its own. The most important will be 
mentioned here. 
 
                                                 
107  This includes a number of websites that offer reports on art crimes. Most important are the 
website of the Illicit Antiquities Research Centre, University of Cambridge 
(http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/IARC/home.htm), the US State Department’s 
International Cultural Property Protection website (http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop) and 
the Museum Security Network website (http://www.museum-security.org/).  
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7.2.1 Art theft 
 
Many articles on art crimes or art theft mention the theft in 1990 from the 
Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston. It involved the theft of a number of 
paintings by Rembrandt, Vermeer, Degas, and Manet, and is usually considered 
as the largest art theft ever. According to the FBI, the total value may be as high 
as $300 million (Koldehoff, 2004).108 Other often discussed thefts include the 
four robberies of the Alfred Beit collection in Russborough House in Ireland, in 
which each time a number of old masters were taken (Koldehoff, 2004; Massy, 
2000; McLeave, 1981). The first robbery was committed by members of the IRA 
in 1974. Thereafter, the collection was robbed three times by others in 1986, 
2001 and 2002. Despite the spectacular nature of such large thefts, they make up 
a minor part of all art thefts. However, as these thefts are solved relatively often, a 
lot can be learned about the perpetrators of these crimes and their motives 
(Koldehoff, 2004; Tijhuis & Van der Wal, 2005; Mc Leave, 1981). Although art 
has always been stolen, thefts from museums have become more frequent with 
the rapid rises in prices of fine art since the late 1950s. At a number of auctions 
during the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the idea of master 
pieces as objects with spectacular and ever-increasing value, was established as 
more or less an undisputed fact for the public at large (Lacey, 1998; Koldehoff, 
2004). As prices rose, paintings and other objects seemed an easy way for many 
criminals, to earn a lot of money without too much risk. One could either try to 
sell the objects or try to force insurance companies or owners to pay for their safe 
return. 
 Most art thefts in fact do not occur in museums. Most art is stolen from 
domestic dwellings and galleries.109 As far as the first category is concerned, this 
ranges from art that is stolen in regular burglaries (besides other objects) to well-
planned thefts from large private collections. The large majority of objects is not 
recovered and it is therefore difficult to say what happens with these objects. 
 A specific category of thefts are those of religious art and objects. In many 
countries, churches, temples, and other religious places are popular with thieves. 
Catholic churches are stripped of their precious objects by thieves who profit 
from the lack of security. Especially in Italy, this type of theft is a huge problem, 
but other countries in Europe, like France and Belgium, experience the same 
problem on a smaller scale (Carabinieri, 2004; Interpol, 2005, Massy, 2000). In 
Russia and some other countries in the region, religious icons have been stolen 
in substantial numbers for a long time. Icons will only rarely be recovered, partly 
due to the difficulty to identify individual icons and the sheer number of icons 
that has entered the market (Interpol, 2005). In Asia, the theft of Buddha and 
                                                 
108  http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/arttheft/northamerica/us/isabella/isabella.htm 
 (Visited, December 3rd, 2004). 
109  Some statistics can be found at the Art Loss Register website:  
 http://www.artloss.com/Default.asp (Visited November 5th 2005). 
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other statues has been a major problem in several countries (Interpol, 2005; 
Nagashima, 2002; Thosorat, 2001). Nepal has been one of the countries hardest 
hit by these thefts (Stingelin, 1992). Jürgen Schick extensively documented the 
situation in Nepal in his book The Gods are leaving the country (1998). Buddha 
statues can originate from temples and be ‘owned’ and known. In that case they 
are comparable with other works of art discussed here. However, many Buddha 
and other statues are located in deserted areas and unknown, and not ‘owned’ by 
someone, except for the general claims of some countries on everything that is 
located on their territory. In case of these unknown objects they are usually 
categorized as antiquities. 
 Besides religious art, rare books and manuscripts form another specific 
category. Although not as well-known as thefts of fine art from museums, this 
type of theft occurs rather often and victimizes many libraries.110 More than most 
other thefts here, book thefts are regularly committed by persons with a 
connection to the objects. They can for example be scholars, students, collectors, 
museum curators or dealers. Furthermore, these persons are often serial thieves 
who may operate for years and in many places. 
 
7.2.2 Fakes and forgeries 
 
“Fakes are works of art made to resemble existing ones; forgeries are pieces 
that are passed for as original works by known artists. The mere production of 
a work that resembles an existing one is not a crime, but intentionally and 
deceptively passing it off as someone else’s work is forgery, a type of fraud” 
(Conklin, 1994:48). 
 
At first glance, the field of fakes and forgeries seems to be clearly different from 
the illicit trade in stolen and smuggled art and antiquities. It is well known that 
fakes and forgeries are part of the art trade and probably part of many museum or 
private collections. How many fakes and forgeries are around is a matter of 
debate and also depends on the exact definition one uses. According to Thomas 
Hoving, the former director of the Metropolitan Museum in New York, about 
40% of all fine art in museum collections consists of either fakes or forgeries. He 
dedicated a book on the history of fakery and forgery (Hoving, 1996). One of 
the things he shows is the fact that in every period art from earlier periods was 
forged and faked. 
 Many cases of fakes or forgeries have a transnational element. Two main 
categories can be distinguished. First of all, fakes of objects of fine art that are 
moved abroad to be sold. Secondly, forgeries of antiquities that are moved from 
the source country to the market country to be sold. The first category can be 
                                                 
110  Many cases of book thefts can be found on the following website:  
 http://www.saztv.com/page13.html (Visited November 5th 2005).  
 See also www.museum-security.org (Visited November 5th 2005). 
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illustrated by a range of books on contemporary and past fakers and forgers 
(Goodrich, 1973; Jansen, 1994; Reitz, 1993). Often, works of modern art are 
faked or forged like works by Picasso or Dalí. However, old masters are also 
successfully forged or faked, as can be learned from the work of serial faker and 
forger Eric Hebborn. His drawings penetrated some of the world’s most 
prestigious museums for over forty years (Hebborn, 1997; Landesman, 2001). In 
1996 Hebborn published a book in which he outlined his methods. A week after 
it was published he was killed in Rome. 
 The second category consists of forgeries of antiquities. All kinds of 
antiquities, like for example Buddha statues, African masks, or Roman statues, are 
faked. In daily practice this can have confusing consequences, for example in case 
of fake Buddha statues. When these are sent abroad without export permits, for 
example from Cambodia, they will be initially considered as smuggled and 
probably looted items. They may be seized and action may be taken against the 
supposed smuggler. Only after it has been established that the objects are fakes, it 
turns out that in fact no crime has occurred (in most cases). One Mexican forger 
was so successful that he was arrested and accused of looting pre-Columbian sites. 
He was released only after he demonstrated his craft (Brodie et al., 2000:19). 
From a perspective of interfaces, the difference between fakes and original items 
is of particular importance. It will often mark the difference between licit and 
illicit trade, and therefore whether an interface exists and where the legal–illegal 
interface is to be located. 
 According to some experts in Asia, the production of high quality fakes is 
actually a blessing for the protection of the authentic pieces.111 The same could 
be thought of the fakes of African art. Besides fakes that can to some degree be 
confused with authentic pieces, so-called ‘airport-art’ is another issue. This is a 
category of objects that is specifically made for the tourist market and consists of 
low quality fakes of indigenous art. Sometimes, objects are made that do not 
even resemble the ones known for the region but something from another region 
or country (Fuchs, 1992). 
 
7.2.3 Looting and smuggling of antiquities 
 
The looting of antiquities is often discussed together with art theft. Although 
there are similarities, however, it is important to point out the differences 
between the two. Art theft concerns known objects, owned by someone, that are 
stolen. Looted antiquities are usually objects that are not known before as 
individual objects, for example because they are still unearthed in tombs or 
elsewhere. Many states claim these unearthed antiquities as their property, but 
most national laws will not succeed in enforcing this claim against owners outside 
their jurisdiction. One of the reasons for this is the fact that it is often impossible 
                                                 
111  Personal correspondence. 
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to proof unequivocally that an object comes from the territory of a particular 
country. However, a recent trial might indicate some change on this point. 
Frederick Schultz, a New York antiquities dealer and former president of the 
National Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art, was 
found guilty by a US court of conspiring to receive and handle stolen Egyptian 
antiquities. He bought antiquities that were smuggled out of Egypt. The 
smuggling was organized by an antiquities restorer from the UK, Jonathan 
Tokeley-Parry, who worked with a local network in Egypt. They smuggled 
more than 2000 items out of the country. Tokeley-Parry was caught and 
prosecuted in the UK. These convictions in the two largest art market countries, 
together with the accession of the UK to the UNESCO Convention possibly 
mark a change in the legal status of smuggled antiquities (O’Keefe, 2004; 
TRACE, 2003). 
 Besides Egypt there are numerous countries from which antiquities are looted 
and often smuggled abroad (Acar & Rose, 1995; Brodie et al., 2001; Fuchs, 
1992; Nagashima, 2002; Roux & Paringaux, 1999; Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2003a; 
Tubb, 1995). It needs to be stressed that looted and smuggled items are just part 
of the overall trade. First of all, there are legitimately bought antiquities that leave 
their source countries with export permits. Secondly, there are also antiquities 
that are probably looted but still leave their source country with permits. Finally, 
and often forgotten, there is a large stock of antiquities with private collectors and 
museums in market countries that has been there for decades or even longer. 
Whatever its provenance, it is clearly different from items that have left there 
countries of origin recently.112 
 Several countries in the Middle East have comparable problems to that of 
Egypt, like Iraq, Jordan, and Syria (Abdulrahman, 2001; Bisheh, 2001). Both in 
the colonial era as well as later, this region has always played a part in the illicit 
supply of antiquities on the market. During the latest decades, a number of wars 
and civil wars have made things worse, as most recently could be observed in 
Iraq.113 Latin America is another region that suffers from illicit excavations and 
smuggling. Especially pre-Columbian objects are looted in countries like Peru, 
Columbia, and Ecuador.114 Some countries have struggled with looting for ages 
and still have plundered sites (e.g., from the Spanish colonial period). In Belize, 
legislation to protect its cultural heritage has been in place for over hundred 
years. According to Belizean law, all antiquities belong to the state and cannot be 
exported definitely. Nevertheless, there is a lively trade in illicit material (Gilgan, 
2001:73-89). According to a PhD study by Matsuda, Belize may have as many as 
                                                 
112  For example because international treaties like the UNESCO 1970 and Unidroit 1995 
Treaties did not exist at the time of accession of the objects involved. 
113  For a detailed discussion of the looting in Iraq see: Bogdanons (2005); Gibson (2004). 
114  For a comprehensive list of objects and the countries where they can be found, see the 
ICOM Red List for South America: http://icom.museum/redlist/LatinAmerica/ 
english/red_list.html (Visited November 8th 2005).  
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30,000 to 50,000 people who hunt and gather artifacts (Matsuda, 1998a). About 
one to three percent of this group are full-time looters (Matsuda, 1998b). 
 Several parts of Africa are another source for illicit antiquities. Nok statues, 
terracotta, bronzes and pottery is looted and smuggled from countries like Mali, 
Niger, Ghana, and Burkina Faso (Gado, 2001; Mapunda, 2001).115 In several 
countries, the trade in illicit antiquities is organized in open and diverse ways, 
due to the inability and sometimes unwillingness of governments to do anything 
against it. On the one hand, networks of native traders connect the remotest 
villages with the main ports for shipment overseas. On the other hand, European 
traders directly buy their merchandise in regional centers and sometimes live in 
Africa for longer periods or even permanently (Gado, 2001). This marks a 
difference with the other regions from which antiquities originate. In South 
America, the trade tends to be more secretive and seems to involve more private 
collectors, besides dealers, looters, middlemen, and other actors (Alva, 2001). In 
South-East Asia, the trade is open and well-developed in several centers like 
Hong Kong and Bangkok. However, the structure of the trade before it ends up 
in these centers is less clear (Fuchs, 1992; Nagashima, 2002; Soudijn & Tijhuis, 
2003a). 
 Asia has several regions that provide input for both licit and illicit trade. The 
main regions are South-East Asia, China, India, and the border region of 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Some categories of objects are regularly 
intercepted at borders or claimed from foreign collections as stolen objects 
(Nagashima, 2002; Shankar, 2001; Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2003a; Watson, 1998a). 
They include Gandharan statues from the border region of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, Khmer objects from Cambodia or Thailand and all kinds of objects 
from China. 
 Europe and the United States are usually considered as regions that are 
primarily important as markets. However, several countries face the same 
problems as discussed above. Italy is the best known example here and loses 
significant amounts of antiquities, besides the works of art discussed in the first 
paragraph (Ciotti Galletti, 2003; Isman, 2000; Watson, 1998a). The United 
Kingdom, although always discussed as typical market country, has experienced a 
significant problem with illicit excavations with metal detectors (Addyman, 2001; 
Gill & Chippendale, 2002; Tubb, 1995). According to some experts, this has 
played an important role in the ratification by the UK of the UNESCO 1970 
treaty and the relatively far-reaching legislation adopted to implement the treaty. 
In the United States, the cultural heritage of the Native Americans, as well as 
other cultures, is often the object of theft, illicit excavations, and smuggle 
(Canouts & McManamon, 2001; Conklin, 1994). 
                                                 
115  For a comprehensive list of objects and the countries where they can be found, see the 
ICOM Red List for Africa, http://icom.museum/redlist/afrique/english/intro.html 
(Visited November 8th 2005). 
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7.2.4 War, civil war and occupation 
 
The regular thefts of works of art, and the illicit excavations of archaeological 
sites easily obscures the role of all kinds of political unrest at any given point in 
time (Chamberlin, 1983; Fuchs, 1992). This unrest has always caused significant 
looting, smuggling, and confiscation of art and antiquities. As a result of the 
international character of the art trade, one needs to focus on this topic to fully 
understand the intricate links between this type of crime and political 
developments and actors. In the literature on the illicit art and antiquities trade, 
however, the role of this topic is often under-exposed and restricted to World 
War II. This obscures the fact that warfare, revolutions, and civil wars are a 
permanent fact of life and cause permanent looting and smuggling of art and 
antiquities. Many works of art or antiquities that have been stolen or taken 
abroad without permit actually originate from the situations mentioned above. 
Some examples are outlined below. 
 The occupation of many countries by Nazi Germany led to systematic theft 
and confiscation of cultural goods on an unprecedented scale. Thanks to the 
renewed interest in this topic during the 1990s, many objects were returned to 
the original owners and the knowledge about this topic has been increased 
substantially (Aalders, 1999; Den Hollander, 1998; Feliciano, 1997; Muller & 
Schretlen, 2003). At the same time, the theft of artworks from Germany by the 
Soviet Union during the end of World War II, was studied and described by 
some authors in recent years, although this topic received far less attention than 
the Nazi atrocities (Akinsja & Kozlov, 1996). During the 1950s the Soviet Union 
returned approximately one and a half million objects to East-Germany. After the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the debate about the works of art stolen during and after 
the war became a hot issue again and let to new exchanges of stolen art 
(Greenfield, 1996:220-235; Lerner & Bresler, 1998:222). 
 As far as Germany is concerned, there is one episode after the war that needs 
to be added here. In the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), a 
specialized government organization existed that was involved in all kinds of 
smuggling operations to obtain foreign currency. Part of the organization was 
aimed at the sale of works of art that were confiscated from East-German citizens 
and museums during the 1970s and 1980s. Large quantities of works of art were 
thus sold abroad, while the authorities told the victims that the items would go to 
museums in the GDR (Bischof, 2003; Blutke, 1990). 
 Long before World War II, art and antiquities were looted by many other 
emperors, like for example Napoleon during his military campaigns. Venice and 
Rome were among the places that were especially badly hit by the looting 
campaigns of the French (Chamberlin, 1983). During the Nineteenth century, 
many antiquities were stolen from the colonies of European countries. The 
British are for example known for the plunder of antiquities from Ghana and 
Benin (Chamberlin, 1983; Lloyd, 1964). 
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 After World War II, a number of other territories were occupied and looted. 
Nevertheless, traditional wars are getting less important than civil wars in which 
organized crime and transnational crime often play a significant role (Crefeld, 
1998; Jean & Rufin, 1999). In recent decades, numerous internal conflicts have 
had a major influence on the proliferation of looted art and antiquities. Many 
source countries have seen civil wars, anarchy or revolutions during extended 
periods. Afghanistan, Lebanon, China, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Colombia, and Nicaragua are examples of countries 
which have lost parts of their cultural heritage as a result of these events (Brodie 
et al., 2001; Fuchs, 1992). The loss of cultural heritage can have quite different 
causes. First of all, the chaos as a result of civil war may create a perfect situation 
for looting of sites or institutions. Secondly, the authorities or their opponents 
may engage in looting and smuggling to finance their regime or struggle. 
Thirdly, they may simply be corrupt and fill their own pockets with the revenues 
of illicit trade. Finally, the cultural heritage might ‘simply’ be destroyed for 
ideological reasons or as a result of hostilities. In this case, there is actually no 
transnational crime but only local vandalism.116 
 Often, the same countries will experience both ‘regular’ looting as well as 
looting due to (civil) war or revolution. The case of Cambodia can illustrate this. 
During the era of the Khmer Rouge, antiquities were both looted and destroyed. 
Looting served to generate funds for the Khmer Rouge while they destroyed 
antiquities at the same time (Nagashima, 2002). After the Khmer Rouge was 
ousted from power, antiquities continued to be looted and smuggled across the 
border to Thailand (Crampton, 2003; Thosarat, 2001a, 2001b). Another example 
is Afghanistan, were both times of war as well as ‘peace’ were marked by large-
scale looting and destruction. 
 A parallel can be drawn with some transnational crimes which were discussed 
before: the illicit arms trade, drug trafficking and trafficking ‘blood’ diamonds. 
These crimes are also strongly connected with unstable countries or regions 
(Brunwasser, 2002; Morstein, 1989; Naylor, 1993, 2001; Phythian, 2000). In 
some countries illicit arms sales were financed by the smuggling of ‘blood’ 
diamonds, like for example Angola and Sierra Leone (NIZA, 2001; Wood & 
Pelemans, 1999; Wright, 1997). The same holds true for drug trafficking and the 
arms trade in Afghanistan and Colombia. The involvement of foreign intelligence 
organizations further complicates things in several countries (Kwitny, 1987; 
McCoy, Read & Adams, 1972). Although this used to be particularly evident 
during the Cold War, it remains to be seen whether the same pattern will be 
repeated within the context of the ‘war on terrorism’. 
 Finally, one point should be added to the influence of political unrest during 
particular periods in particular countries. It sometimes depends on one’s own 
                                                 
116  Nevertheless, these acts of vandalism are crimininalized in many states on the basis of 
international law. 
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political point of view whether certain activities are defined as smuggling or 
export, and as theft or safeguarding. A concrete example given by Sereny (1983), 
quoted by Conklin can illustrate this.  
 
“Between 1933 and 1949, a group of thirty museum officials moved around 
the Chinese countryside 19,500 large cases of artworks originally housed in 
Beijing’s imperial palace. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was the 
impetus for the removal of the treasures from Beijing, but the termination of 
the war with Japan in 1945 was followed by internal strife between the 
Communists and the Nationalists. In 1949, eight of the thirty scholars and 
workers followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan with three shiploads of crates, 
which included some 600,000 of China’s most precious art treasures; the 
remaining 16,000 cases were returned to Beijing’s Palace Museum. Today, 
the mainland Chinese Communists regard Chiang Kai-shek as a thief; 
contemporary Taiwanese Nationalists believe that they are safeguarding their 
people’s cultural heritage” (Conklin, 1994:223-224) 
 
It is important to note the parallel with other transnational crimes, like trafficking 
in arms, ‘blood’ diamonds or human beings. In some situations it is hardly 
possible to define the thin line between transnational crime and legitimate cross-
border activities, without deciding on a clear political stand. 
 
7.3 The extent of the illicit trade 
 
Starting from the assumption that the illicit trade can be defined, and therefore 
separated from the licit trade, one can attempt to measure it. Several ways to 
measure the trade can be considered: the number of objects stolen or smuggled, 
the number of thefts, or the total value of the objects. However, each way of 
measuring the trade has significant problems. The number of thefts or objects is 
impossible to measure adequately. This speaks for itself with respect to looted 
antiquities. They are usually only known, and therefore measurable, as soon as 
they are stolen. To some extent this holds true for art thefts as well. Many thefts 
from museums, for example, are never registered because of failing oversight or 
because the objects involved were in fact never properly registered as belonging 
to the museum stock. 
 Despite the problems to measure the extent of the illicit trade, there are many 
bits and pieces of information that provide some indication of the scale of the 
trade. Three sources of information will be used here to sum up the available 
data. First of all, data can be gathered from the private Art Loss Register that 
registers stolen and missing objects and (among other things) searches auction 
catalogues to recover them. The data from the Art Loss Register is all taken from 
its website www.artloss.com. Secondly data provided by Brodie and Watson in 
their study Stealing History: the illicit trade in cultural material (2000). Thirdly, some 
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numbers on the situation in Italy are available, as described in an article in the 
UNESCO courier and also some numbers of the situation in Belgium as 
commuted by Massy (Carabinieri, 2004; Isman, 2001; Massy, 2000). 
 The Art Loss Register keeps records of over 10,000 losses from insurers, 
owners, and law enforcement agencies on its database each year. The database 
contains over 100,000 identifiable stolen or missing items from all kinds of 
countries. Each year, the items in the database are compared with over 300,000 
items to be sold at the most important auctions. Since 1991, the searches for 
stolen and missing items have led to the recovery of over 1000 items and many 
more associated items. The total value of these items is about $100 million. The 
Art Loss Register also provides information on the victims of thefts that are 
registered in their database. Most thefts occur in domestic dwellings (54%) 
followed by museums (12%), galleries (12%), churches (10%), commercial 
premises (4%), public institutions (3%), warehouses and storage (2%), and others 
(3%). From the different types of objects that are recovered (for example 
paintings or books) it is calculated which share they have in the overall number 
of recovered objects. This leads to the following statistics: paintings (51%), 
furniture (10%), silver (10%), sculpture (8%), books (6%), clocks (6%), jewelry 
(3%), ceramics (2%), antiquities (2%), musical instruments (1%), and rugs (1%). 
Finally, it has been calculated how stolen or missing items have been identified. 
This turns out to be primarily by searching auction catalogues (51%) and by ad 
hoc searches by the police (31%). 
 Brodie and Watson provide numbers from several sources that give some 
impression of the scale of the illicit trade. A selection of these numbers is 
mentioned here, the complete overview can be read in their study (2000:21-23). 
It needs to be pointed out that the authors do not provide the names of their 
sources, although some numbers can also be found in other publications. In 
January 1997, the Swiss police sealed four warehouses in the Geneva Freeport 
which were found to contain approximately 10,000 antiquities from sites all over 
Italy. They were valued at about £25 million. In late 1998, a raid on a villa in 
Sicily revealed more than 30,000 Phoenician, Greek and Roman antiquities, 
worth more than £20 million. 
Between 1993 and 1995, the Turkish police was involved in 17,500 official 
police investigations into stolen antiquities.117 Raids on an antiquities dealer, 
carried out by the German police in Munich in 1997, recovered 50-60 crates full 
of material ripped from the walls of churches in North Cypriot churches, 
containing 139 icons, 61 frescoes and four mosaics. In Mali, a survey of 125 
square miles found 834 archaeological sites and found that 45% had been looted, 
                                                 
117  Although this information relatively old, it can be added that the Turkish authorities are 
regularly sending long lists of stolen items to foreign governments, which might illustrate 
their active approach to this problem. At the same time, several authors have pointed to 
the tremendous loss of cultural heritage in Cyprus due to the Turkish occupation of a part 
of the island. 
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17% badly. According to Brodie and Watson, the history of Mali is literally 
disappearing from under the feet of its inhabitants. In Pakistan, a survey in the 
Charsadda District showed that nearly half of the Buddhist shrines, stupas, and 
monasteries had been badly damaged or destroyed by illegal excavations for 
vendible antiquities. 
 Isman described the activities of the art squad of the Italian police. The art 
squad is the largest in any country worldwide and has more than 150 members. 
Since its start in 1969 until 2001, they recorded 630,000 thefts. The stolen 
objects are recorded in a database that contains more than 1,100,000 objects. The 
following investigations led to the recovery of 180,000 works of art and 360,000 
archaeological objects (Isman, 2001). Massy calculated some art theft statistics for 
Belgium. In the table below, the development of the overall number of thefts 
and stolen objects can be seen. 
 
Year of theft 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Number of 
thefts 
363 621 1346 1659 1682 1110 1226 
Number of 
objects 
3433 7960 10604 11888 16377 17287 10246 
Source: Massy (2000:89-90) 
 
The numbers provided by Massy seem to lend some proof to the often suggested 
trend of rising numbers of art theft after the fall of the Berlin Wall, although 
more data is needed to really test this hypothesis. 
 
7.4 The link between the illicit art and antiquities trade and other  
  illegal markets 
 
A recurrent theme in the literature of art crime is the connection with drug 
trafficking and money laundering. As Bernick wrote in his article on art and 
antiquities theft in Transnational Organized Crime: “law enforcement agents 
frequently have reported links between stolen art, money laundering and drug 
deals” (1998). James Emson, former director of the Art Loss Register, noted in an 
interview that: “[...] criminal organizations often trade in stolen artworks as 
collateral in making deals with one another. [...] its a very valuable commodity 
that allows you to launder money very easily” (Lyall, 2000). 
 Usually, experts point at three potential connections between the illicit art 
and antiquities trade and drug trafficking as well as money laundering. First of all, 
precious stolen works of art are supposedly used as collateral or means of payment 
in major drug deals. Secondly, stolen art or looted antiquities are trafficked 
together with drugs from source to market country. Thirdly, stolen art is thought 
to be used to launder proceeds from drug trafficking or other criminal activities. 
 The first connection is often illustrated with a Spanish case in 1999. In 
January of that year, the Spanish police broke up an international art smuggling 
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ring and seized stolen masterpieces by Giacometti, Braque, Miro, Goya, and 
Picasso, as well as pre-Columbian sculpture, estimated to be worth $35 
million.118 Most of the items had allegedly been stolen in late 1997 from a chalet 
near Geneva. The perpetrators had planned to trade the objects for cocaine from 
drug traffickers (Brodie et al., 2000). Besides this Spanish case, there was an 
Italian case that may lend some support to the link between the illicit art and 
antiquities trade and other illegal markets, although it did not involve drugs. In a 
‘sting’ operation against the Mafia, Italian secret agents posed as buyers of 
smuggled nuclear materials. When one of the agents had set up a bank account, 
and the smugglers found he was solvent, they made an unexpected offer. As part 
of the deal they wanted to sell a long-lost painting by Raphael for £30 million. 
One of the agents said he had been shown the painting in a hotel room and 
agreed to pay £15.5 million provided that the sale took place in Italy. The 
painting was brought back to Italy, described as a “minor artist of the Umbrian 
school” to avoid import tax. A trial of those involved in the deal later ended in 
the conviction of two art dealers from Rome and a courier who brought the 
Renaissance painting from Switzerland, although the organizers behind the deal 
were not caught.119 Not many other examples of art thefts that can be linked to 
either drugs or other illegal trades can be found.120 It seems a real but relatively 
rare phenomenon that cannot explain a significant part of the international art 
thefts (Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2004). 
 A second connection is assumed to be present in the trade in illicit antiquities. 
Drugs and antiquities are assumed to go together physically. That is, shipments 
contain both drugs and illicit antiquities. An example is mentioned by Brodie and 
Watson. A smuggler’s plane, arriving in Colorado from Mexico, carried 350 
pounds of marijuana together with many pre-Columbian antiquities (Brodie et 
al., 2000). Furthermore, in Guatemala and Belize, secret airstrips in the rain forest 
have been discovered from which cocaine and Mayan objects were flown to 
Miami and other US cities (Brodie et al., 2000). Finally, Gilgan noted many links 
between marijuana growers and traders and antiquities looters (Gilgan, 2001). It 
seems that these are not mere examples, but rather a summary of almost all 
known examples, because other credible cases can hardly be found in the 
literature or media reports. 
 The last link between the illicit art and antiquities trade and the drug trade has 
to do with money laundering. It is assumed that stolen art and antiquities are used 
                                                 
118  ‘International Art-theft ring busted in Spain’ Museum Security Network Report (© Reuters), 
January 17th 1999, http://www.museum-security.org/reports/000899.html  
 (Visited November 5th 2005). 
119  ‘Lost Raphael seized during Mafia ‘sting’ ‘ Museum Security Network Report (© London 
Times), February 22nd, 1999, http://www.museum-security.org/reports/002399.html 
(Visited November 5th 2005). 
120  A less recent example that is often cited is the theft from the Alfred Beit collection in 
Ireland in 1986. See Bailey (1997). 
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to launder funds generated with drug trafficking.121 According to Brodie and 
Watson, Miami is a crossroad for illicit art and antiquities from Ireland, Peru, 
Guatemala, Mexico, and Greece. Drug profits pay for the art and antiquities that 
are sent for auction so as to obtain a good pedigree for the cash (2000:18). 
However, empirical evidence is scarce here and in the rare cases which are often 
cited, the works of art turned out to be fakes. Despite the theoretical potential for 
money laundering with regular (non-stolen art), the occurrence of this mode of 
money laundering seems to be rare in practice (Boot & Ten Wolde, 1997; Ott, 
2003; Tijhuis & Van der Wal, 2003). In one case, two art dealers were charged 
with conspiring to launder $4.1 million in drug funds. They had tried to sell two 
paintings to someone who wanted to pay with drug money. The alleged buyer 
turned out to be an informant and before concluding the deal, the two art dealers 
were arrested.122 However, cases like this one do not prove the occurrence of 
money laundering schemes but only the willingness of some individuals to be 
helpful in such schemes. 
 Looking at the data on the various connections between the illicit art and 
antiquities trade and other illegal markets, it seems to consist primarily of a few 
incidents. Because of the difficulties to obtain sufficient and reliable data in this 
field, one cannot conclude that this means that the mentioned connections lack 
any credible evidence. The UK Ministerial Advisory Committee on the Illicit 
Trade in Cultural Objects noted with regard to this topic that: 
 
“Evidence from law enforcement agencies also shows that the illicit trade in 
cultural property is in some instances (and in some parts of the world very 
frequently) linked with other illegal activities <note: In South America for 
example, the illicit trade in antiquities is very frequently connected with the 
drugs trade>. While this evidence is inevitably anecdotal, we nevertheless find 
it persuasive” (2000:13). 
 
Whereas the Committee finds the anecdotal evidence persuasive, it seems to be 
way too little to draw any general conclusions as an academic observer of the 
illicit trade. The data indicate that there are definitely cases where the illicit trade 
is connected with other types of crime, but any systematic connection has neither 
any proven empirical nor theoretical basis. 
 
                                                 
121  ‘Art dealers dabble in drug money; are accused of money laundering’ The Art Newspaper, 
October 22, 2002. 
122  ‘Two New Yorkers, man from Connecticut charged with money laundering’ Portsmouth 
Herald, June 1st 2001, http://www.seacoastonline.com/2001news/6_1_sb1.htm (Visited 
November 5th 2005); ‘Art dealer served time for fencing stolen art’ Museum Security 
Network Report (© Boston Herald), June 3rd 2001, http://www.museum-
security.org/01/120.html#4 (Visited November 5th 2005). 
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7.5  Conclusions 
 
In the previous chapter, the sources of data for the empirical study of the 
transnational illicit art and antiquities trade were outlined. The data will be used 
in the next two chapters to study the interfaces that can be found in this type of 
transnational crime. In this chapter, a general overview of the illicit art and 
antiquities trade was provided as an introduction to the empirical study discussed 
in the next chapters. The three main sub-fields within the illicit trade are art theft 
and smuggle, antiquities looting and smuggling, and the production and sale of 
fakes and forgeries. These sub-fields are often assumed to be connected with 
other illegal markets, primarily the market for illegal drugs. Although there are 
several incidents in which the different markets collided, there does not seem to 
be any convincing evidence that this assumed connection is indeed significant. 
 A major factor in the illicit trade in general, is the occurrence of numerous 
(civil) wars, revolutions, and other political instability, particularly in the post-
World War II period. Besides that, the colonial past of several Western countries 
has left a significant mark on the dispersion of cultural heritage from a range of 
countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As was highlighted 
in this chapter, it is often hard to draw a line between the mentioned sub-fields 
in the illicit trade. Furthermore, it is often hard to differentiate licit from illicit 
trade. This last topic will be extensively discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8  
 





The previous chapter provided a general overview of the illicit art and antiquities 
trade. The overview was based on a review of the available literature on this 
subject, media reports, specialist archives on the internet and other open sources. 
 In this chapter, the transnational trade in stolen and smuggled art, as well as 
fakes and forgeries, will be viewed from a perspective of interfaces, as developed 
in chapters 2 to 4. The analysis will be based mostly on the data that were 
collected specifically for this study but these will be supplemented by secondary 
data. 
 The trade in looted and smuggled antiquities will be analyzed in the next 
chapter. Because of the differences between the two markets, they will be 
analyzed separately. These differences consist of both the structure of the 
transnational trade as well as its legal characteristics.123 As a result, the interfaces 
between legal and illegal actors are partly different for these two trades. 
 In the next section, the interface typology and the lock model will be 
confronted with the data that was collected on the trade in stolen and smuggled 
art. The aim is to find answers to two related questions. First of all, to what 
degree can the interfaces between legal and illegal actors in the illegal art trade be 
understood with the interface typology? Secondly, are there interfaces between 
legal and illegal that are not covered by the existing typology and how should 
these be labeled? Following the discussion of the interface typology and the 
illegal art trade, a separate section will discuss the role of armed conflicts in the 
illegal art trade. Finally, a number of case studies will be used to analyze the 
usefulness of the lock model that was developed in chapter 5. 
 When the text mentions a ‘case’, this means a solved art theft or smuggle 
operation. In practice, theft and smuggle will often coincide, but not necessarily 
so.124 Cases can either be derived from the empirical study performed for this 
study, or from media reports, literature, or other sources. 
                                                 
123  See e.g. Atwood (2004); Koldehoff & Koldehoff (2004); Messenger (2003). 
124  This is the cause of much confusion, for example in relation with the EU Directive on the 
return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a member state. When 
works of art are stolen in an EU member state and thereafter taken to another EU member 
state, it is often assumed that the objects involved are therefore smuggled and can be 
returned on the basis of the directive. However, the fact that an object is stolen and taken 
across the border, does not automatically mean that it is smuggled. Only when it involves 
objects that are protected by law as cultural heritage, and that need permits to cross the 
border, theft will coincide with smuggle in the mentioned situation.  
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8.2 The interface typology 
 
The typology consists of two categories of interfaces: four antithetical and six 
symbiotic interfaces. Hereafter, the ten different antithetical and symbiotic 
interfaces will be discussed from the perspective of the illicit art trade. 
 




Injurious relationships occur when actors undermine, attack, or harm each other 
in other ways than as covered by the predatory, parasitical, or antagonistic 
interface. 
 It can be argued that art thefts lead to an injurious interface almost by 
definition. It depends on the situation who can be called the injured actor. This 
can be a private collector, a museum or a state as owner of collections of certain 
museums as well as other institutions.125 In fact, much of the illicit art trade starts 
with theft, involving an injurious interface. The largest category of thefts that can 
be understood with the injurious interface is the so-called ‘normal’ theft. Normal 
thefts are thefts that are committed purely for the sake of reselling the works of 
art for profit without much delay (Tijhuis, 2005). These thefts do not involve 
any kind of extortion or collaboration between thieves and dealers. They are 
often solved because the thieves are caught when they offer their loot to dealers 
or auction houses that are suspicious, or because the thieves are offering their loot 
to pseudo dealers or collectors who are in fact undercover policemen. 
 In April 1989, the Koetser Gallery in Zurich, Switzerland, was robbed by a 
group of three men. They bound and gagged the secretary who led them in to 
the gallery and made off with 21 paintings, including works by Jan Davidsz de 
Heem, Jan Maertsen the Younger, Jan Steen, and others. Some time later the 
paintings were offered to a dealer in New York. The dealer did not trust the 
potential client who claimed to be a wealthy Swiss citizen who wanted to sell his 
private collection of old masters paintings. He checked with Interpol and IFAR 
but neither organization did know anything was wrong with the paintings. 
Nevertheless the dealer further checked with colleagues in New York until one 
of them remembered a robbery in Switzerland. Thereafter he found out that the 
collection did come from the Koetser gallery that had not informed Interpol or 
IFAR, and the thieves were arrested.126 
 In many cases, thefts do not only harm the property of institutions or 
individuals, but involve direct physical attacks. An example is the robbery of the 
                                                 
125  The state is usually also the owner of still unearthed antiquities. This will be discussed in 
chapter ten. 
126  ‘Arrests and Recoveries in Zurich Dutch Old Masters Theft’ IFAR Report Vol. 10, no. 6, 
June 1989. 
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Alfred Beit collection in Ireland by the IRA, which included a direct 
confrontation with the collector (Koldehoff, 2004).127 In another well-known 
case in France, a series of robberies was performed with brutal force by a gang of 
robbers. They victimized a range of castles and museums. This French case was 
analyzed during the stay with the French police and will be further discussed in 
the next section. It fits into a tradition of serial thieves working in France (Leitch, 
1969; Macleave, 1981; Roux & Paringaux, 1999).128 
 Before all thefts are simply called injurious, some important exceptions need 
to be made here. Many thefts are so-called internal thefts that will be discussed in 
section 8.2.10. These thefts do not really fit into a definition of an interface 
involving one actor attacking or harming the other. Although there is harm, to 
be sure, this situation seems to demand another definition. 
 
Antagonistic and (systemic-) synergy interface 
 
One of the antithetical interfaces is described as antagonistic relationships. 
Antagonistic relationships exist when there is competition between legal and 
illegal actors. Actors vying for a market share may be acting independently or in 
direct competition with each other. 
In case of (systemic) synergy, actors benefit each other while they go about their 
business, independently promoting their interests and objectives. 
 The antagonistic and synergy interface are taken together here. In the original 
typology, these two interfaces were clearly separated. The antagonistic interface 
was part of the antithetical interfaces and the synergy interface was part of the 
symbiotic interfaces. While discussing the legitimate organizations as interface (in 
chapter 3) it was shown that these two interfaces are in fact often closely related. 
Depending on the frequency and consequences of certain illegal activities, 
relationships between actors can turn from synergic to antagonistic. Furthermore, 
the same activities can result in antagonistic relationships with one actor, while 
being synergic with another actor or entity. In this chapter, the two interfaces 
will be discussed together because of the observed relatedness of synergy and 
antagonistic relationships. 
 Although the antagonistic and synergy interface are thus treated together here, 
it should be pointed out that they remain analytically distinct interfaces. 
Furthermore, the connection between the two does only count for particular 
crimes. That is, for crimes were both actors are involved in the same kind of 
activity (whether it is legal or illegal). However, the synergy interface is also used 
to understand relationships between actors that are active in completely different 
branches (see also chapter 2). 
                                                 
127  ‘Four Thefts in 20 Years: The Saga of the Beit Collection’ IFAR Journal, Vol. 5, no. 3, 
2004. 
128  ‘Voor tonnen antiek terug naar Frankrijk: Verdachte handelaar uitgeleverd door justitie 
Roermond’ Opportuun, no. 3, November 2003. 
CHAPTER 8 
146 
 Due to protective legislation in almost all source countries of art, dealers in 
objects from those countries are restricted in their opportunities to acquire new 
items and to take them abroad. Therefore, some dealers will not buy particular 
items from particular countries anymore. At the same time, other dealers will 
continue buying items and look for creative ways to smuggle them out of the 
countries of origin. The actual number of dealers who continue buying, or on 
the contrary stop their acquisitions in accordance with the mentioned legislation, 
will not be discussed here. This is an empirical question which cannot be 
answered on the basis of the available data, and seems to differ substantially for 
different types of items, source countries, and destination countries. The same 
holds for dealers in works of art that are stolen in market countries, like for 
example paintings from private collections or antiques from French castles. The 
point here is a distinction between two types of dealers that compete with each 
other. The first type acquires objects directly from the source country, while the 
other type is dependent on items which have been on the market for some time. 
The question to be answered here is whether those dealers actually benefit from 
each other’s activities (synergy) or are hurt by them (antagonistic). It seems that 
this depends very much on the actual market situation. Two examples can 
illustrate this and will be outlined below. 
 The first example is the trade in icons from Russia and the Baltic States. 
Before the fall of the Iron Curtain, it was difficult to legally obtain icons from the 
source countries. Nevertheless, there were always individuals smuggling them to 
Western Europe in limited and sometimes substantial numbers. As long ago as 
1970, the Soviet government made a formal request to Sotheby’s and Christie’s 
to avoid handling certain icons smuggled out in diplomatic bags, and one 
Western government was asked to recall its ambassador in Moscow since he was 
caught shipping out icons by the gross (Middlemas, 1975:71). During the Soviet 
era, prices were relatively high and the new acquisitions probably helped the 
smugglers and the dealers who bought them, as well as the dealers who only 
acquired items from existing collections. The new input was easily absorbed by 
the demand from a small group of collectors and eased the shortage for items on 
the market. However, as the Iron Curtain disappeared after 1989, a massive flow 
of icons emerged from the countries previously locked behind the wall. Although 
more than fifteen years have past since then, the data collected for this study in 
the Netherlands showed that icons are still finding their way from East to West. 
The same observation can be made from media reports from other countries.129 
                                                 
129  US Customs Service (2001) ‘U.S. Customs Returns Precious Icons To Russia’ May 17th, 
http://www.customs.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2001/0517-00.htm (Visited August 5th, 2005) 
 ‘Police seize rare Russian icons, artwork smuggled into Greece’ Athens News Agency: Daily 
News Bulletin in English, February 28th 2000, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ 
ana/2000/00-02-28.ana.html#09; ‘Icons smuggled into Germany will be returned to 
Russia’ Pravda, May 24th 2001, http://english.pravda.ru/culture/2001/05/24/5853.html 
(Visited August 5th, 2005). 
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As a result of the developments in 1989 and thereafter, prices went down because 
the demand from the collectors was not sufficient to absorb all the new items for 
the same prices. This clearly harmed honest dealers, while at the same time it 
might have harmed or benefited the dishonest dealers, depending on the balance 
between substantial extra turnover and lower prices. 
 Another example is provided by the life of one of Holland’s most productive 
fakers of modern art, Geert Jan Jansen.130 He originally owned a gallery for some 
time, but discovered how easy he could bring self-made fakes onto the market 
through auction houses and other channels. He fed the Dutch market with fakes 
and forgeries until things got out of hand in 1988 and he had to leave the 
country and moved to France. Several galleries turned out to have sold fakes and 
forged works by Karel Appel and one dealer was imprisoned for some months. In 
France, Jansen continued to produce fakes and forgeries in large numbers. For 
years he added works by Appel, Picasso, Magritte, Jorn, and other artists to the 
existing stock on the market (Bierens, 2002). In the Autumn of 1993, the 
beginning of the end came when Jansen, under his alias of ‘Van den Bergen’, 
offered a drawing by Karel Appel to the Munich auction house Karl & Faber. A 
Dutch dealer who saw the drawing in the catalogue informed the auction house 
that he believed it to be a fake. However, because the drawing was accompanied 
by a certificate that it had been auctioned before, no action was taken. In April 
1994, Van den Bergen approached the auction house again. This time he had 
works on offer by Chagall, Asger Jorn, and Appel. The auction house consulted 
experts for all the works. Although Appel declared that the painting on offer was 
his, the experts on Chagall and Asger Jorn believed the works to be forgeries. 
Thereafter the German police was informed and it was discovered that Jansen 
had offered works of art to numerous auction houses in Germany and France. 
When the French police finally found Jansen’ chateau near Poitiers in May 1994, 
they ran into 700 fake drawings and gouaches and 1,500 forged certificates of 
authenticity. According to Jansen, this was probably less than five percent of what 
he produced.131 In prison he wrote an autobiography about his life in the art 
trade (Jansen, 1998). Thanks to the trial in France there is clear evidence that he 
was an extremely productive faker and that he sold many items in France. His 
autobiography describes the same connection between synergy and antagonistic 
relationships that was outlined above. In the beginning, his fakes were absorbed 
easily by the market and benefited everybody involved. However, as time passed 
by and the number of fakes increased, the trust in works by particular artists was 
                                                 
130  H. Schutten (2000) ‘Master forger Geert Jan Jansen on trial in France’ Het Parool, English 
version at Museum Security Network, September 26th, http://www.museum-
security.org/00/170.html (Visited November 8th 2005); J. Voorthuis (1994) ‘The hunting 
and capture of two fakers – Ali Baba’s cave of forgeries uncovered: the crucial evidence lay 
in the fake certificates’ The Art Newspaper, July 1st. 
131  R. Gollin (2003) ‘De echtheid bepalen was alleen maar lastig’ Volkskrant, October 22nd. 
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partly undermined and prices negatively influenced.132 Despite the large 
quantities of works involved, Jansen is just one of many fakers and forgers known 
in the literature on this type of art crime (Goodrich, 1973; Hebborn, 1997; 
Hoving, 1996; Reitz, 1993). 
 The above examples seem to be quite manifest in their consequences for the 
specific parts of the overall art market. However, many incidents of illicit cross-
border trade in art, are often assumed to be without much impact on the broader 
market. Only a limited number of cases involve very unique items or large 
quantities of art and antiquities. Furthermore, as many deals involve individuals 
or unknown dealers, they are considered to lack significance for the art market in 
general. However, considering a number of factors, this impression is almost 
certainly less than accurate. One factor is the fact that only a minor part of the 
trade can and will come to the attention of customs or other authorities, or 
journalists and academic researchers. This means that, as with all illicit 
commodities, the real number of stolen and/or smuggled items will be much 
higher than the numbers found in a study like the one at hand. The flow of items 
between for example Belgium and the Netherlands is not covered by any 
customs checks. On the basis of both the literature on art thefts and the 
experiences of the last couple of years, this surely obscures a major part of the 
illicit trade (Leitch, 1969; MacLeave, 1981; Roux & Paringaux, 1999).133 In 
addition to the fact that some flow of objects seems to exist, the simple fact that 
almost all objects are durable goods (as opposed to drugs for example) makes sure 
that objects with a dubious provenance will not simply fade away with the 
passing of time. The fact that precious and valuable items will always find their 
way to the top-end dealers, auction houses, collectors, and museums is another 
important factor. Therefore, it is just a matter of time before stolen and smuggled 
objects from source countries, will find their way to these actors in the most 
important market countries. 
 As a result of the mentioned factors, one can assume that the illicit and licit 
trade are almost always directly or indirectly linked. Furthermore, the fact that 
smuggled or stolen items will enter the market continuously year after year, and 
consist of durable goods, makes its impact larger than can be judged from the 
individual incidents of shipments with smuggled or stolen items. Depending on 
                                                 
132  In general, one could also consider the effects of forgeries through the so-called ‘droit du 
suite’ on works of art. This legal principle enables some categories of artists, or their heirs, 
to profit from reselling works of art made by them. Due to the EU Directive, this principle 
will be incorporated in the laws of all EU member states on January 1st 2006. 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/search_lif.html (Directive 2001/84) (Visited 
November 8th 2005). 
133  Denis Meynard (2002) ‘Le cerveau du gang des chateaux écroué’ Le Parisien, January 7th; 
Voor tonnen antiek terug naar Frankrijk: Verdachte handelaar uitgeleverd door justitie 
Roermond’ Opportuun, no. 3, November 2003; ‘Maastrichtenaar vijf jaar cel in voor 
kerkroven’ Dagblad de Limburger, March 31st 2005. 
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all relevant market factors, this will lead to antagonistic or synergic interfaces 




The legal–illegal interface is called predatory when the aim is to destroy or bleed 
to death an organization or to control or fraudulently bankrupt a business. 
 It is rather hard to find examples of this interface in the illicit art trade. The 
definition of the predatory interface has several elements that will rarely be found 
together in empirical cases in this field of crime. First of all, the intention on 
‘destroying or bleeding to death’. When a parallel is drawn with art, this would 
involve museums, private collectors or others and their works of art. However, as 
far as they can be seen as organizations, they are not known to be destroyed, 
neither literally nor financially. Instead of the organizations, one could 
theoretically also focus on the destruction of the objects involved, although the 
predatory interface was never meant to aim at such a situation. The thefts of 
works of art and prints from rare books will regularly damage these objects 
themselves and sometimes lead to their definite disappearance (Conklin, 1994; 
Koldehoff & Koldehoff, 2004; MacLeave, 1981). Sometimes, parts of stolen 
paintings or other works of art will be cut from the original and used to 
blackmail the owners to pay a ransom (Middlemas, 1975; Koldehoff & 
Koldehoff, 2004). However, the purpose here is clearly the collection of a 
ransom and only when the thieves or their middlemen fail to obtain such a 
ransom easily, they will try to obtain it by destroying a piece of the artwork. The 
destruction of objects as such is usually not intended by thieves.134 
 However, in some cases, destruction and illegal trade will go hand in hand. 
After the invasion of Turkish troops in Cyprus in 1974, years of massive 
destruction to Cyprus’ cultural heritage followed. Together with the destruction 
of objects, many objects like icons and mosaics, were smuggled abroad and sold 
there (Hadjisavvas, 2001; Watson, 1998). Nevertheless, even in this case the 
destruction and smuggling can usually be separated. The destruction as vandalism 
with a transnational character and without a commercial element, and smuggle as 
part of a transnational criminal enterprise to obtain profits for all actors involved. 
The case of Cyprus is just one of many cases in which states are involved in 
crimes related to works of art, or in which the wars between states or within 
states are the cause for crimes related to works of art.  
 Neither the literature on art crimes, nor the empirical study that was done, 
provided any examples of cases that can be understood as predatory interfaces. 
                                                 
134  Incidents like the destruction of two ancient Buddha statues in the Bamiyan province in 
Afghanistan in March 2001 fall outside the scope of this study. Similar cases can be found 
in other countries but do not fall within the definition of transnational crime used here. 
See e.g. ‘Reporters see wrecked Buddha’s’ BBC News, March 26th 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1242856.stm (Visited August 5th, 2005). 
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However, some elements of the predatory interface are found in situations as 
those discussed above. In general it also appears to be unlikely to find the 
predatory interface, as understood in this study, in concrete cases in the illicit art 
and antiquities trade. Therefore, it can be concluded that this interface does not 




When the aim is to preserve the viability of the legal actor, so that illegal benefits 
can be extorted on a more or less regular basis, the interface is called parasitical. 
 Two types of art theft partly resemble the parasitical interface but do not fully 
match the definition. They are nevertheless discussed here because they play an 
important role in the illicit trade and may suggest an additional interface to the 
typology. 
 First of all, illegal benefits can be reaped on a regular basis, but without 
extortion of one actor by another. In case of so-called internal thefts, illegal 
benefits can be reaped for years while the organization is preserved and often 
unaware of this. Internal thefts are thefts by staff members or security officials of 
museums, libraries, galleries, or private collectors. 
 In September 2003, the Royal Library of Denmark in Copenhagen was 
contacted by Christie’s auction house with an inquiry as to whether the library 
was missing some books. As a result of this inquiry, one of the largest internal 
thefts ever was solved.135 The books that were consigned to Christie’s were part 
of more than 3,200 unique books and copper engravings that were stolen from 
the library by a philologist during the late 1960s and 1970s. A substantial part of 
this collection of objects was sold during the period from 1998 to 2003. The 
objects went to auction houses in London, New York, and Hong Kong. A 
number of people around the former employee of the Royal Library were 
involved: his widow, son, daughter in law as well as a friend of them. In June 
2004 they were all convicted to prison terms for their involvement in this case. 
 In the same year another large case of internal theft was solved. It involved 
the Army Museum in Delft in the Netherlands.136 In April of 2003, some 
employees of the museum discovered the theft of a number of items. Three 
months later two persons were arrested, among them the main suspect: a curator 
of the museum. During several years he stole hundreds of books, prints, 
                                                 
135  Copenhagen City Court, 28th division, June 3rd 2004, case no. 28.2543/04; ‘Four 
Convicted in Danish Royal Library Theft’ American Libraries Online, June 4th, 2004, 
http://www.ala.org/ala/alonline/currentnews/newsarchive/newsarchive.htm (August 5th, 
2005). 
136  R. Gollin (2003) ‘‘Loyale’ conservator stal uit eigen collectie – Legermuseum loopt voor 
miljoenen euro’s schade op door verdwijning van schilderijen, boeken en prenten’ 
Volkskrant, December 2nd; ‘Marechaussee houdt verdachten aan van diefstal 
Legermuseum’ Ministry of Defense, July 22nd 2003, http://www.mindef.nl/ 
nieuws/nieuwsberichten/220703_diefstal.html (Visited August 5th, 2005). 
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drawings, and paintings. The thefts often resulted in major damage or destruction 
of unique books. The stolen items were sold to dealers and collectors in the 
Netherlands and abroad.137 
 These two cases are among many cases involving curators, security personnel, 
academic researchers, and others in the vicinity of valuable art collections 
(Koldehoff & Koldehoff, 2004; Middlemas, 1975; Tijhuis & Van der Wal, 2005). 
In 1998, the FBI pointed at an internal study that had researched thefts from 
museums. They had found that 83% of the known thefts could be classified as 
‘internal thefts’, which meant performed by museum staff or others with 
privileged access to collections, like scientists, security officials and restorers.138 
Although this study was limited to museums, private owners face comparable 
problems (McLeave, 1983; Tijhuis & Van der Wal, 2005). 
 In the Summer of 1983, Nelly Dehem, the 88-year-old daughter of the 
painter Henri Dehem, was hospitalized in Cannes. She had entrusted the care of 
the villa and here collection of impressionist paintings to a hospital worker and 
his wife. During her stay in the hospital they took about 40 paintings by Monet, 
Gauguin, Renoir, Pisarro, Sisley, and others, along with jewelry and pieces of 
gold. With the assistance of a Parisian art dealer, the paintings had been sold in a 
number of countries spread all over the world.139 
 An old but telling example of internal thefts is the case of the Edvard Munch 
Museum in Oslo. Between 1961 and 1968, numerous paintings by the 
Norwegian master appeared on the English market. In many cases certificates 
were later issued from the curator in Munch Museum who was considered an 
expert for Munch paintings. When a painting was returned to the museum while 
the curator was on holiday, the deputy director recognized the painting as being 
part of the museum collection. He went to the police and Scotland Yard later 
traced thirty paintings that were sold by the curator in London (MacLeave, 1981; 
Middlemas, 1975). 
 In addition to the above variation, numerous cases of extortion involving 
works of art can be found. However, these consist of once-only cases of 
extortion, and are often merely national instead of transnational. Many art thefts 
are in fact so-called art-nappings. Extremely valuable art is stolen to extort money 
from either the owner or the insurer for the safe return of the objects. This type 
of theft quickly became a kind of plague in the 1960s and since then remained a 
recurring theme although it never again achieved the frequency it had in those 
years. In 1960 and 1961, a number of large-scale thefts for ransom followed one 
after another in France. Thereafter it quickly spread to the United Kingdom and 
                                                 
137  An inventory of stolen items is available on the internet: http://www.antiqbook.nl/ 
gestolen (Visited August 5th, 2005). 
138  ‘Art theft from within museums’ Museum Security Network Report, March 21st 2002, 
www.museum-security.org (Visited August 5th, 2005). 
139  IFAR Report, Vol. 6, no. 1, January/February 1985; IFAR Report, Vol. 6, no. 5, July 1985. 
CHAPTER 8 
152 
other countries until one managed to find ways to limit the opportunities and 
potential profit of these thefts (Middlemas, 1975; MacLeave, 1981). 
 However, theft for ransom or art-napping is still an important kind of theft. 
After stealing three paintings by Renoir and Rembrandt in December 2001, 
thieves tried to extort four million Pounds from the Swedish National Museum. 
They failed in their attempt and were finally arrested.140 Sometimes, attempts to 
extort museums or other institutions or individuals have been successful. In 1975, 
the Gallery of Modern Art in Milan was robbed of twenty-eight paintings. The 
thieves demanded a ransom and this demand was met by the museum. 
Subsequently, the museum got its paintings back but three months later another 
theft occurred and thirty-eight paintings were lost (Conklin, 1994). In October 
1994, seven paintings by Picasso were stolen from a Zurich gallery. A Swiss man 
and two Italians were jailed in 1996 for the theft, but the paintings were not 
recovered at that time. In February of the year 2000, the theft was solved when 
five of the paintings were returned. According to a statement by the police and 
prosecutors the Picassos had been recovered with the help of an unnamed 
intermediary, who was rewarded by being allowed to keep two of the seven 
paintings.141 
 




With collaboration the links are (relatively) long-lasting and more direct as legal 
and illegal actors work together for the commission of the same offence. 
 Collaboration is only different from the reciprocity or outsourcing interface as 
far as the exact division of labor is concerned between thieves, smugglers, and 
dealers or middlemen. When two actors are working closely together, and 
actually act as a group or organization, outsourcing or reciprocity turns into 
collaboration. A recent example of this interface is the Cornelius M. case. This 
case involved a Belgian-based Dutch antiquities dealer that worked with a gang 
of gypsies who robbed French castles during the 1990s. The objects which were 
stolen in France were sold in Belgium and the Netherlands to dealers and 
middlemen who subsequently sold many objects to collectors abroad. The 
Cornelius M. case is just one example of many cases involving the same set-up 
(Leitch, 1969; Middlemas, 1975, MacLeave, 1981; Roux & Paringaux, 1999). 
That is, art and antiquities are stolen in French castles or museums and thereafter 
                                                 
140  ‘Sweden art heist suspects arrested’ CNN Europe, January 4th, 2001, www.cnn.com; 
‘Stockholm art thieves jailed’ Museum Security Network Report, July 28th, 2001, 
www.museum-security.org (Visited August 5th, 2005). 
141  IFAR Report, Vol. 15, no. 12, December 1994; ‘Picassos recovered 5 years after Zurich 
gallery theft’ Museum Security Network Report, February 9th 2000, www.museum-
security.org (Visited August 5th 2005). 
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taken to Belgium or the Netherlands to be sold. Since 1995, at least three large 
cases were discovered in the Netherlands alone. They will be discussed hereafter 
in the section that deals with the lock model. 
 It is sometimes difficult to distinguish empirically between the collaboration 
interface and other interfaces. Only with detailed information about the precise 
relationship between dealers or middlemen and thieves, is it possible to say 
whether this relationship can be understood as collaboration or as outsourcing or 
reciprocity. The literature on the trade in looted and smuggled antiquities shows 
many examples whereas the literature on art theft often provides too little 
information to define the relationship (Brodie & Renfrew, 2001; Brodie & 
Watson, 2000; Chamberlin, 1983; Conklin, 1994; MacLeave, 1981; Middlemas, 




Reciprocity exists when there are consciously mutual benefits between the legal 
and illegal actors. This type includes the interface, whereby legitimate or 
conventional actors are the clients for goods and services offered by criminals 
(e.g., drugs, gambling, weapons, prostitutes). 
 Reciprocity aims at a relationship that falls between synergy (where one of 
the two parties is unaware of the illegal nature of their transaction) and 
outsourcing or collaboration (where both parties are not only informed but also 
actively engaged in the criminal activities). 
 Subtle differences in the relationship between actors in the art trade can make 
the difference between one type of interface or the other. In general, reciprocity 
is a rather common interface and more or less in the middle between synergy and 
outsourcing or collaboration, as was outlined in chapter 2. However, contrary to 
other types of crime, this interface will be found less often in the illegal art trade. 
This has to do with the unique and durable character of most art works. Because 
of this, and the registers of stolen art, it is not without risk for art dealers and 
auction houses to simply buy or accept stolen art from thieves or middlemen.142 
Nevertheless, there are some important exceptions here. First of all, there are 
numerous categories of objects that do not make it to the registers for stolen art. 
The reason for this can for example be the fact that the objects are lacking a 
sufficient description and photo, or that their owners are unable to use the 
services of commercial registers or Interpol. Examples are objects from museums 
in many poor countries, rare books, and icons. However, in market countries, 
like for example the Netherlands, registers like that of Interpol will also be left 
unused because the police organizations are not always able to send the necessary 
information to Interpol, for whatever reasons. Secondly, there are parts of the 
                                                 
142  To be sure, this does not mean that stolen art does not find its way through large auction 
houses and well-known dealers. On the contrary, despite all registers, these actors turn out 
to be regularly handling stolen and smuggled items.  
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trade that are in general not hurt by the activities of any register or police 
agencies. This can be explained by the fact that they operate in a region or 
country that lacks any serious police involvement, or by the fact that the objects 
are usually directly sold to customers. The trade in stolen art and antiquities from 
France in Belgium and the Netherlands serves as an example here. Finally, many 
private or public owners simply do not bother to register the stolen works of art 




Outsourcing refers to a division of labor between legal and illegal actors, where 
one party offers specialized services to the other. It can be a one-off or a 
continuous relationship between a client and a provider. The client can both be a 
legitimate organization as well as a criminal organization or individual. 
 The relationship between an art thief and a dealer, fence or middleman will 
sometimes be a relationship of outsourcing. When a dealer or middleman actually 
orders a theft, one can label this situation as outsourcing. When the thief is 
offering his merchandise independently from the orders of the dealer, the 
relationship shifts to ‘reciprocity’ which will be discussed hereafter. Subtle 
changes in the relationship between dealer and thief can change the type of 
interface that covers the relationship. When a dealer works closely, and during a 
longer period, together with a thief or group of thieves, and they are mutually 
dependent on each other for merchandise and profits, the relationship can best be 
understood as collaboration. This collaboration between a specific group of actors 
may in turn cause other interfaces with new actors. When other thieves hear 
about the collaboration, they may conclude that the dealer involved can be an 
interesting figure to offer part of their own merchandise. As a result, a 
relationship of reciprocity can develop which in turn can change to 
collaboration. 
 In the data gathered in this study, it was sometimes hard to distinguish 
between outsourcing and other interfaces in concrete cases. However, the 
outsourcing interface has definitely a role in understanding the illicit art and 
antiquities trade. The literature on art theft provides numerous examples of 
dealers or middlemen who are involved in relationships with thieves or gangs of 
thieves (Fuchs, 1992; Koldehoff & Koldehoff, 2004; Leitch, 1969; Massy, 2000; 
Middlemas, 1975). 
 The above relationships do not include thefts of famous works of art in 
museums that are ordered by rich collectors. This often iterated explanation for 
major art thefts has never been backed up by any serious evidence (Koldehoff & 
Koldehoff, 2004; Tijhuis & Van der Wal, 2005).143 
                                                 
143  An example that is sometimes mentioned is the theft of a number of paintings from the 
Museum of Fine Arts in Budapest in 1983. The theft was allegedly done by Italian Mafiosi, 





Within relationships between legal and illegal actors, the power relations might 
be even but can also be uneven. When there are mutual benefits but uneven 
power relations, the interface is called co-optation. 
 Within the illicit art trade, it is not easy to find many examples which could 
be understood as a situation of co-optation. In some cases, art dealers or thieves 
are involved in corrupt relationships with customs officials, police officers, 
museum directors, or others. However, in most of these cases one cannot 
conclude that these relationships are clearly characterized by an uneven balance 
of power. Usually, it seems to be relatively easy for smugglers and thieves to 
establish relationships with relevant authorities in source countries as far as 
relatively poor countries are concerned. Therefore, one is not dependent on 
particular persons or on the highest levels of government bureaucracies. 
Furthermore, the relatively extensive financial resources of dealers from market 
countries puts them at a clear advantage towards the officials in the often poorer 
source countries. This can even suggest that the balance of power is indeed 
uneven, with the foreign dealer in control. However, this will in some cases be 
prevented by the small but ever-present risk that some official will in fact take 
action against a smuggler annex dealer. Even the remotest chance of having to 
spend a couple of years behind bars in Thailand, Congo, or Peru will weaken his 
position. 
 The arguments against the co-optation interface are not meant to be read as 
an argument for the irrelevance of this interface here. The point is that for most 
dealers or smugglers, a situation of co-optation is unlikely to develop. However, 
in theory it is possible to assume the existence of a number of high-end dealers 
who are in fact involved in a relationship which could be characterized as co-
optation. A number of examples are given in the autobiography of Michel van 
Rijn who was engaged in all kinds of art crimes in the past. He mentions co-
optation like relationships he allegedly had with authorities in the former Soviet 
Union, Malta and elsewhere (Van Rijn, 1993). Although there are no 
independent sources to verify his story, the examples are at least colorful 
illustrations of the co-optation interface as it could exist in the illicit trade.144 
                                                 
acting on orders of a Greek olive oil millionaire. This Greek was arrested but later released 
for lack of proof. The paintings were later found in a Greek cloister. See: IFAR Report, 
Vol. 7, no. 4, June 1986. 
144  A number of Dutch journalists published about this ambiguous character in the art trade. 
See e.g. A. Schreuder (1993) ‘De handel en wandel van Michel van Rijn’ NRC 
Handelsblad, October 26th; E. Spaans (1994) ‘Rembrandts familiekasteel; ‘De duistere 
kanten van de kunsthandel’ NRC Handelsblad, August 12th; R. Gollin & B. Witman 
(1997) ‘Met scrupules kom je niet ver in deze handel’ De Volkskrant, June 6th; L. Heyting 
(2000) ‘Vaag gesjoemel’ NRC Handelsblad, December 29th; B. Witman (2000) 




Especially in countries that are known to enforce their export laws seriously, 
relationships like the ones mentioned above, are likely to develop. On the 
contrary, countries which are either not seriously enforcing their laws, or are 





The funding interface involves situations where legitimate organizations provide, 
knowingly or not, essential financial support for the operation of criminal groups. 
 This interface seems to be inspired by the recent growth in importance and 
attention for international terrorism, although examples of this interface can be 
found from longer ago (see for example Tupman, 1998a, 1998b). Within the art 
and antiquities trade it is unlikely to find relationships like this. Occasionally, a 
dealer might help out a thief or receiver who is temporarily short of cash, but this 
is clearly different from what is meant here. In the data that were gathered for 
this study, no examples were found of relationships that could be understood as 
funding. 
 
8.2.3 New interfaces and superfluous interfaces 
 
The discussion of the antithetical and symbiotic interfaces showed the relevance 
of the individual interfaces for understanding the illicit art and antiquities trade. A 
number of interfaces from the typology could be used to understand particular 
activities within the illicit trade. Several interfaces turned out to be superfluous 
and of no use for understanding the trade. Other interfaces should be adapted or 
added to be used in the illicit art and antiquities trade. 
 The discussion of this typology in this chapter showed that seven of the ten 
interfaces could be used to understand the relationships between actors in the 
illicit art trade. These seven consisted of two antithetical interfaces and five 
symbiotic interfaces. The antithetical interfaces are the injurious and antagonistic 
interfaces; the symbiotic interfaces were the outsourcing, reciprocity, 
collaboration, co-optation and synergy interface. Three interfaces seem super-
fluous as far as the illicit art trade is concerned: the predatory, parasitical and 
funding interface. 
 The analysis of the antagonistic and synergy interface showed that they can 
best be taken together. This may seem contradictory in general but makes sense 
for the illicit art and antiquities trade. This can be explained by the fact that the 
illicit trade is a trade embedded within a legal sector, that is the licit art and 
antiquities trade. Therefore, the indirect (antagonistic or synergic) relationships 
between different actors are far more complicated and dynamic than in typical 
illegal markets like for example the drug trade. It should be stressed that it is not 
argued here that the antagonistic and synergy interface should be analyzed 
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together by definition. On the contrary, they consist of two distinct types of 
interfaces. However, in practice, depending on the particular type of crime, they 
may be taken together. 
 The analysis of several interfaces showed some potential shortcomings of the 
typology to understand the legal–illegal interface in the art and antiquities trade. 
One important shortcoming is the fact that so-called internal thefts cannot be 
fully understood with the interfaces from the typology. In case of an internal 
theft, both victim and offender are members of the same institution and/or are 
connected as employer and employee. Furthermore, the connection between the 
two usually plays a major role in causing the theft. The proverb ‘opportunity 
makes a thief’ probably characterizes most thefts quite correctly. While discussing 
the parasitical interface, two cases were mentioned that involved ‘serial’ (internal) 
thieves. However, if one does not limit the analysis to serial thefts but also 
includes incidental ‘internal’ thefts, there are numerous cases to be mentioned. A 
study of fifty major thefts of paintings from museums and private collection in 
Europe, showed that a substantial part of the thefts were in fact internal thefts. 
Considering the number of items stolen, it is probably the most important type of 
theft (Tijhuis & Van der Wal, 2005). Due to the specific characteristics of 
internal thefts, and the importance for the illicit trade in general, it seems 
appropriate to develop an interface type which covers this relationship. This 
interface will be described as ‘facilitating’. The internal thefts are passively 
facilitated by the institutions or employers in two ways. First of all, the individual 
is provided with maximum information about the collection, the way it is 
secured and potentially its value. Secondly, many institutions or employers 
abstain from attempts to secure themselves against their staff members. 
 The facilitating interface should not be confused with another interface from 
Passas’ original typology. This interface, organized crimes committed by 
(otherwise) legal actors, differs from the facilitating interface. The facilitating 
interface does not aim at organized crimes committed by legal actors, but at 
crimes of individuals within (parts of) legal actors that are not directed by the 
legal actor as a whole. The legal actor as a whole, for example a particular 
museum or government, does not initiate the criminal activity but indirectly 
facilitates this activity by the opportunities it offers its staff members or sub-
agencies. 
 The discussion of the interface typology showed not only its uses and 
shortcomings, but also the fact that relatively few of the cases from the empirical 
study in the Netherlands and elsewhere can be connected and understood with 
the different interfaces. Part of this fact can be explained from the lack of detailed 
information on the relationship between the different persons involved. 
Furthermore, the differences between the different types of interfaces seem very 
subtle and sometimes hard to see, as far as the illicit art trade is concerned. As was 
pointed out before, this can probably be explained by the fact that this trade 
consists of a licit and illicit part that is thoroughly linked. Therefore, the 
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differences between for example reciprocity and outsourcing are a lot smaller in 
this field than for example in the drug trade. 
  
8.3 State conflicts and crimes related to art 
 
The previous chapter pointed out how war, civil war, and other violent 
phenomena in which states can be involved, are related to the theft and 
destruction of works of art and antiquities. Whereas the illicit art trade is 
sometimes seen as merely another variation of organized crime or illegal markets, 
this trade thus will often be embedded in national and international conflicts. 
There are several ways in which art theft is related to these conflicts. These will 
be outlined below. Thereafter, the perspective of interfaces will be added as well 
as a comparison with other fields of transnational crime. 
 The first way in which art theft is related to war is the theft of works of art by 
the victorious party in a war. Instead of individuals or organized criminals, it is 
the state that acts as perpetrator of the crimes of theft or destruction on a large 
scale. Best known example here is the systematic looting campaign by Nazi 
Germany in the countries it occupied during World War II. In a couple of years 
an enormous number of works of art were either looted, confiscated, or bought 
from dealers, collectors, and others that were forced to sell to the Nazis. As a 
result of the renewed interest in this topic during the 1990s, part of the stolen 
works of art were returned to the original owners and the knowledge about this 
topic was increased substantially (Chamberlin, 1983; Muller & Schretlen, 2003; 
Van Rappard-Boon, 1998).145 Following the German looting campaigns, the 
Soviets systematically plundered German museums and other collections (Akinsja 
& Kozlov, 1995). After the war, some Allied troops illustrated that the interest in 
art was not restricted to the Nazis en Soviets, despite the fact that the looting by 
Allied troops was far less. Although less often cited in discussions on this topic, 
the French looting campaigns under emperor Napoleon were at least as extensive 
as those coordinated from Germany during World War Two. Venice and Rome 
were among the places that were especially badly hit by the looting campaigns of 
the French (Chamberlin, 1983). The French looted so many objects that they 
were not able to find a new home for everything before the empire finally 
crumbled (Middlemas, 1975). A variation of this type of theft is the theft of art by 
colonial powers in the past. The British are for example known for the plunder 
of antiquities from Ghana and Benin (Chamberlin, 1983; Lloyd, 1964). A more 
recent example of plunder is the looting of museums and looting and burning of 
libraries in Kuwait during the occupation by Iraq in 1990-1991. 
                                                 
145  This is not to say that restitution of stolen art did not take place before the late 1990s. 
However, the works of art restituted directly after the war and in the decades afterwards 
were limited and interest in them declined until the climate with respect to this topic 
changed significantly at the end of the 20th century. 
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 Besides the organized plunder of art treasures of one state by another, there is 
another way in which art theft is connected with wars and civil wars. Often, the 
chaos and disruption of order in societies caused by wars or civil wars enables 
thieves or gangs of thieves to smuggle objects out of the country. Recently, the 
war in Iraq provided an example of this when the National Museum was robbed. 
Although the damage turned out to be less than estimated at first, it still 
represented a substantial loss of unique objects. Furthermore, as the media 
attention focused primarily on this incident, a range of other incidents occurred 
around the same time. Among the most important were the looting and burning 
of the Iraq National Library and Archives and a famous Koran Library, as well as 
the looting of the Mosul Museum. There was also looting and destruction of art 
works in the Museum of Fine Art in Baghdad, and the destruction of libraries in 
universities around the country. Fine art departments and institutes, as well as 
private art galleries were destroyed.146 Furthermore, the looting of antiquities 
from archaeological sites went on continuously (Atwood, 2004). At the time of 
writing of this book, the looting still continues, according to reports by the BBC 
and other media.147 This will be further discussed in the next chapter. With 
almost any revolution, war, or civil war, incidents like those mentioned before 
can be found.148 In 1969, the Nigerian civil war led to the looting of the Oron 
museum in Calabar in South-East Nigeria. In 1950, two British officers who 
were in Seoul during the Korean War, made straight for the city’s art gallery and 
removed the bulk of the collection of carved jewels and jade (Middlemas, 
1975:152-153). The invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops in 1974 resulted in 
both looting and smuggling by non-state actors as well as looting and destruction 
by the Turkish military (Hadjisavvas, 2001; Watson, 1998). Due to a lack of 
supervision in the years after the invasion, the destruction and looting could 
continue almost unhindered. When fighting erupted in the Somali capital of 
Mogadishu in 1991, one of the first casualties was the National Museum. Within 
weeks many of its prized exhibits, including ancient Egyptian pottery, were on 
sale to tourists in neighboring Kenya. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, as 
in Somalia, years of fighting have left many of the country’s museums nearly 
empty.149 
                                                 
146  MacGuire Gibson (2005) ‘Cultural tragedy in Iraq: a report on the looting of museums, 
archives and sites’ IFAR, http://www.ifar.org/tragedy.htm (Visited November 9th 2005). 
147  James Menendez (2005) ‘Iraq’s treasures still being looted’ BBC World Service, June 21st 
(Visited, August 7th 2005); Owen Bowcott (2005) ‘Archaeologists fight to save Iraqi sites’ 
The Guardian, June 20th. 
148  As far as libraries and archives are concerned, a 1996 report by UNESCO provides 
hundreds of examples of institutions that were plundered, destroyed (or both) during the 
20th century. Van der Hoeven, H. & J. van Albada (1996) Lost Memory – libraries and 
archives destroyed in the twentieth century (UNESCO, Paris) – Libraries and Archives 
destroyed in the Twentieth Century. 
149  Labi, I. & S. Robinson (2001) ‘Looting Africa: Theft, illicit sales, poverty and war are 




 Whereas the types of theft above were aimed at objects abroad and during 
times of war of civil war, a completely different type of large-scale theft occurred 
in East-Germany. During the 1970s and 1980s an organization was founded that 
combined the opportunities of white-collar crime, secret service, state control of 
the economy, and secrecy jurisdictions in Europe (Von Bülow, 2003:31-40). 
This organization, called ‘Kommerzielle Koordinierung’ (KoKo) (~ commercial 
coordination), was set up by Schalck-Golodkowski, a senior state-intelligence 
officer. He wrote a PhD. study about ways to earn foreign currency by imports 
and exports from East-Germany. The result was a range of organizations that 
were involved in everything from illicit trade in arms, waste, metals, and other 
commodities. To enable the illicit activities and to keep them out of sight from 
domestic and foreign observers, an intricate web of companies was used in places 
like Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, not particularly known for their 
role in the global trade in raw materials. One of the organizations was aimed at 
the sale of works of art that were confiscated from East-German citizens and 
museums during the 1970s and 1980s. KoKo had developed an efficient way to 
confiscate art and antiquities from its citizens and institutions. First, a burglary by 
members of the organization, accompanied by art experts from the state 
intelligence agency, enabled them to make an estimate of the value of the works 
of art. Thereafter, the owners received a notice that they were due to pay taxes. 
Coincidently the amount of taxes was equal to the value of the works of art that 
were subsequently seized. Large quantities of works of art were thus sold abroad, 
while the authorities told the victims that the items would go to museums in the 
GDR (Bischof, 2003; Blutke, 1990; Von Bülow, 2003). 
 The above variations, and the examples that were mentioned, can be 
understood from a perspective of interfaces. Each individual case can be labeled 
with one or more of the interfaces from the typology. However, the importance 
of these variations lies more in the way they differ from the incidents discussed 
before. First of all, the specific role of states in the theft and cross-border traffic of 
works of art. Secondly, the relationship between the illicit trade and wars and 
other conflicts. Finally, in connection with the second point, the parallel between 
the illicit art trade and other illicit trade like the illicit trade in diamonds and the 
illicit arms trade. Each topic will be briefly discussed here. 
 Within the context of the illicit trade, states are usually seen as victims. They 
can either be a victim because the antiquities in their soil are looted or because 
the works of art in their museums are stolen and taken abroad. However, as was 
pointed out above, states can also be the perpetrators of art crimes, like theft or 
vandalism, with individual collectors, dealers, or institutions abroad as their 
victims. Furthermore, they can be the facilitators, by negligence, of art crimes on 
their territories. Finally, as in the case of East-Germany, the crimes of the state 
can even be directed against its own citizens and museums. 
                                                 
 (Visited November 9th 2005). 
INTERFACES AND THE ILLICIT ART TRADE 
 
161 
 On an abstract level, one can point at the synergy between wars, civil wars 
and acts by authoritarian states like the former East-Germany on the one hand, 
and the illicit trade on the other hand. Although this holds especially true for the 
trade in illicitly excavated antiquities, it can also be observed in the trade in 
works of art from museums, collectors, and others. 
 Finally, a parallel can be drawn between the illicit art trade and some 
transnational crimes which were discussed before: the illicit arms trade, drug 
trafficking and ‘blood’ diamonds trafficking (see section 7.2.4). Apart from the 
extensive role of intelligence agencies during the Cold War, the interrelatedness 
of illicit trades and civil wars seems to have remained the same of even increased 
(Crefeld, 1998; Rufin, 1999; Naylor, 2001). 
 
8.4 The lock model and the interface typology: case studies from 
France, Italy, and the Netherlands 
 
In chapter 5, the so-called lock model was developed. This model simplifies the 
analyses of the complicated mechanisms by which transnational activities change 
with respect to their legal status. Illegal activities are laundered and legitimate 
activities become illegal. These mechanisms are found regularly with arms 
trafficking, financial crimes, cigarette smuggling, and trafficking of ‘conflict’ 
diamonds (Naylor, 1987, 2001; NIZA, 2001; Paoli, 1995; Passas, 1995; Von 
Bülow, 2003). 
 This section will describe a number of case studies from the empirical study of 
the illicit art trade that was done in the Netherlands, France, and Italy, as well as 
cases from the literature. These cases will be used to discuss how the lock model 
and the interface typology can be used to understand the relationships between 
legal and illegal. 
 The first case involves the Belgian-based Dutch dealer named Cornelius M. 
who directed the so-called ‘castle-gang’ in France.150 The Cornelius M. case was 
analyzed at the French police (OCBC) who conducted an extensive investigation 
of this case. More than fifteen persons were involved in dozens of robberies of 
large French estates, capturing precious antiquities, paintings, timepieces, 
tapestries, and furniture. Many of the estates were only occupied part of the year 
and the burglaries usually took place when nobody was present. This partly 
explains why the thieves were never caught red-handed. Sometimes they 
burglarized estates that were occupied, but at the same time were so large that 
the inhabitants did not notice it.151 
                                                 
150  Denis Meynard (2002) ‘Le cerveau du gang des chateaux écroué’ Le Parisien, January 7th; 
A. Reerink, (2003) ‘Le gang des châteaux’ Algemeen Dagblad, June 21st; C. Naber (2000) 
‘Recidivist uit Retie liet zigeuners zeshonderd kastelen plunderen’ De Morgen, December 
9th. 
151  An example is the burglary of the estate of Josselin de Rohan, the then chairman of the 
Gaulistic RPR in the French Senate during the night of July 12th 1998. While De Rohan 
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 The robberies took place from 1998 to 2000. The thieves were local gypsies 
and were not involved in the transport or sale of the items. For transport 
Cornelius M. had hired chauffeurs, including a man named Cipoletti, an Italian 
driver, who took the items to the Netherlands. When Cipoletti was arrested he 
admitted to have driven at least forty loads of antiquities to the Netherlands, and 
the whole scheme fell apart. In the Netherlands, Cornelius M. sold the items to a 
number of complicit antiquities dealers who sold the items to international 
customers. Centre of the trade were local markets in the border region of 
Belgium and the Netherlands, in the South of Limburg, a Dutch province. The 
trade is fuelled by lack of legislation and supervision on the art and antiquities 
trade in the Netherlands and Belgium, and the relative tight provisions in France. 
 Cornelius M. had a history of involvement in the illicit trade. In 1994 and 
1996 he was arrested for theft of and receiving stolen antiquities, and was given a 
prison sentence. The moment he was released coincided with the first robberies 
of the gang in France. He now serves a fourteen-year prison sentence in France. 
His fifteen accomplices were given prison sentences from one to six years.152 
 The typology can be used to label the different relationships around Cornelius 
M. Collaboration with the gang, reciprocity or outsourcing with other dealers 
and synergy between the overall market and his activities. However, besides the 
different individual interfaces, it is particularly interesting how Cornelius M. acts 
as the link between the art and antiquities robbed by the violent gang, and the 
good faith purchasers abroad. Although the Netherlands and Belgium do not act 
as interface strictly speaking, they de facto play the same role. This is, among other 
things, caused by the fact that a central and complete registry of stolen art, a 
specialized police force and adequate legislation have been insufficient or lacking 
for years. Due to these factors, works of art that have made it across the border to 
Belgium and the Netherlands and have been sold there, are practically laundered. 
This can explain why the Netherlands, as well as Belgium, have acted as an outlet 
for stolen art and antiquities from France for decades. In a French study on art 
crimes, this topic was summarized with the well-chosen title Le Grand bal des 
receleurs which can be translated as ‘The great ball of receivers’ (Roux & 
Paringaux, 1999). To be sure, this book was written before the Cornelius M. 
case came to light. Two crucial elements have been the basis under this ball for 
decades. One is the favorable civil code in the Netherlands and Belgium, and the 
other is the fact that France has innumerable private and state collections of art 
and antiquities which provide a constant opportunity for art thefts.153 The result 
                                                 
was watching TV to see how France won the world soccer championships, the Cornelius 
M. gang took his antiques. See: Berkhout, K. & J. Wevers (2005) ‘Hoe Nederlanders 
Frankrijk leegroven’ NRC Handelsblad, October 14th. 
152  Judgment of the Montbrison Court, File no. 02/01050, March 6th 2003. 
153  In theory, the EU Directive for the Restitution of illegally exported cultural goods, should 
erase part of this problem. In practice, this does not change the situation very much. First 
of all, the directive is very hard to use effectively, and secondly it will by definition be 
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is a persistent system in which art is stolen in France and subsequently sold to 
dealers in Belgium and the Netherlands. On the one hand these dealers have 
established shops and can use this to pass good title on objects to their customers. 
On the other hand, they are in practice professional receivers at the same time. 
Most dealers are located in remote areas, in the border region of Belgium and the 
Dutch province Limburg in the South of the country. 
 Another illustration of this system is a case of an antique dealer in the town of 
Echt in Limburg. He was caught in 1997 as receiver and dealer in numerous 
precious items from thefts from French castles. Often, the time between the theft 
en the sale in the Netherlands was relatively short. In a collaborative effort of the 
French OCBC and the local Dutch police, his merchandise was investigated and 
dozens of stolen objects he still had were discovered in different locations. Like 
Cornelius M., he was sentenced to a prison term in France.154 
 In March 2005, yet another Dutch dealer was sentenced in France for 
coordinating a range of thefts and burglaries in French churches. Simon V., a 
dealer from Maastricht in the South of Limburg, was sentenced in the French 
city of Le Havre. He received a prison sentence of five years for complicity in the 
burglary of twenty-eight churches in the Northern and Western part of 
France.155 The thefts took place during the late 1990s to 2001. More than ten 
people, in changing combinations, took part in the thefts from churches in the 
country side of the French Normandy region. The set-up was the same all the 
time. The perpetrators tried to park their car as close as possible to the church. 
Thereafter, they went inside and within minutes took the objects of interest in an 
often rather rude way. The objects were driven to Maastricht where they were 
sold in the shop of Simon V. or to other dealers and auctions. An important 
difference between Cornelius M. and Simon V. was that the latter directly sold to 
well-known dealers and one major auction house in the Netherlands. 
 Two incidents led to the end of the spree of thefts coordinated by Simon V. 
First, the number-plate of a group of thieves was registered by a group of 
teenagers who noticed the thieves leaving a church with an object wrapped in 
cloth. The number-plate lead to the name of a man from Maastricht. In March 
2001 he was caught red-handed when he tried to burglarize a Belgian castle. 
Secondly, Simon V. became a suspect after a stolen antique mirror offered at the 
French La Biennale des Antiquaires was traced back to Simon V. When the police 
search his shop they find many stolen objects and Simon V. is held in custody for 
some time. He is released on bail and some time later flees to Senegal. When he 
returns to the Netherlands in 2004, he is arrested and extradited to France. 
                                                 
without much effect if local authorities in Belgium or the Netherlands do not actively 
enforce the national and EU laws. 
154  ‘Voor tonnen antiek terug naar Frankrijk – Verdachte handelaar uitgeleverd door justitie 
Roermond’ Opportuun, no. 3, November 1999. 
155  ‘Un néerlandais condamné à cinq ans de prison pour vols d’objets d’art’ Agence France 
Presse, March 31st 2005. 
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 Beside the case of Simon V., there are other cases in which stolen art has 
found its way rather easily to the middle and high end of the market, in 
Amsterdam and the Hague. According to Roux and Paringaux, three dealers 
from The Hague and Amsterdam were visited by the French and Dutch police in 
June 1996. One of them was a dealer in the art district around the Rijksmuseum. 
The police found thirty-four stolen objects in his shop. They originated from 
fourteen burglaries in several chateaux and one museum and were valued at five 
million French francs (about 1.5 million euros) (Roux & Paringaux, 1999).156 
 Despite the scale of the Cornelius M. and Simon V. cases, a thorough study 
of the literature and media reports reveals that numerous similar examples can be 
found – as can be expected on the circumstances mentioned above (Leitch, 1969; 
MacLeave, 1981; Middlemas, 1975; Roux & Paringaux, 1999). According to an 
estimate of the French OCBC, about 200 cases like the Cornelius M. case, albeit 
usually a lot smaller in scale, have been registered since the police squad was 
established in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, some of the cases that were discussed 
in the section on the interface typology can also illustrate the same mechanism. 
Icons that are stolen and smuggled, or just smuggled, from countries like Russia 
and the Baltic states, are one example. Dealers who manage to ship these icons 
abroad and sell them there, have effectively laundered them thanks to all factors 
described before, like differences in legislation, failing or non-existent systems of 
registration etc. 
 An example of such a dealer is the Russian national Sergej W.157 His activities 
in the art trade came to an end in 1998. In that year he was caught at Schiphol 
airport in the Netherlands. He had come from St. Petersburg in Russia with a 
suitcase full of precious objects. When customs opened his suitcase they found, 
amongst other items, two volumes of a unique atlas dated 1710. Furthermore, 
they discovered 185 engravings, almost the whole graphic oeuvre of Jacques 
Calot, a famous seventeenth century French artist (Leerintveld, 2000; Ministry of 
Finance, 2000). 
 It soon turned out that a number of objects were stolen. Instead of an 
innocent collector, Sergej W. had been a dealer for a long period of time. He 
was stopped at customs in Amsterdam four times before during the 1990s, always 
with precious art and antiquities. He usually stayed in Holland for extended 
periods. A major part of his business was probably done in Holland due to these 
and other circumstances. Large cash deposits were found in a number of bank 
faults at several locations in Amsterdam. In his belongings, a large number of 
business cards were found which formed an interesting sample from the art trade. 
As far as could be established, Sergej W. conducted business with at least a 
number of (legal) art dealers and an auction house in the Netherlands. At the 
same time, he was supplied with merchandise in Russia. Although this might 
                                                 
156  D. Mulkens (1998) ‘Rijswijks trio handelde in gestolen kunst’ Haagsche Courant, January 
13th. 
157  The name of the person meant here is altered. 
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have been partly legal merchandise, it was not allowed to leave Russia without 
permits. Furthermore, his involvement in the trade in stolen art in Russia was 
also proven when the police searched one of his apartments in Russia. They 
found 300 stolen icons stashed away. As far as could be established, Sergej W. 
was given a prison sentence of 9 years for this in Russia. 
 Besides the individual interfaces between Sergej W. and numerous actors in 
the art trade, he partly functioned as a lock. He combined his opportunities as 
individual with that of the different jurisdictions. As individual he smuggled the 
objects from Russia to the Netherlands and was able to funnel the illicit art into 
the legitimate market through his wide range of productive contacts in the art 
trade. The differences between the Netherlands and Russia further enabled the 
successful traffic: the absence of specific legislation in the Netherlands, as well as 
the lack of effective international registries of stolen and smuggled art, combined 
with the lack of efficiency in communications between law enforcement agencies 
across international borders. 
 The above cases can be partly understood as a result of several factors in the 
art trade (as probably in many trades). A strong eagerness to ensure interesting 
and profitable merchandise, as well as a certain contempt for the regulations 
protecting cultural heritage, provides a climate in which all kinds of illegal 
transactions can take place (Rijn, 1993; Hoving, 1994, 1996; Lacey, 1998; 
Mason, 2004). 
 The importance of this mechanism of laundering can hardly be overestimated. 
In practice, the opportunities of individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions are 
combined to accomplish this laundering. Through this mechanism, a profitable 
trade exists for thieves, fences and the dealers they work with. The reason for this 
is that most customers do not want to buy objects which obviously have been 
stolen. This indicates a difference with the trade in antiquities that will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 The files and other sources that were studied in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere, in combination with literature and media reports, showed how works 
of art were laundered through several jurisdictions, organizations, and individuals. 
The lock model can help to explain this laundering, although in practice the 
different variations of the model are often combined. The French data, in 
combination with the literature on art thefts in France, illustrated the inner 
workings of the Le Grand bal des receleurs. The trade between France, Belgium 
and the Netherlands is probably one of the most enduring internationally, but 
also least known in the Netherlands, except for those who are familiar with the 
trade in art and antiquities in the (relatively remote) province of Limburg in the 
South of the Netherlands. 
 Through time, these laundering processes can change due to changes in 
legislation, the activities of law enforcement agencies, the development of the 






This chapter started with a number of research questions. First of all, the question 
as to what degree interfaces between legal and illegal actors in the illegal art trade 
can be empirically described with the typology. To answer this question, each 
interface from the typology was analyzed in the first section. The analyses showed 
that seven of the ten interfaces could be used to describe the relationships 
between actors in the illicit art trade. These seven consisted of two antithetical 
interfaces and five symbiotic interfaces. The antithetical interfaces are the 
injurious and antagonistic interfaces; the symbiotic interfaces are the outsourcing, 
reciprocity, collaboration, co-optation and synergy interface. Three interfaces are 
not found as far as this study of the illicit art trade is concerned: the predatory, 
parasitical, and funding interface. 
 On an abstract level, antagonistic or synergic interfaces develop as result of the 
combined efforts of all actors in both licit and illicit trade around the world. 
Within this global system, wars and other conflicts are integrated and are 
responsible for part of the supply of certain types of objects. This shows a clear 
parallel with other transnational trades that were discussed in previous chapters. 
In the next chapter this will be further analyzed as far as antiquities are concerned 
 Although the typology could thus be used to understand the illicit art trade, 
there are some significant limitations. First of all, the symbiotic interfaces do not 
much help to clarify the relationships between the actors involved in the illicit 
trade. The differences between the different interfaces are very small as far as the 
illicit art trade is concerned. Therefore, the typology does add less to the 
understanding of the illicit trade as it does in other fields of crime. 
 The second question was whether there are interfaces between legal and 
illegal that are not covered by the existing typology and how these should be 
labeled. It turned out that one important category of thefts, the so-called internal 
thefts, cannot be understood with the typology. The interface between the 
perpetrators of these thefts and their victims was labeled as ‘facilitating’. 
 The third question looked at the usefulness of the lock model for the illicit art 
trade. A number of case studies showed the usefulness of the lock model that was 
developed in chapter three and four, in combination with the interface typology. 
The lock model can help to explain how stolen and smuggled art is laundered 
through a combination of specific individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions. It 
is through this mechanism that the illicit trade can be profitable and remains 
active as part of the overall trade. Furthermore, the lock model provides a tool to 
appreciate the important role of individuals in the illicit art and antiquities trade. 











In the previous chapter the illicit art trade was discussed from a perspective of 
interfaces. In this chapter the focus will be on the illicit trade in antiquities. The 
difference between the art and antiquities trade was pointed out in chapter 7. As 
a basic rule, everything from excavations is called antiquities and everything else 
is called art. However, in case works of art are almost as anonymous as antiquities 
from excavations, they are often labeled as antiquities also. The trade of stolen 
Buddha statues from Nepal or Cambodia for example, is usually understood as 
part of the illicit antiquities trade (Fuchs, 1992; Lafont, 2004; Thosarat, 2001a).158 
 Besides the difference between illicit art and antiquities, there is a thin line 
between licit and illicit. Although this chapter is about illicit antiquities it should 
not be forgotten that this can hardly be seen as clear-cut concept for further 
study. Brodie and Doole, both members of the Illicit Antiquities Research Centre of 
Cambridge University wrote about this problem in their introduction to their 
collection of papers by experts on the illicit antiquities trade in a wide range of 
source countries: 
 
“We do not feel at the present time that from an international perspective it is 
useful, or indeed possible, to distinguish between a ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ trade in 
antiquities. Numerous case studies have shown that looted material is 
effectively ‘laundered’ as it passes through the trading network, so that what 
might be moved illegally out of one country will at a later date be offered for 
sale legally in a reputable outlet in another without that outlet knowing that 
the material was looted” (Brodie & Doole, 2001:2) 
 
The laundering that is mentioned by Brodie and Doole is a mechanism that has 
been discussed in previous chapters with respect to other trades. This chapter, 
among other things, will focus on this mechanism in the antiquities trade and try 
to clarify the role of interfaces and the lock model, as it was developed in chapter 
5. 
 The analysis in this chapter will be mainly based on our primary data. The 
different sources in the Netherlands, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and 
elsewhere, were outlined in chapter 6. As far as antiquities are concerned, the 
most important primary data were collected at the Inspectorate of Cultural 
                                                 
158  The categories used here are based on the literature on art crimes. They do not reflect 
insights from the field of archaeology or art history.  
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Heritage in the Netherlands and the Carabinieri in Italy. This does not mean that 
the data from other sources were not used. Sometimes different sources provide 
data on the same cases. Furthermore, the different sources of data shed light on 
different stages in the illicit trade. Whereas the literature focuses on the situation 
in source countries, the data from the Netherlands show the end of the trade 
network. As far as the literature is concerned it can observed that the body of 
literature on the illicit antiquities trade is significantly larger and more diverse that 
the literature on the illicit art trade (e.g. Atwood, 2004; Brodie & Renfrew, 
2001; Brodie & Watson, 2000; Fuchs, 1992; Lafont, 2004; Meyer, 1973; 
Nagashima, 2002; Rascher, 2000; Schick, 1998; Tubb, 1994; Watson, 1998a). 
 In the next section, the interface typology will be confronted with the data 
that were collected for this study. The aim is to find answers to three related 
questions. First of all, to what degree can the actual interfaces between legal and 
illegal actors in the illegal antiquities trade be described and understood with the 
typology that was developed in chapter 2. Secondly, are there legal and illegal 
interfaces that are not covered by the existing typology and how should these be 
labeled. Finally, a number of case studies will be used to analyze the usefulness of 
the lock model that was developed in chapter 5, in combination with the 
interface typology. 
 When the text mentions a ‘case’, this means a solved art theft, smuggling 
operation, or illicit excavation.159 These can either come from the data that were 
gathered for this study, or from media reports, literature, or other sources. 
 
9.2 The interface typology 
 
In the sections below, the occurrence of legal–illegal interfaces in the illicit 
antiquities trade will be discussed. The antithetical interfaces will be discussed 
first, starting with the interfaces found most often. Thereafter the symbiotic 
interfaces will be discussed, again starting with the interfaces that are most often 
found. 
 There is one specific characteristic of the illicit antiquities trade that needs to 
be mentioned before all the interfaces are discussed. As the illicit antiquities trade 
is embedded within the licit antiquities trade, it will not automatically be evident 
where legal ‘meets’ illegal. Legal actors who buy stolen or smuggled items are 
often not ‘end-user’ of these goods but parts of a network that connects a range 
of actors. The flow of antiquities will often be legalized somewhere along the 
way. Where exactly, will depend on the jurisdictions involved, the status of the 
actors involved and possibly other factors. In the analysis here, the focus will be 
on the whole trajectory of stolen and smuggled items. Therefore, the network 
                                                 
159  That means that it has become clear who was involved in such cases, where the art or 
antiquities went to etc.  
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through which certain items will go from source to destination will be looked at 
independently of the exact legal status of these items at a specific point.160 
 




It can be argued that the illicit art and antiquities trade involves an injurious 
interface almost by definition. The injurious interface involves situations where 
actors undermine, attack, or harm each other in other ways than covered by the 
predatory, parasitical, or antagonistic interface. It depends on the situation who 
can be called the injured actor. This can for example be a state as self-declared 
owner of unexcavated antiquities or an honest dealer who is hurt by a colleague 
who sells looted or forged antiquities. In fact, most of the illicit art and antiquities 
trade starts with a theft or illicit excavation, involving an injurious interface. 
Furthermore, the previous chapter showed that art thefts regularly involve direct 
physical attacks on the owners of the objects involved (Koldehoff & Koldehoff, 
2004; MacLeave, 1981; Middlemas, 1975).161 The same holds true for illicit 
excavations. Several authors have pointed at the violence that sometimes 
accompanies the illicit excavations in countries like Peru, China, Cambodia, Iraq, 
and Tibet (Atwood, 2004; Brodie, 1999; Nagashima, 2002; Shuzhong, 2001). An 
example of an extremely violent incident was given by Thosorat in an account of 
the destruction of cultural heritage in Thailand and Cambodia. In 1993, a group 
of 300 bandits surrounded the Angkor Conservation compound, which housed 
statues for safekeeping. Hand grenades were used to blow apart the door, and the 
entrance to the main warehouse was destroyed by a rocket launcher. Ten items 
were stolen, never to be recovered (Thosorat, 2001a:13). As far as Tibet is 
concerned, Brodie pointed at “armed gangs (are) still attacking and despoiling 
monasteries” (1999a:1). Furthermore, Brodie summarized the findings of Haskett 
who described how “armed gangs have killed monks in their violent attempts to 
remove statues from monasteries” (Brodie, 1999b:1). 
 Before all thefts are simply called injurious, some important exceptions need 
to be made here. The previous chapter showed that many art thefts are so-called 
internal thefts. As far as antiquities are concerned, the same can be observed in 
several source countries (Atwood, 2004; Hadjisavvas, 2001; Nagashima, 2002; 
Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2003). The facilitating interface that was developed in the 
previous chapter will be used here to label illicit excavations and thefts by persons 
with legitimate access to archeological sites. 
                                                 
160  This follows from the definition of transnational crime that was chosen and explained in 
chapter two. Because of this definition the interface between legal and illegal in the 
antiquities trade, as well as other trades, can be better explained. 
161  ‘Four thefts in 20 years: the saga of the Beit collection’ IFAR Journal, Vol. 5, no. 3, 2004; 
Denis Meynard (2002) ‘Le cerveau du gang des chateaux écroué’ Le Parisien, January 7th. 
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 Another situation which turns out to be rather complicated on reflection is 
the illicit excavation. First of all, the ‘regular’ illicit excavation can cause some 
theoretical problems. If someone digs up objects illegally, the injured actor will 
often be the state. The basis for this is the fact that many states have legislation 
which claims ownership of all unexcavated antiquities in their soil.162 However, 
in other states it will often be disputed whether the mere declaration in a national 
law is sufficient to establish the state’s ownership, and thereby its status as injured 
actor in case of an illicit excavation. In the Schultz case in 2002, the legal 
principle of state ownership of antiquities was extensively discussed in a US court 
(Gerstenblith, 2002; O’Keefe, 2004; TRACE, 2003).163 Schultz was an art dealer 
who had imported stolen antiquities from Egypt, a state which claims ownership 
of all antiquities found in its soil (TRACE, 2003). Although he was convicted of 
handling stolen goods, the litigation showed that general declarations about 
antiquities are all but automatically accepted. One of the criteria used was the 
question whether governments enforce their own laws consistently. Several 
source countries, such as China, Thailand, or Nigeria, will have difficulties to 
show such consistency in their enforcement (Nagashima, 2002; Soudijn & 
Tijhuis, 2003a, 2003b).164 
 The official files that were studied in the Netherlands provide a good 
impression of the injurious interface. Out of a total of 140 cases, 104 involved 
shipments of objects that were supposedly antiquities when they crossed the 
border. These 104 shipments turned out to include 4 fakes and 33 that were not 
definitely identified. Furthermore, 40 shipments involved objects that were either 
‘airport art’ or cultural goods that did not require permits.165 The remaining 31 
cases involved imports of antiquities that were suspected to be stolen or received 
and lacked permits from their country of origin in case they should, or probably 
should have one according to the law of that country.166 In these cases, an 
injurious interface exists between the person or organization responsible for 
smuggle or theft of the objects involved and the government of the source 
country. That government has adopted legislation that aims to protect the 
                                                 
162  In some states, antiquities in general are claimed as state property, as far as they have not 
been claimed as private property before the legislation went into effect. In other states, 
antiquities can be owned privately but always have to be registered with the authorities. 
163  For earlier case law on this topic see: Messenger (2003). 
164  M. Bailey (2000) ‘Don’t return artefacts to Nigeria’ The Art Newspaper, October. 
165  ‘Airport art’ is a category of objects that is specifically made for the tourist market and 
consists of low quality fakes of indigenous art. Sometimes, objects are made that do not 
even resemble the ones known for the region but something from another region or 
country (Fuchs, 1992). See also: Institut für Auslandbeziehungen (1987). 
166  To decide whether an object should have a permit will often be rather complicated. It 
usually demands an expert opinion of the nature of the objects involved and knowledge of 
the most recent legislation in force in the source country and the exact moment when the 
object left the country of origin. 
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cultural heritage of their country and prevent the unlawful export of objects.167 
Most cases concerned shipments from Cambodia, Thailand, China/Hong Kong, 
and Ghana. As was pointed out in chapter 6, the lack of export permits is 
irrelevant under Dutch law, as none of the international treaties have been 
ratified and implemented in the Netherlands.168 Therefore, cross-border 
transactions with antiquities that fall within the definition of transnational crime 
used here will not constitute a crime in the Netherlands. 
 The 31 cases mentioned above were investigated by customs officials because 
of either the suspicion of theft or receiving, or because of suspicion of tax 
evasion. Theft or receiving could rarely be proven. Antiquities are usually not 
registered in their country of origin and will by definition remain unregistered in 
case they come from illicit excavations. One studied case, in which the theft of 
objects was more or less clear, but not legally proven, concerned a shipment of 
objects from Cambodia and Thailand that was intercepted by Dutch customs in 
1995. The objects came from Angkor Wat and Banteay Chhmar in Cambodia 
and Ayutthaya in Thailand. Both Thailand and Cambodia asked for the return of 
the objects but the Dutch authorities did not find a legal basis for the restitution 
of the objects, as the legal evidence for theft of the objects was lacking. The 
objects were kept for some time, but as evidence for theft or receiving was not 
forthcoming, they had to be returned to the Dutch owner at some stage. The 
Thai authorities therefore raised the alarm bell through their Embassy and the 
Cambodians asked for help from UNESCO in Paris. In the Netherlands, 
questions were asked about this affair to the Secretary of Justice.169 In the end, 
the dealer who had imported the items decided to voluntarily renounce them. 
 The files of the Dutch Inspectorate contain more examples of cases in which 
the owner of smuggled antiquities decided to give them back. In 2003, two 
seventeenth century Hindu statues were intercepted from a shipment that 
originated from Indonesia. Several Indonesian officials came to the Netherlands 
to study the objects and concluded that they were both authentic and illegally 
                                                 
167  This is not to imply that all source countries are actively enforcing the legislation in place. 
Some countries seem to be rather ineffective or ambiguous in their policies, like for 
example China and Thailand (Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2003; Nagashima, 2002). Other countries 
seem to use the available ways to counter the illicit trade, despite the limited means at their 
disposal, like for example Belize, Peru, and Mali (Atwood, 2004; Gilgan, 2001; Van 
Beurden, 2001).  
168  These treaties are the The Hague Convention (1954), the UNESCO Convention (1970) 
and the Unidroit Convention (1995). In 2005, proposals for legislation to implement the 
UNESCO Convention as well as the The Hague Convention were sent to parliament. 
However, at the time of writing (September 2005) these proposals have not yet been 
accepted and will probably not lead to legislation until at least 2006. See further: 
www.tweedekamer.nl. 
169  The written questions in Parliament were raised by MP J.M. Verspaget (Labor Party) on 
October 20th 1995. The Minister of Justice at the time, W. Sorgdrager, replied on 




exported. As in the case of the Cambodian and Thai objects, the owner finally 
decided to abandon the objects. 
 Examples like those mentioned above are often used as proof of the clear-cut 
distinction between market and source countries. Market countries are 
considered to be almost automatically reluctant to act against the theft and 
smuggle of antiquities. Within that context it is interesting to look at Thailand’s 
policy in the past towards restitution of stolen and smuggled antiquities from 
Cambodia or Burma. As Nagashima (2002) pointed out in his book on artifact 
smuggling in Thailand and Cambodia, the Thai government used to demand 
written proof of the origin of stolen objects. As Burma and Cambodia could not 
deliver such proof, in most cases the demanded objects remained in Thailand. In 
recent years, the Thai have become more willing to return objects and 
collaborate with Cambodia to counter illicit trade (Nagashima, 2002:164-173). 
Another example of a country that finds itself on more than one side, as far as the 
illicit antiquities trade is concerned, is Turkey. Whereas experts are describing the 
problem of illicit excavations in Turkey and the smuggling of items abroad, the 
Turkish military has done incredible harm to the cultural heritage of Cyprus 
(Özgen, 2001; Hadjisavvas, 2001). The same can be said of China, which has 
been directly or indirectly responsible for injuring Tibet’s cultural heritage in a 
significant way.170 At the same time the Chinese government claims back objects 
from numerous countries that have allegedly been looted in China and smuggled 
abroad (Brodie, 1999a; Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2003a). 
 Whereas the analysis of cases in the Netherlands showed primarily the market 
end of the illicit trade, the study of the Italian situation shed light on the other 
end of the trade. Italy is a source country of illicit art and antiquities in the first 
place.171 Antiquities are looted from innumerable illicit excavations throughout 
Italy.172 These excavations constitute the interface with which the illicit trade 
often begins. On the one hand are the gangs of looters and on the other hand the 
state that claims ownership of the antiquities in its soil. Recently, one of the 
                                                 
170  F. Bai (2005) ‘The plunder of Tibet’s treasures’ Radio Free Asia, August 1st. 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/arts/2005/08/01/tibet_artifacts (Visited, September 4th, 
2005). 
171  Nevertheless, Italy is also known for its reluctance to return a famous obelisk that was 
looted in 1937 from Ethiopia and placed at a square in Rome in front of what was once 
the ‘Ministry for Italian Africa’ (now the FAO building). Although Italy promised in 
writing to return the obelisk with the peace treaty of 1947, it did not start to return the 
obelisk until recently. After years of pressure from the Ethiopians, the final part of the 
obelisk left Rome for Ethiopia in April 2005. See: ‘The Axum Obelisk’ 
www.ethioembassy.org.uk/news/news.htm. 
172  Statistics from the Italian Carabinieri itself illustrate the scale of the illicit trade in art and 
antiquities as far as it is registered by the authorities. Between 1970 and 2003, they 
registered 99.200 incidents of looting or theft. These incidents are registered in their 
database that counted 2.319.862 objects in the given period. This includes objects from 
abroad although they are only a minor part of the total number. In the same period, the 
Carabinieri recovered 223.903 works of art and 510.737 antiquities.  
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largest cases of looting and subsequent export of antiquities led to the 
imprisonment of the antiquities dealer Giacomo Medici.173 This case will be 
further discussed in the section on the lock model. 
 
Antagonistic interfaces and synergy 
 
Antagonistic relationships exist when there is competition between legal and 
illegal actors. Actors may be vying for market share acting independently or in 
direct competition with each other. 
 In case of (systemic) synergy, actors benefit each other while they go about 
their business, independently promoting their interests and objectives. 
 The antagonistic and synergy interface are taken together here. While 
discussing the legitimate organizations as interface (in chapter 3) it was shown 
that these two interfaces can in fact be very closely linked. Depending on the 
frequency of certain illegal activities, relationships between actors can turn from 
synergic to antagonistic. Furthermore, the same activities can result in 
antagonistic relationships with one actor, while being synergic with another actor 
or entity. In the previous chapter and in this chapter, the two interfaces are 
discussed together because the same mechanisms can be found in both the art and 
the antiquities trade. 
 Although the antagonistic and synergy interface are thus treated together here, 
it should be pointed out that they remain analytically distinct interfaces. 
Furthermore, the connection between the two does only count for particular 
crimes. That is, for crimes where both actors are involved in the same kind of 
activity (whether it is legal or illegal). However, the synergy interface is also used 
to understand relationships between actors that are active in completely different 
branches (see also chapter 2). 
 Due to protective legislation in almost all source countries, dealers and other 
participants in the art trade from those countries are restricted in their 
opportunities to acquire or sell items from these countries. Therefore, some 
dealers will not buy particular items from particular countries anymore. At the 
same time, other dealers will continue buying items and look for creative ways to 
smuggle them out of the countries of origin. As was pointed out in the previous 
chapter, the actual part of the dealers who continue buying, or on the contrary 
end their acquisitions in accordance with the mentioned legislation, will not be 
discussed here. This is an empirical question which cannot be answered by the 
available data, and seems to differ substantially for different types of items, source 
countries, and destination countries. The issue here is a distinction between two 
types of dealers that compete with each other. The first type acquires objects 
directly and illegally from the source country, while the other type is dependent 
                                                 
173  Medici was convicted in December 2004; see also Watson (1998); ‘The great smash and 




on items which have been on the market for some time or which can be legally 
obtained in source countries. It depends on the actual market situation whether 
those dealers actually benefit from each others’ activities (synergy) or are hurt by 
them (antagonistic). 
 In practice, the above distinction can be hard to find in the empirical reality. 
Many dealers will not fit into one of the two categories. Furthermore, in many 
cases it will be hard to determine whether theft, smuggle or looting of objects 
should be understood as antagonistic or synergic or both. The study of official 
files in the Netherlands showed numerous examples of art and antiquities that 
were taken out of their countries of origin illegally, that is without the required 
permits. Depending on the type of objects and their market situation, this will 
almost by definition imply an antagonistic or synergy interface, depending on the 
beneficial or detrimental effects for the actors involved. 
 Especially Asia is important as region of origin, as far as the Netherlands is 
concerned. The Netherlands has been one of the centers for trade in Asian art 
and antiquities since the seventeenth century and it seems that the licit trade is 
reflected with an illicit image.174 About half of the files that were studied at the 
Inspectorate of Cultural Heritage, concerned shipments from Asian countries. 
Most important are China (including Hong Kong), Thailand, and Indonesia. 
Although the importance of Indonesia can be partly connected with historical ties 
between the Netherlands and its former colony, the importance of Thailand and 
China reflects their role as source and transit countries of (licit and illicit) 
antiquities. In addition to these countries, shipments were registered to come 
from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Burma. 
 The cases in the Netherlands also reflected the licit art trade in at least one 
other way. Hardly any shipments of antiquities were observed from South 
America. Whereas this continent is rather important internationally, it is hardly 
represented in the licit trade in the Netherlands. 
 Despite the parallels between the licit and illicit trade, one needs to be 
cautious to draw general conclusions. As the Dutch authorities cannot and do not 
search for illicit art and antiquities in a systematic way, the number of cases is 
relatively small and it is uncertain to what degree the registered illicit trade 
reflects the actual trade. On the other hand, some tentative conclusions seem to 
be justified. First of all, considering the small chance of interception of shipments, 
                                                 
174  The fashion for collecting Chinese blue and white porcelain, for example, was started in 
the Holland in the seventeenth century by Amalia van Solms the wife of the ‘Stadhouder’ 
(~governor) Frederik Hendrik who amassed a huge collection. The Dutch East India 
Company was for a long period the exclusive trader in Japanese art through its trading post 
on Deshima and it is therefore not surprising that the first public museum in Asiatic, i.e. 
Japanese art was started in the Netherlands with the collection of two officials from that 
company, Cock Blomhoff and Von Siebold (Rappard-Boon, 1991). Furthermore, at the 
yearly European Fine Art Fair (TEFAF) in Maastricht, Dutch dealers in Asian art and 
antiquities still make up a significant part of the international assembly of dealers in this 
category of objects. 
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the number of cases discussed here is probably a rather small part of the actual 
number. Secondly, due to the durable nature of antiquities, the objects that are 
smuggled to market countries are there to stay. This implies that even if the new 
objects on the market do only account a small percentage of the overall market, 
they will in one or two decades amount to a large minority or even majority of 
the objects involved. Finally, despite the relatively small number of cases there 
were some shipments involving relatively important objects. In combination with 
the previous points this will probably mean that a substantial number of 
important objects with an illicit origin circulate on the market. 
 In some cases, the licit and illicit trade can hardly be separated and the licit 
trade is obviously largely based on the merchandise provided by the illicit trade at 
some point. Peru is the primary example here, since the looting of antiquities 
accelerated after the discovery in 1987 of a mausoleum where, over two 
centuries, a dynasty of Moche rulers and their wives and attendants were buried. 
This so-called Sipàn treasure has been widely studied and discussed in the 
literature (Atwood, 2004; Alva, 2001; Kirkpatrick, 1992; Watson, 1999). In his 
study of the looting and smuggle of Peruvian artifacts, Atwood pointed out how 
looters directly respond to trends in the market. The looters that he interviewed 
were familiar with the latest taste of customers in the United States, about which 
Atwood was informed by dealers inside that market country (Atwood, 2004:13). 
 The supply of stolen and smuggled objects on the market clearly affects the 
dealers involved. However, determining whether the licit and illicit trade actually 
benefit or hurt each other is rather difficult. One reason for this is the fact that 
licit and illicit are often difficult or even impossible to separate, although most 
countries are less notorious than Peru. The interconnected nature of licit and 
illicit is proven in many cases of stolen antiquities that turned up in museums, 
auction-houses or with established dealers. Recently, the trial against Giacomo 
Medici showed how many museums had bought looted antiquities from Medici 
or one of his frontmen.175 In another case, the Miho Museum in Japan bought a 
rare bodhisattva statue from a well-known dealer in London in 1995. It turned 
out later that the statue had been stolen from a museum in Shandong province in 
China in July 1994 (Doole, 2001; Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2003b). Although the 
statue was eventually voluntarily returned to China, this case illustrated that 
looted objects do indeed end up with established dealers and museums, and at the 
same time it illustrated how fast this can happen. Many similar cases can be found 
involving objects from China, India, Peru, and other countries (Atwood, 2004; 
Brodie & Renfrew, 2001; Palmer et al., 2000; Shankar, 2001; Soudijn & Tijhuis, 
2003a, Watson, 1998a). 
                                                 
175  ‘Italy art trafficker duped US museums police say’ Iranian Cultural Heritage News Agency, 
January 15th, 2005, http://www.chn.ir/english/eshownews.asp?no=4568; ‘The great 




 Furthermore, even where licit and illicit trade can be more or less separated 
they often indirectly need each other. The illicit trade needs the official market 
because this market in general creates the highest prices and most buyers for 
objects. The licit trade needs the illicit trade because it guarantees new input into 
an otherwise marginalized market. An example of a part of the trade that is 
influenced by the theft and smuggle of objects is the trade in Nok statues from 
Nigeria. Nok statues used to be rather exclusive and relatively scarce items with 
high prices.176 However, at some point smuggling as well as fake Nok statues 
reached a critical level. Since then, prices have dropped substantially. It remains 
to be seen whether the lobby against the trade in these statues, including its 
placement on the Red List of the International Council of Museums (ICOM), 
will reverse this trend.177 
 Intimately linked with the trade in stolen or smuggled antiquities is the trade 
in forged and fake antiquities. The study of files from the Inspectorate of Cultural 
Heritage in the Netherlands showed that several cases involved only fakes while 
many cases involved fakes besides authentic pieces.178 The fake objects included 
for example Buddha statues, canons from the Dutch East India Company (VOC), 
and fake African antiquities. In Italy, according to the Carabinieri, there have 
been cases in which looters first emptied tombs at a site and thereafter filled it 
with fakes. They then defrauded collectors by letting them believe they had 
found the location of an ancient tomb. In exchange for a substantial sum of 
money, the collectors were given the opportunity to join the looter into the 
ancient tomb and take part of the booty. 
 In fact, what is understood as the trade in stolen and smuggled antiquities is 
for a significant part a trade in fakes and forgeries.179 Some source countries, like 
China or Thailand are notorious for their production of fakes and forgeries 
(Nagashima, 2002; Soudijn & Tijhuis, 2003a). However, to some degree all 
source countries are affected by this problem (Brent, 2001; Brodie & Renfrew, 
2001; Hoving, 1996). It should be added here, however, that the ‘problem’ of 
fakes and forgeries is sometimes interpreted positively. Several Asian experts 
explained in interviews that the trade in fakes and forgeries indirectly helped to 
limit the looting of authentic pieces.180 Dealers could sell the fakes and forgeries 
to foreigners without the risk of buying and smuggling looted objects. 
                                                 
176  Vincent Noce (2001) ‘Le pillage des statues nok continue – Plusieurs objects exportés 
illégalement d’Afrique ont été saisis en France’ Liberation, April 13th. 
177  The ICOM Red List for Africa can be found at: http://icom.museum/redlist/afrique/ 
english/intro.html (Visited December 12th 2004). 
178  This concerned only ‘convincing’ fakes and forgeries that could only be distinguished from 
authentic objects by experts. The other objects were placed in the category of ‘airport art’ 
and other objects that do not need export permits. 
179  It depends on the legislation of the countries involved whether the production of and trade 
in fakes and forgeries will constitute a crime and what kind of crime. 
180  The were interviewed at the ‘Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property’ seminar held in Bangkok 
from the 24th till the 26th of March 2004. The seminar was organized by the Institute of 
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 In terms of interfaces, an antagonistic or synergy interface can be found 
between the dealers in fakes and dealers in authentic objects. Whether the 
interface can best be understood as antagonistic or synergy depends on the 
relative ‘success’ of the producers of fakes and forgeries. This will differ between 




In the previous chapter a new interface was added to the typology, based on the 
importance and characteristics of so-called internal thefts. The facilitating 
interface covers the situation in which public institutions, private collectors, or 
governments facilitate the theft or looting by persons under their supervision. 
These persons are mostly provided with (1) legal access to collections or sites, (2) 
maximum information about the objects involved, their value and the way they 
are secured, (3) an employer or government that abstains from serious control 
over them. 
 This interface is also found in the illicit antiquities trade. Examples can be 
derived from the literature. As most of the official files from the Netherlands did 
not contain detailed information about the exact provenance of antiquities, they 
did not add any information as far as this interface is concerned. 
 In some African countries, staff members are allegedly connected to serious 
thefts of antiquities from their own collections (Van Beurden, 2001). In China, 
museum directors have been reported selling part of their collection openly.181 In 
Cambodia, the military has been involved in several ways in the looting and 
smuggling of items from Angkor Wat and other famous sites (Nagashima, 2002; 
Thosarat, 2001a, 2001b). In late 1998, units of the Cambodian army put on 
maneuvers in the area of Banteay Chhmar to frighten off the villagers, and then 
moved in with heavy equipment and gutted the site of all its remaining cultural 
treasures for sale through neighboring Thailand (Thosarat, 2001a:11). In early 
January 1999, a driver was arrested with a lorry loaded with 117 pieces of 
sculpture from Banteay Chhmar. The Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok reported 
that Cambodian soldiers delivered the reliefs in six pick-up trucks (Thosarat, 
2001a:11). In its most extreme form, officials play a leading role in looting or 
smuggling operations. In that case, the perpetrator and its victim are representing 
one and the same entity: the national state. However, the national state in general 
is considered here to facilitate the crimes of individual actors working under the 
authority of this state. This actor can be an individual, like an individual thief, or 
                                                 
Asian Studies in Bangkok (Thailand), the International Institute for Asian Studies in Leiden 
(The Netherlands) and the Research School of Pacific and Asean Studies in Canberra 
(Australia).  
181  Cultural Heritage Watch (2000) ‘Is it a museum? Or illicit cultural property shelter? 
There´s no national standard in China’ CHW report, March 17th. 
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an organization, like an intelligence agency or military unit involved in looting 
or smuggling activities. 
 The case of Egypt illustrates that the incidents above have precedents from 
long before the last two or three decades of looting and illicit trade. Under 
Rameses IX around 1111BC and then under Rameses XI some 25 years later, 
major investigations were executed into the problem of tomb looting. The 
investigations showed that systematic looting of the royal burial places was carried 
out by workmen who had helped prepare the tombs and the burial. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that tomb thefts took place with the 
connivance of some officials. 
 Incidents of looting and smuggling that involve a facilitating interface will 
sometimes coincide with situations of war or civil war. Section 9.3 will discuss 
this topic and its relevance from a perspective of interfaces. 
 
Predatory and parasitical interface 
 
When one actor aims to destroy or bleed to death an organization or to control 
of fraudulently bankrupt a business, the relationship between the two can be 
characterized as predatory. The discussion of the predatory interface within the 
illicit art trade showed that for several reasons this interface is rarely found there. 
Although the interface aims at organizations one can extend its reach to the 
actual objects themselves. That is, the destruction of art and antiquities. 
However, this variation is unlikely to occur very often. First of all, destruction is 
usually a by-product of illicit trade and not a goal in itself. Secondly, in case of 
intended or unintended destruction, this will most often not lead to the death of 
an organization or the bankruptcy of a business. These reasons do also hold for 
the illicit antiquities trade. However, the number of cases that share some, 
although not all, elements of the predatory interface differs significantly in scale 
and these cases are often an inherent part of the illicit trade. 
 Several wars between countries were accompanied by intentional destruction 
of the enemies’ cultural heritage (Atwood, 2004; Chamberlin, 1983; Conklin, 
1994).182 Besides the intentional destruction of cultural heritage, the ‘regular’ 
illicit excavations cause a tremendous loss of antiquities. One reason for this loss 
                                                 
182  Furthermore, many civil wars and authoritarian regimes engaged in the destruction of their 
cultural heritage. However, these cases are usually lacking the transnational element. A 
recent example is the destruction of two ancient Buddha statues in the Bamiyan province 
in Afghanistan in March 2001. See: ‘Reporters see wrecked Buddha’s’ BBC News, March 
26th 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1242856.stm. Another example 
is the destruction caused by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, although most damage in 
Cambodia was allegedly done after the peace agreement in 1991 (Atwood, 2004; Lafont, 
2004; Nagashima, 2002); and the destruction of China’s cultural heritage during the 
Cultural Revolution. See: Bezlova, A. (2005) ‘China: A case of a pot calling the kettle 
black to halt artefact loss’, May 4th http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/print.asp? 
idnews=28552. 
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is the rude way in which many looters operate. Another reason is the fact they 
are often only interested in part of the inventory of ancient tombs and 
archaeological sites. Several studies have shown how often a multiple of the 
antiquities that are looted are destroyed in the process. This is especially so in 
countries like for example Peru, Italy, and China where antiquities are looted 
from ancient tombs (Alva, 2001; Atwood, 2004; Pastore, 2001; Shuzong, 2001). 
 As only the objects for sale are shipped abroad, the objects that were 
intercepted in the Netherlands do not show much of the destruction that 
accompanies the illicit trade. However, in several cases – for example the Buddha 
statues – recent signs of breaking and cutting were visible. Although no legal 
proof, this is a well-known indication of theft.  
When the aim is to preserve the viability of the legal actor, so that illegal 
benefits can be extorted on a more or less regular basis, the interface is called 
parasitical. In the previous chapter it was argued that the parasitical interface as 
such does not or only rarely occur in the illicit art trade. However, two types of 
art crimes shared elements of this interface: the internal theft and the theft for 
ransom. The internal theft was discussed above with the facilitating interface. The 
theft for ransom does not appear to be part of the illicit antiquities trade. 
Although there is no reason why illicit antiquities could not be used to extort 
money from persons or governments, it is not likely to find such extortion. The 
main reason is the inherent obscurity of illicitly excavated and smuggled 
antiquities. 
 




Reciprocity aims at a relationship that falls between synergy (where one of the 
two parties is unaware of the illegal nature of their transaction) and outsourcing 
or collaboration (where both parties are not only informed but also actively 
engaged in the criminal activities). Many auction houses or dealers who trade in 
antiquities from for example China, Cambodia, or Italy, will know or assume 
that the objects involved are often, or may often be, stolen, illicitly excavated, or 
smuggled.183 In that case, a relationship of reciprocity connects these participants 
in the antiquities trade. 
                                                 
183  For China see e.g. Bruce Doar (1999) ‘Off with their heads – the antiquities market is 
destroying China’s Buddhist statuary’ Archaeology, online features, www.archaeology.org; 
‘Japanese agree to return a stolen statue to China’ Museum Security Network Report, April 
18th 2001, www.museum-security.org; Dobrzynski, J. (1997) ‘Exodus of Chinese art from 
Hong Kong’ The New York Times, June 13th; for Cambodia see e.g. Crampton, T. (2003) 
´Cambodia´s crusaders of lost art´ International Herald Tribune, August 30th; Nagashima 
(2002); Thosarat (2001a); and for Italy: Ciotti (2003); Elia (2001); Watson (1998). 
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 It depends upon the circumstances of a particular case whether there is a 
relationship of reciprocity between the actors involved, or some other interface. 
As far as the antiquities trade is concerned, the same problem can be found as in 
the illicit art trade. Rather small differences in relationships between actors will 
make the difference whether one interface or another covers the relationship. 
 The files from the Inspectorate in the Netherlands showed some examples, or 
potential examples, of the reciprocity interface in the illicit antiquities trade. In 
some cases, dealers directly obtained items in source countries that were probably 
stolen and not allowed to leave these countries without export permits. In case of 
theft, the dealers and their suppliers are connected by reciprocity. However, in 
case the objects were not stolen but were bought from legitimate owners and 
subsequently taken out of the country without permits, it is only the dealer that 
commits a crime. Nevertheless, as soon as this dealer sells the items to customers 
or other dealers in the Netherlands, who know that the objects have been 
smuggled, a situation of reciprocity can be said to exist between the actors 
involved. However, one could argue that the dealer is a legitimate actor and not 
a criminal. Therefore, the reciprocity interface would not be suitable for this 
situation. This problem will come back in section 2 on the lock model in the 
illicit antiquities trade. 
 It is interesting to note that the different variations mentioned above are 
unevenly distributed across geographical regions. The data from the Dutch 
Inspectorate showed that imports from Asia do often come from regional trade 
centers like Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Singapore. Objects are usually bought 
from established art dealers in those cases. That means that the importers did not 
directly buy from thieves or private persons. The same observation can be made 
from the literature on the illicit trade in this region (Lafont, 2004; Nagashima, 
2002). Files on imports from Africa showed that the origin of objects from this 
region is often less clear although this does not automatically mean that objects 
were bought from thieves or receivers.184 
 In Italy, the reciprocity interface can be used to label some of the relationships 
between local looters (the so-called tombaroli) and the middlemen in Italy or 
dealers in Switzerland who ultimately buy the looted objects. Based on the 
interviews with Italian officials, as well as the literature on this country, it can be 
concluded that this interface is actually very common in this specific setting. 
 Besides the relationships between dealers among each other and dealers and 
their customers, there are other relationships that can be understood with this 
interface. To enable the smuggling of antiquities, corrupt relationships are 
developed with customs and other officials. Atwood pointed at customs officials, 
                                                 
184  Some insight in the trade in Africa is given by Gado (2001); Schmidt & McIntosh (1996). 
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as well as airline personnel, in Peru that play their part in the smuggling of 
antiquities from that country to the US.185 
 In case the balance of power between the actors involved is clearly uneven, 
the co-optation interface is more suitable to cover the relationship. When one 
actor is offering specialized services to another actor, the outsourcing interface is 




Outsourcing refers to a division of labor between legal and illegal actors, where 
one party offers specialized services to the other. This can involve cases where 
the ‘dirty work’ is done by ‘criminals’, while the main benefit is reaped by a legal 
actor. However, the opposite is also possible. The relationship between a client 
and a provider can be a one-off or continuous. 
 The relationship between an art thief or looter of antiquities and a dealer or 
middleman can be a relationship of outsourcing. When a dealer or middleman 
actually orders a theft, one can label this situation as outsourcing. When the thief 
is offering his merchandise independently from the orders of the dealer, the 
relationship is one of reciprocity which was discussed above. Subtle changes in 
the relationship between dealer and thief can change the type of interface that 
covers the relationship. When a dealer works closely together with a thief or 
group of thieves and they are mutually dependent on each other for merchandise 
and profits, the relationship can best be understood as collaboration. This 
collaboration between a specific group of actors may in turn cause other 
interfaces with new actors. When other thieves hear about the collaboration, 
they may conclude that the dealer involved can be an interesting figure to offer 
part of their own merchandise. As a result, a relationship of reciprocity can 
develop which might in turn change to collaboration. 
 The cases of the Dutch Inspectorate showed one specific type of outsourcing 
in addition to the above variation. In case of one source country, several 
shipments were outsourced to a particular shipping company. This company 
arranged double invoices with which it was able to obtain both an export permit 




Collaboration is only different from the reciprocity or outsourcing interface as far 
as the exact division of labor is concerned between thieves, smugglers, and 
dealers or middlemen. When the two actors are working closely together, and 
actually act as a group or organization and share profits, outsourcing or 
                                                 
185  In practice all kinds of routes via third countries are used to minimize the chances of 
getting caught by US customs. Similar to the routes used for trafficking drugs, these change 
all the time. 
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reciprocity turns into collaboration. It is therefore often difficult to say whether 
the collaboration interface is very common in the illicit art and antiquities trade. 
Only when detailed information about the precise relationship between dealers 
or middlemen and thieves is available, it is possible to say whether this 




For the same reason mentioned several times before, it is hard to point at 
occurrences of the co-optation interface in the illicit antiquities trade. It depends 
upon the precise relationships between the actors involved and small nuances can 
make the difference between one interface or another. The occurrence of the co-
optation interface is more or less the same for illicit antiquities as for illicit art. 
However, as co-optation is primarily a phenomenon found in poor sources 
countries, and as the trade from these countries consists primarily of antiquities 
instead of art, one is more likely to find instances of co-optation in the illicit 
antiquities trade.  
 In many cases, antiquities dealers or thieves are involved in corrupt 
relationships with customs officials, police officers, airline personnel, or others. 
However, in most cases one cannot conclude that these relationships are clearly 
characterized by an uneven balance of power. Usually, it seems to be relatively 
easy for smugglers and thieves to establish relationships with relevant authorities 
in source countries. Therefore, one is not dependent on particular persons or on 
the highest levels of government bureaucracies. Furthermore, the relatively 
extensive financial resources of dealers from market countries, buying in often 
poor source countries, puts them at a clear advantage towards the officials in 
source countries. This can even suggest that the balance of power is indeed 
uneven, with the foreign dealer in control. However, this will in some cases be 
prevented by the small but ever-present risk that some official will in fact take 
action against a smuggler annex dealer. Even the remotest chance of having to 
spend a couple of years behind bars in Thailand, China, or Nigeria will weaken 
his position. Furthermore, several widely publicized cases in the US have made 
clear that market countries can and will in some cases act against dealers in looted 
and smuggled merchandise, despite the fact that punishment in most cases 
remained rather mild (Atwood, 2004; TRACE, 2003). 
 For most dealers or smugglers in this illegal market, a situation of co-optation 
is unlikely to develop. However, in theory there are good reasons to believe 
there might be a number of high-end dealers who are in fact involved in a 
relationship which could be characterized as co-optation. One example, 
involving a dealer importing antiquities from Ghana is discussed by Fuchs (Fuchs, 
1992). Another example is a case from the Inspectorate which was discussed in 
detail in several articles by a Dutch journalist and even led to questions in 
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Parliament to the Secretary of Justice (Van Beurden, 1994, 1995, 2001).186 Both 
dealers discussed by Fuchs and Van Beurden, allegedly had close ties to an 
ambassador and a local king. These relationships enabled them to engage in 
export of items which were apparently beyond reach of other dealers without 
these connections. A number of other examples are given in the autobiography 
of Michel van Rijn and were discussed in section 8.2.8.  Especially in countries 
that are known to enforce their export laws seriously, relationships like the ones 
mentioned above, are likely to develop. However, in most source and market 
countries, the enforcement of export laws is rather lax. Therefore, it is unlikely 





Funding does not resemble typical interfacing relationships in the illicit antiquities 
trade. Art dealers, as a legitimate organization, may forward funds to smugglers or 
thieves in case they are otherwise unable to do their work. However, this will 
lean towards outsourcing or collaboration instead of funding. Atwood showed 
how one of the main figures in smuggle of objects from the famous Sipàn site in 
Peru was given money to fly to London to smuggle shipments of Sipàn objects 
out of the country. 
 Funding as relationship between antiquities dealers and terrorists has not been 
found in the empirical study in the Netherlands and elsewhere, nor in the 
literature. Nevertheless, similar to the illicit art trade, the relationship between 
the illicit trade and armed conflicts in numerous source countries should not be 
underestimated. This will be studied in the next section. 
 
9.3 State conflicts and crimes related to antiquities 
 
The previous chapters pointed out how war, civil war, and other violent 
phenomena in which states can be involved, are related to the theft and 
destruction of works of art and antiquities. Several ways in which art theft is 
related to these conflicts were outlined with examples in chapter 8. The 
relationship between the illicit antiquities trade and armed conflicts is very similar 
and the two variations mentioned in chapter 8 also do apply here. 
 First of all theft and destruction of antiquities caused by states engaged in war. 
An often mentioned example is the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the 
tremendous damage that was done afterwards (Hadjisavvas, 2001; Watson, 
1998b). As far as antiquities are assembled in museums, these are often the first to 
                                                 
186  The written questions in Parliament were raised by MP J.M. Verspaget (Labor Party) on 
July 11th 1995. The Minister of Justice, W. Sorgdrager, replied on August 26th, 1996. See: 
‘Aanhangsel Handelingen, no. 1627, vergaderjaar 1995-96’. 
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be looted, as was pointed out in the previous chapter.187 Secondly, the theft and 
smuggle of antiquities that is enabled by the chaos and disruption of order in 
societies, caused by wars or civil wars. The looting of archaeological sites in Iraq 
especially since 2003 is a recent and vivid example.188 The case of Afghanistan 
can be added here. 
 The cases of the Inspectorate involved several source countries involved in 
wars or civil wars. One shipment in 1997 consisted of a collection of more than 
forty important items from several countries, among them Angola and Congo. As 
the most relevant items originated from Congo, several attempts were made to 
reach the Congolese authorities. Due to the turbulent political situation at the 
time, they could not be reached. As a result, the Dutch law enforcement officials 
had no ground to take further legal action. Another shipment from Congo, 
destined for two other EU countries, was investigated in 2003. It consisted for a 
large part of antiquities made of ivory. Although some objects were characterized 
as important, not all objects were studied. However, shipments like these indicate 
at least how antiquities can be shipped from instable countries and regions 
without any problems. In addition to shipments from Congo, antiquities were 
registered from Afghanistan, although these turned out to be less important. 
 On an abstract level, one can point at the synergy between (civil) wars and 
the illicit antiquities trade. This was observed in the previous chapter with respect 
to works of art but holds especially true for the trade in illicitly excavated 
antiquities. Against this argument one could interpret (civil) wars as structural 
conditions that shape or influence illicit markets. However, this would imply that 
the relationship between these conditions and the illicit trade is determined solely 
by these conditions. However, the ways in which political actors can obtain 
funds through illicit trades, whether this involves diamonds, antiquities, oil or 
other commodities, also influences their decisions in the wars they are fighting. A 
country that can serve to illustrate this argument is Angola, where the abundant 
availability has for decades influenced and prolonged the civil war (Matloff, 1997; 
Wright, 1997). 
                                                 
187  Labi, I. & S. Robinson (2001) ‘Looting Africa: Theft, illicit sales, poverty and war are 
conspiring to rob a continent of its rich artistic heritage’ Time Magazine Pacific, August 6th 
2001, http://www.time.com/time/pacific/magazine/20010806/art.html (Visited, August 
4th, 2005); as far as libraries and archives are concerned, a 1996 report by UNESCO 
provides hundreds of examples of institutions that were plundered, destroyed (or both) 
during the 20th century. Van der Hoeven, H. & J. van Albada (1996) Lost Memory – 
libraries and archives destroyed in the twentieth century (UNESCO, Paris) – Libraries and 
Archives destroyed in the Twentieth Century. Sometimes, museums survive under the 
most severe circumstances. The National Museum in Beirut, Lebanon, protected its 
collection from the Syrian as the Israeli armed forces during the civil war by hiding them 
in pouring concrete. See: Speetjens, P. (1998) ‘Museum in de vuurlinie: Parijs toont 
verstopte schatten uit Libanons nationaal museum’ NRC Handelsblad, November 20th. 
188  MacGuire Gibson (2005) ‘Cultural tragedy in Iraq: a report on the looting of museums, 
archives and sites’ IFAR, http://www.ifar.org/tragedy.htm (Visited, August 4th, 2005). 
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 Furthermore a parallel can be drawn between the illicit art trade and some 
transnational crimes which were discussed in previous chapters: the illicit arms 
trade, drug trafficking and trafficking ‘blood’ diamonds. All these variations of 
transnational crime are often connected with war zones in all parts of the world 
(Crefeld, 1998; Morstein, 1989; Naylor, 1993, 2001; Phytian, 2000).189 
However, one important difference seems to exist between these crimes and the 
illicit antiquities trade. The illicit antiquities trade is hardly ever used to finance 
all kinds of wars, civil wars or terrorist acts. This sets the trade apart from for 
example the trade in ‘conflict’ diamonds and several kinds of drugs (Crefeld, 
1999; Naylor, 2001; Wright, 1997). The illicit antiquities trade is almost always 
used solely for personal profit of the actors involved. 
 
9.4 The lock model and the interface typology: case studies from the 
Netherlands and Italy 
 
In chapter 5 the so-called lock model was developed, based on the discussions in 
the chapters 3 and 4. This model simplifies the often complicated mechanisms by 
which illegal activities are ‘laundered’ and become legal, or in which legal 
activities become illegal. This mechanism is found regularly with arms trafficking, 
financial crimes, cigarette smuggling, and the trafficking of ‘conflict’ diamonds 
(Naylor, 1987, 2001; NIZA, 2001; Paoli, 1995; Passas, 1995; Von Bülow, 2003). 
The lock model showed how transnational (criminal) activities can be laundered, 
or on the contrary become illegal, through the involvement of certain 
individuals, organizations, or jurisdictions. 
 In this section several case studies will be discussed that were found in the 
empirical study that was executed in the Netherlands and Italy, as well as one 
case study from the literature. 
 The first case study involved a shipment of rare items from Ghana, 
intercepted in the Rotterdam harbor in 1996, mentioned above with the co-
optation interface. It is one of the cases of the Inspectorate which has been 
described in several articles by Van Beurden (1994, 1995, 2001). The owner of 
the goods was a dealer who had established firm business relations with this 
African country. According to the Embassy of Ghana he had been involved in 
smuggle of items at least two times before, in 1992 and 1994 (Van Beurden, 
2001). In connection with this particular shipment, questions were asked by a 
Member of Parliament to the Secretary of Justice.190 In her answer to these 
questions the Minister stated that the cultural historical value of the goods was 
substantial, and that Ghana had not given export permits for their transport to the 
                                                 
189  The connection between the illicit art and antiquities trade and the trade in drugs is 
discussed by Tijhuis & Soudijn (2004). 
190  The written questions in Parliament were raised by MP J.M. Verspaget (Labor Party) on 
July 11th 1995. The Minister of Justice at the time, W. Sorgdrager, replied on August 26th 
1996. See: ‘Aanhangsel Handelingen, no. 1627, vergaderjaar 1995-96’.  
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Netherlands. Nevertheless, in the end the owner could not be forced to cede the 
items. 
 More or less the same happened in 1992. A large shipment of items was 
intercepted by Dutch customs in the Rotterdam harbor. Part of the shipment 
were 92 historic stone sculptures from the Koma region in Northern Ghana. 
Only after the Embassy of Ghana threatened with summary proceedings, the 
owner was prepared to surrender the items to Ghana. However, due to the lack 
of legislation in the Netherlands, he could keep the rest of the smuggled items 
after he paid the tax based on its real value (Van Beurden, 1994). Although the 
dealer did not want to respond to this particular shipment, he was willing to give 
his ideas about the trade in Ghana. Every now and then one would engage 
traders who were selling items from little villages in the bush. They were selling 
authentic items, as opposed to most dealers in regular shops (Beurden, 1994). 
This seems to confirm the pattern seen more often in Africa. A network of 
thieves, smugglers, and middlemen connects the authentic items from illicit 
excavations, churches, or museums, with the dealers in market countries. It is 
through a well-connected foreign dealer who ships the items abroad and sells 
them that they are laundered and placed in the legal market in for example 
Belgium, Switzerland, or the Netherlands (Gado, 2001; Schmidt & McIntosh, 
1996). 
 This particular case can be analyzed in terms of interfaces. Depending on the 
status of the items involved (illicitly excavated, stolen or legitimate property from 
the seller) and the role of the dealer and the local middlemen, their relationship 
can be understood as outsourcing, reciprocity, or collaboration. At the same time 
the dealer and his competitors, who lack his direct source-country supply, are 
‘linked’ by antagonistic relationships. The overall market in the objects involved 
benefits from the dealers’ activities so that synergy can be said to exist. Labeling 
the different relationships as types from the typology enables a comparison with 
other cases and other types of crime. 
 However, labeling the relationships in a particular case does not explain the 
process of laundering through all the different relationships. That is turning the 
smuggling of protected (and maybe stolen) antiquities into the legitimate sale of 
antiquities in the Netherlands (or elsewhere). A number of factors that were 
discussed in the chapters on individuals and states as interface helps to explain 
this. The primary factor in this case is the fact that the lack of legislation in the 
Netherlands creates a situation in which smuggled and under circumstances 
stolen and looted items can be legally sold without any problems. This is 
especially so in case of antiquities that cannot be traced back to individual owners 
and therefore not confiscated on the basis of the crime of theft or receiving. This 
means that the Netherlands as jurisdiction acts as a lock between illicit and licit 
trade. Through this lock, smuggled objects are turned into legitimate 
merchandise. The fact that the dealer is obviously very well-connected in the 
source country and organized the transport of the items from source to 
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destination country, helps to reach this result but does not explain it in this case. 
A comparison with two other situations can make this clear. First of all, in case 
the same dealer would smuggle his merchandise to a country with legislation 
demanding export permits for antiquities, he would not be able to launder the 
objects by simply importing them. Secondly, in case an inexperienced ad hoc 
smuggler (for example a tourist) would take an object to the Netherlands, 
without an export permit from the source country, the same laundering would 
be possible as in case of the dealer. 
 The Ghanese-Dutch case discussed above can be seen as an example of many 
of the cases that were studied in the Netherlands. Sometimes they will involve 
less active dealers, or private persons, but the basic mechanism is always the same. 
As a result, the Netherlands as jurisdiction acts as an interface for this kind of 
trade. This interface has two variations. First of all, there are shipments of 
antiquities that are smuggled but not stolen. This also includes antiquities that 
have been stolen but that will never be proven to be so, because of a lack of 
documentation.191 Secondly, there are antiquities that are stolen and that can be 
legally proven to be so. 
 In case of the first variation, the antiquities are effectively laundered by taking 
them out of the source country and into the Netherlands, which acts as a lock 
between licit and illicit trade. As soon as they have arrived in the Netherlands, or 
a comparable country, the fact that they have been smuggled is no longer a legal 
problem for the owner.192 The cases from the Inspectorate provided many 
examples of this situation. This included shipments from countries like Thailand, 
Hong Kong, China, Afghanistan, Ghana, and Zambia. This does not mean that 
smuggled objects are never returned to the countries of origin. The two 
Seventeenth century Hindu statues that were returned to Indonesia in 2003 are 
among several cases of voluntary restitution. 
 The second variation is slightly more complicated, from a perspective of 
laundering. In case objects are proven to be stolen, they can be intercepted and 
potentially returned to their original owners. However, this is only so if 
restitution is not blocked by the fact that the object is presently owned by a 
purchaser who is protected because of his good faith or because of relevant 
statutes of limitations.193 This means that the laundering process involves at least 
one extra step. This step can be that the objects are sold by a dealer to a customer 
                                                 
191  This is an important difference with for example the situation in the US. This country has 
several bilateral treaties which outline categories of objects that are protected irrespective of 
documentation or other technicalities. See for example: Gerstenblith (2002; 2004); 
O’Keefe (2004). 
192  In practice dealers will often under-declare and falsely describe their shipments and for that 
reason risk a fine by customs. 
193  The protection of good faith purchasers is excluded by the EU Directive 93/7. However, 
this directive aims at illegally exported cultural goods and not specifically at stolen goods. 
The stolen objects that are intercepted or signaled by the relevant authorities do often fall 
outside the scope of this directive.  
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inside the Netherlands. Another possibility is that objects have already been 
purchased from established dealers in for example Bangkok, Chiang Mai, or 
Hong Kong. The Dutch cases contained many examples of items which were 
probably stolen but were bought from established dealers in one of those centers 
of the antiquities trade. In these cases dealers or private persons are also protected 
as good faith purchasers. Furthermore, the objects can be held as long as 
necessary before the statute of limitations runs out. Finally, there is a very 
practical and frequent way in which antiquities are laundered. Several source 
countries are hardly able to communicate with the market countries. This can be 
because of language difficulties, lack of modern communications technologies, 
under-funded bureaucracies or other reasons. Therefore, authorities from market 
countries will not be able to verify whether certain items are registered as 
stolen.194 This means that for such shipments of antiquities the same logic applies 
as for the antiquities that have ‘only’ been smuggled (see above). In the end, 
almost all illicit antiquities are laundered into licit antiquities and added to the 
existing stock of objects on the market and with collectors, museums, or others.
  
 The second case is taken from the literature and involves some activities by 
parts of the auction house Sotheby’s during the 1990s.195 According to a study by 
Peter Watson, an extensive system of laundering practices existed around auction 
house Sotheby’s in London.196 Peter Watson worked as a research journalist and 
later had a position at the Illicit Antiquities Research Centre of the University of 
Cambridge (Brodie & Watson, 2000; Watson, 1998). Watson described a 
number of cases in which auction house Sotheby’s served as an interface between 
legitimate sellers of legally owned or stolen art in particular countries on the one 
hand, and legitimate buyers in good faith in the UK on the other hand. As it was 
illegal to bring the art objects out of country of origin to the UK, where the art 
could be sold on a free market, Sotheby’s repeatedly agreed with smuggling 
operations, or knowingly worked together with dealers who smuggled the items 
into the UK (Brodie & Watson, 2000; Watson, 1998). 
 In India, Sotheby’s allegedly worked together with dealers who obtained 
antiquities in several ways and wanted to sell it at the London market. In this 
case, Sotheby’s was no passive party in a relatively small deal (as in other cases of 
auction houses), but rather active in large-scale deals. Specialists from Sotheby’s 
                                                 
194  Theoretically, thefts can be registered with Interpol and placed on their CD-rom with 
stolen art. See: http://www.interpol.int/Public/WorkOfArt/CDrom/default.asp. In 
practice, this system does not work or at least not fast enough to seriously help the 
interception of stolen antiquities. 
195  This case is purely based on the studies of Watson and other mentioned authors.  
196  Recently, the UK implemented the UNESCO Convention with legislation to counter the 
illicit trade. Some of the practices described by Watson are no longer legal in the UK. 
Around the same time Switzerland also acceded to the UNESCO Convention. According 
to official sources in Italy this notorious country is making significant progress with respect 
to measures against the illicit trade. 
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allegedly actually ordered certain types of objects for their sales in London. 
Subsequently, they assisted the dealers to find convenient ways to bring the items 
to the London auction. As the items went through the auction house, they had 
in most cases been effectively laundered and added to the supply of legitimate art 
and antiquities (Brodie & Watson, 2000; Watson, 1998). 
 In terms of interfaces, this provides a number of different types. Between 
Sotheby’s and the dealers, smugglers, and others involved situations of 
outsourcing, collaboration, and reciprocity can be found. On a more abstract 
level, the antiquities market will most of the time benefit from all kinds of 
arrangements like those described here. Between the parties involved in these 
arrangements, and those not involved, a situation of synergy exists. Furthermore, 
it can be argued that the different interfaces are not confined to the situations 
uncovered by Watson. A strong eagerness to ensure interesting and profitable 
merchandise, as well as certain contempt for the regulations protecting cultural 
heritage, provides a climate in which all kinds of illegal transactions can take 
place (Rijn, 1993; Hoving, 1994, 1996; Lacey, 1998; Mason, 2004). In addition 
to the individual interfaces, the auction house, together with some accomplices, 
acted as a lock between illicit and licit market. Hereby, the individuals, 
organization and jurisdiction were combined to accomplish this outcome.197 To 
understand this mechanism, the role of each part needs to be clarified. First of all, 
the role of the United Kingdom as jurisdiction. As the UK did not implement 
any of the treaties against the illicit trade, objects that were only smuggled could 
be laundered by simply bringing them into the UK and selling them.198 
However, many objects were not only smuggled but also stolen, or could be 
argued to be stolen.199 To enable the sale of these objects, bringing them to the 
UK and selling them there was not enough. Therefore, the Indian dealers who 
consigned the objects to Sotheby’s obfuscated the recent Indian provenance, for 
example by using false addresses and other names as consignees of the objects for 
auction. When the objects were subsequently sold at an auction, they were de 
facto laundered and added to the licit trade.  
 The last case is connected with the Sotheby’s case and was studied in Italy. It 
involves the Italian mega-smuggler and dealer Giacomo Medici. He had been 
active in the illicit trade for over three decades when he was arrested and later 
sentenced to a long prison sentence and payment of damages in the millions of 
euros. Medici started as a smuggler himself before he grew through the hierarchy 
                                                 
197  It should be stressed that auction houses do not, neither in the UK nor the Netherlands, 
produce a valid title to good faith purchasers of objects.  
198  As was pointed out in previous chapters, the UK has since then ratified the UNESCO 
1970 treaty and implemented legislation against the illicit trade. Therefore, the same logic 
does no longer apply in present cases. The role of the different treaties was discussed in 
detail in chapter seven on the research data.  
199  As was discussed before, the concept of theft can have different meanings depending on 
the country one focuses on, because of legislation claiming all, or almost all, antiquities as 
property of the state.  
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of the illicit trade in Italy and became the coordinator of massive smuggle 
operations and sales to US museums, private collectors, Sotheby’s and others, 
through a number of frontmen (Brodie & Watson, 2000).200 The antiquities came 
from illicit excavations in Italy and were smuggled in bulk to Switzerland where 
they were stalled in warehouses in Geneva’s Freeport. From there they went to 
several frontmen who subsequently send the items abroad. The warehouses were 
found by the Swiss and Italian police after Watson published his book on 
Sotheby’s. The warehouses turned out to contain 10,000 unprovenanced 
antiquities, valued at £25 million (Brodie & Watson, 2000). 
 The relationships between Medici and all his frontmen and smugglers can be 
dissected into individual interfaces, ranging from collaboration to synergy. 
However, the most interesting element of this case is the combination of a 
productive dealer annex smuggler, his frontmen, the auction house and the 
advantages of Swiss legislation.201 This combination acts as a lock through which 
the large flow of illicit antiquities is laundered and integrated in the open, fully 
licit, market. Although this case is unique as far as its scale is concerned, it is 
exemplary for most of the trade in illicit antiquities from Italy. The Italian 
Carabinieri have been dealing with cases like this continuously since they 





In the first sections of this chapter, the antithetical and symbiotic interfaces in the 
illicit antiquities trade were discussed. At least three conclusions can be drawn 
from the analysis above. The conclusions are similar to those in the previous 
chapter. 
 First of all, two of the antithetical interfaces, the predatory and parasitical, 
were not found in the data of the empirical study of interfaces in the illicit 
antiquities trade. However, instead of the parasitical interface, the facilitating 
interface can be used to describe relationships in many cases in the illicit 
antiquities trade. 
 Secondly, the differences between the symbiotic interfaces are often very 
small and therefore less meaningful than with other transnational crimes. For the 
same reason, one can regularly find many different interfaces around one 
particular actor. 
 Finally, the mechanism through which antiquities are laundered can be 
described but not explained by the use of the interface typology. However, the 
                                                 
200  The verdict in his case, dated December 13th 2004, contains an impressive number of items 
and the names of some well-known institutions who bought items for their collections that 
originated from Medici.  
201  The policies and legislation of Switzerland are currently changing rapidly. When 
Switzerland is discussed in this context, the situation before 2002 is meant. 
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typology can label all different stages of this process. To be sure, the typology was 
never intended to explain this process in the first place. Instead of the typology, 
the lock model can help to explain this mechanism. The laundering in individual 
cases can be explained by the combination of the different parts of the lock 
model: individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions as interface. One interesting 
conclusion from the cases in the Netherlands is the fact that laundering 
sometimes takes place primarily through the characteristics of its jurisdiction. As 
far as the Netherlands are concerned, these characteristics are rather simple: the 
complete absence of any legislation, except for the EU Directive. Similar 
situations were found to be in place in jurisdictions like Hong Kong, Thailand, 
and South Africa.202 As far as Italy and other countries are concerned, it will 
usually take a combination of individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions to 
enable the laundering process. In general it can be concluded that the role of 
jurisdictions is often sufficient to enable the laundering of illicit antiquities. 
 The findings from this chapter show both the usefulness as well as the 
limitations of the interface typology and the lock model. Whereas some of the 
interfaces from the typology are of no use for the illicit antiquities trade, the 
remaining interfaces can be used to describe the different relationships between 
the actors involved. In addition to this, the lock model can be used to explain, or 
to help explain the mechanism through which illicit antiquities are laundered and 
enter the licit market. 
 
                                                 
202  South Africa became a party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 2003. The remarks 
here therefore aim at the period before 2003. 
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10.1  Introduction 
 
This study addressed several questions concerning the interfaces between legal 
and illegal actors in transnational crimes. The background of these questions are 
several observations in the literature on transnational crime that were outlined in 
the introduction. First of all, the literature on transnational crime describes 
numerous interfaces between legal and illegal actors in these crimes. In many 
studies, these interfaces are presented as more or less one-way connections 
between illegal actors who corrupt legal actors or invest their profits in legal 
companies. Furthermore, these interfaces have been presented as growing and 
dangerous ‘facts’, especially since the demise of the Soviet Union. However, 
general analytical models and explanations of the interfaces between legal and 
illegal actors are scarcely available. Empirical studies of this research topic in 
general have also been few in number, although some studies have been executed 
on specific cases or specific crimes. Furthermore, convincing and unambiguous 
empirical evidence of the nature and extent of transnational crime, as well as its 
interfaces with legal actors, has not been provided. 
 This book aimed to fill some of the gaps mentioned above. A number of 
research questions guided this theoretical and empirical study that was executed 
from 2001 to 2005. The main research questions were: 
 
- 1. What kind of interfaces can be found between legal and illegal actors in 
transnational crimes? 
- 2. How can the transformation in legal status of certain transnational 
activities be explained? 
- 3. Does the interface typology provide an analytical tool to describe the 
interface between legal and illegal actors in the illicit art and antiquities 
trade 
- 4. How can the transformation in legal status in the licit and illicit art and 
antiquities trade be explained? 
 
In addition to these research questions, this chapter will look at two practical 
questions that can be answered after all the analyses in this study have been done 
and the conclusions have been drawn. 
 
- 5. What can be recommended for future studies on transnational crime 
and the interfaces between legal and illegal actors? 
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- 6. What can be recommended for future public policies dealing with 
transnational crime and related topics? 
 
The following sections will summarize the findings from this study and provide 
answers to the research questions, as far as they were produced in this study. 
After that, a number of recommendations will be formulated. 
 
10.2 A typology of interfaces 
 
Different types of interfaces can be found between legal and illegal actors in 
transnational crime. The starting point of my research was a typology of 
interfaces developed by criminologist Nikos Passas. This typology was chosen 
because it provides one of a very few attempts to deal with the legal–illegal 
interface in a systematic, instead of ad hoc, manner. This typology consists of four 
antithetical and eight symbiotic interfaces between legal and illegal actors. 
 The typology was analyzed to see whether it covers the most important types 
of interfaces between legal and illegal actors, without including any superfluous 
types or missing any relevant types. The analysis of the typology led to several 
conclusions. First of all that the typology appeared to cover all the important 
conceivable types of interfaces between legal and illegal actors. However, two 
symbiotic interfaces seemed to be superfluous or inconsistent with the typology 
itself and were left out. The definitions of the other interfaces were clarified if 
necessary. In some cases, the definitions of certain interfaces put forward by the 
original typology showed potential overlap that would blur the distinction 
between separate interfaces too much. In those cases, these definitions were 
restricted to prevent overlap as much as possible. This is not to say that the 
typology was and is meant as a meticulous model of guaranteed mutually 
excluding types. However, the different types should nevertheless be as precise 
and mutually excluding as possible. The resulting new interface typology still 
consisted of the two categories: antithetical interfaces and symbiotic interfaces. 
The different types will be briefly summarized below. 
 
10.2.1  Antithetical interfaces 
 
The first antithetical interface consists of so-called antagonistic relationships. These 
relationships occur when there is competition between legal and illegal actors. 
This interface turned out to be useful to understand the relationship between 
legal and illegal actors in a range of transnational illegal markets. Arms dealers and 
producers engaged in illicit deals that compete with dealers and producers that 
stick to the laws governing their trade and smugglers and dealers of ‘conflict 
diamonds’ that compete with importers and dealers who deal in accordance with 
the Kimberley Process. 
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 The second antithetical interface is the parasitical interface. This interface 
occurs when the aim is to preserve the viability of the target, in such a way that 
illegal benefits can be extorted on a more or less regular basis. This interface can 
be used to understand all kinds of extortion practices. 
 The predatory interface is the third interface. This interface involves the 
situation when the aim is to destroy or bleed to death an organization, for 
example to control and fraudulently bankrupt a business. Both the parasitical as 
the predatory interface seem to be inspired on particular relationships that have 
been well-documented in the literature on (national) organized crime 
(Abadinsky, 1994; Block, 1981; Jacobs, 2001). Racketeering practices in the US 
and elsewhere, for example, can be understood with the parasitical interface. 
Within the literature on transnational crime, however, clear examples of these 
relationships are hard to find. Nevertheless, chapters 3 and 4 discussed a number 
of case studies that can partly be understood in terms of parasitical and predatory 
interfaces. Because of a lack of criminological literature dealing with these case 
studies, other literature was used to obtain the necessary information. 
 Especially the case studies of financial institutions are relevant here. However, 
in these cases the parasitical or predatory interfaces are usually combined with 
symbiotic interfaces. It is only in the long run, or at a more abstract level, that the 
relationships between certain actors can be understood as predatory or parasitical. 
This points at a rather important conclusion about these interfaces. The 
relationships between actors can be dramatically different at different points in 
time or at different levels of analysis. That is, antithetical interfaces can go hand in 
hand with symbiotic interfaces. The study of the illicit art and antiquities trade 
confirmed this finding. 
 Besides the examples mentioned above, many forms of terrorism can be 
understood with the predatory and especially the parasitical interface. Although 
the terrorist groups involved are often presented as aimed at the destruction of 
specific countries, institutions or even ‘civilization’, most seem to aim at specific 
political goals like the end of foreign occupations or influences or the change of 
local regimes. 
 The last antithetical interface is the injurious interface. It covers the 
relationship between actors that undermine, attack, or harm each other, as far as 
this not covered by the other interface types. An example is the illicit trade in 
toxic waste. Foreign territories, and their inhabitants, that are used to dump the 
toxic waste are seriously injured although the dumping did not take place 
specifically to inflict injury. The illicit art and antiquities trade almost always 
involved injurious interfaces. 
 
10.2.2  Symbiotic interfaces 
 
Outsourcing is the first symbiotic interface. Outsourcing refers to a division of 
labor between legal and illegal actors, where one party offers specialized services 
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to the other. These specialized services can for example involve the shipment of 
arms from legitimate producers to outlawed end-users, organized by arms 
brokers. The party offering these services can both be the legal as well as the 
illegal actor. 
 In case actors actually work together for the same offence, the interface is 
called collaboration. Cigarette producers that are actively involved in the 
organization of smuggling schemes or criminal networks are one example of this 
interface. 
 The third interface is called co-optation. This interface involves situations of 
mutual benefits but uneven power relations between the parties involved. High 
level customs officials that allow particular criminal groups to perform particular 
smuggling operations are just one example here. 
 In case legitimate organizations knowingly and willingly provide financial 
support for the operation of criminal groups, the interface is called funding. 
Charities that support terrorist organizations are an example of this interface. One 
of those charities was discussed in more detail in chapter 3. It is only after 9/11 
that this topic has received full attention in Europe and the US. 
 Reciprocity is the fifth symbiotic interface. This interface involves a situation of 
consciously seeking mutual benefits for the legal and illegal actors. Relationships 
between individual users of illegal services or goods and their suppliers can be 
labeled as reciprocity. 
 The last interface is called synergy. We can speak of synergy when legal and 
illegal actors benefit each other while they go about their business independently 
promoting their interests and objectives. The practical effects of synergy are 
similar to those of outsourcing. Synergy may exist between actors involved in the 
same kind of business but also between different kinds of businesses. For example 
between certain banks and their customers that deposit the proceeds of drug 
trafficking or other crimes with them. Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated how certain 
relationships can turn from antagonistic to synergic or the other way around. In 
those cases it often depends on the intensity of illegal activities whether they are 
still beneficial for the legal actors. At some point, the balance turns out negative 
for the legal actors. 
 
The lines between the different types of interfaces cannot be drawn meticulously 
in practice, although each type theoretically aims at a distinct type of relationship 
between legal and illegal actors. The typology provides an analytical tool to 
understand and describe different relationships between legal and illegal actors, 
independent of the kind of transnational crime or the kind of actors involved. 
Therefore, interfaces between legal and illegal actors involved in the illicit arms 
trade can for example be compared with interfaces in the trade in illegal drugs. 
Furthermore, the typology helps to nuance the idea of one-way connections 
between illegal actors who corrupt legal actors or invest their profits in legal 
CONCLUSIONS 
197 
companies. Often, the initiative will come from legal actors, or they will at least 
work together voluntarily with illegal actors. 
 Despite the analytical usefulness of the typology, the interface between legal 
and illegal can sometimes be better described and understood with the so-called 
lock model. This is the case when interfaces are not only or primarily found 
between actors but instead coincide with specific individuals, organizations, or 
jurisdictions. Chapters 3 and 4 dealt with these actors or entities as interface. In 
chapter 5, the lock model was developed that helps to explain how these actors 
and entities can launder transnational crimes, or instead turn transnational legal 
activities into transnational crimes. Section 10.4 will discuss the lock model. 
 
10.3 Individuals, legitimate organizations, and jurisdictions as 
interface 
 
The interface typology describes interfaces between legal and illegal actors. This 
implies two or more actors, legal or illegal, and ‘an’ interface in between. The 
interface links an illegal and legal actor in a particular way, for example as 
partners in an ongoing collaboration. In other words, the interface describes the 
relationship that exists between two actors at some point in time. However, a 
particular actor will often have numerous relationships with legal and illegal 
actors around him. All these relationships can be labeled with the different types 
of interfaces from the typology. But in case this actor finds himself in the middle 
of legal and illegal actors that are connected to a particular transnational crime, 
such an actor can also, or instead, be seen as an interface himself. This is 
especially so in case the relationships with both legal and illegal actors are more 
or less on the same level. The same level means that an actor acts as criminal in 
his relationships with other illegal actors, while at the same time he acts as legal 
actor in his relationships with other legal actors. 
 
10.3.1   Individuals as interface 
 
We started with the analysis of the role of individuals as interface. On the basis of 
a number of case studies, it was argued that certain individuals themselves can be 
understood as an interface between legal and illegal actors. They often act as 
brokers arranging deals between different parties, for example in the illicit arms 
trade, or as dealer who combine the licit and illicit trade. In some cases, it is 
through these individuals, and the set-ups they invent, that illicit trades are 
laundered or that licit merchandise is funneled to the black market. It is for a 
number of reasons that these individuals can play such a role. These include the 
combination of several identities, for example as anonymous private person as 
well as established business men, and as citizens with diplomatic passports from 
different countries under different names etc. Furthermore, political protection at 
the highest levels sometimes plays a role. Through this protection, the discussed 
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individuals often generate immunity from prosecution in the countries in which 
they are doing business. 
 Analytically, two different models of individuals as interface were 
distinguished. On the one hand brokers in transnational crime and on the other 
hand transnational (criminal) dealers. 
 
10.3.2  Legitimate organizations as interface 
 
Besides individuals, some organizations can act as interface by themselves. The 
same laundering may take place through these organizations. The specific 
opportunities of legitimate organizations play an important role here. The 
possibility to change licit for illicit trade or to divert funds for illicit ends. We 
discussed a range of case studies in which all kinds of organizations could be 
understood as interface between legal and illegal actors. Banks, intelligence 
agencies, auction houses, and charities may all act as interface in specific 
circumstances. In practice, it will often be through such organizations together 
with the individuals discussed above, that transnational crimes are turned into 
legitimate activities or the other way around. 
 Legitimate organizations as interface can also be distinguished in two different 
analytical models. They were called the Ambrosiano model and the coffee shop 
model. 
 
10.3.3  Jurisdictions as interface 
 
Finally, jurisdictions can under certain circumstances act as an interface. To be 
sure, a jurisdiction is of course not a regular ‘actor’ like a human being or a 
legitimate organization. However, based on the laws of countries, or the absence 
thereof, they can have the same function as individuals or organizations. Such a 
jurisdiction is in the middle of a transnational chain of activities which are 
defined as transnational crimes at one side of its border, and as legitimate activities 
at the other. In practice, this mechanism will often involve certain organizations 
and individuals as well. 
 Besides the mere presence or absence of particular legislation, the activities of 
law enforcement agencies also play a role. In some case particular activities are 
criminalized in a jurisdiction although the relevant laws are never or rarely 
enforced. This may partly facilitate the laundering of certain criminal activities, in 
combination with other factors. The cause of this type of laundering was called 
the de facto interface. It is, however, not a pure interface like the individuals, 
organizations, and jurisdictions discussed earlier, but it consists of a mixture of 




10.4 The lock model 
 
The second research question was: how can the transformation of legal status of 
certain transnational activities be explained? 
 The findings from the case studies suggested an answer to this question. It is 
through certain individuals, organizations, and jurisdictions that this process can 
take place. In chapter 5 these findings were used to develop an analytical model 
besides the interface typology. This model, the so-called lock model, can be used 
to understand the mentioned process. This transformation can be understood as a 
ship going through a lock. The inner-part of the lock does not belong to either 
side of the lock. The same holds true for the individuals, organizations, and 
jurisdictions. They cannot be seen as purely legal or illegal but enable certain 
activities to be transformed from illegal to legal or the other way around. On the 
one hand these actors or entities illegally deal with (often criminal) actors while 
on the other hand they are engaged in fully legal transactions with (often 
legitimate) actors. It may also be that an organization deals with different parts of 
one actor on both sides, like for example with many money laundering 
operations. A drug trafficker can infuse funds to a bank on the one hand, while 
he takes it out (for example in a loan-back structure) in another capacity (for 
example with his legitimate corporation). 
 The lock model is not an alternative for the interface typology but aims to 
explain a particular process that can be found in many empirical cases of 
transnational crime involving an interface between legal and illegal actors. In all 
these cases, the interface typology can be used to describe all the relationships 
between the different actors involved. 
 Besides explaining this particular process, the lock model and the analyses that 
preceded its development, illustrate the importance of certain individuals, 
organizations, and jurisdictions. Individuals are often neglected in studies of 
transnational crime. Many authors look at transnational crime as the cross-border 
variation of local organized crime. Individuals do not fit in that perspective. 
Legitimate organizations are usually seen as passive actors used by, or infiltrated 
by, criminals. However, this study showed how certain legitimate organizations 
are the center of a range of transnational crimes and relationships with numerous 
illegal actors. Finally, the role of jurisdictions is often overlooked, except for the 
role of certain tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions. However, numerous 
countries that certainly do not fit the latter categories, act as havens for particular 
transnational crimes. 
 
10.5 The illicit art and antiquities trade 
 
We then discussed the empirical study of the illicit art and antiquities trade that 
was executed specifically for this study. There were two major reasons why the 
transnational illicit art and antiquities trade provided an interesting and useful 
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object of study within the context of a study of interfaces. The first reason is the 
assumption that this trade has many interfaces because in general stolen or 
smuggled art needs to be sold in the legal market to be profitable. This implies 
some form of laundering along the way from the moment of theft and/or illegal 
export to the sale to a customer. The second reason to study the illicit art and 
antiquities trade is the fact that it has hardly been studied by criminologists. 
 We outlined the data sources that were used for this study. These sources 
included official data from different countries, interviews with experts and 
dealers, and reports from specialized media. The literature on the illicit art and 
antiquities trade was used to complement these sources. After an outline of the 
sources, a general overview of the illicit art and antiquities trade was provided in 
chapter 7. The interface typology and lock model were discussed in chapters 8 
and 9. 
 
10.5.1  The interface typology and the illicit art and antiquities trade 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn with respect to the interface typology. 
First of all, the analysis of interfaces in the illicit antiquities trade did not produce 
clear examples of the predatory and parasitical interface. However, the injurious 
interface is a standard element of almost every criminal activity in the 
transnational illicit art and antiquities trade. Most instances of illicit trading in art 
and antiquities begin with either stealing or smuggling objects. Most of the time, 
objects are first stolen and thereafter smuggled abroad. 
 Furthermore, the antagonistic interface plays an important role in this field. In 
some cases, the antagonistic interface can be seen as one end of a continuum that 
has the synergy interface as its other end. This paradoxical observation is similar 
to the observations that were made with respect to legitimate organizations 
functioning as a lock. The beneficial or harmful consequences of the activities of 
one actor in relation to others can change over time as well as on different levels. 
This is rather remarkable because these two interfaces were clearly separated 
analytically in the interface typology. The exception to the rule that the 
antagonistic and synergy interface are clearly separated involves the situation 
where legal and illegal actors are involved in the same activity. Depending on the 
level of analysis or the point in time, the relationship between these actors will 
best be defined as antagonistic or synergic. 
 In addition to the typology, one new type of interface was added based on the 
findings in the empirical study of the illicit art and antiquities trade. The new 
interface was called a facilitating interface. It aims at situations of so-called internal 
thefts of works of art or antiquities that are subsequently sold abroad. Legitimate 
organizations are facilitating these thefts passively, by providing access to the 
objects involved and failure to secure the objects from insiders. 
 The symbiotic interfaces were also hard to separate from each other in the 
illicit art and antiquities trade. Relatively small details can make the difference 
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between one type of interface or another as the best description of a particular 
interface between legal and illegal actors. This decreases the added value of the 
typology for this particular field of crime, as opposed to some other fields of 
transnational crime like trafficking illegal drugs or human beings. As opposed to 
the latter types of transnational crime, it remains to be seen whether the illicit 
arms trade or other trades embedded in licit trades, can be compared to the art 
and antiquities trade. That is, whether the differences between the types of 
interfaces are also rather small within these trades. 
 
10.5.2   The lock model and the illicit art and antiquities trade 
 
As stated before, the typology can label all different stages of the process through 
which illicit art and antiquities are laundered. However, the lock model can help 
to explain this process. The laundering in individual cases can be explained by 
the combination of the different parts of the lock model: individuals, 
organizations, and jurisdictions as interface. One interesting conclusion from the 
cases in the Netherlands is the fact that laundering sometimes takes place 
primarily through the characteristics of this jurisdiction. These cases involve the 
import of art and antiquities from outside the European Union. As far as the 
Netherlands are concerned, these characteristics are rather simple: the complete 
absence of any legislation, except for the EU Directive and Regulation as well as 
legislation protecting a list of objects inside the Netherlands.203 Similar situations 
were found to be in place in jurisdictions like Hong Kong, Thailand, and South 
Africa.204 Through such jurisdictions, source countries and market countries of 
illicit art and antiquities are connected without the risk of detection of the illicit 
provenance of the objects involved. 
 The analysis of official and other data in the Netherlands, France and Italy 
illustrated the lock model ‘in action’. For each country, one must distinguish 
between import and export and in the case of Italy between art and antiquities. 
 In Italy, the looting of antiquities is the beginning of the transnational illicit 
antiquities trade. The antiquities are primarily destined for collectors and 
museums in Switzerland, the United States, and other market countries. The 
study in Italy showed how these antiquities are usually laundered before they 
appear on the legal market. In many instances, the antiquities are first smuggled 
to Switzerland. In Switzerland they are given a false provenance, for example that 
the objects originate from private collection X or Y (in Switzerland) and have 
been in that collection for a long time. This ‘long time’ usually predates the 
                                                 
203  At the time of writing (November 2005) the Dutch government is working on legislation 
to implement the UNESCO 1970 Convention as well as the 1954 The Hague 
Convention. However, it will at the earliest be in 2006 that this legislation will be adopted 
and enter into force. 
204  South Africa acceded to the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 2003. This may lead to the 
implementation of legislation against the illicit trade.  
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enactment of specific legislation in the countries involved that outlaws certain 
objects from being exported or transferred from one owner to another. 
Thereafter, the objects are sold abroad at auctions, art fairs or directly to 
museums and collectors. As Switzerland was no party to the UNESCO 
Convention until 2003, and is not a member of the EU, importers of objects 
from Switzerland did not run any risks because they legally bought objects that 
had effectively been laundered before. It is thus primarily through the differences 
in legislation between the countries involved, combined with the fraudulent 
techniques of certain individual dealers, that this laundering takes place. 
 As Switzerland has acceded to the 1970 UNESCO Convention and increased 
its efforts to counter the illicit trade, the described situation might change 
significantly for the better. If so, it remains to be seen how the antiquities trade 
will adapt to this change in opportunity structure. 
 With respect to works of art, the situation is, at least in theory, far more 
complicated due to the fact that these objects can be registered and recognized. 
Therefore, in case of theft, they will not be laundered for the simple reason that 
they cross certain borders and their owners claim a certain provenance. In case 
works of art are stolen from churches, museums or private collectors, their 
picture and relevant characteristics will ideally be included in the Leonardo 
database of the Carabinieri and the Interpol Stolen Art and Antiquities CD-Rom. 
However, works of art will in many cases be laundered as effectively as the 
antiquities discussed above. First of all, the use of registries of stolen art, like the 
Interpol CD-Rom, is rather limited in many countries. Therefore, even if objects 
are registered adequately this will not deter the trade in these objects in many 
countries. Furthermore, in case dealers suspect that the registration of stolen 
objects will potentially pose a significant problem they sometimes change the 
description of the objects in case they are brought in at auctions. They may 
slightly change the measurements as well as ascribe the object incorrectly. 
Through this they can frustrate the efforts of law enforcement agencies that try to 
recover stolen items by checking the catalogues of all major auctions of art and 
antiquities. 
 In France, the theft of works of art from chateaux, churches and museums, is 
in most cases the beginning of the illicit art trade. Many objects are smuggled to 
Belgium and the Netherlands and from there exported to yet other countries. 
The study of this trade showed that for decades the same modus operandi has 
been used successfully. The stolen objects are sold in Belgium or the 
Netherlands, where the new owner benefits from the civil code that directly 
grants full ownership to good faith purchasers from art dealers. The sale may be 
to an unsuspecting end-user or to another dealer who subsequently sells the 
objects to collectors abroad. In some cases, the objects themselves may be 
changed so as to frustrate any potential attempt to recover them. This is 
sometimes done, for example, with antique timepieces. The actual laundering of 
the objects involved is caused by a number of factors. In case the objects are sold 
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in Belgium and the Netherlands and subsequently shipped outside the European 
Union, the mentioned civil codes grant the new owner full ownership rights. 
The EU Directive 93/7, which nullifies this protection for the sake of restitution 
of smuggled items, is only applicable inside the European Union and can thus not 
be used against non-EU owners outside the EU. Furthermore, in practice the 
EU Directive has had hardly any noticeable effect on the trade in stolen works of 
art or antiquities. In case the objects remain in the EU, the indifference of most 
law enforcement agencies, as well as the failing system of registration and 
exchange of information between law enforcement agencies, will effectively 
launder the objects, or at least assure immunity from prosecution for their 
owners. The applicable, and limited, statutes of limitations in countries of 
continental Europe will further help this outcome. 
 The Netherlands was already mentioned above with respect to antiquities 
from outside the European Union. Due to the lacking legislation with respect to 
these antiquities, the mere import in the Netherlands often suffices for its 
effective laundering. Dealers in particular antiquities use this situation when they 
obtain items abroad and smuggle these to the Netherlands. In the country of 
origin (of the objects involved) these dealers act as smugglers and/or fences while 
in the Netherlands they act as professional art dealers. Only in case of antiquities 
that can be proven to be stolen, this can be otherwise. However, the difficulties 
of international collaboration between law enforcement agencies, combined with 
inadequate registration of stolen antiquities, minimizes the change that stolen 
antiquities will be recovered and returned to their original owners. 
 In case of art and antiquities from inside the European Union, the situation is 
different due to the EU Directive and Regulation. In case antiquities can be 
proven to be exported from an EU country to the Netherlands after 1992205 and 
without export permit, they may be confiscated by the authorities and returned 
to the original owners after a civil procedure in which the country of origin 
claims the antiquities from the present owner. The fact that the present owner 
has purchased the antiquities in good faith cannot stop the country of origin from 
claiming them back although the present owner can under specific circumstances 
be granted damages. 
 When works of art are illicitly exported from the Netherlands to other EU 
member states, the same applies as discussed above. However, in case of illicit 
export from the Netherlands of legally protected works of art, to countries 
outside the EU, the same applies as discussed above with respect to the import of 
antiquities from outside the EU. As the Netherlands has not ratified the 
UNESCO 1970 Convention or the 1995 Unidroit Convention, it will not be 
able to claim back objects that have ‘only’ been illegally exported, that is objects 
that were not stolen before they were exported. These objects can thus easily be 
                                                 
205  As new member states were added to the European Union after 1992, another year defines 
the application of the EU Directive and Regulation.  
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sold on the legal market, as long as they do not enter the European Union before 
the statue of limitations has run out. 
 In case works of art in the Netherlands are not protected as such (this applies 
to the large majority of art) they may also be laundered easily after they have 
been stolen. In case stolen works are unintendedly bought and subsequently sold 
by a professional dealer, the good faith purchaser of the object is protected on the 
basis of the Dutch civil code. Furthermore, in case a work of art is stolen in the 
Netherlands and sold in a country where similar laws apply, these laws will 
effectively launder these objects. 
 The different situations in Italy, France, and the Netherlands illustrate how 
the illicit art and antiquities trade can under circumstances be transformed into a 
licit trade. The different variations of the lock model can help to understand this 
transformation. As far as the art and antiquities trade is concerned, the substantial 
difference in legislation between the countries involved is the most important 
factor enabling this process of laundering. 
 
10.5.3  Other topics related to the illicit art and antiquities trade 
 
The discussion of the typology and the lock model also produced several insights 
that increase the understanding of this field of crime and at the same time took 
away some myths that are often reiterated in publications about this type of 
crime. 
 First of all, the role of (civil) wars and similar disturbing phenomena was 
observed in many instances of illicit trade in art and antiquities. Examples are the 
looting of works of art during and after World War II, by the Nazis, the Soviets, 
and the Allied forces, and the looting of museums in many civil wars in for 
example Nigeria, Somalia, Iraq, Congo, Afghanistan and Kuwait. An interesting 
parallel can thus be drawn with the illicit arms trade, as well as the trade in 
conflict diamonds and some instances of drug trafficking. It was also shown that 
the so-called internal thefts of works of art and antiquities play a much larger role 
than usually assumed. 
 Furthermore, with respect to the illicit art trade in the Netherlands and other 
market countries, the empirical study pointed to the large scale of thefts from 
France and the subsequent role of Belgium and the Netherlands as market or 
transit countries for the stolen objects. This ‘great ball of receivers’ is largely 
neglected in the literature on the illicit art and antiquities trade. Especially in the 
Netherlands, this topic demands the full attention of both law enforcement 
agencies as well as researchers. 
 Thirdly, some common explanations for art thefts and the illicit trade in art 
appeared to lack much empirical proof. This involved the theft of, and trade in, 
works of art by organized criminals with a background in drug trafficking. 
Furthermore, it involved the theft of works of art ordered by rich collectors. This 
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common explanation for major thefts could not be backed up by any credible 
evidence. 
 Finally, the often mentioned link between the trafficking of drugs and 
antiquities cannot be substantiated with more than a few examples. Drugs and 
antiquities are rarely found together in aborted smuggling operations. 
Furthermore, very little evidence has been found that stolen works of art, or 
looted and smuggled antiquities were used to launder proceeds from drug 
traffickers or other criminals. 
 
10.6 Recommendations for future studies on transnational crime and 
the interfaces between legal and illegal actors 
 
10.6.1   Studies of transnational crime and interfaces 
 
The current study can be used to reflect on research areas and questions that can 
benefit from an increased attention from researchers. This applies first of all to 
transnational crime in general and the interfaces between legal and illegal actors. 
It is also applicable to the study of specific types of transnational crime, in 
particular the illicit art and antiquities trade. 
 The first recommendation is to increase the number of empirical and 
theoretical studies focusing on transnational crime. The lack of these studies was 
one of the reasons to engage in the present study but the need for these studies is 
still apparent. Although this issue was not dealt with in this study, it seems that 
the field of transnational crime as a part of criminology still has to catch up with 
respect to the level of both theoretical and empirical studies. Finding answers to 
research questions, and formulating new questions, depends heavily on solid 
empirical studies. Especially in times of significant changes and challenges, 
empirical studies produce the much needed input for theoretical progress. During 
the 1990s these changes and challenges came for example from the imploded 
Soviet Union. A lack of empirical studies sometimes led to the wildest 
assumptions and theories about types of transnational (organized) crime 
connected with this part of the world. At this moment, a particular kind of 
terrorism provides a new challenge. Empirical studies can help to increase our 
understanding of these challenges and ideally help to suggest solutions to certain 
aspects of these challenges. 
 Even if the criminological studies do not help to decrease its present object of 
study, it can help to prevent contra-productive law enforcement policies. The 
‘moral panic’ about transnational crime often initiated policies that did seriously 
compromise the rule of law and the integrity of law enforcement agencies 
without decreasing the actual occurrence of transnational crime. This may be 
especially so with respect to the recent policies against terrorism. Basic legal 
principles are easily discarded on the presumption that this is both necessary and 
effective. However, as during the 1990s in the fight against transnational crime, it 
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has not been proven yet that a significant increase in the competences of law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies provides the solution to the threat of 
terrorism. What has been proven, however, is the fact that these increases 
sometimes infringe civil liberties in a way that seems to be incompatible with 
what is generally accepted as the norm in free and democratic societies. Empirical 
studies of different forms of terrorism should ideally help to explain the causes 
and describe the modus operandi and types of perpetrators. On the basis of such 
studies, one could help to suggest policies that are effective against terrorism 
without unnecessarily discarding these liberties or causing collateral damage that 
may even induce more or new incidents of terrorism. The best example of the 
latter danger is of course the war in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in 
Guantánamo Bay as well as elsewhere. However, less well-known examples are 
also important here. The way in which the US administration has acted against 
all kinds of so-called informal value transfer systems (IVTS), often misleadingly 
called ‘underground banking’ by law enforcement agencies around the world 
helps to estrange foreign populations from anti-terrorism policies that should 
ideally be the first to mobilize in favor of such policies. Furthermore, it directly 
harms millions of people that often depend on these systems for their daily 
survival in regions that are not yet covered by regular banking facilities. 
 In addition to the need for empirical studies as such, the need for an 
interdisciplinary approach is evident. This is not meant as an obligatory 
recommendation as it is coined so often. Understanding transnational crime, as 
well as the interfaces between legal and illegal actors, touches on so many 
different disciplines that it cannot be understood from just one perspective. These 
disciplines include at least public administration, economics, law, political 
science, and criminology. Furthermore, it has already been mentioned that some 
appreciation of the historical background of certain transnational crimes is needed 
to fully understand these crimes and their precedents in previous eras. Often, 
seemingly new crimes and threats have precedents in the past, and have been 
well-documented before by researchers from other disciplines. Finally, other 
disciplines can help to analyze the debate on transnational crime and in particular 
terrorism, together with the law enforcement policies and their justifications. 
 As far as interfaces are concerned, the need for empirical studies is also 
apparent. Such studies should shed more light on the causes of different types of 
interfaces in specific transnational crimes and in specific regions or countries. 
They should further elaborate on the way licit and illicit markets are connected. 
As far as the actors are concerned, studies should more often focus on the 
legitimate actors. Not only corporations, but also some governments agencies can 
and do play relevant roles in certain transnational crimes. The same goes for 
certain charities that are related to terrorist organizations. Furthermore, empirical 
studies can test and improve the lock model that was developed in this study. 
This also has to include further study of the role of individuals, legitimate 
organizations, and jurisdictions that was discussed in this study. 
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 Finally, the role of all kinds of (civil) wars, revolutions, boycotts, and similar 
phenomena should be studied more often within the context of transnational 
crime. Many instances of transnational crime are in some way related to these 
phenomena but this does hardly lead to any theorizing. 
 
10.6.2   Studies of the illicit art and antiquities trade 
 
The empirical study of the illicit art and antiquities trade provided several insights 
that were summarized above. However, it also revealed some topics that could 
benefit from new empirical studies. 
 With respect to the illicit art trade, there are several research questions that 
should be studied empirically. To a large extent it is still unknown what the 
destination of most stolen works of art is. A minor part turns up at some point at 
auction houses or galleries. However, the trajectory of the objects involved from 
theft onwards usually cannot be fully reconstructed. Future studies should thus be 
guided by several research questions. First of all, what kind of perpetrators are 
responsible for art thefts? Furthermore, where do all the stolen objects go? Are 
they sold to unsuspecting private persons or to complicit dealers? Finally, what is 
the role of insiders with both the theft of, and trade in, works of art? 
 The illicit antiquities trade has been a little more transparent than the illicit art 
trade. Furthermore, in the empirical study executed for this study, new insights 
about this trade have been added. These included the type of antiquities that are 
smuggled to or through the Netherlands, the destination countries as well as the 
countries that are used as transit countries. 
 However, some topics demand further study. First of all, the scale of the illicit 
trade is largely unknown with respect to many objects and destinations. The 
official files that were studied in the Netherlands, for example, do not justify any 
rough estimate of the overall size of the trade. Foreign sources, like the data from 
the Italian Carabinieri or the Illicit Antiquities Research Centre at the 
Cambridge University, do only span particular geographical regions or particular 
objects. Furthermore, the role of (civil) wars and similar phenomena should be 
given a proper place in the literature about this trade. It should no longer be 
treated as separated from the illicit trade in general but as an integral part of it. 
Finally, with respect to legislative instruments, it should be asked whether more 
effective legislation can be formulated, or whether the existing legislation can be 
used and interpreted in a more productive way. Despite the great importance 
that is granted to well-known treaties, there is no convincing evidence that the 
ratification of these treaties by itself does substantially decrease the illicit trade in 




10.7 Recommendations for public policies 
 
In addition to the recommendations relating to criminological studies, several 
recommendations can be suggested with regard to public policies. These will be 
limited to those that can reasonably be based on the results of the discussions and 
findings in this study. The different recommendations should not be seen as 
clear-cut solutions for a number of observed problems in this particular area. 
They are meant as suggestions to formulate policies that may eventually reduce 
the problem of transnational crime and the interface between legal and illegal 
actors. 
 
10.7.1   Public policies in general 
 
The introduction of this book discussed one of the primary causes of 
transnational crime which is the difference in legislation between countries with 
respect to all kinds of licit and illicit goods and services. These differences 
stimulate the illegal traffic in these goods and services across borders. Sometimes 
countries differ to such a degree that the trade in, or ownership of certain goods 
is legal in one country while illegal in another. However, sometimes the 
differences only exist as far as the intensity of law enforcement is concerned, or in 
the level of taxation of certain legal goods. In the analyses of the interface 
typology and the development of the lock model, it turned out that these 
differences in legislation are as crucial for the topic of interfaces as they are for 
transnational crime in general. Differences in legislation can even play a role in 
laundering certain transnational crimes, as was discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 5 integrated this finding as part of the lock model. 
 The differences mentioned above are not immutable facts of life but can be 
changed or at least influenced by public policies. Hereafter, several general 
recommendations will be formulated to deal with these differences. Following 
these general recommendations, several recommendations with respect to the 
illicit art and antiquities trade will be formulated. Some of these recommend-
ations may be criticized to hammer on an open door. However, as long as some 
obvious policies are not implemented it is justified to reiterate their potential in 
dealing with transnational crime and related problems. 
 The first recommendation is to strive for more harmonization of legislation 
on topics related to transnational crimes. This may involve dramatic changes in 
legislation but also minor adaptations with major (positive) consequences for 
particular crimes. In its most simple variation, the harmonization only involves a 
change in taxation of certain goods. This may lessen or even take away the 
motivation to smuggle these goods. Cigarette smuggling is the primary example 
here. This type of transnational crime is for a large part caused by the differences 
in taxation of this product. Within Europe, for example, differences between 
countries in the level of taxation are the cause for large-scale smuggling 
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operations. It should be noted of course that without these differences there will 
still be grounds for trafficking cigarettes or other similar goods. As long as there 
are ways to evade any taxes, instead of seeking the lowest level in a particular 
region (which still means considerable taxes), smuggling will continue. Despite 
the fact that it will thus be difficult or impossible to prevent most instances of 
cigarette smuggling, harmonizing the level of taxation within a particular region 
will probably limit the losses in tax revenues significantly. Furthermore, it will 
free the capacity of law enforcement and customs agencies for more pressing 
types of transnational crime. It should be stressed here that the above reasoning is 
not the same as an argument to abandon all taxes on cigarettes or similar goods. 
However, within specific regions, like the European Union, or the US and 
Canada, there is no convincing argument why levels of taxation cannot be 
harmonized so as to decrease the incentive for large-scale smuggling. 
 In a way the kind of differences mentioned above are probably the easiest to 
solve in comparison with other differences. In the situation above, specific goods 
are legal in both countries and are only causing illegal activities because of 
differences in taxation. With respect to several other goods and services, the 
differences are larger. Especially chapter 4, on jurisdictions as interface, illustrated, 
for example, the importance of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions and the 
services that these jurisdictions offer. Strict bank secrecy laws, instant-corporation 
businesses and anonymity of shareholders are helpful instruments for transnational 
crimes. The difference between jurisdictions offering these services and those that 
do not and strongly oppose them, is hard to bridge. However, that is not to say 
that it is impossible or that one should not strive towards harmonization bit by 
bit. The attempts to do this in Europe have shown how difficult this can be but 
at the same time that changes can be reached, although slowly. 
 The secrecy jurisdictions can be understood as a hole in the international 
patchwork of regulation. The attempts mentioned above are filling these holes a 
little. In addition to this specific topic, all kinds of jurisdictions should have their 
holes ‘filled’. As far as art and antiquities are concerned, this applies for example 
to the Netherlands or Thailand; as far as toxic waste is concerned this applies to 
many developing countries, and as far as arms are concerned this applies to 
countries like Singapore or some former Soviet Republics. 
 The role of tax havens should not obfuscate the fact that as far as money 
laundering is concerned, Western countries like the US and the UK have always 
played a rather important role. The revelations about large-scale money 
laundering for Russian criminals by Western banks are a recent example of this 
role. The same goes for the role of these banks as well as other companies in all 
kinds of infrastructural and other projects in development countries in which 
billions of euros simply disappear. Since 2001, the regulatory structure to control 
the banking sector has become significantly stricter. It remains to be seen 
however, whether the increased regulation will decrease the potential and 
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occurrence of money laundering. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether all 
regulations will stay in place as the fear of terrorism subsides. 
 The role of financial institutions and other legitimate organizations was 
discussed in chapter 3. The different kinds of organizations call for different 
public policies. In the diamond trade, increased regulation and enforcement 
could help to prevent or cut links between legitimate dealers and auctions on the 
one hand and outlawed guerrillas and smugglers on the other hand. With regard 
to charities, regulations to promote transparency could prevent them from being 
used for terrorist purposes without stigmatizing dozens of organizations involved 
in purely humanitarian projects. 
 The discussion of the so-called coffee shops raises the question as to whether 
partial or whole legalization of certain types of drugs could decrease the most 
important type of transnational crime without increasing the consequences of 
drug abuse. As this topic has not been discussed in-depth in this study, this 
question will only be raised here for further thought. A parallel can be drawn 
between the fight against drug trafficking and the prohibition of alcohol in the 
USA during the 1920s, that is described in almost every textbook on organized 
crime. A consensus seems to be present that prohibition only caused more crime, 
it corrupted politicians, it made gangsters rich, and most importantly, it did not 
keep people from drinking. 
 
10.7.2    Public policies with respect to the illicit art and antiquities trade 
 
In the sections above, several recommendations were already mentioned with 
respect to the illicit art and antiquities trade. The Netherlands, together with 
several other market countries, should adopt or change legislation to be able to 
effectively act against the traffic in stolen and smuggled art and antiquities. New 
legislation should be adopted to implement the treaties against the illicit trade 
(after these have been ratified) and existing legislation should be adjusted to deal 
more effectively with the trade in stolen and smuggled art. The latter 
recommendation involves changes in the statute of limitations as well as the 
protection of good faith purchasers. In addition to the mere adoption of 
legislation, concrete and effective policies should be developed to enforce these 
laws. 
 In the addition to these legislative changes, there are more practical changes 
that can be recommended. First of all, law enforcement agencies in market 
countries should increase their efforts with respect to this type of crime. In some 
countries this means start devoting attention to this topic, as specialized police 
units are now lacking. Furthermore, the registration of stolen art should be 
started (in countries that lack any registration) or increased (in countries that have 
outdated or incomplete registries). In addition to that, the information in these 
registers should be easily exchanged between countries so that it can assist the 
recovery of stolen objects. Technically it is relatively easy to connect databases of 
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stolen art and let large groups of users share in a basic register of stolen objects. 
Besides the national registers, and the exchange between national registers, the 
use of the Interpol register should be stimulated and this registration itself should 
be made more efficient. Finally, and not the least important, ways should be 
found to stimulate an awareness that the illicit art and antiquities trade matters 
very much; not because it is illegal, not because it is the most important 
transnational crime in numbers or monetary terms (it clearly is not) but because it 
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Dit boek is de weerslag van een promotieonderzoek naar de verbindingen tussen 
legale en illegale actoren rondom transnationale misdaad. Deze verbindingen 
worden aangeduid met de term interface. Interface heeft daarbij zowel de 
betekenis van raakvlak als van een verbinding tussen legaal en illegaal. Deze 
interfaces komen in de criminologische literatuur en in de media veelvuldig maar 
tegelijkertijd vaak eenzijdig aan bod. De eenzijdigheid uit zich op tenminste drie 
manieren. Ten eerste is de aandacht vaak gericht op incidentele interfaces tussen 
legaal en illegaal. Ten tweede zijn deze interfaces vaak niet het hoofdthema maar 
een subthema van een studie of journalistiek verslag van bijvoorbeeld een bepaald 
soort misdaad of een zeker schandaal. Ten derde ligt de nadruk vaak op de 
infiltratie in legale actoren door illegale organisaties en blijven allerlei interfaces, 
die meer het karakter van samenwerking hebben, onbesproken. 
 In dit onderzoek wordt daarentegen geprobeerd om interfaces op 
systematische wijze te onderzoeken. Daarbij staan vier onderzoeksvragen 
centraal. De eerste vraag is welke interfaces gevonden kunnen worden tussen 
legale en illegale actoren en hoe deze in een typologie van interfaces zijn samen 
te vatten. De tweede vraag is hoe de transformatie verklaard kan worden waarbij 
transnationale criminele activiteiten legaal worden en omgekeerd transnationale 
legale activiteiten illegaal worden. De derde vraag luidt of de typologie van 
interfaces een analytisch hulpmiddel vormt om de interfaces tussen legale en 
illegale actoren in de kunst- en oudhedenhandel te beschrijven. Tenslotte wordt 
de vraag gesteld hoe de transformatie van legaal naar illegaal en omgekeerd 
verklaard kan worden in een speciaal toepassingsgebied: de illegale kunst- en 
oudhedenhandel.  
  De eerste vraag richt zich op de verschillende interfaces die gevonden kunnen 
worden tussen legale en illegale actoren rondom transnationale misdaad. Het doel 
is te komen tot een typologie van interfaces tussen legale en illegale actoren, 
onafhankelijk van het specifieke type transnationale misdaad of specifieke 
actoren. Uitgangspunt hierbij is een bestaande typologie van de criminoloog 
Nikos Passas. Deze typologie maakt onderscheid tussen vier antithetische en acht 
symbiotische interfaces. Antithetische interfaces zijn interfaces waarbij illegale 
actoren de legale actoren afpersen, beconcurreren, beschadigen of vernietigen. 
Symbiotische interfaces zijn interfaces waarbij legale en illegale actoren op 
verschillende manieren direct of indirect samenwerken bij het plegen van 
transnationale misdaad. Aan de hand van de literatuur over transnationale misdaad 
is onderzocht in hoeverre de verschillende typen van Passas voorkomen en welke 
typen eventueel ontbreken. Het resultaat hiervan is een ingekrompen typologie 
waarbij twee typen interfaces uit de oorspronkelijke lijst zijn geschrapt en de 
overige typen op onderdelen anders gedefinieerd. In de nieuwe typologie wordt 
de overlap tussen de verschillende typen zo veel mogelijk vermeden. 
 Het eerste type van de nieuw geconstrueerde typologie is de antagonistic 
(antagonistische) interface, een antithetische interface waarbij illegale actoren 
concurreren met legale bedrijven of overheden. De tweede antithetische interface 
is de predatory (‘roofdier’) interface waarbij de illegale actor de legale actor 
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vernietigt of dood laat bloeden. Bij de parasitical (parasitaire) interface perst de 
illegale actor de legale actor af zonder deze definitief ten onder te laten gaan. De 
laatste antithetische interface is de injurious (verwondende) interface waarbij legale 
actoren worden aangevallen of ondermijnd op andere manieren dan bij de 
antagonistic, predatory en parasitical interfaces. Naast de vier antithetische 
interfaces zijn er zes symbiotische interfaces. De eerste symbiotische interface is 
outsourcing (uitbesteding) waarbij een taakverdeling bestaat tussen legale en illegale 
actoren en de ene actor gespecialiseerde diensten levert voor de andere. Bij 
collaboration (samenwerking) worden de verbindingen sterker en werken legale en 
illegale actoren samen bij het plegen van grensoverschrijdende delicten. In geval 
van co-optation (coöptatie) zijn er wederzijdse voordelen tussen legale en illegale 
actoren waarbij de legale actor de machtigste partij is. Indien er wederzijdse 
voordelen zijn zonder dat één van de voorgaande interfaces van toepassing is 
wordt gesproken van reciprocity (wederkerigheid). Wanneer wederzijds voordelen 
bestaan zonder dat de legale en illegale actor contact met elkaar hebben is sprake 
van (systemic-) synergy (synergie) Tenslotte is sprake van funding (financiering) 
wanneer legale actoren essentiële financiële steun leveren voor criminele 
organisaties.   
 Met de interface typologie kunnen interfaces tussen legale en illegale actoren 
beschreven worden onafhankelijk van het type misdaad of het type actor. De 
typologie biedt echter geen adequate beschrijving en verklaring van een ander 
fenomeen: de transformatie van transnationale criminele activiteiten naar legale 
activiteiten en omgekeerd. Op basis van de analyse van de interface typologie in 
hoofdstuk twee werd geconcludeerd dat deze transformatie begrepen kan worden 
door de rol van bepaalde individuen, legale organisaties en jurisdicties nader te 
bestuderen. Deze actoren en jurisdicties kunnen dan zelf gezien worden als 
interface tussen legaal en illegaal, waardoor de betrokken activiteiten van legale 
status veranderen.  
 Aan de hand van een aantal case studies zijn individuen en organisaties als 
interface onderzocht in hoofdstuk drie. De individuen als interface kunnen 
onderscheiden worden in transnationale (criminele) makelaars en transnationale 
(criminele) handelaren. De makelaars sluiten deals waarbij goederen van legale 
status veranderen, zonder dat zij deze goederen zelf bezitten. De handelaren laten 
hun eigen goederen van status veranderen door ze te smokkelen en te verkopen.  
 Vervolgens zijn de legale organisaties als interface onderzocht. De legale 
organisaties als interface kunnen onderscheiden worden in twee modellen: het 
coffeeshop-model en het Ambrosiano-model. In het coffeeshop-model is de legale 
organisatie het uiteinde van een criminele organisatie of netwerk. Het 
Ambrosiano model behelst een legale organisatie die talloze verbindingen heeft 
met zowel legale als illegale actoren.  
 Na de individuen en organisaties zijn jurisdicties als interface onderzocht aan 
de hand van enkele case studies. Jurisdicties kunnen als interface functioneren 
wanneer daarin wetgeving ontbreekt ten aanzien van grensoverschrijdende 
activiteiten die in andere landen illegaal zijn. Naast de jurisdictie zijn twee 
zogenaamde de facto interfaces te onderscheiden die ook geografisch bepaald zijn. 
Deze de facto interfaces zijn combinaties van individuen, organisaties en 
jurisdicties als interface. Enerzijds zijn er interfaces in de vorm van corrupte 
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netwerken en anderzijds interfaces als gevolg van overheidsbeleid waarmee het 
effect van wetgeving met betrekking tot transnationale misdaad feitelijk 
uitgeschakeld wordt 
 Op basis van de bevindingen in hoofdstuk drie en vier is in hoofdstuk vijf het 
zogenaamde lock model (sluismodel) ontwikkeld. Dit model laat op abstracte wijze 
zien hoe de transformatie van legaal naar illegaal, en omgekeerd, functioneert. 
Zowel individuen, legale organisaties als jurisdicties kunnen aldus een 
‘lockfunctie’ vervullen. 
 
Na de ontwikkeling van de nieuwe typologie en het lock model is in hoofdstuk 
zes tot en met negen gekeken naar de illegale kunst- en oudhedenhandel. In 
hoofdstuk zes is de dataverzameling besproken. Bij gebrek aan rijke bronnen van 
data is een eclectische aanpak gevolgd. Daarbij is uit een reeks aan bronnen 
materiaal verzameld aan de hand waarvan is getracht de centrale vragen te 
beantwoorden. Voorafgaand aan de bespreking van de aldus verzamelde data is 
een overzicht gegeven van de illegale kunst- en oudhedenhandel. Deze handel 
bestaat uit gestolen, illegaal uitgevoerde en vervalste kunst- en oudheden. In veel 
gevallen is sprake van zowel gestolen als illegaal uitgevoerde voorwerpen.  
 De algemene bespreking van deze handel leverde een aantal conclusies op. 
Voor de vaak veronderstelde band tussen illegale kunsthandel en de drugshandel 
zijn, uitgezonderd enkele spaarzame incidenten, geen aanknopingspunten 
gevonden. Hetzelfde geldt voor de diefstallen in opdracht van verzamelaars en 
het gebruik van gestolen kunst voor het witwassen van criminele gelden uit 
bijvoorbeeld de drugshandel. Tenslotte blijkt de illegale kunst- en oudheden-
handel wel sterk beïnvloed te worden door oorlogen en burgeroorlogen in 
bronlanden van kunst en oudheden.   
  Na de algemene bespreking van de illegale kunst- en oudheden handel is 
specifiek gekeken naar de interface typologie en het lock model. Ieder type 
interface en de toepasselijkheid van het lock model is onderzocht aan de hand 
van de beschikbare data. De resultaten van dit onderzoek van de illegale 
kunsthandel zijn daarbij grotendeels gelijk aan die van de illegale handel in 
oudheden. Zo blijken enkele interfaces uit de typologie niet voor te komen in de 
onderzochte data, te weten de parasitical, predatory en funding interface. Verder 
zijn de grenzen tussen de verschillende symbiotische interfaces minder duidelijk 
dan bij andere vormen van transnationale misdaad zoals drugshandel en 
mensenhandel. Bovendien blijkt veelvuldig een interface voor te komen waarin 
de typologie niet voorziet. Het is de interface tussen zogenaamde interne dieven 
en hun omgeving. Interne dieven zijn personen die bijzondere toegang hebben 
tot musea, privé-collecties, bibliotheken, opgravingen en andere verzamelplaatsen 
van kunst en oudheden. Dit nieuwe interfacetype is aangeduid als facilitating 
(facilitaire) interface. Terwijl de illegale kunst- en oudhedenhandel aldus de 
noodzaak van een nieuw type interface laat zien, blijkt tevens dat in deze handel 
de - als tegenpolen gedefinieerde - antagonistic en synergy interface nauwelijks 
van elkaar te onderscheiden zijn.   
 Tenslotte is het lock model onderzocht. De transformatie van illegaal naar 
legaal in de illegale kunst- en oudhedenhandel blijkt met het lock model te 
kunnen worden begrepen. Daarbij bestaan belangrijke verschillen tussen kunst en 
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oudheden en tussen verschillende bron- en marktlanden. De transformatie van 
geroofde oudheden is in de meeste gevallen minder complex vanwege het feit 
dat oudheden veelal geen individuele eigenaar hebben en niet met zekerheid te 
herleiden zijn tot een bepaald bronland. De lockfunctie van jurisdicties volstaat 
dan veelal om de transformatie van illegaal naar legaal te bewerkstelligen. De 
verschillende bron- en marktlanden kennen grote verschillen in wetgeving, 
opsporing en registratie van (gestolen) kunst en oudheden. Dankzij deze 
verschillen kunnen veel gestolen objecten uiteindelijk weer deel worden van de 
legale handel. Dit laatste is tegelijk één van de belangrijkste oorzaken van steeds 
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